Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Workers' Compensation: Value of Expenses Reimbursed by Employer as Factor in Determining Basis for or Calculation of Amount of Compensation Under State Workers' Compensation Statute. 63 A.L.R.6th 187.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Workers' Compensation, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 269.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Statutes limiting recovery for permanent total disability resulting from a second injury while working for the same employer, but leaving open-ended the recovery for permanent total disability from a single injury, are not unconstitutional as an unreasonable classification, since the purpose is to encourage employers to retain injured employees. Corbitt v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 256 Ark. 932, 511 S.W.2d 184 (1974).

Construction.

There is no ambiguity between the language of subsection (c) of this section and § 11-9-502(b)(1). Sparks Regional Medical Ctr. v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Bank Fund, 22 Ark. App. 204, 737 S.W.2d 463 (1987).

Subsection (b) of this section does not except compensation payable to surviving dependents of a deceased employee from the 662/3% limitation. Mecco Seed Co. v. London, 47 Ark. App. 121, 886 S.W.2d 882 (1994).

The commission erred in holding that a dependent widow and three children could recover 80% of the deceased employee's average weekly wage, since this exceeded 662/3% of the deceased's average weekly wage; the amounts set out in § 11-9-527 are subject to the maximum limitations as set forth in subsection (b) of this section. Mecco Seed Co. v. London, 47 Ark. App. 121, 886 S.W.2d 882 (1994).

Compensation.

—In General.

Maximum compensation figure covered all benefits payable under both this section and § 11-9-521. Garner v. American Can Co., 246 Ark. 746, 440 S.W.2d 210 (1969).

The term “compensation” as used in this section refers to money benefits paid to the injured employee for disability. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

The proviso of subsection (d) regarding the maximum weekly benefit for permanent partial disability is limited by the total disability rate which is defined in subsection (b). Noggle v. Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop., 31 Ark. App. 104, 788 S.W.2d 497 (1990).

—Amount.

Where the degree of permanent partial disability was of a percentage that would cause the percentage of his wages to be less than the minimum compensation, it was proper for the commission to order payment of the minimum for the total number of weeks allowed. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Maxey, 212 Ark. 161, 205 S.W.2d 29 (1947) (decision under prior law) Metro Temporaries v. Boyd, 314 Ark. 479, 863 S.W.2d 316 (Ark. 1993).

Where board awarded specific compensation for permanent injury, employee was entitled to payment of that amount even though employer had previously paid him more than the amount. Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952).

The minimum is not to be applied inflexibly in every case or demonstrable inequalities will occur, so, in no case is the amount to exceed the amount of average weekly contributions to the support of his parents by the deceased employee, even though this amount is less than the minimum. Vines v. Arkansas Kraft Corp., 247 Ark. 573, 446 S.W.2d 669 (1969).

Workers' Compensation Commission had authority to reduce the amount of award for a compensable injury without resorting to expert testimony that claimant's doctor's bill was excessive in precisely that amount. Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977).

Where claimant suffered a compensable injury, received medical treatment, returned to his regular job and continued to work until he became totally disabled several years later, claimant is entitled to the maximum weekly benefit rate in effect at the time the disability occurred, and this rate is based on the wages being earned on the date of the accident. Montgomery v. Delta Airlines, 31 Ark. App. 203, 791 S.W.2d 716 (1990).

—Employment During Disability.

A worker who receives an award for a definite number of weeks, and during the time accepts employment and later petitions for a resumption of payments, is entitled to the payment with no deduction for “time out” during voluntary employment. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Snow, 213 Ark. 713, 212 S.W.2d 346 (1948) (decision under prior law).

—Joint Employment.

In determining benefits for a claimant who was employed by two employers in the capacity of a joint employee and who was only working one forty-hour work week, although employee was receiving a check from both employers for the same work week, the commission concluded that claimant was entitled to idemnity benefits based upon his combined wages. Cook v. Recovery Corp., 50 Ark. App. 49, 900 S.W.2d 212 (1995), aff'd, 322 Ark. 707, 911 S.W.2d 581 (1995).

Credit.

Appellant employee's healing period had ended on June 10, 2011, and respondents were entitled to receive a credit for any permanent partial disability (PPD) payments made toward their maximum obligation for permanent temporary disability (PTD) benefits; employee was not entitled to simultaneously receive both PPD and PTD, and respondents were entitled to credit for the advance payments they made to the employee. Skinner v. Tango Transp., Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 304, 495 S.W.3d 637 (2016).

Dependents.

Widow of a deceased worker did not have priority, but shared priority with children by a prior marriage, receiving a proportionate amount of the maximum weekly benefit as set out in subsection (e). Gary McJunkin Trucking Co. v. Byars, 258 Ark. 387, 525 S.W.2d 662 (1975).

A widow's lump sum payment upon remarriage does not constitute a weekly benefit and thus may not be applied as a weekly death payment in calculating an employer's maximum liability. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 304 Ark. 359, 801 S.W.2d 653 (1991).

Disability Determination.

Evidence sufficient to support commission finding that mental disability was permanent as well as total. Dresser Minerals v. Hunt, 262 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.2d 138 (1977).

Loss of the use of the body as a whole involves two factors, the first is the functional or anatomical loss and that percentage is fixed by medical evidence, secondly, there is the wage-loss factor, that is, the degree to which the injury has affected claimant's ability to earn a livelihood; this second element is to be determined by the commission, based on medical evidence, age, education, experience, and other matters reasonably expected to affect the earning power. Cohn v. Haile, 267 Ark. 734, 589 S.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence insufficient to support the commission's finding that the claimant had only permanent partial disability rather than permanent total disability. Smelser v. S.H. & J. Drilling Corp., 267 Ark. 996, 593 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant was entitled to additional compensation for temporary total disability. Wise v. Deltic Farm & Timber Co., 269 Ark. 881, 601 S.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1980).

When determining the compensability of nontraumatically induced mental illness, which allegedly resulted from claimant's work, claimant must show more than the ordinary stress to which all workers are subjected. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).

While comparisons to fellow employees may be of some evidentiary value in evaluating stress, the ultimate test is whether the stress constituted an abnormal working condition for that type of employment. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).

The workers' compensation commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and the authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force, and its findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).

Statute of Limitations.

The Statute of Limitations provided in § 11-9-702(a) does not begin to run until the true extent of the injury manifests itself and causes an incapacity to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the accident, and the wage loss continues long enough to entitle him to benefits. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983); Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 38 Ark. App. 86, 829 S.W.2d 424, aff'd, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Wage Earning Loss.

Whether or not an injured employee can be retrained is a pertinent factor for the commission to consider in determining the amount, if any, of wage earning loss since the commission can properly consider the worker's rehabilitation potential. Smelser v. S.H. & J. Drilling Corp., 267 Ark. 996, 593 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. 1980).

Waiting Period.

This section makes no mention of reinstating the seven-day waiting period after a recurrence of disability. Since a recurrence is not a new injury but simply another period of incapacitation resulting from a previous injury, under the language of this section the waiting period applies only to the first seven days' disability from injury. Pinkston v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 30 Ark. App. 46, 782 S.W.2d 375 (1990).

When one receives a serious injury, for which he is disabled longer than the seven-day waiting period, and recovers adequately enough to return to work, but subsequently suffers a recurrence of his disability from the original compensable injury, imposing an additional waiting period would only penalize the injured employee, and would be contrary to the requirement that the workers' compensation act be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Pinkston v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 30 Ark. App. 46, 782 S.W.2d 375 (1990).

Where claimant sustained an accidental injury while at work, was off work for a period of six days, returned to work, continued having problems until her doctor advised that she be taken off work due to her initial injury and did not return to work again for three weeks because recurrence resulted in disability that extended beyond the required two-week period, claimant met her waiting period requirement and was entitled to compensation for all wage-loss disability suffered. Hodges v. Baptist Medical Sys., 31 Ark. App. 200, 790 S.W.2d 922 (1990).

Cited: Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968); Garner v. American Can Co., 246 Ark. 746, 440 S.W.2d 210 (1969); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Howell, 248 Ark. 1124, 455 S.W.2d 849 (1970); Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980); Hunter Wasson Pulpwood v. Banks, 270 Ark. 404, 605 S.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980); Harrison Furn. v. Chrobak, 2 Ark. App. 364, 620 S.W.2d 955 (1981); City of Waldo v. Poetker, 275 Ark. 216, 628 S.W.2d 329 (1982); Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982); Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982); Farm Air Corp. v. Reader, 11 Ark. App. 72, 666 S.W.2d 717 (1984); Bemberg Iron Work v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Calion Lumber Co. v. Goff, 14 Ark. App. 18, 684 S.W.2d 272 (1985); Marianna School Dist. v. Vanderburg, 16 Ark. App. 271, 700 S.W.2d 381 (1985); Glenn v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Ashby v. Arkansas Vinegar Co., 22 Ark. App. 167, 737 S.W.2d 177 (1987); Metro Temporaries v. Boyd, 314 Ark. 479, 863 S.W.2d 316 (Ark. 1993); Bussell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 64 Ark. App. 194, 981 S.W.2d 98 (1998).

Magnet Cove Sch. Dist. v. Barnett, 81 Ark. App. 11, 97 S.W.3d 909 (2003); Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Legacy Ins. Servs., 95 Ark. App. 189, 235 S.W.3d 544 (2006).