Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-203 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Harbison v. State: Just Say No to a Usable Amount, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 425.

The Culpability, or Mens Rea, “Defense” in Arkansas, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 805 (2000).

Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Recent Developments: Felony Conviction for Recklessly Violating the State's Drug-and-Paraphernalia-Possession Laws Does Not Prevent Readmission to the Arkansas Bar, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 601 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Criminal Law — Controlled Substances — Arkansas Adopts the Useable Amount Standard. Harbison v. State, 302 Ark. 315, 790 S.W.2d 146, 4 A.L.R.5th 1025 (1990), 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Case Notes

Establishment.

Criminal purpose or intent is a state of mind that is not ordinarily susceptible to proof by direct evidence; it may be inferred from facts and circumstances shown to have existed at the time. Chadwell v. State, 37 Ark. App. 9, 822 S.W.2d 402 (1992).

Appellate court found no merit in defendant's argument that he was merely rhetorically questioning a 14-year-old girl about sex, rather than soliciting her, and that he had no intent to make such a statement where there was testimony that he offered to pay money in exchange for sex, that he offered her more money after she refused him, and that he kissed her on the neck after encouraging the young boys in her charge to kiss her. Heape v. State, 87 Ark. App. 370, 192 S.W.3d 281 (2004).

Legislative Intent.

In a first-degree felony murder case, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention that it erred in deciding Perry v. State and Hill v. State by failing to apply subsection (b) of this section. Contrary to defendant's suggestion that its decisions ignored the legislature's mandate stated in subsection (b), the Supreme Court's felony-murder jurisprudence was in concert with the legislature's intent. Holian v. State, 2013 Ark. 7 (2013).

Possession of Weapons.

Where a deputy found that defendant had an improvised weapon hidden in his sock while incarcerated at the county jail and defendant said he possessed the weapon because he was “tired of the brutality and he had to do what he had to do”, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that defendant knowingly possessed the weapon for the infliction of serious physical injury or death, in violation of § 5-73-131. Owens v. State, 92 Ark. App. 480, 215 S.W.3d 681 (2005).

Purposely.

Defendant was properly convicted of second-degree assault against a family member because there was substantial evidence that he entered the victim's home with the purpose of assaulting her. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 234, 459 S.W.3d 821 (2015).

Recklessly.

Because the attorney committed the drug and drug paraphernalia possession crimes with only a reckless mental state under § 5-2-202(3) and subsection (b) of this section, had been rehabilitated, had successfully completed his suspended sentence, and had successfully established his present mental and emotional stability and good moral character, the attorney was not prevented from being readmitted to the Arkanses Bar under Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Reg. Prof'l Conduct § 24(B)(2), and his request for readmission to the Arkansas Bar pursuant to Ark. R. Admis. Bar XIII(G) was granted. In re Haynes, 2013 Ark. 102, 426 S.W.3d 411 (2013).

Although the circuit court in a bench trial incorrectly held that the applicable culpable mental state was strict liability in a DWI case under § 5-65-103 that did not involve alcohol, defendant's conviction was affirmed where the circuit court made an alternative finding under the correct standard that the State had submitted proof sufficient to satisfy reckless conduct under subsection (b) of this section and § 5-2-202; the testimony of the officer, the pharmacist expert, and the defendant provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant acted recklessly in taking prescribed barbiturates (for her migraine) and then operating a motor vehicle. Cordero v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 484, 588 S.W.3d 369 (2019).

Requirement and Establishment.

Where a statute does not contain or specify the culpable mental state required for its violation, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Criminal Code recognizes three distinct culpable mental states under the section to sustain a conviction. Coleman v. State, 12 Ark. App. 214, 671 S.W.2d 221 (1984).

The Omnibus Driving While Intoxicated Act of 1983 is valid even though it does not require a culpable mental state pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Price v. State, 285 Ark. 148, 685 S.W.2d 506 (1985).

The “Use of Prohibited Weapons” statute, § 5-73-104, does not create a strict liability offense; it requires proof of a culpable mental state. State v. Setzer, 302 Ark. 593, 791 S.W.2d 365 (1990).

Where mandatory language contained within § 27-53-101 did not explicitly enunciate any particular mental state, but instead stated that a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, this mandatory language was a clear indication that the accident-causing driver's mental state was irrelevant. Stivers v. State, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003).

Circuit court erred in ruling that the Omnibus DWI Act of 1983 is a strict liability statute that does not require proof of a culpable mens rea. As the DWI statute, codified at § 5-65-103, does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state has to be imputed to the offense through the plain language of this section; and the offense is not subject to the statutory exception in § 5-2-204(c)(2) because the offense is included in the Criminal Code. Leeka v. State, 2015 Ark. 183, 461 S.W.3d 331 (2015) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court erred in concluding that § 5-64-411 does not require a culpable mental state. Section 5-64-411 adds an enhanced sentence for a person found guilty of certain offenses, including that for which appellant was convicted, only if an additional requirement is met, i.e., the location where the act was committed; thus, § 5-64-411 defines an offense. Small v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 80, 543 S.W.3d 516 (2018).

Because a circuit court erred in ruling that a sentencing-enhancement offense under § 5-64-411, for delivery of hydrocodone within 1,000 feet of a church, did not require a culpable mental state and improperly instructed the jury, reversal and remand were required; a culpable mental state is imputed under this section when the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state. Silmon v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 388, 557 S.W.3d 266 (2018).

Use of Weapons.

Section 5-73-104, prohibiting use of certain weapons, does not create a strict liability offense; under subsection (b) of this section, if a statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required. Yocum v. State, 325 Ark. 180, 925 S.W.2d 385 (1996).

Cited: Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W.2d 81 (1977); Menard v. State, 16 Ark. App. 219, 699 S.W.2d 412 (1985); Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 720 S.W.2d 900 (1986); Bargery v. State, 37 Ark. App. 118, 825 S.W.2d 831 (1992); McDougal v. State, 324 Ark. 354, 922 S.W.2d 323 (1996); Avery v. State, 93 Ark. App. 112, 217 S.W.3d 162 (2005); Edwards v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 59, 377 S.W.3d 271 (2010); French v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 502, 563 S.W.3d 582 (2018).