Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2026)

Time limitations on prosecutions

✓ current as of July 2026

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939.74939.74 Time limitations on prosecutions.

939.74(1)(1) Except as provided in subs. (2) and (2d) and s. 946.88 (1), prosecution for a felony must be commenced within 6 years and prosecution for a misdemeanor or for adultery within 3 years after the commission thereof. Within the meaning of this section, a prosecution has commenced when a warrant or summons is issued, an indictment is found, or an information is filed.

939.74(2)(2) Notwithstanding that the time limitation under sub. (1) has expired:

939.74(2)(a)(a)

939.74(2)(a)1.1. A prosecution under s. 940.01, 940.02, 940.03, 940.05, 940.225 (1), 948.02 (1), or 948.025 (1) (a), (b), (c), or (d) may be commenced at any time.

939.74(2)(a)2.2. A prosecution for an attempt to commit a violation of s. 940.01, 940.05, 940.225 (1), or 948.02 (1) may be commenced at any time.

939.74(2)(am)(am) A prosecution under s. 940.06 may be commenced within 15 years after the commission of the violation.

939.74(2)(ap)(ap) A prosecution under s. 940.11 (2) may be commenced within the applicable time under sub. (1) or within 6 years of the date the corpse was discovered or identified, whichever is later.

939.74(2)(ar)(ar) A prosecution for a violation of s. 940.225 (2) may be commenced within 20 years after the commission of the violation. A prosecution for a violation of s. 940.225 (3) may be commenced within 10 years after the commission of the violation.

939.74(2)(av)(av) A prosecution for a violation of s. 940.302 may be commenced within 10 years after the commission of the violation.

939.74(2)(b)(b) A prosecution for theft against one who obtained possession of the property lawfully and subsequently misappropriated it may be commenced within one year after discovery of the loss by the aggrieved party, but in no case shall this provision extend the time limitation in sub. (1) by more than 5 years.

939.74(2)(c)(c) A prosecution for violation of s. 948.02 (2), 948.025 (1) (e), 948.03 (2) (a) or (5) (a) 1., 2., or 3., 948.05, 948.051, 948.06, 948.07 (1), (2), (3), or (4), 948.072, 948.075, 948.08, 948.081, 948.085, or 948.095 shall be commenced before the victim reaches the age of 45 years or be barred, except as provided in sub. (2d).

939.74(2)(cm)(cm) A prosecution for violation of s. 948.03 (2) (b) or (c), (3), (4), or (5) (a) 4. or 5., 948.04 or 948.07 (5) or (6) shall be commenced before the victim reaches the age of 26 years or be barred, except as provided in sub. (2d).

939.74(2d)(2d)

939.74(2d)(a)(a) In this subsection, “deoxyribonucleic acid profile” means an individual’s patterned chemical structure of genetic information identified by analyzing biological material that contains the individual’s deoxyribonucleic acid.

939.74(2d)(am)(am) For purposes of this subsection, crimes are related if they are committed against the same victim, are proximate in time, and are committed with the same intent, purpose, or opportunity so as to be part of the same course of conduct.

939.74(2d)(c)(c) If, before the applicable time limitation under sub. (1) or (2) (am), (ar), (c), or (cm) for commencing prosecution of a felony under ch. 940 or 948, other than a felony specified in sub. (2) (a), expires, the state collects biological material that is evidence of the identity of the person who committed the felony, identifies a deoxyribonucleic acid profile from the biological material, and compares the deoxyribonucleic acid profile to deoxyribonucleic acid profiles of known persons, the state may commence prosecution of the person who is the source of the biological material for the felony or a crime that is related to the felony or both within 12 months after comparison of the deoxyribonucleic acid profile relating to the felony results in a probable identification of the person or within the applicable time under sub. (1) or (2), whichever is latest.

939.74(2d)(e)(e) If, within 6 years after commission of a felony specified under sub. (2) (a), the state collects biological material that is evidence of the identity of the person who committed the felony, identifies a deoxyribonucleic acid profile from the biological material, and compares the deoxyribonucleic acid profile to deoxyribonucleic acid profiles of known persons, the state may commence prosecution of the person who is the source of the biological material for a crime that is related to the felony within 12 months after comparison of the deoxyribonucleic acid profile relating to the felony results in a probable identification of the person or within the applicable time under sub. (1) or (2), whichever is latest.

939.74(3)(3) In computing the time limited by this section, the time during which the actor was not publicly a resident within this state or during which a prosecution against the actor for the same act was pending shall not be included. A prosecution is pending when a warrant or a summons has been issued, an indictment has been found, or an information has been filed.

939.74(4)(4) In computing the time limited by this section, the time during which an alleged victim under s. 940.22 (2) is unable to seek the issuance of a complaint under s. 968.02 due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to any threats, instructions or statements from the therapist shall not be included.

939.74 HistoryHistory: 1981 c. 280; 1985 a. 275; 1987 a. 332, 380, 399, 403; 1989 a. 121; 1991 a. 269; 1993 a. 219, 227, 486; 1995 a. 456; 1997 a. 237; 2001 a. 16, 109; 2003 a. 196, 279, 326; 2005 a. 60, 276, 277; 2007 a. 80, 97, 116; 2009 a. 203; 2011 a. 271, 282; 2013 a. 165, 167; 2015 a. 121, 366; 2017 a. 128; 2025 a. 56, 59, 88, 90.

939.74 AnnotationWhile courts have no duty to secure informed waivers of possible statutory defenses when accepting a guilty plea, under the unique facts of the case, the defendant was entitled to withdraw a guilty plea to a charge barred by the statute of limitations. State v. Pohlhammer, 82 Wis. 2d 1, 260 N.W.2d 678 (1978).

939.74 AnnotationSub. (3) tolls the running of statutes of limitation during the period in which a defendant is not a state resident and violates neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989).

939.74 AnnotationA person is not “publicly a resident within this state” under sub. (3) when living outside the state but retaining state residence for voting and tax purposes. State v. Whitman, 160 Wis. 2d 260, 466 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1990).

939.74 AnnotationAn arrest warrant is issued for purposes of sub. (1) when it is signed by a judge with the intent that it be executed and leaves the possession of the judge. That the warrant is never executed is irrelevant. State v. Mueller, 201 Wis. 2d 121, 549 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1996), 93-3227.

939.74 AnnotationThe statute of limitations for a continuing offense does not run until the last act is done, which, viewed alone, is a crime. Otherwise, a prosecution for a felony offense must be commenced within six years. State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 197, 257 Wis. 2d. 124, 650 N.W.2d 850, 01-1406.

939.74 AnnotationWhen the jury found the defendant guilty of having sexual contact with the minor victim during the period outside the statute of limitations, but also found that the victim was unable to seek the issuance of a complaint due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to statements or instructions by the defendant, the statute of limitations was tolled under sub. (4). The jury was required to agree upon a specific act committed within a specific time period but was not required to determine exactly when the agreed-upon offense was committed. When the date of the crime is not a material element of the offense charged, it need not be precisely alleged or determined. State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 197, 257 Wis. 2d. 124, 650 N.W.2d 850, 01-1406.

939.74 AnnotationWhen a defendant is already in custody due to the defendant’s incarceration, the filing of a criminal complaint is sufficient to commence a prosecution. State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393, 01-0507. See also State v. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528, 14-0354.

939.74 AnnotationThe common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

939.74 AnnotationWhen sub. (2) (c) was created in 1987, it only applied prospectively. Subsequent amendments did not change this conclusion because they did not change the initial applicability of sub. (2) (c). Rather, the language in the subsequent amendments, which stated these amendments apply to offenses not yet barred, was clearly meant to apply to offenses that sub. (2) (c) had not already barred. State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, 310 Wis. 2d 550, 750 N.W.2d 910, 06-1379.

939.74 AnnotationThe circuit judge decides the tolling issue under sub. (3) in a pretrial proceeding wherein the state must prove that the defendant was not a public resident by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, 310 Wis. 2d 550, 750 N.W.2d 910, 06-1379.

939.74 AnnotationThe 36-year tolling of the statute of limitations under sub. (3) was not unconstitutional in this case. It did not violate the privileges and immunities, due process, or equal protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Sub. (3) does not burden a fundamental right, and it is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of detecting crimes and apprehending criminals. State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, 328 Wis. 2d 289; 786 N.W.2d 227, 07-2711.

939.74 AnnotationSub. (2) (a) does not apply to a prosecution for attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which must instead be commenced within six years in accordance with sub. (1). State v. Larson, 2011 WI App 106, 336 Wis. 2d 419, 801 N.W.2d 343, 10-1666.

939.74 AnnotationSub. (2) (b) does not impose a requirement on the aggrieved party to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the theft or loss. The one-year extension period in sub. (2) (b) begins to run only when the aggrieved party actually discovers the loss, not when it should have discovered the loss. State v. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102, 357 Wis. 2d 430, 855 N.W.2d 437, 13-2491.

939.74 AnnotationWhen an offense is a continuing offense, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last act is done that viewed by itself is a crime. Reading ss. 943.20 (1) (a) and 971.36 (3) (a) and (4) together, multiple acts of theft occurring over a period of time may, in certain circumstances, constitute one continuous offense that is not complete until the last act is completed. State v. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528, 14-0354.

939.74 AnnotationThe statute of limitations is not tolled under sub. (3) by a municipal ticket. Municipal offenses have a separate statute of limitations and are not contemplated in the criminal statute of limitations. State v. Kollross, 2019 WI App 30, 388 Wis. 2d 135, 931 N.W.2d 263, 18-0931.

939.74 AnnotationThe Perils of Plain Language: Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Assault Defendants. Flynn. Wis. Law. Mar. 2009.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 54 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1966–2026 · leading case: State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 72 (Wis. 2008).

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State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 72 (Wis. 2008). · cites it 210× “¶ 2 This case presents the following issues: First, should the statute of limitations that governs the charges against MacArthur be the version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 that was in effect between 1965 and 1972 or the version of that statute that was in effect in 2006? [2]…”

State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10 (Wis. 2003). · cites it 154× “Based on the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) (1999-2000) [2] and related criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless arrests, we conclude that if an individual, like Jennings, is already in custody due to…”

State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91 (Wis. 2010). · cites it 55× “11(2) are subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) (2007-08), 1 the statute of limitations was tolled while McGuire was not publicly a resident of Wisconsin.”

State v. Sweat, 561 N.W.2d 695 (Wis. 1997). · cites it 56× “20, and considering the purposes of the restitution statute, we hold that the same statute of limitations that applies in the underlying criminal proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 939.74 , [2] including its tolling provisions, also applies in the related restitution proceedings.”

State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42 (Wis. 2003). · cites it 20× “The circuit court concluded that even if the year-and-a-day rule were part of the law of Wisconsin after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, the legislature eliminated the year-and-a-day rule by enacting Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2), authorizing a prosecution for violation of §…”

State v. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 35× “See Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) *432 (2011-12). 1 Section 939.”

State v. Sher, 437 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1989). · cites it 20× “We find further *10 support for this interpretation in the comments by the Judiciary Committee who submitted the bill establishing sec. 939.74, Stats. The comments state that in computing the statute of limitations, sec.”

State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 197 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 18× “Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1). Miller also contends that the broad charging period is unconstitutionally duplicitous and vague.”

State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35 (Wis. 2015). · cites it 8× “" Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2)(a)(1) (2011-12). A prosecution under Wis.”

State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39 (Wis. 2003). · cites it 21× “Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2)(c) (1989-90). 2 In 1994, about five years before the statute of limitations would have run, the legislature amended the limitations period under § 939.”

State v. Kollross, 931 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 14× “§ 939.74 had passed for the May 28, 2011 incident.”

State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 912 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 2018). · cites it 4× “See Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1). Mathematically, at least six years must elapse between conduct committed before the person's tenth birthday and the person's seventeenth birthday.”

Show all 54 citing cases →

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) — 25 cases

State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10 (Wis. 2003). “Based on the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) (1999-2000) [2] and related criminal statutes that deal with the commencement of criminal prosecutions and warrantless arrests, we conclude that if an individual, like Jennings, is already in custody due to…”

State v. Mueller, 549 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).

State v. Sher, 437 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1989). “We find further *10 support for this interpretation in the comments by the Judiciary Committee who submitted the bill establishing sec. 939.74, Stats. The comments state that in computing the statute of limitations, sec.”

State v. Annala, 484 N.W.2d 138 (Wis. 1992).

State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 72 (Wis. 2008). “¶ 2 This case presents the following issues: First, should the statute of limitations that governs the charges against MacArthur be the version of Wis. Stat. § 939.74 that was in effect between 1965 and 1972 or the version of that statute that was in effect in 2006? [2]…”

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2) — 5 cases

State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42 (Wis. 2003). “The circuit court concluded that even if the year-and-a-day rule were part of the law of Wisconsin after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, the legislature eliminated the year-and-a-day rule by enacting Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2), authorizing a prosecution for violation of §…”

State v. Wilson, 440 N.W.2d 534 (Wis. 1989).

State v. Haines, 2002 WI App 139 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).

State v. Larson, 2011 WI App 106 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(a) — 2 cases

State v. Wilson, 440 N.W.2d 534 (Wis. 1989).

State v. Larson, 2011 WI App 106 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(b) — 1 case

State v. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) *432 (2011-12). 1 Section 939.”

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) — 3 cases

State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39 (Wis. 2003). “Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (2)(c) (1989-90). 2 In 1994, about five years before the statute of limitations would have run, the legislature amended the limitations period under § 939.”

State v. Haines, 2002 WI App 139 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(d) — 1 case

State v. Molitor, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) — 9 cases

State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91 (Wis. 2010). “11(2) are subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1) (2007-08), 1 the statute of limitations was tolled while McGuire was not publicly a resident of Wisconsin.”

State v. Kollross, 931 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019). “§ 939.74 had passed for the May 28, 2011 incident.”

State v. Whitman, 466 N.W.2d 1993 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).

— Wis. Stat. § 939.74(4) — 1 case

State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 197 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1). Miller also contends that the broad charging period is unconstitutionally duplicitous and vague.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.