Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2026)
Informed consent
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448.30448.30 Informed consent. Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the availability of reasonable alternate medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments. The reasonable physician standard is the standard for informing a patient under this section. The reasonable physician standard requires disclosure only of information that a reasonable physician in the same or a similar medical specialty would know and disclose under the circumstances. The physician’s duty to inform the patient under this section does not require disclosure of:
448.30(5)(5) Information in emergencies where failure to provide treatment would be more harmful to the patient than treatment.
448.30(7)(7) Information about alternate medical modes of treatment for any condition the physician has not included in his or her diagnosis at the time the physician informs the patient.
448.30 AnnotationA one to three in 100 chance of a condition’s existence is not an “extremely remote possibility” under sub. (4) when very serious consequences could result if the condition is present. Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).
448.30 AnnotationA doctor has a duty under this section to advise of alternative modes of diagnosis as well as of alternative modes of treatment for diagnosed conditions. Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995).
448.30 AnnotationWhat constitutes informed consent under former s. 448.30, 1993 stats., emanates from what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would want to know. What a physician must disclose is contingent on what a reasonable person would need to know to make an informed decision. When different physicians have substantially different success rates with a procedure and a reasonable person would consider that information material, a court may admit statistical evidence of the relative risk. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996), 93-3099.
448.30 AnnotationA hospital does not have the duty to ensure that a patient has given informed consent to a procedure performed by an independent physician. Mathias v. St. Catherine’s Hospital, Inc., 212 Wis. 2d 540, 569 N.W.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1632.
448.30 AnnotationThe onset of a procedure does not categorically foreclose withdrawal of a patient’s consent. Withdrawal of consent removes the doctor’s authority to continue and obligates the doctor to conduct another informed consent discussion. In this type of informed consent case in which the issue is not whether the patient was given the pertinent information so that the patient’s choice was informed, but rather whether the patient was given an opportunity to make a choice after having all of the pertinent information, the cause question is, “What did the patient himself or herself want?” Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 223 Wis. 2d 417, 588 N.W.2d 26 (1999), 96-3676.
448.30 AnnotationAs a general rule, patients have a duty to exercise ordinary care for their own health. Under limited, enumerated circumstances, contributory negligence may be a defense in an informed consent case. A doctor is not restricted to only the defenses listed under this section, but a court should be cautious in giving instructions on nonstatutory defenses. Brown v. Dibbell, 227 Wis. 2d 28, 595 N.W.2d 358 (1999), 97-2181.
448.30 AnnotationIn the absence of a persistent vegetative state, the right of a parent to withhold life-sustaining treatment from a child does not exist, and the need for informed consent is not triggered when life-sustaining treatment is performed. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 01-1933.
448.30 AnnotationA patient’s consent to treatment is not categorically immutable once it has been given. A physician must initiate a new informed consent discussion when there is a substantial change in circumstances, be it medical or legal. Here, the decedent’s postoperative complications did not at some point become a substantial change in medical circumstances necessitating a second informed consent discussion because it was undisputed that the decedent was informed of the risks the decedent later faced. Hageny v. Bodensteiner, 2009 WI App 10, 316 Wis. 2d 240, 762 N.W.2d 452, 08-0133.
448.30 AnnotationFormer s. 448.30, 2007 stats., requires any physician who treats a patient to inform the patient about the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment, including diagnosis, as well as the benefits and risks of such treatments. Although the jury determined a physician was not negligent in the physician’s standard of care for failing to employ an alternative when treating the defendant, that did not relieve the physician of the duty to inform the patient about the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment. Bubb v. Brusky, 2009 WI 91, 321 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 903, 07-0619.
448.30 AnnotationNeither case law nor former s. 488.30, 2011 stats., limits a physician’s duty to inform a patient of modes of treatment only for the final diagnosis. The distinction between conditions “related” to the final diagnosis and conditions “unrelated” to the final diagnosis finds no support in the statute or case law. A physician’s duty is to inform a patient about diagnostic procedures about which a reasonable patient would want to know to make an informed, voluntary decision about the patient’s medical care, even if those diagnostic procedures are aimed at conditions that are unrelated to the condition that was the final diagnosis. Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 2012 WI 39, 340 Wis. 2d 31, 813 N.W.2d 627, 08-1972.
448.30 AnnotationThis section does not create a duty or liability on the part of individuals other than a patient’s treating physician to ascertain whether the patient is capable of providing informed consent. Well-established Wisconsin law provides that the treating physician—not the hospital—bears the duty of advising a patient of a treatment’s risks and ensuring that the patient provides informed consent. That duty is codified in this section. Wetterling v. Southard, 2023 WI App 51, 409 Wis. 2d 434, 997 N.W.2d 115, 21-1694.
448.30 AnnotationWhen considered in the context of this section, the word “inform” means more than a physician merely reciting the relevant information; rather, the physician must actually convey the information in a manner such that the patient can understand it and use it to make an informed decision. It follows that a physician has an inherent responsibility under this section to assess whether the patient understands the provided information and whether the patient is capable of using that information to intelligently exercise the right to consent to a treatment. Wetterling v. Southard, 2023 WI App 51, 409 Wis. 2d 434, 997 N.W.2d 115, 21-1694.
448.30 AnnotationLike other medical malpractice claims, an informed consent claim under this section requires proof of the four elements of negligence: 1) a duty of care on the part of the physician; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) a causal connection between the breach and the injury; and 4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the injury. Hubbard v. Neuman, 2024 WI App 22, 411 Wis. 2d 586, 5 N.W.3d 852, 23-0255.
448.30 AnnotationUnder this section, a physician could be a physician who treated a patient, even though that physician did not actually perform the treatment at issue in the complaint. In this case, a plaintiff’s complaint painted a picture of a physician’s intended and actual involvement with the treatment at issue, even though that physician did not actually perform the treatment herself. Hubbard v. Neuman, 2025 WI 15, 416 Wis. 2d 170, 20 N.W.3d 720, 23-0255.
448.30 AnnotationThe doctrine of informed consent is limited to apprising a patient of risks that inhere to proposed treatments. It does not impose a duty to apprise the patient of any knowledge the doctor may have regarding the condition of the patient or of all possible methods of diagnosis. McGeshick v. Choucair, 9 F.3d 1229 (1993).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 46
cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1993–2025 · leading case: Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2012 WI 39 (Wis. 2012).
Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2012 WI 39 (Wis. 2012). “Bullis breached her duty to *46 inform a patient under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2007-08), 2 by failing to inform Jandre of a diagnostic test (a carotid ultrasound) that was available to rule out the possibility of a stroke.”
Bubb v. Brusky, 2009 WI 91 (Wis. 2009). “The respondents state the issue as follows: "Did the evidence presented at trial establish an informed consent claim [under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 ] against Dr. Brusky?" The petitioners ask whether "the trial court committed] reversible error by precluding the jury from considering…”
Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999). “Dibbell's violation of the Wisconsin informed consent statute, Wis. Stat. §448.30 (1993-94). 2 The plaintiffs sued Dr.”
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995). “The issue is whether sec. 448.30, Stats., 1 required Dr. William H.”
Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94 (Wis. 2005). “1 is based on a statute governing medical informed consent, Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2003-04), [5] "the legal theories of informed consent for medical doctors and for chiropractors are the same.”
Johnson Ex Rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). “Richard Kokemoor (the defendant) 2 alleging his failure to obtain her informed consent to surgery as required by Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (1993-94). 3 The jury found that the defendant failed to adequately inform the plaintiff regarding the risks associated with her surgery.”
Melissa A. Hubbard v. Carol J. Neuman, MD, 2024 WI App 22 (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). “§ 448.30 (2021-22).1 Dr. Neuman also moved for summary judgment regarding the causation element of Hubbard’s claim, alleging that she only observed a portion of the February 2018 surgery, she confirmed that Hubbard had severe endometriosis during the surgery, and she recommended…”
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 500 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “Hansen and Fort Atkinson Memorial Hospital, [1] alleging negligence in their care and treatment of Cheryl and in failing to comply with sec. 448.30, Stats. [2] A jury found that neither Dr.”
Jandre v. Physicians Ins., 2010 WI App 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). “Bullis did not negligently diagnose Jandre with Bell's palsy but was negligent with respect to her duty of informed consent under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2007-08) 2 The trial court entered judgment against PIC and the Fund on the jury's informed consent verdict, and apportioned…”
Melissa A. Hubbard v. Carol J. Neuman, MD, 2025 WI 15 (Wis. 2025). “According to the allegations of the complaint, Dr. Neuman planned to attend and participate in the surgery.”
Bubb v. Brusky, 2008 WI App 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). “§ 448.30 (2005-06), [2] the informed consent statute, created this cause of action and that the jury should be provided with WIS JICIVIL 1023.”
Schreiber Ex Rel. Krueger v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999). “Consistent with Wis. Stat. § 448.30 Figge had a duty to conduct another informed consent discussion and should have again presented Janice her treatment options and given her the opportunity to choose.”
— Wis. Stat. § 448.30(1) — 1 case
Kuklinski v. Rodriguez, 552 N.W.2d 869 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
— Wis. Stat. § 448.30(2) — 1 case
Brown v. Dibbell, 582 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wis. Stat. § 448.30(3) — 1 case
Brown v. Dibbell, 582 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wis. Stat. § 448.30(4) — 3 cases
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995). “The issue is whether sec. 448.30, Stats., 1 required Dr. William H.”
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards, 500 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “Hansen and Fort Atkinson Memorial Hospital, [1] alleging negligence in their care and treatment of Cheryl and in failing to comply with sec. 448.30, Stats. [2] A jury found that neither Dr.”
Brown v. Dibbell, 582 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
— Wis. Stat. § 448.30(6) — 1 case
Hageny v. Bodensteiner, 2009 WI App 10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
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