Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (2026)
Criminal intent
✓ current as of July 2026
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939.23(1)(1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, such intent is indicated by the term “intentionally”, the phrase “with intent to”, the phrase “with intent that”, or some form of the verbs “know” or “believe”.
939.23(3)(3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition, except as provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word “intentionally”.
939.23(4)(4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.
939.23(5)(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the section under which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that section.
939.23(6)(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime in question.
939.23 NoteJudicial Council Note, 1988: Subs. (3) and (4) are conformed to the formulation of s. 2.02 (2) (b) ii of the model penal code. [Bill 191-S]
939.23 AnnotationA person need not foresee or intend the specific consequences of an act in order to possess the requisite criminal intent and is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the act. State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973).
939.23 AnnotationInstructions on intent to kill created a permissible rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of production to the defendant, but not the burden of persuasion. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).
939.23 AnnotationThe court properly refused to instruct the jury on a “mistake of fact” defense when the accused claimed that the victim moved into the path of a gunshot intended only to frighten the victim. State v. Bougneit, 97 Wis. 2d 687, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1980).
939.23 AnnotationThe constitutionality of sub. (3) is upheld. State v. Smith, 170 Wis. 2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1992).
939.23 AnnotationThe trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s proffered expert and lay testimony regarding posttraumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder trial without valid justification violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and to testify on her own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 103
cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1967–2026 · leading case: State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68 (Wis. 2004).
State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68 (Wis. 2004). “02 (2)? (2) If not, do Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 , 939.43(2), and 948.”
State v. Weeks, 477 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “" Here, there is no doubt but that the shooter intended to shoot, irrespective of whether "intent" is given its common meaning of "purpose," Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1176 (1976), or the meaning in section 939.23, Stats. By the same…”
State v. Dale R. Neumann, 2013 WI 58 (Wis. 2013). “The phrase "with intent to" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (Criminal intent) in subsection (4) as follows: "'With intent to' or 'with intent that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is…”
State v. Head, 2002 WI 99 (Wis. 2002). “describe four gradations of mental element as follows: (1) The mental element is intentional when the actor has the purpose to cause death or is aware that death is practically certain to be caused by the conduct [ Wis. Stat. § 939.23 ]; (2) The mental element is aggravated…”
State v. Smith, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). “Smith contends that the trial court erred when it determined that: (1) the statutory definition of intent as found in sec. 939.23(3), Stats., was neither unconstitutionally violative of Smith's due process rights nor vague; (2) his defense counsel's failure to request both a…”
State v. Black, 2001 WI 31 (Wis. 2001). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (2). As a crime having a requisite mental state, the crime is not a true strict liability offense.”
State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53 (Wis. 2005). “§ 939.23(2) defines "know" as requiring "only that the actor believes that the *82 specified fact exists.”
State v. Cissell, 378 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1985). “Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), defines malice as: "The intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent.”
State v. Gonzalez, 2011 WI 63 (Wis. 2011). “23(3) defines "intentionally" to include knowledge: " 'Intentionally' means that the actor either *304 has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition, except as provided in…”
State v. Stoehr, 396 N.W.2d 177 (Wis. 1986). “Section 939.23(1), Stats. 1983-84, provides guidance to determine whether the legislature intended scienter to be an element of an offense set forth in the criminal code.”
State v. DeLain, 2004 WI App 79 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). “Intentionally is a term of art when used in criminal statutes, see Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (1), and is defined as "mean[ing] that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that…”
State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74 (Wis. 2002). “" Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (3). In addition, the State must show that the actor had "knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal.”
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(1) — 9 cases
State v. Stoehr, 396 N.W.2d 177 (Wis. 1986). “Section 939.23(1), Stats. 1983-84, provides guidance to determine whether the legislature intended scienter to be an element of an offense set forth in the criminal code.”
State v. Mueller, 549 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Danforth, 385 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 1986).
State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68 (Wis. 2004). “02 (2)? (2) If not, do Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 , 939.43(2), and 948.”
State v. Verhasselt, 266 N.W.2d 342 (Wis. 1978).
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(2) — 9 cases
State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53 (Wis. 2005). “§ 939.23(2) defines "know" as requiring "only that the actor believes that the *82 specified fact exists.”
State v. Lossman, 348 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1984).
State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68 (Wis. 2004). “02 (2)? (2) If not, do Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 , 939.43(2), and 948.”
State v. DeLain, 2005 WI 52 (Wis. 2005).
State v. LaPlante, 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3) — 30 cases
State v. Smith, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). “Smith contends that the trial court erred when it determined that: (1) the statutory definition of intent as found in sec. 939.23(3), Stats., was neither unconstitutionally violative of Smith's due process rights nor vague; (2) his defense counsel's failure to request both a…”
State v. Cissell, 378 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1985). “Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), defines malice as: "The intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent.”
State v. Morgan, 536 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Migliorino, 489 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25 (Wis. 2005).
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4) — 17 cases
State v. Weeks, 477 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “" Here, there is no doubt but that the shooter intended to shoot, irrespective of whether "intent" is given its common meaning of "purpose," Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1176 (1976), or the meaning in section 939.23, Stats. By the same…”
State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53 (Wis. 2005). “§ 939.23(2) defines "know" as requiring "only that the actor believes that the *82 specified fact exists.”
Oscar Thomas v. Marc Clements, 789 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2015).
Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
Jackson v. Gray, 569 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(5) — 2 cases
State v. Weeks, 477 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). “" Here, there is no doubt but that the shooter intended to shoot, irrespective of whether "intent" is given its common meaning of "purpose," Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1176 (1976), or the meaning in section 939.23, Stats. By the same…”
State v. Hurd, 400 N.W.2d 42 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
— Wis. Stat. § 939.23(6) — 2 cases
State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68 (Wis. 2004). “02 (2)? (2) If not, do Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 , 939.43(2), and 948.”
Olson v. Ratzel, 278 N.W.2d 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
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