Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-527 (2020)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Common Law Marriage, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 487.

The Effect of Void and Voidable Marriages in Arkansas, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 188.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Karber, Survey of Arkansas Law: Workers' Compensation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 294.

Survey—Workers' Compensation, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 269.

Case Notes

Construction.

Failure to grant retroactive application of the 1976 amendment to subsection (d) to child who had received compensation did not deny his right to equal protection. Park v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 262 Ark. 668, 560 S.W.2d 226 (1978) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

The section was severable and the offending words “during the continuance of his incapacity or” were excised from it. Swafford v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 343, 621 S.W.2d 862 (1981) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Provisions are to be construed liberally in favor of the claimant. Arkansas Vinegar Co. v. Ashby, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988); City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 38 Ark. App. 172, 832 S.W.2d 262 (1992), aff'd, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

The “full and complete payment” language contained in subdivision (d)(1), which was inadvertantly left in from a time when it had some relevance is now meaningless surplusage. Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Prior case law dealing with dependents' benefits was not in conflict with the 1993 amendment of this section and, therefore, still controlled after that date. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

Clear language of this section does not allow for termination of a minor child's survivor benefits upon termination of the employee's parental rights or adoption. J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016).

Because of countless possibilities that may occur in the future with regard to parents and their children, the Legislature provided courts with a clear directive in subsection (h) of this section, stating all questions of dependency shall be determined at the time of the injury. This directive is simple and unambiguous. Dependency is determined at the time of injury. J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016).

Purpose.

With respect to § 11-9-102 and this section, it was the legislature's intent that to provide compensation for the death of an employee and to make compensation available equally for a widow and widower would be more consistent with the legislative purpose than to exclude widows; thus, the employer could not successfully argue that deletion of the unconstitutional portions of these sections was not the proper way to equalize treatment for widows and widowers. Russell v. International Paper Co., 2 Ark. App. 355, 621 S.W.2d 867 (1981) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Applicability.

The minimum amount set forth in the section was not intended to apply to a case in which the calculation of compensation for partial dependency produces an award of less than the minimum. Vines v. Arkansas Kraft Corp., 247 Ark. 573, 446 S.W.2d 669 (1969).

The 1976 amendment to subsection (d) would not be applied retroactively to a child who received compensation, under the preexisting subsection, only until his eighteenth birthday. Park v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 262 Ark. 668, 560 S.W.2d 226 (1978).

Beneficiaries.

The right of a widow to receive 35 percent of the average weekly wages of her deceased husband was prior to all claims; in addition thereto, where she qualified under former law she was entitled to an additional compensation for each minor child. Gunnells v. Gunnells, 203 Ark. 632, 158 S.W.2d 54 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Denial of dependency benefits to the deceased husband's son was appropriate pursuant to subsection (c) of these section, because there was no evidence that at the time of his father's death, the son had a reasonable expectation of support from him. The son was a frozen embryo at that time and was not born until approximately two years after his father's death. Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 288 S.W.3d 685 (2008), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 464 (Apr. 9, 2009).

Survivor benefits were properly awarded to a deceased employee's minor children in Mexico under subsection (c) of this section after the employee was involved in a fatal workplace accident in the U.S. because the employee's children were wholly and actually dependent upon him, even though his wife testified that she never expected to see him again. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Rodriguez, 104 Ark. App. 375, 292 S.W.3d 827 (2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 445 (May 7, 2009).

Dependent benefits were properly awarded to a deceased employee's parents under this section as: (1) the decedent sent the parents money regularly from the United States while he was working here, and had supported them since 1990 when he worked in Mexico; (2) the parents testified that the money was critical to them, and that they received no other money from family members; and (3) the money-transfer records were made out to the mother, but she took care of household bills in cash and gave the father money as needed. White Oak Constr. Co. v. Olvera, 2011 Ark. App. 682, 386 S.W.3d 616 (2011).

Both of a deceased employee's parents were properly awarded dependent benefits under this section as this section and § 11-9-111 had to be read together to understand the Arkansas legislature's intent, and the appellate court was not convinced that by the use of the word “or” to separate the words father and mother in § 11-9-111, the legislature intended to render the award of benefits to each parent provided by this section void. White Oak Constr. Co. v. Olvera, 2011 Ark. App. 682, 386 S.W.3d 616 (2011).

Deceased employee's parents were properly awarded dependent benefits under this section as the one-year period in § 11-9-111 would have been July 2006 through July 2007, and the testimony presented by his parents, coupled with a portion of the records of money transfers (July 3, 2006 through July 25, 2007), supported the determination that the decedent provided support for one year prior to the date of his death. White Oak Constr. Co. v. Olvera, 2011 Ark. App. 682, 386 S.W.3d 616 (2011).

One statute only provides the maximum amount of money an employer must pay as compensation for an employee's work-related death, but the statute is silent on whether a credit for good-faith, but ultimately mistaken, payments may be given; because the widow was not her husband's dependent, the money the employer paid her could not be counted as weekly benefits or compensation, and the payments did not accrue as a credit against the employer's responsibility to the Fund. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Widow had the burden to establish facts showing dependency on her husband before being entitled to benefits. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Widow did not have a statutorily required expectation of support from her husband when he died, as she could not say with certainty that they would have reconciled had he not died, and she had not withdrawn the divorce papers and she had removed him from her phone plan and dropped his life and health insurance; the court affirmed the denial of benefits. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Whether the widow was actually dependent on her husband when he died was a fact question. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the decision that the widow was not actually dependent on her husband when he died, as she was working full time to support herself, she lived apart from her husband and had filed for divorce without asking for support, and his monthly contributions were between $200 and $300, which were insufficient. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

In a workers' compensation case, there was an error in giving preference to a deceased employee's wife as the widow, rather than apportioning the benefits to her and the children as a class where the number of dependent children exceeded the amount payable. Because there was not enough money to pay a widow a 35 percent share and each dependent child a 15 percent share, each member of the class could have been paid an equal share, or a determination of beneficiaries could have been made. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Myers, 2014 Ark. App. 102 (2014).

—Amounts.

Where an employee's death arose out of his employment and he left only parents, brothers, and sisters, commission properly made award to the family of the deceased, expense award to the family of the deceased, and an award to the claimants' attorney for $100. Brown v. W.H. Patterson Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 465, 361 S.W.2d 13 (1962).

In case of a deceased workman who left surviving him a widow and two minor children by a prior marriage, the widow did not have priority, but shared priority with the children, and should receive a proportionate amount of the maximum weekly benefit. Gary McJunkin Trucking Co. v. Byars, 258 Ark. 387, 525 S.W.2d 662 (1975).

The commission erred in holding that a dependent widow and three children can recover 80% of the deceased employee's average weekly wage since this exceeds 662/3% of the deceased's average weekly wage; the amounts set out in this section are subject to the maximum limitations as set forth in § 11-9-501(b). Mecco Seed Co. v. London, 47 Ark. App. 121, 886 S.W.2d 882 (1994).

—Child.

Child held to be dependent on deceased parent and, therefore, entitled to benefits. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979); Doyle's Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 267 Ark. 874, 596 S.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1979); Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980); Hunter Mem. United Methodist Church v. Millirons, 268 Ark. 975, 597 S.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1980); Porter Seed Cleaning, Inc. v. Skinner, 1 Ark. App. 230, 615 S.W.2d 380 (1981).

Evidence insufficient to establish that claimant was a stepchild of, or was wholly and actually dependent upon, decedent. Bankston v. Prime W. Corp., 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (1981).

Although children of decedent lived with their mother, who did not receive formal child support, children were found to be entitled to benefits under this section. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 60 Ark. App. 64, 958 S.W.2d 538 (1997), aff'd, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

—Dependents.

Prior events and all circumstances are to be considered in determination of the relation of dependency, since a temporary situation is not controlling. Nolen v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 446, 196 S.W.2d 899 (1946) (decision under prior law).

One is a dependent under the act if he relies for support on employee in whole or in part. E.H. Noel Coal Co. v. Grilc, 215 Ark. 430, 221 S.W.2d 49 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Dependency is determined as of the time of the injury. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Yeager, 219 Ark. 20, 239 S.W.2d 1019 (1951) (decision under prior law).

The addition of the word “actually” in subsection (c) was intended to change what amounted to a conclusive presumption of dependency under prior cases; it follows that when the widow and child were not living with the employee at the time of his death, there must be some showing of actual dependency. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979).

For the purposes of determining eligibility for benefits under this section, dependency is a question of fact as opposed to a question of law. Doyle's Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 267 Ark. 874, 596 S.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1979); Hunter Mem. United Methodist Church v. Millirons, 268 Ark. 975, 597 S.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1980); Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983).

Persons who are ordinarily recognized in law as dependents, including a wife and child, and to whom the employee owes a duty of support are “wholly dependent” and establishing whether they are “actually dependent” under subsection (c) does not require total dependency, but rather a showing of actual support or a reasonable expectation of support. Porter Seed Cleaning, Inc. v. Skinner, 1 Ark. App. 230, 615 S.W.2d 380 (1981).

A factor to be considered in determining dependency is the claimant's reasonable expectation of future support. Williams v. Cypress Creek Drainage, 5 Ark. App. 256, 635 S.W.2d 282 (1982).

Where an administrative law judge, in denying dependency benefits to the decedent's mother, took his definition of the word “dependent” from a popular dictionary instead of this chapter and the appellate cases which have construed and interpreted this chapter, and where the commission specifically stated that it adopted the law judge's opinion as its own, the decision appealed from was not based upon the law and had to be remanded. Williams v. Cypress Creek Drainage, 5 Ark. App. 256, 635 S.W.2d 282 (1982).

While the support being furnished at the time of the worker's injury is obviously important in determining dependency benefits, conditions prior to the injury should also be considered; a reasonable period of time should be used, as dependency is not to be controlled by an unusual temporary situation. Williams v. Cypress Creek Drainage, 5 Ark. App. 256, 635 S.W.2d 282 (1982).

In situations where the surviving spouse or child is living apart from the deceased at the time of his death, the test of wholly dependent is met by proof of that legal status and actually dependent does not require a showing of total dependence, rather a finding of some measure of actual support or a reasonable expectation of it will suffice. Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983).

Dependency of a stepchild is not a question of law, but a fact issue to be determined by the circumstances existing when the compensable injury occurs; it is based on proof of either actual support from the deceased employee, or a showing of a reasonable expectation of support where there is evidence that the stepchild is being actually supported by her natural parent, or where she has a right to expect support from the natural parent even if it is not actually provided. Hoskins v. Rogers Cold Storage, 52 Ark. App. 219, 916 S.W.2d 136 (1996).

This section cannot be interpreted to mean that a minor child would never be entitled to the death benefits specified in subsection (c)(3) if the parents were divorced and the child received any support whatever from the surviving parent. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

Where decedent-claimant acknowledged both his sons, visited with or maintained telephone contact with them, and contributed, albeit sporadically, to their welfare and support, they were dependents entitled to workers' compensation death benefits; the fact that the boys' mothers did not secure child-support payments from the decedent-claimant did not mean that the boys no longer had any reasonable expectation of support. Fordyce Concrete v. Garth, 84 Ark. App. 256, 139 S.W.3d 154 (2003).

—Parent.

Parents held dependent on deceased child and entitled to benefits. E.H. Noel Coal Co. v. Grilc, 215 Ark. 430, 221 S.W.2d 49 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Although father asserted his common law right to his child's earnings, it did not preclude the father from the possibility of being a dependent under former Workers' Compensation Act upon the death of the minor son. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Parents held not dependent on deceased child and not entitled to benefits. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Yeager, 219 Ark. 20, 239 S.W.2d 1019 (1951) (decision under prior law); Rowe v. Druyvesteyn Constr. Co., 253 Ark. 63, 484 S.W.2d 513 (1972).

In determining whether decedent's mother was his dependent at the time of his death, it would be appropriate to consider the amount of any contribution the decedent made to his mother's support in the light of the amount of any contribution she made to his support. Williams v. Cypress Creek Drainage, 5 Ark. App. 256, 635 S.W.2d 282 (1982).

—Partial Dependency.

Partial dependency is all that is necessary to establish a claim. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Evidence supported the finding that there was no partial dependency. Pufahl v. Tamak Gas Prods. Co., 238 Ark. 895, 385 S.W.2d 640 (1965); Smith v. Farm Serv. Coop., 244 Ark. 119, 424 S.W.2d 147 (1968).

Award reduced to reflect partial, rather than complete, dependency. Vines v. Arkansas Kraft Corp., 247 Ark. 573, 446 S.W.2d 669 (1969).

Whether or not a minor child, not living with one of his parents and receiving only a part of his support therefrom, is subject to the partial dependency benefits of this section is a fact question to be determined in light of surrounding circumstances, since the addition of the word “actually” in subsection (c) means that there is no longer a conclusive presumption of the dependency of a child. Doyle's Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 268 Ark. 167, 594 S.W.2d 243 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to support award of partial dependency benefits. Russell v. International Paper Co., 2 Ark. App. 355, 621 S.W.2d 867 (1981).

In determining whether actual dependency exists, the commission need only find some dependency upon the deceased employee to entitle widow to the maximum benefits provided for in the compensation law; the fact that the husband was not the sole support of his wife does not subject her to the section of the compensation law providing benefits for partial dependency. Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983).

Denial of partial dependent benefits to a widow was proper because she had no reasonable expectation of support from her deceased husband; the widow only received occasional support from her husband in the 10 years after their separation, and testimony otherwise was not found to be credible. Moss v. Rogers Logging Co., 2014 Ark. App. 277 (2014).

—Sibling.

Giving of small gifts from time to time to a brother does not make the brother a dependent. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950) (decision under prior law).

Sister held not dependent on deceased brother. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Yeager, 219 Ark. 20, 239 S.W.2d 1019 (1951) (decision under prior law).

—Spouse.

Benefits denied on the grounds that the applicant was not the wife of the deceased. Orsburn v. Graves, 213 Ark. 727, 210 S.W.2d 496 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Spouse held not dependent on decedent and not entitled to benefits. Spratlin v. Evans, 260 Ark. 49, 538 S.W.2d 527 (1976); Flowers v. Southern Rd. Bldrs., 268 Ark. 692, 594 S.W.2d 865 (1980).

Where a widower was dependent, but not incapacitated at the time of his wife's death, he was not entitled to dependency death benefits. Hunter Mem. United Methodist Church v. Millirons, 268 Ark. 975, 597 S.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1980).

A showing of actual dependency does not require proof that without the husband's contribution wife would lack the necessities of life, but only that the decedent's contributions were relied upon by the claimant to maintain her accustomed mode of living. Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983).

Evidence sufficient to show that loss of husband's wages detrimentally affected wife's station in life supported a finding of fact of some dependency upon him entitling her to maximum benefits under subsection (c). Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983).

When the widow is not living with the employee at the time of his death, there must be some showing of actual dependency, which does not require a showing of total dependence, but of some measure of actual support or a reasonable expectation of it. Robinson v. Ed Williams Constr. Co., 38 Ark. App. 90, 828 S.W.2d 860 (1992).

Benefits Awarded.

Deceased worker's statutory beneficiaries were entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits under this section because a compensable injury was suffered under § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) when the worker died in a fire in her living quarters at a hotel where she was employed, even though she was off-duty at the time. Under the increased-risk doctrine for residential employees, the worker's fatal injury was compensable as a residential employee who indirectly advanced the interests of her employer. Jivan v. Econ. Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007).

Causal Connection.

Evidence insufficient to establish causal connection between death and an injury arising out of employment. French v. Jonesboro Pub. Schs., 233 Ark. 879, 349 S.W.2d 670 (1961); Treadway v. Riceland Foods, 268 Ark. 658, 594 S.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence sufficient to establish causal connection between work-related injury and death and to support award of benefits. Exxon Corp. v. Fleming, 253 Ark. 798, 489 S.W.2d 766 (1973); Boswell v. Davis, 268 Ark. 662, 595 S.W.2d 942 (Ct. App. 1980).

Employment Services.

Workers' compensation death benefits under § 11-9-527 were not awarded to a decedent's beneficiaries because the decedent was not performing employment services under § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) when she was killed in a fire at a hotel where she worked, since she was attending to her own personal needs in her residence. The fact that she was on-call did not change the decision. Economy Inn & Suites v. Jivan, 97 Ark. App. 115, 253 S.W.3d 4 (2007), rev'd, Jivan v. Econ. Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007).

Funeral Expenses.

Lump sum settlement under § 11-9-804 will not preclude payment of funeral expenses. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Where parents of the deceased minor were not wholly or partially dependent upon him for their support, they were not entitled to recover funeral expenses. Rowe v. Druyvesteyn Constr. Co., 253 Ark. 63, 484 S.W.2d 513 (1972).

Legislative Intent.

Because the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly made no substantive changes to this section in 1993, and did not specifically annul prior case law construing it, the prior case law interpreting “wholly and actually dependent” is not contrary to, or in conflict with, the legislative intent. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 60 Ark. App. 64, 958 S.W.2d 538 (1997), aff'd, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

Res Judicata.

If an employee dies as a result of the disability for which he has been awarded compensation, the cause of the disability is res judicata. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 225 Ark. 199, 280 S.W.2d 719 (1955).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Because the undisputed facts established that two minor children were, in fact, dependent on the deceased employee, their biological father, at the time of the compensable injury, and there were no circumstances within the Workers' Compensation Law terminating their dependency status, the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying the children's claim for survivor benefits based on the termination of the biological father's parental rights and adoption of the children. J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016).

Terminations of Dependence.

Because the limit on an employer's or insurance carrier's liability in § 11-9-502(b) applied only to weekly benefits, they were responsible for the remarriage benefit described in subdivision (d)(1) of this section, even after the $75,000 cap was reached. Ark. Elec. Co-Op Corp. v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, 2012 Ark. App. 13 (2012).

—Remarriage.

Provision that a widow is to receive a sum “equal to” 104 times the weekly benefits she had been receiving upon her remarriage is an additional benefit to compensate the widow for the loss of future weekly benefits occasioned by her remarriage. Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987), aff'd, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988).

Lump-sum payment upon widow's remarriage is not to be treated as an advance of weekly benefits. Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987), aff'd, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988).

When a worker's death arises out of his employment and his widow subsequently remarries and receives in one lump sum payment equal to 104 weeks compensation, the increase in benefits payable to her children on her remarriage becomes due immediately and is not postponed until the end of the 104 weeks following the remarriage. Reference to 104 weeks contained in subsection (d) was merely intended to serve as a basis by which to determine the amount of the sum to be paid to a widow upon her remarriage. Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987), aff'd, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988).

Worker's compensation carrier was not entitled to “credit” the lump sum payment to the widow against periodic payments due the remaining dependents. Workers' Compensation Commission improperly denied the decedent's dependent children an increase in benefits upon the remarriage of their mother; upon remarriage of widow, remaining dependents are entitled to compensation in the amount they would have received had they been only persons entitled to benefits upon death of their father. Arkansas Vinegar Co. v. Ashby, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988).

The obvious purpose of the lump sum benefit provision upon remarriage is to lessen the disincentive to remarry that would be inherent in a flat cutoff of dependency benefits. This disincentive for marriage does not cease to exist when the employer reaches his maximum liability in weekly benefits; it continues indefinitely because the widow continues to receive benefits from the fund. Therefore, the need for the reduction of the disincentive, in the form of a lump sum payment, is still needed even after the employer reaches his maximum liability. City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 38 Ark. App. 172, 832 S.W.2d 262 (1992), aff'd, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Allowing a widow to receive the lump sum payment at the time she is remarried, regardless of whether the employer or carrier has reached its maximum liability in weekly benefits, is the only interpretation of the statute that is consistent with the plain language of the statute, the history of the provisions in question, and the purposes underlying these provisions. It appears that the “full and complete payment” language, in subdivision (d)(1), was inadvertently left in from a time when it had some relevance and, in light of the delimitation on a widow's weekly benefits, it is now meaningless surplusage. City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 38 Ark. App. 172, 832 S.W.2d 262 (1992), aff'd, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

The limit on an employer or carrier's liability under § 11-9-502 applies only to weekly benefits; the employer or carrier is still responsible for any benefits in addition to weekly compensation to which the claimant is entitled. It is therefore not inconsistent with the limitations on liability found in § 11-9-502 to require the employer or carrier to pay the lump sum benefit under subdivision (d)(1). City of Fort Smith v. Tate, 38 Ark. App. 172, 832 S.W.2d 262 (1992), aff'd, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1993).

Time of Death.

Fact that employee died more than three years after an injury did not prevent a recovery for death benefits, the statutory presumption that death did not result from the injury being rebuttable. Bell v. Batesville White Lime Co., 217 Ark. 379, 230 S.W.2d 643 (1950) (decision under prior law).

“Wholly and Dependent.”

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the decedent's son was “wholly and actually dependent” upon the decedent at the time of his death; although he was not listed as the father on the son's birth certificate, the decedent acknowledged the son as his son beginning at the time of his birth and contributed sporadic child-support to the mother for the child's support until his death. Hicks v. Bates, 104 Ark. App. 348, 292 S.W.3d 850 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 717 (Mar. 18, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 487 (June 4, 2009).

In a workers' compensation case, a deceased employee's stepchildren were properly found to be dependent for purpose of receiving death benefits where the employee had been married to his current wife for two years, the stepchildren resided with them, and his earnings were used to support the stepchildren. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Myers, 2014 Ark. App. 102 (2014).

Cited: Cole v. Hendry Corp., 230 Ark. 100, 321 S.W.2d 377 (1959); Ellis v. Ellis, 251 Ark. 431, 472 S.W.2d 703 (1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rowe, 256 Ark. 221, 506 S.W.2d 569 (1974); American Can Co. v. Pettyjohn, 258 Ark. 98, 522 S.W.2d 358 (1975); Roberts v. Smith Furn. & Appliance Co., 263 Ark. 869, 567 S.W.2d 947 (1978); Hawthorne v. Davis, 268 Ark. 131, 594 S.W.2d 844 (1980); Swafford v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 1 Ark. App. 214, 614 S.W.2d 244 (1981); Black v. Riverside Furn. Co., 6 Ark. App. 370, 642 S.W.2d 338 (1982); Climer v. Drake's Backhoe, 7 Ark. App. 148, 644 S.W.2d 637 (1983); Hill v. CGR Medical Corp., 9 Ark. App. 334, 660 S.W.2d 171 (1983); Farm Air Corp. v. Reader, 11 Ark. App. 72, 666 S.W.2d 717 (1984); In re Covey, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6408, 36 B.R. 696 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984); McCoy on behalf of McCoy v. Logging, 21 Ark. App. 68, 728 S.W.2d 520 (1987); Arkansas Vinegar Co. v. Ashby, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988); Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Hempstead County, 32 Ark. App. 36, 796 S.W.2d 351 (1990).