Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-514 (2020)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Workers' Compensation, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 251.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is silent as to whether the employer or employee has the right to make the choice of an initial treating physician; section 11-9-508 implies that the employer has the right of first choice because the employer has a duty to provide medical services to an injured employee, but that section speaks only to the employer's duty to provide medical services or bear the expense of medical services, not to the method of providing medical treatment. Welch v. Tri-County Shirt Co., 49 Ark. App. 112, 897 S.W.2d 575 (1995).

Applicability.

This section is inapplicable if the authorized treating physician refers the claimant to another doctor for examination or treatment. American Greetings Corp. v. Garey, 61 Ark. App. 18, 963 S.W.2d 613 (1998).

Appeal.

Whether treatment is a result of a “referral” rather than a “change of physician” is a factual determination to be made by the commission which will be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Patrick v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 39 Ark. App. 34, 833 S.W.2d 790 (1992).

Because a medical center did not apprise the Workers' Compensation Commission of an argument concerning the change of physical rules or get a ruling on the argument, this issue was waived the court did not need to address the merits on appeal. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. & Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. v. Chrisman, 2012 Ark. App. 475, 422 S.W.3d 171 (2012).

Court did not agree that a medical center sufficiently raised an issue regarding the change of physician rules; neither the administrative law judge (ALJ) nor the Workers' Compensation Commission made any ruling regarding the change of physician rules, the center did not complain about the omission of the issue from the ALJ's decision, and although the center submitted a copy of the signed AR-N form, no argument regarding the change of physician rules was made, plus there was no testimony concerning whether the AR-N form was delivered to the claimant, and thus the court could not reach the merits of the issue. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. & Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. v. Chrisman, 2012 Ark. App. 475, 422 S.W.3d 171 (2012).

Merits of an issue relating to an authorized treating physician under this section were not considered because the issue was not raised or ruled on below. The Workers' Compensation Commission made no finding on whether appellants were responsible for paying for the treatment under the change-of-physician provisions. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Price, 2016 Ark. App. 109 (2016).

Employer’s argument under this section concerning the claimant's failure to follow the statutory rules for a change of physician was not presented to the Workers' Compensation Commission and thus was not preserved for appellate review. Univ. of Cent. Ark. v. Srite, 2019 Ark. App. 511, 588 S.W.3d 849 (2019).

Authorization.

Evidence supported finding that medical treatment was unauthorized. Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995).

Although claimant testified that he attempted to see his authorized treating physician and that his authorized physician was not available so the nurse referred him to another physician, there was substantial evidence claimant failed to get required authorization where the insurance carrier testified that it refused to authorize payment for second physician's treatment, sent the commission's form A-11 to claimant's attorney and received no response, never received a bill from claimant or from second physician's office, and never received a referral slip showing that authorized physician had referred claimant to second physician. Pennington v. Gene Cosby Floor & Carpet, 51 Ark. App. 128, 911 S.W.2d 600 (1995).

Appellate court was obliged to strictly construe and apply the Workers' Compensation Act and where it was not disputed that the employee sought additional unauthorized, non-emergency treatment from three physicians, and employee admitted that the day after her injury her husband brought the form which notified the employee of employee's rights regarding a change of physician and the employee signed the form, the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that employee's unauthorized treatment was not compensable was supported by substantial evidence. Sharp v. Lewis Ford, Inc., 78 Ark. App. 164, 78 S.W.3d 746 (2002).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly ruled that the carrier and employer did not have to pay for an employee's treatment with certain unauthorized physicians because she did not petition for a change-of-physician or follow the statute's provisions, and she signed a notice document that stated unauthorized medical expenses were her responsibility Butler v. Lake Hamilton Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 703, 430 S.W.3d 831 (2013).

Burden of Proof.

The compelling reason or circumstances burden to justify petition for change of physician is not applicable where the employer has initially selected the physician. Magic Mart, Inc. v. Little, 12 Ark. App. 325, 676 S.W.2d 756 (1984).

Chiropractor.

The claimant's right to seek treatment from a chiropractor is not unconditional; he still must prove the treatment is reasonable and necessary and causally related to his compensable injury. Alexander v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 15 Ark. App. 41, 689 S.W.2d 3 (1985).

Employer lacked standing to raise constitutional challenge of the exemption of chiropractors from the approval requirements governing change of physicians in this section. County Mkt. v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 770 S.W.2d 156 (1989), rehearing denied, County Market v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 771 S.W.2d 793 (1989).

Compliance.

Statutory requirements for a claimant's change of physician pursuant to subdivision (a)(3)(A)(iii) of this section were met where the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission explicitly granted the petition based upon the condition that the claimant's family doctor later agreed to comply with the terms of the statute; the statute did not mandate that the physician agree to comply with the terms before the Commission could grant the claimant's petition to a change of physician. Am. Std. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Post, 78 Ark. App. 79, 77 S.W.3d 554 (2002).

Emergency Treatment.

This section contemplates an actual selection of a treating physician rather than the occasional use of emergency room facilities, whether for emergency or nonemergency treatment. Stephens v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 15 Ark. App. 209, 691 S.W.2d 190 (1985).

The fact that the worker had first sought treatment in an emergency room did not mean that the worker had selected the emergency room physicians as his treating physician within the meaning of this section, and the worker did not have to petition the Workers' Compensation Commission for permission to change physicians before seeking treatment by the chiropractor. Stephens v. St. Vincent Infirmary, 15 Ark. App. 209, 691 S.W.2d 190 (1985).

The facts warranted the conclusion of the commission that an emergency situation existed as contemplated by this section. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Bussey, 17 Ark. App. 47, 703 S.W.2d 459 (1986).

—Incarceration.

A claimant, who was unable to attend work because he was incarcerated in a matter that was ultimately dismissed as a matter of law, has not committed misconduct under this section. Fleming v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 73 Ark. App. 86, 40 S.W.3d 820 (2001).

A claimant did not commit misconduct where he was incarcerated for allegedly failing to make proper child-support payments, but the case against him was dismissed as a matter of law, notwithstanding the finding by the Appeal Tribunal that the claimant's failure to pay child support resulted in his incarceration and that this was an intentional disregard of his employer's interest. Fleming v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 73 Ark. App. 86, 40 S.W.3d 820 (2001).

Legislative Intent.

The legislative intent of subdivision (a)(2) of this section was to provide for an alternative form of treatment as an alternative to treatment by a medical doctor. Haney v. Smith, Doyle & Winters, 46 Ark. App. 212, 878 S.W.2d 775 (1994).

Liability for Costs.

Conceding, without deciding, that insurance carrier has the right in the first instance to select the physician, it does not follow that injured compensation claimant's later choice of physician exempted insurer and insured from expense of surgical operation, demonstrated with certainty to have been necessary, but opposed by physician selected by insurer. Caldwell v. Joseph W. Vestal & Son, 237 Ark. 142, 371 S.W.2d 836 (1963).

Employer liable for medical bills and disability benefits incurred in interim between employee's petition for change of physicians and its approval. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brown, 256 Ark. 54, 505 S.W.2d 207 (1974).

Refusal of the commission to pay for cost of medical treatment by new physician was within its discretion. Rogers v. International Paper Co., 1 Ark. App. 164, 613 S.W.2d 844 (1981).

Where claimant failed to comply with the clear intent of the statute and the expense of the new doctor's services, where claimant changed physicians, was not the responsibility of the employer. American Transp. Co. v. Payne, 10 Ark. App. 56, 661 S.W.2d 418 (1983).

Absent compliance with this section in changing physicians, the employer is not liable for a new physician's services. Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984); Crosby v. Micro Plastics, Inc., 30 Ark. App. 225, 785 S.W.2d 56 (1990).

Substantial evidence supported commission's finding that it was the claimant's own idea to obtain referral to a neurologist; therefore, the treatment was actually in the nature of a change of physicians and the employer was not responsible for this portion of the treatment. Patrick v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 39 Ark. App. 34, 833 S.W.2d 790 (1992).

Managed Care System.

Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) became null and void on September 1, 1995, when a voluntary managed care system was established. Byars Constr. Co. v. Byars, 72 Ark. App. 158, 34 S.W.3d 797 (2000).

The fact that the employer had not contracted with a certified managed care entity did not mean that the employee/claimant was free to select any physician he wanted as, under subsection (b), the claimant could not change his physician, except for emergency treatment, and, therefore, he was responsible for services rendered by a new physician. Byars Constr. Co. v. Byars, 72 Ark. App. 158, 34 S.W.3d 797 (2000).

Notice to Employee.

The evidence did not support the contention that the claimant received a copy of the documentation explaining her rights and responsibilities concerning a change of physician in a timely manner. The claimant testified that she signed the rights notification form when she was first hired and not after she was injured; and at the time of her signature the “accident information” section was left blank. She further testified that she could not have signed the form after her injury because of the pain in her shoulder, which was so bad the nurse had to fill out the accident report for her. Finally, the claimant testified that the accident date written on the notification form was not in her handwriting. Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000).

Subsection (a)(2) of this section requires the required notice to the employee to be in writing; verbal notification does not comply with the requirements of the statute. Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000).

Second doctor's treatment of a workers' compensation claimant was not subject to the change-of-physician rules in subdivision (c)(1) of this section as there was no Form AR-N signed by the claimant in the appellate record; although the signed Form AR-N was in the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's file, the employer did not introduce the form, ask the Commission to take judicial notice of the form, or ask the claimant if the claimant received and/or signed the form or was advised of the claimant's right to seek a change of physician. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Phipps, 2011 Ark. App. 497 (2011).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying an employee's claim for further medical benefits because there was no evidence to support the Commission's finding that the employee received a copy of the notice of the procedure involved in changing physicians. Delargy v. Golden Years Manor, 2014 Ark. App. 499, 442 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

There was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the claimant received a copy of the form containing notice of the change-of-physician rule, as a copy of the form was in the record bearing the claimant's signature and claimant's supervisor testified that he was certain claimant received a copy of the form. Fuller v. Pope Cty. Judge, 2018 Ark. App. 1, 538 S.W.3d 851 (2018).

Notice to Employer.

An employer's initial failure to provide prompt and effective medical care and treatment to the injured claimant would not estop the employer from invoking the rule governing the proper procedures to be followed by a claimant prior to changing physicians; therefore, the commission abused its discretion when it ruled that the employer was liable for the payment of physicians who were consulted by the claimant without first giving notice to the employer. International Paper Co. v. Plunkett, 4 Ark. App. 314, 630 S.W.2d 552 (1982).

Evidence supported finding notice requirements were sufficiently complied with. Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Buchheit, 21 Ark. App. 7, 727 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Although this section provides that the change of physician requirements outlined therein are inapplicable if the employer fails to deliver the claimant a copy of the statutory notice, failure to furnish the notice does not automatically render the employer liable for all treatment or services provided as the result of the subsequent change of physician. An employer who fails to provide the proper notice is only liable for medical treatments and services which are reasonably necessary for the treatment of the employee's injury. DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).

Employer did not controvert employee's change-of-physician request where employee submitted a request for a change of physician only after employer refused to pay certain medical bills because they were not from the original treating physician; employee did not provide the name of the physician when requested to do so and employer was not responsible for knowing the name of the new doctor based on bills received prior to the submission of the request for change. Jonesboro Human Dev. Ctr. v. Taylor, 61 Ark. App. 42, 963 S.W.2d 617 (1998).

If a claimant desires a change of physician to a chiropractic physician the claimant may make the change by giving advance written notification to the employer. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Pursuant to subdivision (2)(B), the Workers' Compensation Commission committed no error when it granted the claimant a change of physician because the claimant gave the employer advance written notice of the desire to change physicians. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 49 S.W.3d 667 (2001), substituted opinion, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Out-of-State Physician.

Employee would be permitted treatment by out-of-state physician, where it would violate the employer's statutory duty to provide medical care if that care was denied simply because there was no medical service provider in Arkansas qualified and willing to provide the service. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997), supp. op., Clark v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep't, 58 Ark. App. 1, 944 S.W.2d 862.

Physician Referral.

Evidence that employee was referred to a specific specialist held sufficient where employee's treating physician recommended that employee obtain continued care from a hand specialist, provided her with the names of two qualified specialists in that field, and employee obtained treatment from one of them based on this recommendation. American Greetings Corp. v. Garey, 61 Ark. App. 18, 963 S.W.2d 613 (1998).

Referrals to specialists by the treating physician are authorized without making a change of physician. Jonesboro Human Dev. Ctr. v. Taylor, 61 Ark. App. 42, 963 S.W.2d 617 (1998).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying employee medical benefits for visits to his regular physician where a treating specialist released him and referred him back to his original treating physician; there was nothing in the record that stated or even suggested that employee's regular physician did not remain an authorized physician throughout the case. Bray v. Int'l Wire Group, 95 Ark. App. 206, 235 S.W.3d 548 (2006).

Retroactivity.

The commission did not abuse its discretion in the retroactive approval of a change of physicians. Emerson Elec. Co. v. White, 262 Ark. 376, 557 S.W.2d 189 (1977) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Under the facts claimant was excused from formally petitioning for a change in physicians, and the commission did not abuse its discretion in granting retroactive approval of the change. Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982).

This section applies retroactively since, prior to the 1981 amendment, it already contained a provision allowing a claimant to change physicians and that amendment did not disturb any vested right or create any new obligation but merely supplied a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation; therefore, where claimants' injury occurred before the 1981 amendment took effect, but the hearing before the law judge, his decision and the commission's decision to permit the claimant to change physicians occurred after the amendment, the section as amended would apply. Popeye's Famous Fried Chicken v. Willis, 7 Ark. App. 167, 646 S.W.2d 17 (1983).

Since the 1981 amendment to this section, the commission no longer has the broad discretion to retroactively approve change of physicians. American Transp. Co. v. Payne, 10 Ark. App. 56, 661 S.W.2d 418 (1983); Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984).

Commission abused its discretion in retroactively imposing liability on the employer for medical expenses it had not authorized. Continental Grain Co. v. Miller, 9 Ark. App. 317, 659 S.W.2d 517 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decision under prior law).

Commission could not retroactively approve the change so as to make the employer liable. American Transp. Co. v. Payne, 10 Ark. App. 56, 661 S.W.2d 418 (1983).

Since the 1983 amendment to this section, allowing a claimant to change to a chiropractic physician by giving advance written notice to the employer or insurance carrier does not disturb any vested rights or create any new obligations; it merely removes certain procedural barriers and allows an injured employee to seek additional medical treatment. The amendment is entitled to retroactive application. Alexander v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 15 Ark. App. 41, 689 S.W.2d 3 (1985).

The 1981 amendment to this section is not limited in application to those workers whose injuries are sustained after its effective date, but is limited to changes in physicians made after that date; ordinarily, however, it cannot be retroactively applied to ratify a change which was unauthorized at the time the change was actually made. Sterling Stores v. Deen, 16 Ark. App. 36, 696 S.W.2d 784 (1985).

Where the employer failed to comply with the mandates of this section, the change of physician rules did not apply and the employee was entitled to retroactive approval of a change of physician. Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985).

Right to Change.

Sufficient reason for change of physician found. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decided under prior law); Popeye's Famous Fried Chicken v. Willis, 7 Ark. App. 167, 646 S.W.2d 17 (1983); Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984); Magic Mart, Inc. v. Little, 12 Ark. App. 325, 676 S.W.2d 756 (1984).

Subdivision (a)(3)(ii) of this section established an absolute, statutory right to a one-time change of physician under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act where the employer had contracted with a managed care organization and had exercised the right to select the initial primary-care physician; thus, employer's denial of the one-time change of physician as a matter of law failed to fulfill the obligation imposed by § 11-9-508. Collins v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 77 Ark. App. 303, 75 S.W.3d 204 (2002).

Finding in favor of the employee in a workers' compensation action was proper where the employee exercised her absolute, statutory right to a one-time change of physician pursuant to subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii) of this section; thus, the employer and carrier were required to pay for the initial visit to the new physician in order to fulfill their obligation to provide adequate medical services under the provisions of § 11-9-508. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).

After the employee's former doctors pronounced his maximum medical improvement from a back injury and assigned a five-percent impairment rating, the employee petitioned and received a change of physicians in accordance with subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section. Because the employee failed to show that an EMG diagnostic study recommended by his new doctor was reasonably necessary, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had a substantial basis for denying payment. Goyne v. Crabtree Contr. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 200, 301 S.W.3d 16 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 874 (Apr. 22, 2009).

Decision to allow a change of physician was supported by substantial evidence because a benefits claimant was not receiving the treatment that she was entitled to due to her first physician's deterioration in health and ultimate death. The claimant went to another doctor because her first physician was unable to perform his duties due to his advanced age and declining health at the time she attempted to treat with him. Wal-Mart Assocs. v. Keys, 2012 Ark. App. 559, 423 S.W.3d 683 (2012).

Benefits claimant's treatment was not compensable because she was not referred to a disputed provider by one of her authorized physicians, and she did not apply for a change of physician under this section; the provisions of subsection (f) of this section were not met in this case where an employer would not have challenged a valid exercise of the right to a one-time change of physician, and there was no evidence to show that the claimant made a claim for any specific medical benefit with any of her authorized doctors. Foster v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 172, 426 S.W.3d 563 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred as a matter of law by not granting the claimant a change of physician after her initial change-of-physician doctor died. O'Guinn v. Little River Mem'l Hosp., 2013 Ark. App. 593, 430 S.W.3d 150 (2013).

Second Injury.

Where after suffering a second injury similar to the first, the claimant's employer directed her to a different doctor for treatment of the second injury, the claimant did not violate the provision of this section requiring her to get authorization from the commission in order to change physicians, because the change of physicians was directed by the employer and not initiated by the claimant. Home Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 9 Ark. App. 201, 657 S.W.2d 215 (1983).

Subsequent Change.

Where employer and employee mutually agreed to change of physician from the company doctor to employee's family doctor, without the commission being petitioned for a change, the mutually agreed upon change was not employee's first and only change under this section; therefore, employee could petition commission for subsequent change of physician. Magic Mart, Inc. v. Little, 12 Ark. App. 325, 676 S.W.2d 756 (1984).

The Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in interpreting this section to allow claimant to change physicians a second time under the facts of the case. Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Farrell, 16 Ark. App. 59, 696 S.W.2d 779 (1985).

Where the doctor who was treating claimant wished to have claimant examined by another doctor, the treatment by the other doctor was a referral, not a change of physicians. Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985); White v. Lair Oil Co., 20 Ark. App. 136, 725 S.W.2d 10 (1987).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in permitting a second change of physician for the employee under § 11-9-514(a)(3)(A)(iii) as there was substantial evidence that the first physician did not act in a manner consistent with being the employee's physician. St. Joseph's Mercy Health Ctr. v. Lamb, 97 Ark. App. 248, 248 S.W.3d 514 (2007).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding an employee additional benefits because substantial evidence supported its finding that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary and that the employee remained within his healing period and unable to earn wages; the employer failed to give the employee the change-of-physician form after his injury, and thus, the employee was not required to petition the Commission in order to be treated by a competent doctor. St. Joseph's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Redmond, 2012 Ark. App. 7, 388 S.W.3d 45 (2012).

Cited: Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1953); Downs v. Miller, 224 Ark. 35, 271 S.W.2d 623 (1954); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961); Phillips v. Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961); Shelby Electric Co. v. Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 419 S.W.2d 798 (Ark. 1967); Garner v. American Can Co., 246 Ark. 746, 440 S.W.2d 210 (1969); Miller v. Everett, 252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335 (1972); Aluminum Co. of America v. McClendon, 259 Ark. 675, 535 S.W.2d 832 (1976); Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977); Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979); Alred v. Jackson Atl., Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (1980); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Pitts, 268 Ark. 911, 597 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980); Wise v. Deltic Farm & Timber Co., 269 Ark. 881, 601 S.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1980); Franklin County Rd. Dep't v. Nordin, 270 Ark. 177, 603 S.W.2d 477 (1980); Hamrick v. Colson Co., 271 Ark. 740, 610 S.W.2d 281 (1981); Markham v. K-Mart Corp., 4 Ark. App. 310, 630 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 S.W.2d 845 (1983); Tibbs v. Dixie Bearings, Inc., 9 Ark. App. 150, 654 S.W.2d 588 (1983); Taco Bell v. Finley, 38 Ark. App. 11, 826 S.W.2d 313 (1992); TEC v. Falkner, 38 Ark. App. 13, 827 S.W.2d 661 (1992); Torrey v. City of Fort Smith, 55 Ark. App. 226, 934 S.W.2d 237 (1996).