Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (2026)
Obstructing governmental operations
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A person commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the person:
- Knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of any governmental function;
- Knowingly refuses to provide information requested by an employee of a governmental agency relating to the investigation of a case brought under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and is the physical custodian of the child in the case;
- Fails to submit to court-ordered scientific testing by a noninvasive procedure to determine the paternity of a child in a case brought under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; or
- Falsely identifies himself or herself to a law enforcement officer or a code enforcement officer.
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- Obstructing governmental operations by using or threatening to use physical force is a Class A misdemeanor.
- A second or subsequent offense of obstructing governmental operations under subdivision (a)(4) of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
- Otherwise, obstructing governmental operations is a Class C misdemeanor.
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This section does not apply to:
- Unlawful flight by a person charged with an offense;
- Refusal to submit to arrest;
- Any means of avoiding compliance with the law not involving affirmative interference with a governmental function unless specifically set forth in this section; or
- Obstruction, impairment, or hindrance of what a person reasonably believes is a public servant's unlawful action.
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- As used in this section, “code enforcement officer” means an individual charged with the duty of enforcing a municipal code, municipal ordinance, or municipal regulation as defined by a municipal code, municipal ordinance, or municipal regulation.
- “Code enforcement officer” includes a municipal animal control officer.
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 2802; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-2802; Acts 1995, No. 1182, § 1; 1999, No. 577, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 453; 2007, No. 163, § 1; 2009, No. 342, § 1; 2009, No. 748, § 25.
Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 342 inserted “or a code enforcement officer” in (a)(4) and made a related change; and added (d).
The 2009 amendment by No. 748 made stylistic changes in (b)(2).
Research References
ALR.
Criminal and Civil Liability of Civilians and Police Officers Concerning Recording of Police Actions. 84 A.L.R.6th 89.
Case Notes
Evidence Held Insufficient.
Where arrestee who sued police officer and city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleged that he was arrested merely because (1) he watched the police officer as he spoke with two young men from a distance, (2) during the incident arrestee spoke only when spoken to, and (3) arrestee complied with a request for identification, and where police officer admitted some of those facts but asserted that arrestee was arrested only after he refused to move, the court properly denied officer summary judgment based on qualified immunity; under those circumstances, no officer reasonably could have believed he had probable cause to arrest the arrestee for obstruction of justice or any other offense. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2005).
Evidence Held Sufficient.
Evidence that defendant exited his residence and began screaming at officers who were investigating a possible drunk driver who had been stopped in defendant's driveway, causing the suspect to stop cooperating with the police investigation, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of obstructing governmental operations. Kelley v. State, 75 Ark. App. 144, 55 S.W.3d 309 (2001).
Obstruction adjudication was supported by the evidence, because the juvenile was given a lawful command to return to his room by a law-enforcement officer and failed to abide by it. R.B. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 377 (2013).
Search and Seizure.
Vehicle passenger, who was allegedly arrested by a state police officer for refusing to provide identification, stated a claim against the officer for a Fourth Amendment violation. There was no probable cause to arrest the passenger under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for obstructing the performance of a governmental function; the officer's authority under Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2 to request information did not provide probable cause because there was no showing that the passenger had a duty under Arkansas law to furnish identification. Stufflebeam v. Harris, 521 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2008).
Cited: Price v. State, 276 Ark. 80, 632 S.W.2d 429 (1982); Robinson v. Beaumont, 291 Ark. 477, 725 S.W.2d 839 (1987); Nelson v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 421 (2013).