Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Davis, Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 193.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Assault, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 365.

Case Notes

Accomplices.

No accomplice criminal responsibility results from supplying an intoxicant to one allegedly responsible as a principal for violations of subsection (a) of this section, § 5-10-104(a)(1), or § 27-53-101(a)(1). Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Acts Constituting Assault.

Shooting into a crowd was an assault upon each member of the crowd. Scott v. State, 49 Ark. 156, 4 S.W. 750 (1887) (decision under prior law).

Drawing a knife and advancing toward the prosecuting witness constituted an assault, although the prosecuting witness fled and the defendant did not follow. Wells v. State, 108 Ark. 312, 157 S.W. 389 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant drew a cocked shotgun on complainant, there was a presumption that shotgun was loaded. Ball v. State, 192 Ark. 858, 95 S.W.2d 632 (1936) (decision under prior law).

If the jury believed, as it could from the evidence, the victim did not engage in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to the defendant, or that the circumstances did not demonstrate that the victim acted with extreme indifference to the value of human life, then it could not have concluded that he had committed an aggravated assault. Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32 (1979).

Evidence held sufficient where defendant made a threatening statement, pointed a pistol at the victims and then cocked the hammer; based on this evidence, the trier of fact could infer from the circumstances that the gun was loaded. Schwede v. State, 49 Ark. App. 87, 896 S.W.2d 454 (1995).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was proper because there was evidence that defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical injury, as defined in § 5-1-102(21); defendant hit the victim with the butt of a pistol with sufficient force to knock the victim down, breaking facial bones and causing the victim's eye to swell shut. Pitts v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 228 (2012).

Defendant's actions in following the victims, driving toward the victims in his car at full speed, and running from the scene after hitting one of the victims constituted substantial evidence supporting his aggravated assault conviction. Guana-Lopez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 204 (2014).

Codefendants.

One defendant was not liable for an unexpected assault by his codefendant. Le Laurin v. Murray, 75 Ark. 232, 87 S.W. 131 (1905) (decision under prior law).

Construction With Other Law.

Defendant's Arkansas aggravated assault conviction was not a violent felony under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act's force clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because subdivision (a)(1) of this section only required the government to prove conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury. United States v. Jordan, 812 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 2016).

Defense or Justification.

The person assaulted went to the defendant's house and threatened to kill him and followed him with a gun making violent threats was admissible only in mitigation of the punishment and not as a justification where, at the time the assault was committed, the person assaulted had laid down his gun and was going away. Stricklin v. State, 67 Ark. 349, 56 S.W. 270 (1900) (decision under prior law).

A parent could defend a child against an unlawful assault by the other parent. Cox v. State, 99 Ark. 90, 136 S.W. 989 (1911) (decision under prior law).

The burden was upon the one who committed the assault to show that he was justified. Robertson v. Sisk, 115 Ark. 461, 171 S.W. 880 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Because defendant presented evidence arguably supporting self defense or a justification defense to a charge of aggravated assault under Arkansas law, the government had to negate that defense by a preponderance of the evidence for an enhancement for using the firearm in connection with another felony offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) [now (b)(6)] (2005), to apply because whether circumstances negated defendant's excuse or justification was an element of the offense under § 5-1-102(5)(C), which had to be proved by the state under § 5-1-111(a)(1), and the definition of aggravated assault expressly excluded any person acting in self-defense or the defense of a third party under subdivision (c)(2) of this section. United States v. Raglin, 500 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2007).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the district court's finding that defendant's use of deadly physical force under § 5-2-601(2) and (6)(B), which occurred when he pointed a loaded pistol at an undercover officer, was not justified or in self defense, and thus, he was guilty of the felony of aggravated assault under Arkansas law, and the four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) [now (b)(6)] was properly imposed because (1) defendant did not act in self-defense within the meaning of subdivision (c)(2) of this section as he used deadly force against men who had obeyed his command to leave his property and who were loitering on the public sidewalk in front of his house as there was no evidence they were imminently endangering defendant's life under § 5-2-607(a); (2) under § 5-2-607(b)(1), defendant could not use deadly force after he had retreated safely to his house and returned later, unprovoked, to threaten the men; (3) defendant's conduct was not justified as permissible defense of his property within the purview of § 5-2-608 because use of deadly physical force was not authorized by § 5-2-607, and he had no reason to believe that the men who had quietly obeyed a command to leave his property would come back to commit arson or burglary; and (4) defendant's conduct was not justified to defend his home under § 5-2-620 because the men defendant assaulted were not attempting to enter his home, so the statute did not apply. United States v. Raglin, 500 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2007).

Denial of defendant's motion for a brain injury examination did not deprive defendant of a basic tool for his defense as defendant was examined by a psychologist and he failed to object to the admission of the psychologist's report into evidence; defendant could not assert that failure to appoint a head-injury expert rose to the level of protection afforded by the third Wicks exception as (1) defendant was given an opportunity by the trial court to renew the motion for an appointment of the expert but he failed to do so, (2) it was not the trial court's duty to adequately prepare and present defendant's defense, and (3) defendant's argument could not be reviewed as an issue that fell within the purview of Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 10(b)(iv) because it was not a serious error requiring the trial court to intervene and issue an admonition or declare a mistrial. Springs v. State, 368 Ark. 256, 244 S.W.3d 683 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 939, 127 S. Ct. 2257, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1100 (2007).

Trial court did not err in sustaining state's objection that the terms of the civil dispute regarding a loan and the collateral for the loan were irrelevant and in refusing to permit defendant to question the victim concerning the property that had been collateral for the loan because, even if the victim had lied regarding the terms of the loan, that would be no defense to the crimes for which he was convicted, which included kidnapping, terroristic threatening, and aggravated assault. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

In a bench trial resulting in defendant's convictions for aggravated assault on a family member and aggravated assault, the circuit court erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider the defense of justification by ruling that defendant could not present the inconsistent defenses of a general denial and justification; where there is evidence that would support a finding of self-defense, case law has held that a jury instruction is appropriate notwithstanding defendant's testimony that he did not commit the crime. Thus, the circuit court committed an error of law in ruling that defendant was required to choose between the defenses of general denial and justification. Gray v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 543, 590 S.W.3d 177 (2019).

Double Jeopardy.

Where the prosecutor's reference to the fact that defendant had been drinking was indirect and brief, the state did not use defendant's conduct of operating a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition to prove the assault charge; therefore, the state did not establish an essential element of the assault offense by proving conduct constituting an offense for which defendant had already been prosecuted and, therefore, defendant was not placed in double jeopardy. Kaspar v. State, 41 Ark. App. 158, 852 S.W.2d 141 (1993).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in and use of a firearm in commission of a felony in violation of § 16-90-120 did not subject defendant to double jeopardy as the § 16-90-120 conviction was used to enhance defendant's sentence. Davis v. State, 93 Ark. App. 443, 220 S.W.3d 248 (2005).

Trial court properly denied appellant postconviction relief because he failed to show a double-jeopardy violation arising out of the charges for commission of a terroristic act, criminal attempt to commit first-degree battery, and aggravated assault; there were six separate criminal violations resulting from six separate impulses in the firing of six separate shots. Lee v. State, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43 (2017).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. Hogan v. State, 224 Ark. 191, 272 S.W.2d 312 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Where there was evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life and that he purposely engaged in a course of conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to the victim there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for aggravated assault. Vann v. State, 14 Ark. App. 1, 684 S.W.2d 265 (1985).

In proving that a defendant acted purposely to support a conviction for aggravated assault, it is only necessary to show that the defendant manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life and that he purposely engaged in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious injury. It is the conduct that must be undertaken purposefully, not the intended result; so long as the defendant purposely engaged in the required conduct, his intent in doing so does not matter. Neely v. State, 18 Ark. App. 122, 711 S.W.2d 482 (1986).

Where there was abundant evidence of the defendant's guilt of aggravated assault, other testimony was held harmless error. Jarreau v. State, 291 Ark. 60, 722 S.W.2d 565 (1987).

Evidence not sufficient to support conviction where defendant, after police officer ordered him to halt, backed up until he was behind a car and pulled a pistol out of his pocket, but where defendant did not point the pistol in the officer's direction or expressly threaten the officer. Wooten v. State, 32 Ark. App. 198, 799 S.W.2d 560 (1990).

Victim's pretrial and in-court identifications of the defendant were unequivocal and clearly constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude without having to speculate that defendant was the perpetrator. Stipes v. State, 315 Ark. 719, 870 S.W.2d 388 (1994).

Evidence held sufficient to support the conviction for criminal use of a prohibited weapon and aggravated assault. Robinson v. State, 49 Ark. App. 58, 896 S.W.2d 442 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and aggravated assault on a family member when, among other things, evidence showed that defendant drove a car in an attempt to run over the victim, the father of her child, and his girlfriend. Williams v. State, 96 Ark. App. 277, 241 S.W.3d 290 (2006).

Defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence where it was shown that (1) shortly after the incident, defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .23 percent, (2) defendant was driving the car that hit two women and narrowly missed a third, (3) just before the impact, defendant was witnessed to speed up and actually swerve the vehicle toward the women's path, and (4) defendant drove away after the impact. Estacuy v. State, 94 Ark. App. 183, 228 S.W.3d 567 (2006).

Offense of terroristic threatening required no more than the communication of a threat, by word or deed, with the purpose of terrorizing the victim, and the offense of aggravated assault was accomplished when defendant displayed the gun and pointed it at the victim; given the testimony that defendant kept the doorway blocked for several minutes after performing those acts and that the victim was prevented from summoning assistance during that time, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the kidnapping conviction. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, theft of property, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing because while the state did not prove that defendant actually entered a bank, it did provide substantial evidence that he was the driver of the getaway car and thus was an accomplice of the two men who committed the aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and theft of property; after an officer turned on his blue lights, defendant accelerated to a speed of 100 miles per hour and struck an SUV, causing it to flip and resulting in injuries to the driver, and that conduct sufficiently satisfied the elements of aggravated assault and fleeing. Barber v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 210, 374 S.W.3d 709 (2010).

Although there was not substantial evidence to support defendant's convictions for aggravated assault pursuant to subsection (a) of this section with respect to defendant sideswiping a victim's vehicle on an interstate, under § 5-1-110(b), the evidence would clearly sustain convictions for the lesser-included offense of first degree assault under § 5-13-205(a); the testimony established defendant acted recklessly when he approached the victim's vehicle from the rear, going very fast, and in passing the victim's vehicle on the left, defendant sideswiped the vehicle. Mance v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 472 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain an aggravated assault conviction under this section because defendant had complete control of his pit bull, and he directed the dog to attack an officer; by instructing his dog to “get” the officer, defendant intentionally engaged in conduct that put the officer at risk of being bitten by the dog. Banks v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 249 (2011).

Although the circuit court erred in allowing the results of defendant's blood-alcohol test into evidence since the state failed to provide evidence that the blood was drawn by a physician or a person acting under the direction and supervision of a physician as required by this section, defendant was properly convicted of negligent homicide in violation of § 5-10-105 and aggravated assault in violation of this section because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's intoxication; while the only evidence regarding the concentration of alcohol in defendant's blood came from the blood test, there was sufficient evidence at trial to support defendant's conviction on the alternative theory that defendant negligently caused the victim's death as a result of operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Bates v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 446, 384 S.W.3d 654 (2011).

There was sufficient evidence to support the revocation of defendant's suspended sentences based on his commission of aggravated because he purposely engaged in conduct that created a substantial danger of serious physical injury to the victim and there was no requirement that he verbally convey his intentions to the victim or that the knife be produced where the victim identified the use of a knife as a weapon, and his credibility with regard to it was properly determined by the fact finder. Flurry v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 128 (2014).

Defendant admitted to shooting his gun multiple times in the vicinity of his wife and his friend, and that only his friend was injured did not negate the danger of death or injury that his wife was exposed to in this situation; substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. Frazier v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 191 (2014).

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict on an aggravated assault charge where, after realizing that he would be unable to escape from two police officers pursuing him, he turned towards one officer and held a knife in a threatening manner, the officer was able to strike appellant with his baton and take away the knife, and thus, appellant was close enough to the officer to cause serious physical injury. Freeman v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 36, 480 S.W.3d 886 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction, given that defendant had beaten the victim repeatedly while she was bound in such a position that she had to hold her head up in order not to choke, photographs depicted serious injuries to her face, head, and neck, and defendant threatened to kill her and talked about disposing of her body. Reynolds v. State, 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491 (2016).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's aggravated-assault convictions because defendant pointed a gun at a customer inside a bank and fired a shot at close range before exiting the bank and firing a shot toward a second victim; that conduct created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to the victims. Hamilton v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 447, 526 S.W.3d 859 (2017).

There was sufficient evidence that the juvenile committed aggravated assault where the juvenile's flight led the officers to a wet, slippery concrete drainage canal that was poorly lit, the juvenile had his hand on a gun in his pocket as he was continuing to resist arrest and physically tussling with the officer trying to subdue him, the juvenile continued to struggle against an officer who was already suffering from a significant arm injury due to a slip and fall, the officer did not draw his weapon, and his injury made him vulnerable to the potential of being shot while trying to wrest the gun from the juvenile. J.N.A. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 502, 532 S.W.3d 582 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault because the State introduced sufficient proof that defendant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life where he repeatedly delivered blows to the victim's face and choked her into unconsciousness. Even if the appellate court credited defendant's argument that the State failed to prove that he engaged in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury, the State did not fail to prove that he impeded or prevented the respiration of another person or circulation of another person's blood as the victim testified that defendant choked her until she was unconscious. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 219, 547 S.W.3d 709 (2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction given testimony that defendant pulled out a gun and waved it at the victim's father when trying to take the victim's child and threatened to shoot the father (no-merit brief). Kelley v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 71, 568 S.W.3d 801 (2019).

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that defendant's conduct created “a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury” to a police officer to support the conviction for aggravated assault because the evidence established that defendant was physically fighting and resisting an armed police officer who was unprepared to defend himself; the officer's gun could have discharged; and the officer was unable to complete defendant's arrest until another officer arrived to assist. Stuart v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 131 (2020).

—Pointing a Gun.

Assault committed where defendant, after a previous argument with one victim, pointed a gun at that victim and another; although the defendant did not verbally threaten the victims, the fact that a gun is pointed at someone is enough to create a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Harris v. State, 72 Ark. App. 227, 35 S.W.3d 819 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault where the defendant pointed a gun at another person and a search of her vehicle, shortly thereafter, found a loaded gun with one round chambered and the safety off. Dillehay v. State, 74 Ark. App. 100, 46 S.W.3d 545 (2001).

Because defendant did not point the gun at the officer or expressly threaten the officer, defendant was not guilty of aggravated assault. Swaim v. State, 78 Ark. App. 176, 79 S.W.3d 853 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of aggravated assault as pointing a loaded handgun at someone was enough to create a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury. Martinez v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 187, 545 S.W.3d 264 (2018).

Instructions.

Where it was sought to convict a peace officer of an aggravated assault by proof that he used more violence in making an arrest than was necessary and the court charged the jury that if defendant used greater force or violence in making the arrest than was apparently necessary, he would not be justified, it was error to refuse a further instruction asked by the defendant to the effect that the defendant had a right to protect himself from serious bodily injury even though it subsequently appeared that he used more force than was actually necessary. Gillespie v. State, 69 Ark. 573, 64 S.W. 947 (1901) (decision under prior law).

Where trial court forcefully told jury that it could not convict defendant of assault with intent to kill unless the offense would have been murder had the victim died, contention by defendant that court's instruction placed excessive and unfair emphasis on the crime of murder was without merit. Doyle v. State, 253 Ark. 844, 489 S.W.2d 793 (1973) (decision under prior law).

In a prosecution for assault with intent to rape, where the defendant was guilty of an aggravated assault or assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not err in refusing instruction on a simple assault. Frederick v. State, 258 Ark. 553, 528 S.W.2d 362 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Evidence and the defense offered by defendant required trial court to give lesser included instructions requested by defendant. Fladung v. State, 292 Ark. 510, 730 S.W.2d 901 (1987).

Intent.

The principal difference between aggravated assault and assault in the first degree is that one who commits an aggravated assault must act purposely, but one who commits an assault in the first degree need only act recklessly. Rust v. State, 263 Ark. 350, 565 S.W.2d 19 (1978); Neely v. State, 18 Ark. App. 122, 711 S.W.2d 482 (1986).

Substantial evidence supported conclusion that defendant acted with necessary indifference to value of human life and purpose to prove aggravated assault. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).

Sufficient evidence established defendant had the necessary purposeful intent, as defined in § 5-2-202(1), to commit aggravated assault in violation of subsection (a) of this section with respect to a vehicular incident on a local road because the victim testified defendant stopped his car, put it in reverse, and rammed into the victim's vehicle enough times and with enough force to cause her vehicle to spin; the victim's testimony constituted substantial evidence that it was defendant's conscious object to engage in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to the victim and her infant son, who was also in the car. Mance v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 472 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported a finding that defendant had the required purpose for aggravated assault when he discharged a gun in the direction of a step that was three steps down from where the victim was standing. Defendant's explanation of the gun accidentally firing did not match the physical evidence of bullet fragments found near a pock mark on the first step to the front porch and both the victim (an officer who had not identified himself) and defendant being wounded. Montalvo v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 119 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an appropriate motion for directed verdict because appellant failed to show that the motion, even if properly preserved for appeal, would have been meritorious; it was not necessary for the State to demonstrate he aimed the gun at the individual occupants of the house or intended to shoot them because firing the gun in the direction of the victim and the home placed the victim and the occupants' lives in danger and demonstrated the requisite indifference. Lee v. State, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43 (2017).

Lesser Included Offenses.

An assault was included in the charge of robbery. Fox v. State, 50 Ark. 528, 8 S.W. 836 (1888) (decision under prior law).

One could not violate former section dealing with the drawing of deadly weapons without also violating former section defining assault, as the element of assault entered into the higher crime. Sullivan v. State, 131 Ark. 107, 198 S.W. 518 (1917) (decision under prior law).

Aggravated assault held to be a lesser included offense to the charge of criminal attempt to commit capital murder. Moore v. State, 280 Ark. 222, 656 S.W.2d 698 (1983); James v. State, 280 Ark. 359, 658 S.W.2d 382 (1983).

It was permissible for the jury to reject the more serious charge of attempted first degree murder, which would require a finding of a higher degree of culpability than was required of the lesser included offense, and to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated assault. Maples v. State, 16 Ark. App. 175, 698 S.W.2d 807 (1985).

Defendant committed aggravated robbery offense when he entered trailer and announced his intent to rob victims; subsequent actions constituted a separate offense, viz., aggravated assault. Birchett v. State, 294 Ark. 176, 741 S.W.2d 267 (1987).

Aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, arising from the same incident, overlap. Bishop v. State, 294 Ark. 303, 742 S.W.2d 911 (1988), overruled in part, Matthews v. State, 2009 Ark. 321, 319 S.W.3d 266 (2009).

Aggravated and first degree assault are not lesser included offenses of resisting arrest. Enoch v. State, 37 Ark. App. 103, 826 S.W.2d 291 (1992).

Where there was no proof presented that defendant did not have a weapon during the aggravated robbery, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct on the lesser included offenses of robbery and aggravated assault. Tarkington v. State, 313 Ark. 399, 855 S.W.2d 306 (1993).

First-degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser-included offenses of reckless driving and are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Sherman v. State, 326 Ark. 153, 931 S.W.2d 417 (1996).

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on aggravated assault during defendant's trial for aggravated robbery because aggravated assault, in violation of subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) of this section, was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery pursuant to § 5-1-110(b)(1) as the two offenses required different elements of proof; aggravated assault required proof of circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, whereas aggravated robbery did not require such proof. Matthews v. State, 2009 Ark. 321, 319 S.W.3d 266 (2009).

Preservation for Review.

Because defendant, who was convicted under subdivsion (a)(2) of this section, failed to raise the arguments he made on appeal to the circuit court, his arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions were not preserved for review; neither of the arguments defendant made on appeal was the argument he made to the circuit court in his directed-verdict motions. Sampson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 160, 544 S.W.3d 580 (2018).

Cited: Warren v. State, 272 Ark. 231, 613 S.W.2d 97 (1981); Bell v. Lockhart, 741 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1984); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d 718 (1985); Jones v. State, 27 Ark. App. 24, 765 S.W.2d 15 (1989); Parker v. State, 300 Ark. 360, 779 S.W.2d 156 (1989); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990); Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992); Cooper v. State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 205 (1996); Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (1996); Sanders v. State, 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315 (1996).