Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Cochran, Legislative Note: Act 197 of 1977: Arkansas' Rape-Shield Statute, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 806.

Recent Developments: Criminal Law — Evidence: What Constitutes Relevant Evidence in Rape Trial When Defense is Consent, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 826.

Recent Developments (State v. Babbs), 51 Ark. L. Rev. 647.

Note, The Arkansas Rape-Shield Statute: Does It Create Another Victim?, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 949.

Note, Fells v. State: Good Decision on Procedural Grounds, Dangerous Precedent for Future Application of Arkansas's Rape Shield Statute, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 943.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Legislative Survey, Evidence, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 127.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The exception to the general exclusionary policy and the in camera hearing, under this section, provide the accused with a full and fair opportunity to confront his accuser. Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979).

This section does not deny the equal protection of the law, in that it restricts the defendant's freedom to introduce evidence with no similar restriction upon the prosecution, inasmuch as the prosecution is actually restricted by the principle that it cannot bolster its case by proving that the same defendant committed another rape, and since the classification made by this section is not arbitrary, being based upon permissible considerations of public policy. Dorn v. State, 267 Ark. 365, 590 S.W.2d 297 (1979); Burrow v. State, 301 Ark. 222, 783 S.W.2d 52 (1990).

The statute is constitutional and does not violate due process or equal protection rights. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 998, 121 S. Ct. 495, 148 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2000).

Rape shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense during defendant's trial for rape of a minor because defendant was able to cross-examine a physician, who testified that the injury to the victim's vaginal area was not a fresh injury, but occurred sometime in the past. Defendant was also able to cross-examine the victim about her allegations. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of four counts of sexual assault of a minor, the trial court properly upheld the constitutionality of the rape shield statute. The statute survived defendant's separation of powers challenge. Nelson v. State, 2011 Ark. 429, 384 S.W.3d 534 (2011).

—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Decision by defendant's attorney not to request a hearing under this section to explore the relevance of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct, may not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; however, when considered together with counsel's failure to call a witness who would have testified that the eleven-year-old victim had told her that she had fabricated the allegations, the court properly concluded that attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of competence. Wicoff v. State, 321 Ark. 97, 900 S.W.2d 187 (1995).

In General.

This section prohibits evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct unless, on written motion and hearing, relevancy of the proffered evidence is established and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

This section broadly excludes evidence of specific instance of the victim's sexual conduct prior to the trial. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Where defendant proffered the testimony of witnesses who confirmed prior false accusations of rape made by the victim, the victim's denial that she had formerly made false accusations of rape against another person meant that the rape-shield statute applied to the facts in defendant's case and, further, defendant had failed to file pretrial motion for a determination of relevancy pursuant to subsection (c). Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267, 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003).

Construction.

This section relates only to proof of the victim's prior “sexual conduct,” as defined in this section, and posing in the nude for a photograph does not fall within that definition of sexual conduct. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

The “prior” acts mentioned in this section do not refer to sexual acts occurring before the incident in question, but merely any sexual conduct by the victim. Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986).

This section excludes evidence of any kind about the victim's prior “sexual conduct” and defines “sexual conduct” as deviate sexual activity, sexual contact, or sexual intercourse. West v. State, 290 Ark. 340A, 290 Ark. 329, 722 S.W.2d 284 (1987).

“Prior” sexual conduct includes all sexual behavior of the victim prior to the date of the trial. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992).

Purpose.

Information regarding the sexual history of a victim is usually totally irrelevant to the charge of rape and this section was obviously designed to limit this type of examination and protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

The primary purposes of this section were to protect the victim and encourage rape victims to participate in the prosecution of their attackers. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

This section is intended to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges, paraded before the jury and the public, when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

The purpose of this section is to limit evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct and to protect the victim from unnecessary humiliation. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

The purposes of this section is to protect the victim and encourage rape victims to participate in the prosecution of their attackers, and such purposes would be thwarted if defendants were allowed to present uncorroborated evidence that there had been prior consensual acts over the victim's denial that she had ever known her assailant before the incident. Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997).

The purpose of subsection (b) of this section is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008).

Purpose of the rape shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

Applicability.

This section did not apply where prosecutor elicited from victim testimony that she had been a virgin prior to the rape since this section relates to specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct while prosecutor's question did not relate the victim's prior sexual conduct but to the lack thereof. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

This section is not a total bar to evidence of a victim's sexual conduct but instead makes its admissibility discretionary with the trial judge pursuant to the procedures set out at subdivisions (c)(1-3). Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

In order to set in motion a relevancy decision by the trial court regarding prior sexual conduct, subdivision (c)(1) of this section requires that the defendant file a written motion with the court before resting to the effect that the defendant desires to present evidence of the victim's past sexual activity. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

This section does not apply to a charge of violation of a minor. Donihoo v. State, 325 Ark. 483, 931 S.W.2d 69 (1996).

Subsection (b) of this section has no application to a prior inconsistent statement made by the victim as to the offense charged. Lindsey v. State, 54 Ark. App. 266, 925 S.W.2d 441 (1996).

Court rejected defendant's claim that the rape-shield statute did not apply; the evidence defendant sought to introduce clearly fell within the parameters of the rape-shield law because it was evidence of prior sexual conduct offered for the purpose of attacking the victim's credibility, and the trial court properly found that the probative value of the victim's inconsistent statements was slight and the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling in any event because defendant was able to achieve the purpose of impeaching the victim's veracity without touching upon her prior sexual conduct. Turner v. State, 355 Ark. 541, 141 S.W.3d 352 (2004).

In defendant's sexual abuse case, a court properly applied the rape shield law to exclude evidence relating to previous sexual molestation charges brought by the child victim against others where the victim testified that, although she did not remember much of the circumstances surrounding the allegations against another person because she was only four years old at the time, she remembered what he did to her, and she stated that the allegations against him were true; that testimony fell squarely within the ambit of subsection (b) of this section. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004).

In defendant's sexual abuse case, the court properly applied the rape shield law where the fact that the victim, who was 12 years old at the time and did not disclose to her boyfriend that her father raped her when recounting the details of her involvement with her 18-year old stepfather, did not factor into her credibility; the proffered testimony would have prejudiced the jury to question the victim's reputation, which was exactly what the rape-shield statute prohibited. Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260, 163 S.W.3d 843 (2004).

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status of a rape victim is protected under Arkansas's rape-shield statute. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Admissibility.

Evidence properly held inadmissible. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Houston v. State, 266 Ark. 257, 582 S.W.2d 958 (1979); Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979); Hubbard v. State, 271 Ark. 937, 611 S.W.2d 526 (1981); Boreck v. State, 272 Ark. 240, 613 S.W.2d 96 (1981); Manees v. State, 274 Ark. 69, 622 S.W.2d 166 (1981); Fields v. State, 281 Ark. 43, 661 S.W.2d 359 (1983); Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 671 S.W.2d 757 (1984); Jackson v. State, 284 Ark. 478, 683 S.W.2d 606 (1985).

This section only excludes evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim, and the defendant may testify at trial as to the actions of the prosecuting witness on the night of the alleged rape. Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980).

Evidence of prior consensual sexual conduct is inadmissible unless such prior sexual activities were with the accused, and, even in that event, the testimony is allowed only to show that consent may have been given since this section clearly holds such evidence is inadmissible unless it meets certain tests outlined therein. Eskew v. State, 273 Ark. 490, 621 S.W.2d 220 (1981); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Acts of prior consensual intercourse with the accused are admissible only to show that consent may have been given, and where consent is not at issue, because the defendant denies that the act ever occurred, the prior sexual conduct of the prosecutrix is not relevant. State v. Small, 276 Ark. 26, 631 S.W.2d 616 (1982).

The trial court did not err when it refused to allow the defendant to testify that he was told by his codefendant that the codefendant had had prior sexual relations with the alleged rape victim, since the testimony was not coming directly from the codefendant and was, therefore, inadmissible hearsay evidence. Watson v. State, 277 Ark. 197, 640 S.W.2d 447 (1982).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing questioning of the victim about her prior sexual conduct, even where the physician stated that he found nonmotile sperm in her vagina and that sperm could remain motile for up to five days. Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986).

This section, on its face, does not deal with matters that may have occurred subsequent to the alleged offense, and therfore it was error to grant the state's motion in limine to preclude the defendant from offering or cross examining on the basis of the taped telephone conversation between the victim and her stepmother that occurred several months after the alleged rape, which included some references to sexual conduct of the victim some time after the alleged rape. Flurry v. State, 18 Ark. App. 64, 711 S.W.2d 163 (1986), rev'd, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986)Questioned bySlater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992)Questioned byFry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1992), overruled, Doby v. State, 290 Ark. 408, 720 S.W.2d 694 (1986).

While evidence of the victim's and defendant's past relationship should be admitted into evidence, evidence of explicit sexual conduct that has no direct bearing on the events which occurred at the time of the alleged rape should be excluded. Terrell v. State, 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing question regarding how old bruises were without reference to victim's prior sexual conduct. Harris v. State, 322 Ark. 167, 907 S.W.2d 729 (1995).

Court's decision to exclude from the evidence victim's allegations against her step-grandfather was not clearly erroneous. Samples v. State, 50 Ark. App. 163, 902 S.W.2d 257 (1995).

The court properly excluded evidence that, four years before the incident at issue, the victim filed a rape charge against another person, but withdrew the charge one day after filing her report. Booker v. State, 334 Ark. 434, 976 S.W.2d 918 (1998).

One should not conclude that a defendant can never present evidence of a rape victim's human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status when that evidence is relevant to a defense at trial; on the contrary, the rape-shield statute specifically contemplates the admission of such evidence once the required procedures have been followed and the trial court has determined that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Trial court did not err by applying the rape shield statute to exclude evidence of the victims' sexual knowledge allegedly obtained while they were in foster care because: (1) there was no proof that the events actually occurred; (2) none of the prior sexual acts closely resembled the allegations that defendant raped the victims; (3) the alleged sexual acts with other minor children were irrelevant to defendant's having sexual intercourse with the victims; and (4) the acts were not prior to defendant's rape offenses. White v. State, 367 Ark. 595, 242 S.W.3d 240 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 904, 127 S. Ct. 2114, 167 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2007).

At the sentencing phase of a rape trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying, under the rape-shield statute, defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse allegations against a third party because such evidence would have been more prejudicial to the victim than probative. Keller v. State, 371 Ark. 86, 263 S.W.3d 549 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to invoke the rape shield statute (this section) or for failing to argue that the victim had said someone else had raped her or investigate those statements because if counsel had exculpatory evidence to present, the only proper means to seek admission was through a request for a hearing, and even if counsel erred in failing to request such a hearing, the postconviction relief appellant did not establish that, had counsel requested a hearing, his arguments for admission of the evidence would have been effective; there was no basis to support a claim that the evidence was needed to rebut the inference that the child victim received her knowledge of sexual matters from alleged encounters with appellant, and appellant did not establish that there was potentially relevant evidence to be discovered, or that counsel could have sought to admit, that was suitably compelling so as to overcome its highly prejudicial nature through strong probative value, as subsection (c) of this section required. Bell v. State, 2010 Ark. 65, 360 S.W.3d 98 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for raping his daughter under § 5-14-103(a)(4)(A)(i) was appropriate because the evidence was sufficient and because the circuit court properly denied defendant's rape-shield motions. Consent was never an issue in a rape-by-guardian case, and when consent was not an issue, whether the victim had sexual relations with a third person was entirely collateral and irrelevant under subsections (b) and (c) of this section. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, 384 S.W.3d 515 (2011).

—Expert Testimony.

Where physician's testimony in a rape case embraced the ultimate issue of forced sex, but did not mandate a legal conclusion because the testimony did not exclude other causes for the victim's injuries, it was not inadmissible opinion testimony on the ultimate issue. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

—Impeachment of Non-Victim Witness.

Evidence of a sexual affair between the victim and a witness held inadmissible where defendant failed to show how evidence of the alleged sexual affair would impeach the witness' credibility. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

—Impeachment of Victim Witness.

In defendant's sexual assault trial where defendant proffered testimony as evidence of child victim's prior inconsistent statements to undermine her credibility, the proffered testimony violated the rape-shield statute, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002).

Although the rape shield statute is inapplicable to a juvenile delinquency charge, the trial court may otherwise correctly find that the prior sexual history of a victim is entirely irrelevant to the crime with which juvenile is charged; thus, the proper standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a juvenile's proffered testimony on the basis of that testimony's relevance under the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. M. M. v. State, 350 Ark. 328, 88 S.W.3d 406 (2002).

Consent.

Acts of prior consensual conduct between the victim and the accused are admissible only when consent is at issue; where the victim is younger than the age of consent at the time of the alleged conduct, consent patently cannot be a defense. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

Prior acts of sexual conduct are not within themselves evidence of consent in a subsequent sexual act, unless there is additional evidence connecting the prior acts to the consent alleged in the subsequent act. Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997).

The court properly ruled that the alleged victim's subsequent consensual sex with one of the defendants was relevant and probative on the consent issue to be raised at the trial of the defendants. State v. Babbs, 334 Ark. 105, 971 S.W.2d 774 (1998).

Allowing an alleged rape victim's prior sexual conduct into evidence was improper because defendant was charged with raping the victim while she was physically helpless and pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, a person who was physically helpless at the time of the rape was incapable of consent. Therefore, any prior sexual encounters between defendant and the victim, which might have been relevant if consent was a defense, were irrelevant where the victim could not have consented due to being physically helpless. State v. Parker, 2010 Ark. 173 (2010).

Cross-Examination.

The court correctly limited the scope of prosecutrix's cross-examination to allow examination as to the two defendants while excluding testimony about her relations with others. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

What the victim told her father at the time of the rape or what motivated her to cause the charges to be filed was not open to questioning. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

Where defense counsel sought to cross-examine prosecutrix about how long it had been before the rape when she had last had intercourse, the court properly refused to allow such cross-examination since proof of that kind is broadly forbidden by this section and since no written motion to permit such proof was filed before the trial, nor was there a showing of good cause for the matter having been delayed until the trial was in progress. Isom v. State, 280 Ark. 131, 655 S.W.2d 405 (1983).

Disclosure of Defense.

An accused must reveal, upon the state's request, the nature of any defense which he intends to establish at trial, and the names and addresses of the witnesses who will testify in support of those defenses; therefore, at the in camera hearing, it appears that the accused is not forced to reveal any more of his defense strategy than he is required to do under existing procedural rules. Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979).

Discretion of Court.

The appellate court could not decide whether the evidence of the victim's prior conduct was admissible where defendant failed to proffer what the evidence would have been. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

The trial court is vested with a great deal of discretion in ruling whether prior sexual conduct of a prosecuting witness is relevant, and the appellate court does not overturn its decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Under this section, the trial court, upon proper motion, may engage in a balancing test to assess whether the probative value of the testimony sought outweighs the inflammatory nature of the testimony. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Court properly applied the rape shield law where the ruling did not impede the defense but merely prevented questioning the victim with regard to her admission that she had sex with another person subsequent to the crime by defendant; the trial court did allow defendant to argue that the victim was fabricating the allegations because she thought he was too strict with her. Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004).

Exclusion Improper.

Rape-shield statute was intended to protect victims from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury; in this case, evidence that the victim was asking defendant for sex, offering him oral sex, attempting to undo his shorts, and touching his penis through his shorts, all within approximately 10 minutes of penetration, was conduct related to the charges pending and therefore relevant to the issue of consent, such that excluding the evidence was prejudicial. Herren v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 528, 563 S.W.3d 606 (2018).

Hearing.

The in camera hearing is not designed to be used as a subterfuge to obtain a discovery deposition from the alleged victim, and there is no requirement that the victim present herself for questioning by the accused. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

Subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section clearly provides that a hearing shall be held on a motion; however, the timing of the hearing is not mandatory and may occur closer to the trial as the court permits “for good cause.” Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

It was not error to refuse to allow defendant to present evidence that rape victim tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) because defendant failed to comply with the rape-shield statute; defendant never filed the required motion or gave the trial court an opportunity to hold a hearing to determine if the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its highly prejudicial effect. Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Interlocutory Appeal.

A ruling on whether testimony is hearsay is not subject to an interlocutory appeal under this section. State v. Small, 276 Ark. 26, 631 S.W.2d 616 (1982).

The rape-shield law is a product of the General Assembly, and until it sees fit to provide for interlocutory appeal by the state of a trial court's decision with respect to admitting evidence of prior false allegations made by an alleged victim, or until some other jurisdictional basis by rule or constitutional provision appears, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. State v. Mills, 311 Ark. 363, 844 S.W.2d 324 (1992).

Where defendant was charged with the rape of his niece, he was permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim's natural father having been found guilty of a sexual assault in California, but was prohibited from making any reference as to the identity of the victim in the father's case. State v. V. Rapp, 368 Ark. 387, 246 S.W.3d 858 (2007).

Because the Supreme Court of Arkansas had never required the “uniform administration of justice” analysis as it did in state appeals from the grant of a motion to suppress evidence or confessions, the state's appeal from an order allowing evidence under the rape-shield statute was treated as automatically appealable without resort to a normal Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 3 analysis. State v. Parker, 2010 Ark. 173 (2010).

Jurisdiction.

Because defendant's appeal involves a challenge under the rape-shield statute, the court's jurisdiction was pursuant to this section and Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 1-2(a)(8). Turner v. State, 355 Ark. 541, 141 S.W.3d 352 (2004).

Merits Not Considered.

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that evidence of sexual conversations between the victim and her boyfriend was encompassed by the rape-shield statute under this section but defendant acknowledged that the trial court allowed him to cross-examine the victim regarding her bias and allowed him to redact the messages in question to omit the sexual discussion, and defendant agreed with the trial court that the redacted version was sufficient to challenge the victim's credibility; thus, because defendant in essence agreed to the decision, the court did not reach the merits of this point on appeal. Rackley v. State, 371 Ark. 438, 267 S.W.3d 578 (2007).

It was unnecessary to decide if a trial court erred in excluding defendant's proffered testimony under the rape shield statute because overwhelming evidence supported defendant's convictions, so any error was harmless. Pigg v. State, 2014 Ark. 433, 444 S.W.3d 863 (2014).

Motions by Defendant.

It is the defendant's responsibility to pursue a motion requesting a hearing and to bring the matter of a hearing to the court's attention. Cupples v. State, 318 Ark. 28, 883 S.W.2d 458 (1994).

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section requires a written motion to be filed; failure to do so waives the right to challenge application of this section on appeal. Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994).

Evidence barred where defendant failed to file a motion as required by subdivision (c)(2)(C); arguments made in response to the State's motion in limine to bar the evidence were insufficient to comply with this section. Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996).

Where there was no showing that a motion to admit the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct was filed in writing, that the issue was timely raised, or that the trial court in any manner abused its discretion in not finding “good cause” to hold a relevancy hearing later than three days before the trial, the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (c). Bradley v. State, 327 Ark. 6, 937 S.W.2d 628 (1997).

In a rape prosecution, defendant was not entitled to introduce proof of the victim's prior sexual abuse due to his noncompliance with the rape-shield law; defendant failed to file a written motion as required by subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181 (2004).

Trial court did not err under the rape shield law, subsection (b) of this section, in denying defendant's motion to permit testimony concerning prior claims of sexual abuse made by a minor victim because defendant failed to prove that the prior act of sexual abuse clearly occurred; the witness affidavits that defendant presented were determined to be hearsay. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

Trial court properly disallowed questions about another man's DNA on the victim's sheets because the prosecutor did not “open the door” by inquiring about the victim's DNA, defendant's relevancy argument was not preserved for appeal, and defendant did not file a written motion to the trial court for its consideration. Gipson v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 651 (2013).

Objection Untimely.

Where record reflected the state had already asked and received answers to questions regarding witness's sexual relations with the defendant without objection, later objection to the same questioning was untimely, as failure to object at the first opportunity waives any right to raise the point on appeal. Laymon v. State, 306 Ark. 377, 814 S.W.2d 901 (1991).

Because defendant failed to follow the procedure set forth in this section and did not proffer testimony concerning his assertion that the victim had similar accusations against another grandfather, the error complained of was the result of defense counsel's inaction and neither the third nor the fourth Wicks exception applied. Fukunaga v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 4 (2014).

Preservation.

In a rape case, defendant failed to preserve his argument that bondage activity did not fall under the rape-shield statute where he argued before the trial court that evidence that he and the victim had engaged in “rough sex” before was relevant to the defense, highly probative, and went to the credibility of the victim. Moreover, an argument relating to the right to present a defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment was also abandoned because, although the argument was contained in a written motion, defendant did not ensure that a ruling was made on it. Rounsaville v. State, 372 Ark. 252, 273 S.W.3d 486 (2008).

Defendant failed to preserve for review his argument that a court erred during his rape trial in not allowing testimony concerning the victim's previous sexual conduct; he failed to follow the procedure set forth in subsection (c) of this section for establishing relevancy and admissibility of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape-shield statute. Stewart v. State, 2012 Ark. 349, 423 S.W.3d 69 (2012).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of three counts of second-degree sexual assault of two victims, defendant's argument that his motion to admit evidence of the first victim's prior sexual conduct was improperly denied was not preserved for review as he failed to proffer any testimony at the in camera hearing pursuant to the rape-shield statute; even if the circuit court already had knowledge of all the relevant details, defendant's failure to proffer evidence so that the appellate court could determine prejudice precluded review of the issue on appeal. Sweeten v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 590, 564 S.W.3d 575 (2018).

Prior Inconsistent Statements.

In a prosecution of a father for the rape and sexual abuse of his daughter over a four year period, the trial court properly refused to allow the victim's mother and grandmother to testify to prior inconsistent statements by the victim that other men, rather than her father, had perpetrated sexual abuse upon her. Hill v. State, 74 Ark. App. 28, 45 S.W.3d 406 (2001).

Relevance.

Virginity is not relevant per se in a rape case. Duncan v. State, 263 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

Where the two defendants sought to show the prosecutrix's prior sexual relations with a third person both earlier on the same evening and in the same room as the alleged rape and at other times in the past, the court correctly allowed testimony about the incident of the same evening that occurred almost as part of the same episode, but that ruling did not establish the relevancy of any other sexual relations the third person may have had with her so as to render the court's order excluding evidence of his prior sexual relations with the prosecutrix erroneous. Bobo v. State, 267 Ark. 1, 589 S.W.2d 5 (1979).

Prior acts of sexual conduct are not within themselves evidence of consent in a subsequent sexual act; there must be some additional evidence connecting such prior acts to the alleged consent in the present case before the prior acts become relevant. Sterling v. State, 267 Ark. 208, 590 S.W.2d 254 (1979).

When a female at the very threshold of puberty maintains that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her on a regular basis, sometimes as often as two or three times a week since early childhood, the prosecution's medical evidence that the child demonstrates physical characteristics consistent with prolonged sexual activity has an unmistakable relevance to the factual issue, and is not made inadmissible by this section. Marcum v. State, 299 Ark. 30, 771 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1989).

Evidence of victim's past homosexual activity, sought to be admitted to impeach victim who stated defendant was the only person to have committed such acts with victim, was properly held not legally relevant. Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1057, 114 S. Ct. 722 (1994); Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993).

Victim's prior sexual conduct with separate males did not bear on or relate to whether she consented to a group-sex situation. State v. Sheard, 315 Ark. 710, 870 S.W.2d 212 (1994).

Evidence that the victim had a black eye the day before the rape occurred held admissible, but testimony that the victim's husband struck her because she was having an extra-marital affair held inadmissible as hearsay and because, although minimally relevant, its prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. Davlin v. State, 320 Ark. 624, 899 S.W.2d 451 (1995).

In a prosecution for several criminal counts related to three sexual encounters involving the use of the drug Rohypnol with two women, testimony by the defendant regarding a prior oral sexual encounter between himself and one of the victims, which the victim denied, has nothing to do with the episode at issue and was properly excluded. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 17 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 998, 121 S. Ct. 495, 148 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2000).

In defendant's trial for raping his step-granddaughter when she was six years old, the circuit court abused its discretion by granting defendant's motion to introduce evidence that his step-granddaughter was sexually assaulted by someone else when she was four years old; defendant's step-granddaughter's descriptions of the two incidents were substantially dissimilar and, because there was little evidence that the prior incident resembled the acts defendant allegedly committed, information about the prior incident was not relevant to the allegations against defendant. State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, 233 S.W.3d 680 (2006).

Fact that the victim had sexual intercourse with a boy her own age was not related to whether defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with the minor victim; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to have the evidence admitted. Jackson v. State, 368 Ark. 610, 249 S.W.3d 127, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 850, 128 S. Ct. 112, 169 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2007).

Trial court erred, at a rape-shield hearing pursuant to § 16-42-101(c), in granting defendant's request to introduce evidence of the child victim's allegations of sexual abuse against three others in order to show that the victim obtained sexual knowledge from a source other than defendant where the victim's descriptions of the prior abuse and the charged act were very dissimilar. State v. Blandin, 370 Ark. 23, 257 S.W.3d 68 (2007).

Trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim's prior conduct under the rape-shield statute, subsection (b) of this section, during defendant's trial for raping his daughter because evidence of the victim's prior recantation against her stepfather was only slightly relevant, if at all, to the victim's credibility and such evidence was more prejudicial than probative; the victim's prior allegation against her stepfather was not false because the victim's mother had discovered sexually explicit photographs of the victim taken by her stepfather. Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008).

In a case in which the Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction appealed a district court's decision to grant an inmate's 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the inmate argued that the trial judge violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual history pursuant to this section, the rape shield statute, the trial court determined that the evidence was irrelevant, and the decision by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to uphold the evidentiary ruling of the trial court was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2011).

In a second-degree sexual assault and attempted rape case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence from the victim's former classmates because the classmates' testimony about what the victim did in public would not have been similar to the testimony that the victim gave detailing what defendant did to her. The allegations against defendant did not occur in public places; moreover, the evidence that the victim was the aggressor was not relevant since the victim could not have consented. Bean v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 107, 432 S.W.3d 87 (2014).

In a case in which a jury convicted defendant of residential burglary and rape, the circuit court did not commit a manifest abuse of discretion in excluding, under this section, evidence of DNA from semen samples found on the victim's bedsheet and pillow that were inconsistent with defendant's DNA. Defendant failed to show a link between the semen samples found on the victim's bed and the residential burglary and rape. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65 (2015).

It was not clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion for the circuit court to exclude evidence of semen on the victim's bed. The potential humiliation and embarrassment to the victim, as well as the danger of unfairly prejudicing her character before the jury, outweighed the slight probative value of the evidence. Thacker v. State, 2015 Ark. 406, 474 S.W.3d 65 (2015).

In a case where defendant was convicted of rape and sexual assault, testimony that a victim and her boyfriend were having sexual intercourse was not admitted as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. The rape shield statute applied because defendant was charged with rape, not just violation of a minor. Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to admit evidence of the victim's relationship with her boyfriend, where defendant contended that he had threatened to inform the victim's mother that the victim was sexually active with her boyfriend, which showed victim's motive to lie. Any explanation of motive was irrelevant in light of evidence that defendant's wet semen was on the victim's bed on the night of the alleged incident. Robinson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 550, 506 S.W.3d 881 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding DNA evidence found on the victim's clothes where defendant was accused of penetrating the victim with a broomstick, and thus DNA evidence was irrelevant. Sorum v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 384, 526 S.W.3d 50 (2017).

Sexual Conduct.

Partying, drinking, and flirting do not constitute sexual conduct under this section. Slater v. State, 310 Ark. 73, 832 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1992).

Masturbation by the victim is not included within the definition of “sexual conduct” under subsection (a) of this section; however, incidents of individual masturbation by a victim have no relevance when the question at hand is whether a defendant raped that victim. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

As in the case of prior sexual conduct excluded under this section, there is a definite humiliation and embarrassment to the victim associated with a line of inquiry into victim's masturbation history which is not warranted when the evidentiary value of the evidence is weak. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

Probative value of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct was outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the victim and the state's case; the evidence sought to be admitted by defendant was improper character evidence offered to show that the victim was an immoral person, thus, the trial court conducted the appropriate balancing test set out in subsection (c) of this section and concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial nature. Martin v. State, 354 Ark. 289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003).

Where defendant was charged with raping his girlfriend's six-year-old daughter, the circuit court did not err by excluding evidence of the uncle's molestation of the victim under the rape-shield statute, subsection (b) of this section. The sexual abuses perpetrated by defendant and the uncle hardly resembled each other; the victim spoke about the uncle's touching only after she had already told her therapist about defendant's abuse. Swaim v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 557 (2009).

During defendant's trial for sexual assault of a person less than 14 years old, the court erred in granting his motion to introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct of the victim; because the victim asserted that a prior allegation of sexual conduct with her cousin was true, subsection (b) of this section precluded the admissibility of the evidence surrounding the allegation to attack her credibility. State v. Kindall, 2013 Ark. 262, 428 S.W.3d 486 (2013).

Circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct to show the res gestae of the rape charge where defendant failed to demonstrate how evidence of the victim's lap dances with a third party in the presence of the defendant the day before the offense was probative to whether defendant raped the victim the next evening while she was physically helpless and incapable of consent (defendant did not challenge on appeal the circuit court's rejection of his argument that the lap dances did not constitute sexual conduct). State v. Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, 529 S.W.3d 620 (2017).

Cited: Pruitt v. State, 8 Ark. App. 350, 652 S.W.2d 51 (1983); Johnson v. State, 290 Ark. 166, 717 S.W.2d 805 (1986); Logan v. State, 300 Ark. 35, 776 S.W.2d 341 (1989); Rorex v. State, 31 Ark. App. 127, 790 S.W.2d 180 (1990); Dillard v. State, 313 Ark. 439, 855 S.W.2d 909 (1993); Cooper v. State, 317 Ark. 485, 879 S.W.2d 405 (1994); Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 532, 878 S.W.2d 750 (1994); Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87, 884 S.W.2d 248 (1994); Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995); Ridling v. State, 348 Ark. 213, 72 S.W.3d 466 (2002); Small v. State, 371 Ark. 244, 264 S.W.3d 512 (2007); Allen v. State, 374 Ark. 309, 287 S.W.3d 579 (2008); Woodall v. State, 2011 Ark. 22, 376 S.W.3d 408 (2011).