Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Child Support Supported: Policy Trumps Equity in Martin v. Pierce Despite Fraud and a Controversial Amendment to the Paternity Code, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 571.

Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments: Putative Father Entitled to Paternity Test Only During the Period of Time That He Is Required to Pay Child Support, 65 Ark. L. Rev. 517 (2012).

Brittany Horn, Case Note: Who's Your Daddy? State v. Perry and Its Impact on Paternity and the Rights of Adjudicated Fathers in Arkansas, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 1059 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Family Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 200.

Shively, Survey of Family Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 624.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Case Notes

Purpose.

The major purpose of Arkansas' filiation laws is to provide a process by which the putative father can be identified so that he may assume his equitable share of the responsibility to his child. Eaves v. Dover, 291 Ark. 545, 726 S.W.2d 276 (1987).

Previously adjudicated or acknowledged father could not be relieved of past-due child support as this statute only refers to relief from any future obligation of support and the duty to pay child support and other legal obligations is not suspended while a motion challenging the adjudication of paternity is pending; the legislature did not intend for a previously adjudicated or acknowledged father to be relieved of past-due child support upon a finding that he was actually not the legal father. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Parker, 368 Ark. 393, 246 S.W.3d 851 (2007).

Applicability.

Because this section should not be applied retroactively, the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was not conclusive by operation of law under the law as it existed in 1990, and paternity was not established that would trigger the running of the statute of limitations of the former law. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Although this section had been amended, it did not overrule an appellate court decision concluding that the statute did not apply when paternity became an issue after a divorce decree had been entered. Martin v. Pierce, 370 Ark. 53, 257 S.W.3d 82 (2007).

Order holding that appellee was not the biological father of a child, setting aside an order of paternity, setting aside orders for child support, and vacating the outstanding amounts of child support was proper because the trial court applied the version of this section in effect at the time the written order was filed. Wesley v. Hall, 104 Ark. App. 50, 289 S.W.3d 143 (2008).

Authority to Modify.

A judgment may be modified only by the court which ordered it and not by any other court, especially not by a court of inferior jurisdiction. Rose v. Mahan, 29 Ark. App. 93, 777 S.W.2d 864 (1989).

The chancery court did not have the authority to grant a putative father's motion for a paternity test, and later to set aside the paternity judgment, twelve years after the original adjudication of his paternity was entered upon his failure to comply with the testing requirements. Flemings v. Littles, 325 Ark. 367, 926 S.W.2d 445 (1996).

Discretion of Court.

The trial court has discretion in assessing the amount of any awards made under this section. The court, in awarding lying-in expenses or attorney's fees under this section, may exercise its discretion in determining the amount that father should bear, and in doing so, it may even consider the mother's financial means when making an award. Eaves v. Dover, 291 Ark. 545, 726 S.W.2d 276 (1987).

The claim of child support enforcement against putative father was an original action to establish paternity, as opposed to an action to modify a paternity order under this section, and the judge correctly found paternity pursuant to § 9-10-108(a)(6)(B). Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Effect of Amendments.

If Acts 1995, No. 1091 were applied to any type of “acknowledgment of paternity” signed before the act's effective date, a new obligation would be created and the man signing the form, by operation of law, would become the father conclusively, when before Acts 1995, No. 1091 was passed, such evidence could only be used as persuasive, presumptive evidence of paternity. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Jurisdiction.

Default judgment in a child support case should have been set aside because service was unquestionably defective where it was effectuated upon a purported father's brother; therefore, a circuit court abused its discretion when it took any action other than a dismissal of the case under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i). The father's subsequent participation in enforcement proceedings, including his act of filing for paternity testing, did not validate the void judgment. Foury v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 99 Ark. App. 341, 260 S.W.3d 328 (2007).

Legislative Intent.

All legislation is intended to act prospectively unless the purpose and intent of the legislature is to give the statutes retroactive effect which is expressly declared or necessarily implied from the language used. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Modification Denied.

A petition for modification will be denied where the change in financial condition is due to the fault, voluntary wastage, or dissipation of one's talents or assets, or where the means with which to pay were reduced or eliminated by criminal activity. Reid v. Reid, 57 Ark. App. 289, 944 S.W.2d 559 (1997).

Motion to Transfer.

Trial court erred in granting mother's motion to transfer a custody action because there was evidence that the father never established a residence outside of the first county, as contemplated by § 9-10-102(f)(1)(B)(i); thus, on father's motion to vacate, the trial court should have vacated the transfer under subsection (a) of this section rather than grant father a directed verdict under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Stephens v. Miller, 91 Ark. App. 253, 209 S.W.3d 452 (2005).

Paternity Testing.

Where a default judgment was entered in paternity proceedings and the adjudicated father's support obligation was established in 1995, the Office of Child Support Enforcement instituted proceedings in 2005 to recover support arrearages, and the adjudicated father requested a paternity test, the circuit court erred in granting the father's motion because the father's motion was untimely. Subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section allows an adjudicated father one paternity test during any time period in which he is required to pay child support and the father's child support obligation terminated under § 9-14-237 when the child reached the age of majority. State v. Perry, 2012 Ark. 106 (2012).

Period of time that the father was required to pay child support ended under § 9-14-237 when the child turned 18; likewise, the period of time in which the father could seek a paternity test also ended when the child turned 18. State v. Perry, 2012 Ark. 106 (2012).

Retroactive Modification.

Since this section plainly directs the court to relieve the alleged father of only future obligation of support, an adjudicated father, later determined not to be the biological father, was not entitled to a refund of the support paid. State v. Phillippe, 323 Ark. 434, 914 S.W.2d 752 (1996).

An adjudicated father who was shown by scientific evidence not to be the biological father of the child in question was not entitled to relief from back child support under the statute since there was no evidence or contention that he ever had physical custody of the child, as required by § 9-14-234. Littles v. Flemings, 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998).

Order that an alleged father was not obligated to pay the unpaid balance of his support obligation from the date of the order forward pursuant to subdivision (f)(1)(C) of this section was affirmed because the circuit court correctly applied the amended version of this section and found that the alleged father's obligation had to be vacated. State v. Jones, 2009 Ark. 620 (2009).

Termination.

The changes in circumstances which gave rise to a previous modification of support cannot be used again as the basis for termination of support. Benn v. Benn, 57 Ark. App. 190, 944 S.W.2d 555 (1997).

Where scientific evidence proves that an adjudicated father is not, in fact, the biological father of the child in question, the statute mandates prospective relief from child support. Littles v. Flemings, 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998).

A paternity adjudication in a divorce decree is not affected by subsequent scientific testing which negates paternity. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999).

Cited: Belford v. State, 96 Ark. 274, 131 S.W. 953 (1910); Epperson v. Sharp, 222 Ark. 456, 261 S.W.2d 267 (1953); Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981); Roque v. Frederick, 272 Ark. 392, 614 S.W.2d 667 (1981); Wilkins v. Ford, 275 Ark. 469, 631 S.W.2d 298 (1982).