Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-102 (2026)

Case Notes

Construction.

This section does not authorize a court to alter the elements of one type of theft offense, which has not been amended, by applying to it a statute that amends a different theft offense. Coleman v. State, 327 Ark. 381, 938 S.W.2d 845 (1997).

Purpose.

All stolen property crimes were consolidated into the crime of theft by the Criminal Code, the intention being to eliminate needless wrangling over the question whether particular conduct that is obviously criminal constitutes one offense rather than another. State v. Reeves, 264 Ark. 622, 574 S.W.2d 647 (1978), cert. denied, Reeves v. Arkansas, 441 U.S. 964, 99 S. Ct. 2412 (1979).

Conversion.

Conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over property in denial of, or inconsistent with, the owner's right. The conversion need not be a manual taking or for the defendant's use; if the defendant exercises control over the goods in exclusion, or defiance, of the plaintiff's right, it is a conversion whether it is for his own use or another's use. Forehand v. First Bank, 315 Ark. 282, 867 S.W.2d 431 (1993).

Distinction Between Theft Types.

Distinction between types of theft has been abolished under Arkansas law; the statute explicitly states that theft of property embraces the separate offenses previously known as larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, and other similar offenses. Henson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 703, 450 S.W.3d 677 (2014).

Evidence.

Meaningful distinction cannot be drawn, for purposes of Evid. Rule 608(b), relating to specific instances of conduct, between embezzlement and other forms of theft. Sitz v. State, 23 Ark. App. 126, 743 S.W.2d 18 (1988).

Where it was undisputed that a theft occurred, and defendant's receipt of the goods with knowledge or good reason to believe they had been stolen could be established by his confession, the state did not have to independently prove each specific element of the offense of theft by receiving to establish the corpus delicti. Hart v. State, 301 Ark. 200, 783 S.W.2d 40 (1990).

Appellants' convictions for theft of property were affirmed because substantial evidence supported the convictions where (1) while appellants maintained they were simply running a business and made some poor business decisions, the testimony of the victims established a pattern of taking and exercising unauthorized control over the victims' money with the purpose of depriving the victims of their money; (2) the pattern demonstrated that appellants sold items to the victims, accepted the victims' money, purposefully and knowingly delayed delivery of the merchandise, and offered multiple and most often untrue excuses for why the orders did not arrive; and (3) the evidence showed that appellants would tell customers that an item was in shipping, was shipped in the wrong color, back ordered, or damaged in shipping. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 848 (2009).

Indictment, Information or Charge.

Amending the charge to theft by deception changed neither the nature nor the degree of the crime charged, since both prior to and after the amendment, the defendant was charged with the theft of property having a value of $2,500 or more, a Class B felony; the only variation between the initial charge and the charge as amended was the alleged manner of the commission of the theft. Prokos v. State, 266 Ark. 50, 582 S.W.2d 36 (1979).

Provisions of this section allow a charge of theft to be proved notwithstanding specification of a different manner in the information or indictment. Martin v. State, 272 Ark. 376, 614 S.W.2d 512 (1981).

Instructions.

Where the challenged instruction merely set out the law applicable to the issue of false arrest, and where the instruction did not advise the jury that any presumption had been established by the evidence adduced at trial, but to the contrary, advised the jury that if they found the facts to meet the requisites for the statutory presumption, then their verdict should be for defendant, the instruction given was not erroneous. Dawson v. Pay Less Shoes #904 Co., 269 Ark. 23, 598 S.W.2d 83 (1980).

Separate Offenses.

The legislature did not intend to create a statute that would merge an instance of theft-by-receiving, under § 5-36-106, that is committed in one jurisdiction with an instance of theft-of-property, under § 5-36-103, committed in a second jurisdiction; clearly, the two crimes are separate and distinct, and an interpretation of this section that the two offenses merge is particularly untenable when applied to factual circumstances wherein the theft crimes are not committed in the same criminal episode. Nelson v. State, 350 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.3d 909 (2002).

Value.

Stolen property in which victim has either a proprietory or possessory interest may be aggregated to determine grade of offense. Phillips v. State, 297 Ark. 368, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988).

Cited: Bailey v. State, 266 Ark. 260, 583 S.W.2d 62 (1979); White v. State, 271 Ark. 692, 610 S.W.2d 266 (1981); Addington v. State, 2 Ark. App. 7, 616 S.W.2d 742 (1981); Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982); Roberts v. State, 281 Ark. 218, 663 S.W.2d 178 (1984); Culhane v. State, 282 Ark. 286, 668 S.W.2d 24 (1984); Kroger Co. v. Standard, 283 Ark. 44, 670 S.W.2d 803 (1984); Thompson v. State, 284 Ark. 403, 682 S.W.2d 742 (1985); Mendenhall v. Skaggs Cos., 285 Ark. 236, 685 S.W.2d 805 (1985); Garrison v. State, 13 Ark. App. 245, 682 S.W.2d 772 (1985); In re Hoffman, 70 B.R. 155 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); Tippitt v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989); Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1989); Jenkins v. State, 60 Ark. App. 1, 959 S.W.2d 57 (1997); Miller v. Kroger Co., 82 Ark. App. 281, 105 S.W.3d 789 (2003).