Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Requirements and Effects of Putative Father Registries. 28 A.L.R.6th 349.

Ark. L. Notes.

Sampson, Coats, & Barger, Arkansas' Putative Father Registry and Related Adoption Code Provisions: Inadequate Protection for Thwarted Putative Fathers, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 49.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, The Confusion and Clarification of Arkansas's Adoption Consent Law: In re the Adoption of SCD, a Minor, and the Arkansas General Assembly's Response, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 735.

Tiffany N. Godwin, Comment: Does Father Know Best? Arkansas's Approach to the “Thwarted” Putative Father, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 989 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Shively, Survey of Family Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Survey — Family Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, Uniform Adoption Act, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 408.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A putative father had no standing to question the constitutionality of this section, since it was not applied to him in a discriminatory manner. Wineman v. Brewer, 280 Ark. 527, 660 S.W.2d 655 (1983).

Subdivision (a)(11) of this section was not applied to the father in a discriminatory manner because he never registered with the Arkansas Putative Father Registry; hence, he lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, 378 S.W.3d 93 (2011).

Construction.

This section should be strictly construed and applied. Roberts v. Swim, 268 Ark. 917, 597 S.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1980); Dodson v. Donaldson, 10 Ark. App. 64, 661 S.W.2d 425 (1983); Brown v. Johnson, 10 Ark. App. 110, 661 S.W.2d 443 (1983); Bemis v. Hare, 19 Ark. App. 198, 718 S.W.2d 481 (1986).

Under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, “failed significantly” does not mean “failed totally.” It only means that the failure must be significant, as contrasted with an insignificant failure. Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, 378 S.W.3d 93 (2011).

Phrase “failed significantly” in subdivision (a)(2) of this section does not mean “failed totally.” It denotes a failure that is meaningful or important. Fox v. Nagle, 2011 Ark. App. 178, 381 S.W.3d 900 (2011).

Abandonment.

Abandonment of child by father held not to have been established. Woodson v. Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953); Walthall v. Hime, 236 Ark. 689, 368 S.W.2d 77 (1963) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979).

Father's indifference to his children's welfare was tantamount to voluntary abandonment, so that his consent was not needed to the children's adoption by his former wife's second husband. Zgleszewski v. Zgleszewski, 260 Ark. 629, 542 S.W.2d 765 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Abandonment, in the sense of the adoption statutes, means conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979).

Where the natural mother and her new husband proved by clear and convincing evidence that the natural father failed significantly and without justifiable cause to provide for the care and support of the child, the natural father's consent to the adoption was not required. Bemis v. Hare, 19 Ark. App. 198, 718 S.W.2d 481 (1986).

Where the father was not precluded from making his support payments, there was no evidence that the father was financially unable to meet his obligation, and the record clearly reflected that the father voluntarily chose not to pay the support, the father's action in failing to pay support was an arbitrary act without just cause or adequate excuse, whether or not the mother interfered with his ability to observe visitation with the child. Bemis v. Hare, 19 Ark. App. 198, 718 S.W.2d 481 (1986).

Consent for adoption was not required where father's denial of paternity, when child support was sought in prior years, could be considered abandonment. King v. Lybrand, 329 Ark. 163, 946 S.W.2d 946 (1997).

Record supported the circuit court's holding that the natural father's consent to the adoption of his minor child was not required under this section because he had failed significantly, without justifiable cause, to support the child for a period of one year, and therefore had abandoned her per § 9-9-202. Vick v. Cecil (In re A.M.C.), 368 Ark. 369, 246 S.W.3d 426 (2007).

Best Interest of Child.

The fact that, under certain circumstances, the father's consent is necessary, does not require that the adoption be granted. The court must find that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. McKee v. Bates, 10 Ark. App. 51, 661 S.W.2d 415 (1983); Shemley v. Montezuma, 12 Ark. App. 337, 676 S.W.2d 759 (1984).

The mere fact that a parent has forfeited his right to have his consent to an adoption required does not mean that the adoption must be granted. The court must further find from clear and convincing evidence that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. Waldrip v. Davis, 40 Ark. App. 25, 842 S.W.2d 49 (1992).

Where the court's finding was that step-parent adoption was not in children's best interest, the adoption was properly denied. Waldrip v. Davis, 40 Ark. App. 25, 842 S.W.2d 49 (1992).

A probate court may grant a petition for adoption if it determines at the conclusion of a hearing that the required consents have been obtained or excused and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child or individual to be adopted. In re B.A.B., 40 Ark. App. 86, 842 S.W.2d 68 (1992).

In adoption proceedings in which the circuit court determined that the natural father's consent was not necessary, the court's findings to support the determination that allowing a minor child's stepfather to adopt her and severing the child's relationship with her natural father served the child's best interests were not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence since (1) the child had a good relationship with her stepfather, (2) prior to seeing the child in 2005, the natural father had not seen her since 2002, had a number of felony convictions, had missed child support payments, was unemployed, and lived with his mother, and (3) the natural mother and stepfather were morally fit to have the custody of the child, were physically and financially able to furnish suitable support, nurture, and education for the child, and wanted to establish a parent-child relationship with the child. Vick v. Cecil (In re A.M.C.), 368 Ark. 369, 246 S.W.3d 426 (2007).

Appellants argued that the order was clearly erroneous because they proved that the mother's consent to the adoption was not required, but the merits of this argument did not need to be reached because the trial court did not make any findings on this issue and such findings were not necessary based on the conclusion that the adoption was not in the child's best interest; furthermore, as appellants made no request for findings, they waived their right under the rule. Hollis v. Hollis, 2015 Ark. App. 441, 468 S.W.3d 316 (2015).

If a trial court finds that an adoption is not in the best interest of a child, it is of no significance whether consent to adoption is required. If a trial court determines that consent to an adoption is not required, there can be no adoption if the trial court also finds that adoption is not in the best interest of the child, and thus the trial court in this case did not err as a matter of law in not addressing both parts of the two-part adoption analysis. Hollis v. Hollis, 2015 Ark. App. 441, 468 S.W.3d 316 (2015).

Adoption of a child over the objection of the child's parent, who was incarcerated, was appropriate because the circuit court did not err in finding that adoption by the child's successor guardians was in the child's best interest as the parent was essentially asking to place desire by the parent and the parent's family for a relationship with the child over the child's need for a stable and permanent home. Newkirk v. Hankins, 2016 Ark. App. 186, 486 S.W.3d 827 (2016).

Circuit court's best-interest determination was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence where the adopting parents were the only family the child had known, and the child had no real relationship with either the mother or other members of the mother's family. In re Adoption of J.N., 2018 Ark. App. 467, 560 S.W.3d 806 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err by finding that the child's mother and stepfather failed to meet their burden of showing that adoption of the child by the stepfather was in the child's best interests because there was a significant bond between the child and his paternal extended family, the father testified that as soon as he was released from jail he would be involved in the child's life, the parents were extremely young when the child was born, and the father was only 21 years at the time of the hearing. Ballard v. Howard, 2018 Ark. App. 479, 560 S.W.3d 800 (2018).

Consent Not Required.

Finding that the father's consent was unnecessary because he failed to significantly and without justifiable cause communicate with his children for more than one year was not clearly erroneous; there was evidence that the father did not make significant efforts to see his children, he admitted that he gave up seeing his children in 2012 and that his visits were sporadic, and the trial court found that the mother had not unreasonably prevented contact with the children. Sanders v. Savage, 2015 Ark. App. 461, 468 S.W.3d 795 (2015).

Because the father did not establish the necessary relationship with the child prior to the time the petition for adoption was filed, his consent was not required under this section. T.R. v. L.H., 2015 Ark. App. 483 (2015).

Biological father's consent to the adoption was not required because the father did not fall into any of the categories set forth in § 9-9-206(a)(2). Lagios v. Goldman, 2016 Ark. 59, 483 S.W.3d 810, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 77, 196 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2016).

Granting the petition for adoption of a stepson without consent was affirmed because the consent of one acting in loco parentis is not required under this section. Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d 486 (2016).

Adoption of a child over the objection of the child's parent, who was incarcerated, was appropriate because the circuit court did not err in finding that the parent's consent to the adoption was not necessary, as the parent failed to support the child without a justifiable excuse. The successor guardians' failure to forward the parent's letters to the child had nothing to do with the parent's failure to support the child. Newkirk v. Hankins, 2016 Ark. App. 186, 486 S.W.3d 827 (2016).

Consent Required.

Despite the claim that the father had not seen the child for over one year, the father's consent was required for the stepfather to adopt the child, where the father claimed that the mother would not let the father see the child because the father had not been paying child support and the father's family testified the mother changed her phone number without telling them. Havard v. Clark, 2011 Ark. App. 86 (2011).

Court properly denied appellants' petition for adoption because the state, the child's legal guardian, did not consent; additionally, the child had to repeat a grade while residing with appellants, and the child's personality, behavior, and performance at school improved following her removal from appellants' home. The court found that the adoptive parent placed and would place an emphasis on meeting the child's educational needs, that she was devoted to the child, and that she had a loving and appropriate home. Cowan v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 576, 424 S.W.3d 318 (2012).

Circuit court clearly erred in finding that a biological father's consent was not required for the adoption of his daughter where orders of protection concerning the mother effectively barred him from having contact with the child, he did not know where the child was located until the mother filed for divorce, and once the divorce decree was entered, he exercised visitation rights to the fullest extent allowed. Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d 486 (2016).

Mother did not lose her right to consent to the adoption, because the mother had significant contacts with the child and had paid support. Hill v. Powell, 2016 Ark. App. 123 (2016).

Stepmother's petition to adopt stepchildren without the consent of the children's mother was properly denied because it was not clear error to find the children's father unjustifiably blocked the mother's communication and visitation with the children, such that the mother had justifiable cause for not visiting and communicating. Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka (In re Adoption of P.H.), 2020 Ark. App. 178, 598 S.W.3d 846 (2020).

Custody of Another.

Adopting couple held to have custody of child lawfully, despite lack of valid court order awarding custody. Dangelo v. Neil, 10 Ark. App. 119, 661 S.W.2d 448 (1983).

Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to support trial court's granting the petition to adopt. Dale v. Franklin, 22 Ark. App. 98, 733 S.W.2d 747 (1987).

Failure to Communicate or Support.

In an appeal from a circuit court's determination that a stepfather could adopt his stepchild without the consent of the child's biological father, the father's claim that his lack of support and contact with his child was justified based upon medical problems and drug abuse failed because, even after the adoption petition was filed, the father made no attempt to see his child, and by that time, the father had ceased using illegal drugs. Roberts v. Brown, 103 Ark. App. 1, 285 S.W.3d 716 (2008).

Adoption decree in favor of the mother and the adoptive father was appropriate because the biological father voluntarily, willfully, arbitrarily, and without adequate excuse failed to pay child support in excess of one year as set forth under subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Therefore, his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Powell v. Lane, 375 Ark. 178, 289 S.W.3d 440 (2008).

Trial court properly granted a mother's petition for adoption of the parties' biological child because the father's consent was not required under subdivision (a)(2) of this section due to the fact that he failed, without justifiable cause, to establish communication or financial support to the child; a $750 check was the only form of financial assistance given to the mother for the child throughout the child's life. Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, 378 S.W.3d 93 (2011).

Trial court erred under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in determining that a father's consent was not required to the adoption of his child by the child's stepfather because the father did not fail significantly without justifiable cause to communicate with the child; over the course of the statutory one-year period, the father saw the child on numerous occasions. The father took the child to a family reunion and a family birthday party. Fox v. Nagle, 2011 Ark. App. 178, 381 S.W.3d 900 (2011).

One-year period set out in subdivision (a)(2) of this section may be any one-year period, not merely the one-year period preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Fox v. Nagle, 2011 Ark. App. 178, 381 S.W.3d 900 (2011).

Because a father failed to provide child support for only nine months, his consent was required for adoption of the child under subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Havard v. Clark, 2011 Ark. App. 734 (2011).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in granting the adoption of a child without the mother's consent because the mother failed significantly without justifiable cause to support the child for one year; she had not paid any support in several years. She made no effort to contribute to the child's support even after she obtained a job. Lucas v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 365, 423 S.W.3d 580 (2012).

It is not required that a parent fail “totally” in their obligations in order to fail “significantly” within the meaning of subdivision (a)(2) of this section. It only means that the failure must be significant, as contrasted with an insignificant failure. Lucas v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 365, 423 S.W.3d 580 (2012).

Trial court did not err under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in allowing a stepfather to adopt a biological father's daughter without the biological father's consent because the father had no contact with the daughter for 19 months; the father's reliance on his imprisonment to justify his failure to communicate with the daughter was misplaced. Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352, 428 S.W.3d 543 (2013).

Court is unwilling to hold, for purposes of this section, that when a parent cannot have visitation with her children due to a court order, that gives the parent justifiable cause to make no effort in continuing a relationship with the children. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2017 Ark. 182, 519 S.W.3d 324 (2017).

Circuit court erred by finding that the biological father's failure to support the child for seven years was justifiable; his imprisonment did not toll his responsibilities to support the child, he participated in a work-release program earning money yet paid no support, and neither the child support office nor the child's mother prevented him from paying support. Thus, the circuit court erred in finding that the biological father's consent to adoption was required. Johnson v. Beatty (In re Adoption of T.A.D.), 2019 Ark. App. 510, 588 S.W.3d 858 (2019).

Circuit court erred in finding that a father's consent to the adoption of his child was not required because the court clearly erred in finding that the father failed significantly and without justifiable cause to communicate with and to provide care and support for the child. The child's mother barred the father's visitations without a court order for a period of time, and the gaps in the father's child support payments did not constitute a significant failure to provide support for the child for one year and his arrears were now paid in full. Raiteri v. Nowak (In re B.R.), 2020 Ark. App. 115 (2020).

—In General.

“Failed significantly” in this section does not mean failed totally but the failure must be a significant one as contrasted with an insignificant one; it denotes a failure that is meaningful or important. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979); Watkins v. Dudgeon, 270 Ark. 516, 606 S.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1980); Taylor v. Hill, 10 Ark. App. 45, 661 S.W.2d 412 (1983); Dangelo v. Neil, 10 Ark. App. 119, 661 S.W.2d 448 (1983).

In order to adopt a child without the necessity of parental consent, the conduct of a parent who has failed significantly without justifiable cause to communicate with his child or to provide for the care and support of his child as required by law or judicial decree, must be willful in the sense of being voluntary and intentional; it must appear that the parent acted arbitrarily and without just cause or adequate excuse. Roberts v. Swim, 268 Ark. 917, 597 S.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1980); Watkins v. Dudgeon, 270 Ark. 516, 606 S.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1980).

Parent's consent held unnecessary due to significant, unjustifiable failure to communicate with or support child. Henson v. Money, 273 Ark. 203, 617 S.W.2d 367 (1981); Loveless v. May, 278 Ark. 127, 644 S.W.2d 261 (1983); Dodson v. Donaldson, 10 Ark. App. 64, 661 S.W.2d 425 (1983); Brown v. Johnson, 10 Ark. App. 110, 661 S.W.2d 443 (1983); Dangelo v. Neil, 10 Ark. App. 119, 661 S.W.2d 448 (1983); In re Titsworth, 11 Ark. App. 197, 669 S.W.2d 8 (1984); In re K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993).

Justifiable cause means that the significant failure must be willful in the sense of being voluntary and intentional; it must appear that the parent acted arbitrarily and without just cause or adequate excuse. Taylor v. Hill, 10 Ark. App. 45, 661 S.W.2d 412 (1983).

Consent of the natural father to adoption of his children by their natural mother and her second husband held not to be waived. Tisdale v. Seavey, 286 Ark. 222, 691 S.W.2d 144 (1985).

The term “failed significantly without justifiable cause” does not mean that the parent must have failed totally but denotes a failure that is meaningful, important, and willful. Manuel v. McCorkle, 24 Ark. App. 92, 749 S.W.2d 341 (1988).

Father's failure to communicate with his child was unjustified in spite of his claim that the lack of contact was not meaningful because of the child's young age and that he failed to visit because the mother and her new husband did not permit visitation; evidence showed that the father placed only 6 short telephone calls to the mother over a period of more than a year, and while he claimed to have written one letter to the mother it was never received; moreover the mother and her new husband asserted that they did not prevent visitation. Vier v. Vier, 62 Ark. App. 89, 968 S.W.2d 657 (1998).

The natural father's consent was not required where (1) the father admitted that he had no physical contact with the child for more than two years and that he did not pay court-ordered child support for almost two years, (2) he did not attempt to utilize the help of a court to enforce his visitation rights until approximately two and a half years after he learned of the first entry of adoption, and (3) he attempted to justify his failure to pay the court-ordered child support on financial trouble, including a bankruptcy, and credit-card debt. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 41 S.W.3d 397 (2001).

Where father had not communicated with his children for over 12 years, the failure to communicate was not justifiable because sexual abuse allegations against the father did not prevent him from making phone calls or writing letters; thus, the step-father did not need the father's consent to adopt. McClelland v. Murray, 92 Ark. App. 301, 213 S.W.3d 33 (2005).

Trial court erred in granting a petition by step-mother to adopt her step-daughter without the mother's consent as the step-mother and father refused the mother's requests for contact with the child and the mother's gifts for the child; thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the mother's failure to provide for the care and support was “without justification.” Neel v. Harrison, 93 Ark. App. 424, 220 S.W.3d 251 (2005).

Under this section, it is a parent's failure to communicate with the child, not a failure to have visitation, that allows adoption to proceed without consent, as was properly permitted here; the trial court only terminated the mother's visitation, but did not issue a no-contact order, she gave no justifiable cause for failing to have any contact with her children, and once she was drug free, she further failed to petition for review of the temporary order that had suspended visitation. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2017 Ark. 182, 519 S.W.3d 324 (2017).

“Failed significantly”, as used in subdivision (a)(2), certainly does not mean “failed totally”. It means only that the failure to communicate with the child or to provide for the care and support of the child must be significant, as contrasted with an insignificant failure. Swaite v. Steele (In re Adoption of JS and DS), 2018 Ark. App. 595, 566 S.W.3d 517 (2018).

—Sufficient Communication.

Parent held to have failed to significantly communicate with child. Brown v. Fleming, 266 Ark. 814, 586 S.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1979); Belcher v. Bowling, 22 Ark. App. 248, 738 S.W.2d 804 (1987).

Evidence supported finding that parent had not failed significantly to communicate with child. Taylor v. Hill, 10 Ark. App. 45, 661 S.W.2d 412 (1983); In re Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12 (1986).

A letter written by the biological mother to the appointed friend of the court, requesting visitation of her children, and a progress report sent from the custodial parents to her concerning the children did not qualify as communication with the children. In re K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993).

Natural mother's consent to stepmother's adoption was required where mother's efforts to communicate with children had been frustrated by father changing his telephone and pager numbers and not furnishing them to mother and otherwise refusing to facilitate her contact with the children. Cassat v. Hennis, 74 Ark. App. 226, 45 S.W.3d 866 (2001).

Mother's consent to adoption was not required based on her failure to communicate with the child; the mother had four visits and perhaps a few phone calls with the child in the nearly three years since guardianship was granted, and she was employed and had a vehicle for at least two years before the adoption proceedings. “Failed significantly” does not mean “failed totally”. In re Adoption of J.N., 2018 Ark. App. 467, 560 S.W.3d 806 (2018).

Trial court did not err in ruling that a father's consent to a stepparent adoption was not required, because (1) it was undisputed the father had not had contact with the child for over a year, and (2) the court permissibly found no justifiable cause for the failure to communicate. Holmes v. Wilhelm, 2019 Ark. App. 120, 572 S.W.3d 873 (2019).

Appellant's petition for adoption was improperly denied on the grounds that the consent of the father was required because the incarcerated father failed to communicate with his child for a period of one year as he had no proof that he communicated with the child during 2014 or 2016; between 2015 and 2018, the father made one phone call to the telephone number associated with appellant and the child's mother; and his communications were with appellant and the child's mother, never with the child. Holloway v. Carter, 2019 Ark. App. 330, 579 S.W.3d 188 (2019).

Appellant's petition for adoption was improperly denied on the grounds that the consent of the father was required because the incarcerated father did not have justifiable cause for failing to communicate with his child; an isolated incident that occurred in 2018 could not justify his failure to communicate with the child in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and visitations with the child at the penitentiary were sporadic and were all initiated by either the child's mother or the father's wife. Holloway v. Carter, 2019 Ark. App. 330, 579 S.W.3d 188 (2019).

—Support.

The parent must furnish the support and maintenance himself and the duty is a personal one, and he may not rely upon assurance that someone else is properly supporting and maintaining the child to avoid the impact of subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979).

Evidence was insufficient to prove that father had unjustifiably failed to support child. Chrisos v. Egleston, 7 Ark. App. 82, 644 S.W.2d 326 (1983).

Evidence held to support finding that natural parent had not failed significantly and without justifiable cause to contribute to child's support. Taylor v. Hill, 10 Ark. App. 45, 661 S.W.2d 412 (1983); In re Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12 (1986).

A parent has the obligation to support a minor child, and no request for support is necessary. Dangelo v. Neil, 10 Ark. App. 119, 661 S.W.2d 448 (1983).

Evidence sufficient to support finding that parent failed to support child. Belcher v. Bowling, 22 Ark. App. 248, 738 S.W.2d 804 (1987).

Although no order had been entered requiring child support, the trial court did not err in finding that the mother's consent to adoption was not required where for more than one year she had failed to provide any care or support for the child despite being employed, and the father testified that the mother had never offered support and that he had never declined such support. Sharp v. Pike, 2015 Ark. App. 670, 476 S.W.3d 217 (2015).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that a mother's consent was not required for the father's wife to adopt the child where the mother had failed to support the child for three years, the circuit court discredited the mother's testimony that she had no knowledge of a child-support order, and her gifts to the child did not constitute any meaningful support. Childress v. Braden, 2017 Ark. App. 569, 532 S.W.3d 130 (2017).

Circuit court properly found that a father significantly and without justifiable cause failed to pay court-ordered child support for at least one year and, accordingly, that his consent to adoption of his minor children was unnecessary, even though the father was imprisoned for approximately 21 months. Evidence that on two or three occasions the father used food stamps to purchase food that he gave to the adoptive parents did not constitute support of the children in any meaningful degree. Swaite v. Steele (In re Adoption of JS and DS), 2018 Ark. App. 595, 566 S.W.3d 517 (2018).

—Time Period.

The one-year period specified in this section need not be the year immediately preceding the judgment of adoption, since it means any one-year period. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979); In re K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993).

Resumption of payment of support for a brief period, after the required period of one year, is not sufficient to bar an adoption without the consent of the delinquent father by starting a new one-year period of nonsupport under the statute. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979).

The filing of a petition for adoption establishes the cutoff date for dispensing with the natural parent's consent where the parent has failed to communicate with the child and provide support for one year. Dixon v. Dixon, 286 Ark. 128, 689 S.W.2d 556 (1985); In re K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993).

One-year period, after which a parent may lose his right to consent to his child's adoption if he does not communicate with or support his child, must accrue before the adoption petition is filed. Dale v. Franklin, 22 Ark. App. 98, 733 S.W.2d 747 (1987).

The party seeking to adopt a child without the consent of a natural parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the failure to support the child not only continued for at least one year but also that it was willful, intentional, and without justifiable cause. Because one should not be permitted to assert a right until the facts on which it is predicated have accrued, the one-year period after which the parent may lose his right to consent to the adoption must accrue before the petition for adoption is filed. Manuel v. McCorkle, 24 Ark. App. 92, 749 S.W.2d 341 (1988); In re Milam, 27 Ark. App. 100, 766 S.W.2d 944 (1989).

There was no error in the application of this state's law pertaining to the one-year period specified in this section, to circumstances occurring prior to the transfer of jurisdiction to the state, from a state where the time period was two years, instead of one year. In re K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844 S.W.2d 343 (1993).

Although the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held previously that the one-year period referenced in this section can be any one-year period and is not required to be the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition, the Supreme Court believes that circuit courts should consider the parent's conduct, particularly in the period before the filing of the petition, in determining whether the parent's consent to an adoption should be required. Martini v. Price, 2016 Ark. 472, 507 S.W.3d 486 (2016).

Guardian.

The law does not require a written request for consent of legal guardian. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979).

Jurisdiction.

Father argued that the petition for adoption was defective because it was filed before the right to adoption without the father's consent had accrued; the petition for adoption was filed in January 2014, and he claimed to have seen his children in January or February 2013, but this argument was without merit because the one-year period could be any one-year period, and based on the facts, the father's argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction was without merit. Sanders v. Savage, 2015 Ark. App. 461, 468 S.W.3d 795 (2015).

Notice.

Under this subchapter, if consent to the adoption has been given, notice to the consenting party is not required, nor is any further participation required of them; consequently, where mother consented to adoption, she was not entitled to subsequent service of process preceding the adoption nor was a guardian ad litem required to be appointed to represent her. Temple v. Tucker, 277 Ark. 81, 639 S.W.2d 357 (1982).

Unmarried father lacking any substantial relationship with his child is not entitled to notice of the child's adoption proceeding under either the due process clause or the equal protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend. 14. In re S.J.B., 294 Ark. 598, 745 S.W.2d 606 (1988); In re J.L.T., 31 Ark. App. 85, 788 S.W.2d 494 (1990).

Where the maternal grandparents' daughter was alive and had given consent to the adoption of her child, no consent was required by the maternal grandparents nor was notice required to be given to them before the adoption could proceed. Henry v. Buchanan, 364 Ark. 485, 221 S.W.3d 346 (2006).

Proof.

In an adoption proceeding contested by a natural parent the facts justifying the adoption must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 580 S.W.2d 176 (1979); McKee v. Bates, 10 Ark. App. 51, 661 S.W.2d 415 (1983).

Party seeking to adopt must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the nonconsenting parent has failed significantly without justifiable cause either to communicate with or to provide for the care and support of the child for the statutory period. Chrisos v. Egleston, 7 Ark. App. 82, 644 S.W.2d 326 (1983); Taylor v. Hill, 10 Ark. App. 45, 661 S.W.2d 412 (1983); Dodson v. Donaldson, 10 Ark. App. 64, 661 S.W.2d 425 (1983); Brown v. Johnson, 10 Ark. App. 110, 661 S.W.2d 443 (1983); Dangelo v. Neil, 10 Ark. App. 119, 661 S.W.2d 448 (1983); In re Titsworth, 11 Ark. App. 197, 669 S.W.2d 8 (1984).

When proving that a natural parent's consent is not required, the parties seeking to adopt bear the heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence facts which justify dispensing with the required consent of the natural parents. In re Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12 (1986).

The party seeking to adopt a child without the consent of a natural parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed significantly or without justifiable cause to communicate with the child or to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree. Bemis v. Hare, 19 Ark. App. 198, 718 S.W.2d 481 (1986).

Heavy burden is upon party seeking to adopt a child without consent of a natural parent to prove the failure to communicate or the failure to support by clear and convincing evidence. Dale v. Franklin, 22 Ark. App. 98, 733 S.W.2d 747 (1987); In re B.A.B., 40 Ark. App. 86, 842 S.W.2d 68 (1992).

In vacating an adoption decree, the trial court never made a determination of whether the natural father qualified as a father whose consent was required under § 9-9-206(a)(2), so the matter was remanded to the trial court for an analysis of the evidence on that issue; the father's consent was not required under subdivision (a)(3) of this section if it was determined that it was not required under § 9-9-206(a)(2). Britton v. Gault, 80 Ark. App. 311, 94 S.W.3d 926 (2003).

In granting a petition for a mother's husband to adopt the parties' child, a trial court did not err in finding that the father's consent was not necessary under subdivision (a)(2) of this section because, by the father's own testimony, he had not seen his child in over two years; he made no child support payments after being released from prison until he received the adoption petition. Courtney v. Ward, 2012 Ark. App. 148, 391 S.W.3d 686 (2012).

Unreasonable Withholding of Consent.

The courts may grant a petition for adoption to petitioners regardless of the arbitrary dissent by a natural father. Watkins v. Dudgeon, 270 Ark. 516, 606 S.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1980).

Although a father had failed significantly for a period of one year to support his child without justifiable cause, that fact did not preclude him from objecting to a proposed adoption or from being fully heard in the matter, rather it meant that he could not defeat the adoption by simply withholding his consent. Watkins v. Dudgeon, 270 Ark. 516, 606 S.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1980).

This section gives the probate court authority to decide the issue raised by the foster parents whether the Department of Human Services, as legal guardian of the minor, has unreasonably withheld its consent to adopt. The foster parents' rights in that respect are not subject exclusively to the department's policies, the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (§ 25-15-201 et seq.), and circuit court review. Patterson v. Robbins, 295 Ark. 511, 749 S.W.2d 330 (1988).

Where the adoptive parent left the child who suffered from an incurable skin condition alone in a motor home unattended by an adult, the trial court did not err in finding that the guardian was not unreasonably withholding her consent to the adoption of the child under subdivision (a)(8) of this section. The trial court focused on the special medical needs of the child, including her epidermolysis bullosa condition, seizures, and episodes of holding her breath and passing out. Tom v. Cox, 101 Ark. App. 388, 278 S.W.3d 110 (2008).

Order granting foster parents' petition for adoption of a child and dismissing a maternal grandmother's petition for guardianship was proper; in finding that the Arkansas Department of Human Services had unreasonably withheld its consent to the adoption under subdivision (a)(8) of this section, the trial court did not err by giving effect to the statutory preference for adoption. Davis-Lewallen v. Clegg, 2010 Ark. App. 627, 378 S.W.3d 185 (2010).

Evidence did not support a finding that the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) unreasonably withheld its consent to appellants' adoption of a child under subdivision (a)(8) of this section; appellants' adult son lived in their home and an uncle lived in substandard housing on the property without DHS's knowledge while appellants were foster parents. Lewis v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 347 (2012).

Trial court's decision that the father unreasonably withheld consent and that it was in the child's best interest to be adopted by the adoptive parents was not against the preponderance of the evidence, which included evidence that the father was marginally self-sufficient while the adoptive parents had stable employment and housing. T.R. v. L.H., 2015 Ark. App. 483 (2015).

In an adoption proceeding following termination of parental rights, the granting of the foster parents' adoption petition was affirmed, as (1) the circuit court's decision that the Department of Human Services (DHS) unreasonably withheld consent to the adoption by preferring that the child be adopted by relatives was not clearly erroneous, (2) DHS's withholding of consent was not based on maltreatment allegations, and even if it was, the trial court was entitled to judge the credibility and seriousness of those allegations, and (3) DHS did not review all evidence relevant to the child's best interest before deciding to withhold consent. Canerday-Banks v. Barton, 2018 Ark. App. 523 (2018).

Appellate court will apply the clearly-erroneous standard to questions of whether consent to adoption was unreasonably withheld. Canerday-Banks v. Barton, 2018 Ark. App. 523 (2018).

Cited: In re Reeves, 309 Ark. 385, 831 S.W.2d 607 (1992); In re D.J.M., 39 Ark. App. 116, 839 S.W.2d 535 (1992); Reid v. Frazee, 61 Ark. App. 216, 966 S.W.2d 272 (1998); In re SCD, 358 Ark. 51, 186 S.W.3d 225 (2004); Marshall v. Rubright, 2017 Ark. App. 548 (2017).