Ark. Code Ann. § 18-16-101 (2020)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Goforth, Arkansas Code § 18-16-101: A Challenge to the Constitutionality and Desirability of Arkansas' Criminal Eviction Statute, 2003 Arkansas L. Notes 21.

Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 et seq., 2008 Ark. L. Notes 71.

Bryan Foster, The Purpose of Criminal Evictions: Applying the Theories of Punishment to Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2018 Ark. L. Notes 1993.

Ark. L. Rev.

Britta Palmer Stamps, Recent Developments: Pulaski County Circuit Court Judge Herbert Wright Invalidated Arkansas's “Failure to Vacate” Statute, 68 Ark. L. Rev. 531 (2015).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Property, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Survey, Miscellaneous — Property, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 386.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Property Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 549.

Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Laws: Report to Governor Mike Beebe, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Speaker of the House December 31, 2012, 35 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 739 (2013).

Lynn Foster, The Hands of the State: The Failure to Vacate Statute and Residential Tenants’ Rights In Arkansas, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1 (2013).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section does not deprive a defendant of rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Poole v. State, 244 Ark. 1222, 428 S.W.2d 628 (1968); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989).

Although landlords could use this section to evict tenants thus avoiding the use of civil processes which afford the tenant prior notice and hearing, the state was acting within its constitutional authority in providing criminal penalties for tenants who fail to pay rent so long as the federal rights of the tenants are protected by the state courts. Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1976); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989).

Criminal Trespass.

The criminal trespass statute, § 5-39-203, does not apply to a case where a renter, who is served with a valid notice to quit based upon failure to pay rent, refuses to vacate the premises, in view of the more specific statutes regulating a tenant's unlawful detainer, § 18-60-304 and this section. Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923 (1985).

Evidence.

Defendant was guilty of violating this section where written lease agreement contained no term and was a tenancy at will, and when landlord demanded he vacate or pay rent, he did neither. Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 772 S.W.2d 368 (1989).

Injunction.

The possibility of criminal prosecution under this section was not per se irreparable injury, so that tenants were not entitled to a preliminary injunction against prosecution for failure to pay rent. Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1976).

In the absence of intentional conduct motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose, evidence of bad faith was insufficient to justify a preliminary injunction against prosecution under this section. Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1976).

Jury Instructions.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions on the unlawful detainer statute and the criminal possession of real property statute because the instructions were correct statements of the law since they tracked the statutory language of § 18-60-304(2) and subsection (a) and subdivision (b)(1) of this section; there was some basis in the evidence to give the instructions because the lawfulness of the respective parties' legal right to possess real property bore on the issue of punitive damages, and the evidence did not demonstrate that an unlawful detainer action or misdemeanor charges were ever filed, but it was evident that there could have been grounds for such civil or criminal proceedings given the evidence adduced at trial. Schmidt v. Stearman, 2010 Ark. App. 274, 374 S.W.3d 254 (2010).

Notice.

Thirty days after service of notice to vacate constituted a reasonable period in which to vacate for a tenancy at will, and tenant became a trespasser at the end of 30 days after such notice. Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 772 S.W.2d 368 (1989).

Parties.

Where the two owners of undivided interests in land contracted with a third party, also owner of an undivided interest, to lease lands to the third party, one owner-lessor could not procure a cancellation of the lease for failure to pay rent by the third party without joining the other owner-lessor in the proceeding. La Fargue v. La Fargue, 210 Ark. 97, 194 S.W.2d 438 (1946).

Sentence.

Court erred in imposing a sentence of 30 days' imprisonment for a violation of this section as the offense is classified as a violation and is subject to punishment only in accordance with the limitations of this section. Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989).

Cited: Parker v. Brush, 276 Ark. 437, 637 S.W.2d 539 (1982); Breshears v. State, 94 Ark. App. 192, 228 S.W.3d 508 (2006).