§56-3-33. Actions by or against nonresident persons having certain contacts with this state; authorizing Secretary of State to receive process; bond and fees; service of process; definitions; retroactive application.
(a) The engaging by a nonresident, or by his or her duly authorized agent, in any one or more of the acts specified in subdivisions (1) through (7), inclusive, of this subsection shall be considered equivalent to an appointment by a nonresident of the Secretary of State, or his or her successor in office, to be his or her true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding against him or her, in any circuit court in this state, including an action or proceeding brought by a nonresident plaintiff or plaintiffs, for a cause of action arising from, or growing out of, such act or acts, and the engaging in such act or acts shall be a signification of such nonresident’s agreement that any such process against him or her, which is served in the manner hereinafter provided, shall be of the same legal force and validity as though such nonresident were personally served with a summons and complaint within this state:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he or she regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he or she might reasonably have expected the person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state: Provided, That he or she also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; or
(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
(b) When jurisdiction over a nonresident is based solely upon the provisions of this section, only a cause of action arising from or growing out of one or more of the acts specified in subdivisions (1) through (7), inclusive, subsection (a) of this section may be asserted against him or her.
(c) Service shall be made:
By leaving the original and two copies of both the summons and the complaint, and the fee required by §59-1-2 of this code with the Secretary of State, or in his or her office, and this service shall be sufficient upon the nonresident: Provided, That notice of the service and a copy of the summons and complaint shall forthwith be sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, by a means which may include electronic issuance and acceptance of electronic return receipts, by the Secretary of State to the defendant at his or her nonresident address and the defendant’s return receipt signed by himself or herself or his or her duly authorized agent or the registered or certified mail so sent by the Secretary of State which is refused by the addressee and which registered or certified mail is returned to the Secretary of State, or to his or her office, showing thereon the stamp of the post-office department that delivery has been refused. After receiving verification from the United States Postal Service that acceptance of process, notice, or demand has been signed, the Secretary of State shall notify the clerk’s office of the court from which the process, notice, or demand was issued by a means which may include electronic notification. If the process, notice, or demand was refused or undeliverable by the United States Postal Service, the Secretary of State shall create a preservation duplicate from which a reproduction of the stored record may be retrieved which truly and accurately depicts the image of the original record. The Secretary of State may destroy or otherwise dispose of the original returned or undeliverable mail. Written notice of the action by the Secretary of State must then be provided by certified mail, return receipt requested, facsimile, or by electronic mail, to the clerk’s office of the court from which the process, notice, or demand was issued. If any defendant served with summons and complaint fails to appear and defend within 30 days of service, judgment by default may be rendered against him or her at any time thereafter. The court may order such continuances as may be reasonable to afford the defendant opportunity to defend the action or proceeding. If the certified mail was returned by the United States Postal Service as unclaimed, unable to forward, or with any other notation other than “accepted” or “refused”, notice may be served as follows:
(1) In any manner accepted as service within the domiciled state of the nonresident, or otherwise; or
(2) In any manner otherwise permitted by sections 4(d)(7) or (8) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for corporations and any way permitted by section 4(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for individuals or noncorporate entities.
(d) The fee remitted to the Secretary of State at the time of service shall be taxed in the costs of the action or proceeding. The Secretary of State shall keep a record in his or her office of all such process and the day and hour of service thereof.
(e) The following words and phrases, when used in this section, shall for the purpose of this section and unless a different intent be apparent from the context, have the following meanings:
(1) “Duly authorized agent” means and includes among others a person who, at the direction of or with the knowledge or acquiescence of a nonresident, engages in such act or acts and includes among others a member of the family of the nonresident or a person who, at the residence, place of business, or post office of the nonresident, usually receives and receipts for mail addressed to the nonresident.
(2) “Nonresident” means any person, other than voluntary unincorporated associations, who is not a resident of this state or a resident who has moved from this state subsequent to engaging in such act or acts, and among others includes a nonresident firm, partnership, or corporation or a firm, partnership, or corporation which has moved from this state subsequent to any of said such act or acts.
(3) “Nonresident plaintiff or plaintiffs” means a nonresident of this state who institutes an action or proceeding in a circuit court in this state having jurisdiction against a nonresident of this state pursuant to the provisions of this section.
(f) The provision for service of process herein is cumulative and nothing herein contained may be construed as a bar to the plaintiff in any action or proceeding from having process in such action served in any other mode or manner provided by the law of this state or by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction.
(g) This section may not be retroactive and the provisions hereof may not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of the acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section.
Notes of Decisions
Leslie Equip. Co. v. Wood Resources Co., 687 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 2009).
· cites it 57× “See W.Va.Code § 56-3-33. By statutory design, compliance with the service of process procedures set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 expressly authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by the courts of this state.”
Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1999).
· cites it 23× “1996) and W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1997).”
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
· cites it 27× “Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Spartan Mining Co., 96 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.W. Va 1983).
· cites it 20× “1 Plaintiff served process on the defendants pursuant to the West Virginia long arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, posting bond and serving the secretary of state as required by § 56-3-33(c).”
Easterling v. Am. Optical Corp., 529 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 2000).
· cites it 12× “In the instant proceeding, the circuit court’s order indicates that it only analyzed jurisdiction under W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 and federal due process.”
Nezan v. Aries Tech., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 2010).
· cites it 9× “As we have stated, “[a] court must use a two-step approach when analyzing whether personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation or other nonresident.”
Robinson v. Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1997).
· cites it 10× “Specifically, the court found that W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, West Virginia’s long-arm statute, “by its very terms is not retroactive and the provisions are not available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any said acts or occurring prior to the…”
Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
· cites it 4× “First, the defendants concede that even if the advertisement amounted to “transacting business” in this State as contemplated by W. Va.Code § 56-3-33(a)(l) (1984) (Repl.Vol.”
Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.W. Va 1981).
· cites it 8× “Code § 56-3-33 (1980 Cum.Supp.). Defendant essentially argues that she has not had such contact with the state of West Virginia since June 9, 1978, the effective date of the long-arm provision, which would subject her to proper long-arm service.”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(2008): 1 case
Nezan v. Aries Tech., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 2010).
“As we have stated, “[a] court must use a two-step approach when analyzing whether personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation or other nonresident.”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a): 15 cases
Easterling v. Am. Optical Corp., 529 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 2000).
“In the instant proceeding, the circuit court’s order indicates that it only analyzed jurisdiction under W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 and federal due process.”
Leslie Equip. Co. v. Wood Resources Co., 687 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 2009).
“See W.Va.Code § 56-3-33. By statutory design, compliance with the service of process procedures set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 expressly authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by the courts of this state.”
Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Spartan Mining Co., 96 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.W. Va 1983).
“1 Plaintiff served process on the defendants pursuant to the West Virginia long arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, posting bond and serving the secretary of state as required by § 56-3-33(c).”
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
“Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(1): 9 cases
Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1999).
“1996) and W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1997).”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(2): 2 cases
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(4): 4 cases
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(6): 1 case
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
“Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(7): 1 case
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(a)(l): 4 cases
Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
“First, the defendants concede that even if the advertisement amounted to “transacting business” in this State as contemplated by W. Va.Code § 56-3-33(a)(l) (1984) (Repl.Vol.”
Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.W. Va 1981).
“Code § 56-3-33 (1980 Cum.Supp.). Defendant essentially argues that she has not had such contact with the state of West Virginia since June 9, 1978, the effective date of the long-arm provision, which would subject her to proper long-arm service.”
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
“Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(b): 3 cases
Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
“First, the defendants concede that even if the advertisement amounted to “transacting business” in this State as contemplated by W. Va.Code § 56-3-33(a)(l) (1984) (Repl.Vol.”
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
“Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.W. Va 1981).
“Code § 56-3-33 (1980 Cum.Supp.). Defendant essentially argues that she has not had such contact with the state of West Virginia since June 9, 1978, the effective date of the long-arm provision, which would subject her to proper long-arm service.”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(b)(2003): 1 case
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(c): 4 cases
Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Spartan Mining Co., 96 F.R.D. 677 (S.D.W. Va 1983).
“1 Plaintiff served process on the defendants pursuant to the West Virginia long arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, posting bond and serving the secretary of state as required by § 56-3-33(c).”
Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1999).
“1996) and W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1997).”
Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1991).
“Lozinski pursuant to the West Virginia long-arm statute, W.Va.Code § 56-3-33 (Supp.1991). We reverse the decision of the circuit court on the grounds that the West Virginia long-arm statute may apply to actions when a party violates his duty to support his children, thereby…”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(e): 2 cases
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(e)(2): 2 cases
Robinson v. Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1997).
“Specifically, the court found that W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, West Virginia’s long-arm statute, “by its very terms is not retroactive and the provisions are not available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any said acts or occurring prior to the…”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(e)(3): 1 case
Nezan v. Aries Tech., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 2010).
“As we have stated, “[a] court must use a two-step approach when analyzing whether personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation or other nonresident.”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(e)(l): 1 case
Bowers v. Wurzburg, 519 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1999).
“1996) and W. Va.Code § 56-3-33 (1984) (Repl.Vol.1997).”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(f): 2 cases
Leslie Equip. Co. v. Wood Resources Co., 687 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 2009).
“See W.Va.Code § 56-3-33. By statutory design, compliance with the service of process procedures set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-3-33 expressly authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by the courts of this state.”
W. Va. Code § 56-3-33(g): 2 cases
Robinson v. Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1997).
“Specifically, the court found that W.Va.Code § 56-3-33, West Virginia’s long-arm statute, “by its very terms is not retroactive and the provisions are not available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any said acts or occurring prior to the…”
Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.W. Va 1981).
“Code § 56-3-33 (1980 Cum.Supp.). Defendant essentially argues that she has not had such contact with the state of West Virginia since June 9, 1978, the effective date of the long-arm provision, which would subject her to proper long-arm service.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.