United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1981)
A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in that vehicle or the personal property contained within it.
Police stop a vehicle driven by a defendant for whom an arrest warrant has been issued and discover cocaine in a paper bag behind the front seat. Evidence shows the vehicle was reported stolen and its identification numbers were altered. The defendant moves to suppress the evidence, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. The court applies the rule that standing to challenge a search requires a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Because the defendant cannot assert a legitimate claim to the stolen vehicle, he lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car or in containers within it. The court affirms the convictions, holding the defendant lacked standing to contest the search.
At page 413Determining standing to challenge search of stolen vehicle20 citing cases“a person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects.”
- Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002).published(person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects)
- United States v. Cates, 641 F. Supp. 2d 613 (N.D. Tex. 2009).publishedId. (citing United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76-77 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th C…
- State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 727 N.W.2d 503.published (holding that the defendant, who had stolen a vehicle, could not reasonably expect privacy in the vehicle or the personal property found in the vehicle)
- James A. Farrow v. Commonwealth, No. 1811042 (Va. Ct. App. June 28, 2005).unpublishedSee also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 ; United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1981); Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 789, 798 , 520 S.E.2d 393, 398 (1999) (no expectation of privacy in stolen all-terrain vehicle).
- United States v. Nicolai Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2005).published See United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir.1994); Betancur, 24 F.3d at 76-77 ; United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Hensel, 672 F.…
- United States v. Gordon, 65 F. Supp. 2d 365 (E.D. Va. 1999).publishedUnited States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir.1981).
- Rovnak v. State, 990 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999).published A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of container, such as a paper bag." Id. at…
- United States v. Cooper, No. 96-3240 (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 1998).published (driver lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he or she stole)
- United States v. Melgar, 927 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Va. 1996).publishedThis principle extends to personal property the passenger may have placed in another’s car; “[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal ef…
- United States v. Daniel Michael Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1995).publishedSee United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76-77 (10th Cir.1994) (to have standing to contest a search of a vehicle, defendant must prove that he was in lawful possession of the vehicle); United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th…
Show 8 more citing cases
- United States v. Sherman L. Wellons, Jr., 32 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 1994).publishedSee United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir.1990) (driver of rental car had no legitimate expectation of privacy in rental car where driver was not listed as valid driver on rental agreement, even though he had permission of ac…
- Josephs v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 491 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).published United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir.1981); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142, n. 9 , 99 S.Ct. at 429, n. 9 .
- United States v. Carlos Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1990).publishedIn determining that persons present in stolen cars do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those cars, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court’s statement in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 141 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 429 n.…
- United States v. Lloyd Byron Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1988).publishedSee United States v. Hensel, 672 F.2d 578, 579 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 2907 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1316 (1982); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir.1981).
- Smith v. Garrett, 586 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. W. Va. 1984).publishedUnited States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (1981); United States v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559 (1981); see also United States v. Hensel, 672 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 2907 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1316 (1982).
- State v. Wisumierski, 317 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1982).published See: United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 699-700 (1st Cir. 1980); State v. Honnert, 399 So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Nadler, 628 P.2d 56, 58 (Ariz. App. 1981); State…
- United States v. Dwayne Berman Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394 (11th Cir. 1998).published(driver lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle thache or she stole)
- United States v. Erickson, 797 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1992).publishedSee United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir.1981); 10 cf. United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423-24 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992).
At page 412Expectation of privacy in vehicle contents without claim15 citing cases“A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container . . . .â€
- United States v. Dylan Ostrum, 99 F.4th 999 (7th Cir. 2024).published(A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects.)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 100 F. Supp. 3d 905 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published (A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container.)
- Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002).publishedSee United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (unauthorized driver of rental car had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1157 (1995); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 413 (4…
- United States v. Jabrell Smith, 21 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2021).publishedFundamentally, “[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects.” United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981).
- United States v. Terrell Houston, 689 F. App'x 170 (4th Cir. 2017).unpublished In Wellons , we also held that an unauthorized driver of a rental car “cannot reasonably assert an expectation of privacy in a bag found in that automobile” because “[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reaso…
- United States v. Davit Ghazaryan, 685 F. App'x 222 (4th Cir. 2017).unpublished While an individual using a vehicle with the owner’s permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 874 (4th Cir. 1992), an occupant of a stolen vehicle cannot claim a legitimate e…
- United States v. Avagyan, 164 F. Supp. 3d 864 (E.D. Va. 2016).published United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir.1981). 21 In this case, the Government has produced evidence that, if unrebutted, shows that Ghazaryan and Margaryan did no…
- People v. Sotelo, 2014 CO 74, 336 P.3d 188.published In United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981), that court stated, with respect to the driver of a stolen car, that "[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is…
- United States v. Awal Mohammed, 572 F. App'x 203 (4th Cir. 2014).unpublishedUnited States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir.2002); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir.1981).
- United States v. Howard, No. 04-4487 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011).unpublishedThis court has held that a Aperson who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container .…
Show 5 more citing cases
- State v. Bruski, 2006 WI App 53, 711 N.W.2d 679.published"Whether a person has an expectation of privacy in a container that is searched is not determined by his subjective beliefs." United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981).
- United States v. Howard, 413 F. App'x 559 (4th Cir. 2005).unpublishedThis court has held that a “person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container..…
- Arnold v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 235 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).publishedAlthough the Commonwealth cites United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that “[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private rep…
- United States v. Austin Starner, No. 25-4440 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 2026).unpublished(holding that, where the government establishes that a vehicle is stolen and defendant does not show that he acquired the vehicle innocently, defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and lacks stand…)
- United States v. Soto, 779 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Mass. 2011).publishedThat probable cause existed to impound the Chrysler and that the inventory of its contents, including the laptop, was proper is not a matter of serious debate. 16 *218 It is a common-sense proposition that “a defendant who knowingly posses…
At page 415Government's duty regarding informant's presence at trial7 citing casesinformant was staying, and the government did not have him present at the trial. During the trial, Starr requested a subpoena for the informant. That evening…
- Allen v. Commonwealth, 712 S.E.2d 748 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).published“The fact that the evidence against one defendant is stronger than the evidence against other defendants does not in itself justify severance.” Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1145 (citing United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir.1981)).
- United States v. Sappleton, 68 F. App'x 438 (4th Cir. 2003).unpublishedUnited States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir.1981).
- United States v. Jean Oglesby Hubbard, United States of Am. v. Augustine Perez, United States of Am. v. Richard Perez, United States of Am. v. Malinda Jenkins, United States of Am. v. Audrey Mae Colmore, Umited States of Am. v. Teresa Davis Massie, United States of Am. v. Ramos Antonio Altagracia Tejada-Reynoso, 4 F.3d 987 (4th Cir. 1993).unpublished"The fact that evidence against one defendant," in this case Augustine, is "stronger than the evidence against other defendants does not itself justify severance." Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1145 (citing United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 4…
- United States v. Randy Davis Hunt, United States of Am. v. Carl Cooper, 4 F.3d 987 (4th Cir. 1993).unpublishedUnited States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1981).
- United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1992).published United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir.1981).
- United States v. Stone, 85 F. App'x 925 (4th Cir. 2004).unpublished“The fact that the evidence against one defendant is stronger than the evidence against other defendants does not in itself justify severance.” United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1145 (4th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Hargrov…
At page 414Addressing jury bias and informant disclosure issues4 citing casesno error where defendant knew informant’s identity and had worked with informant
- Keith Elwood Hargrove v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 886 S.E.2d 322 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published“That the prosecution may have a stronger case against one co[-]defendant than another does not, by itself, constitute actual prejudice. . . . [T]he mere assertion that a co[-]defendant was ‘more deeply involved in the crime’ does not cons…
- United States v. Russell Francis Chevre, 146 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1998).published (no error where defendant knew informant’s identity and had worked with informant)
- United States v. Richard Craig Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).published See United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 414 (4th Cir.1981).
Other citing cases
- United States v. Daniel A. Brugman, United States of Am. v. Benjamin A. King, A/K/A Bennie, 655 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1981).published
v.
Wayne McNair HARGROVE, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. William Barry ROBINSON, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Michael F. TILLERY, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Paulette ASHTON, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Teresa STARR
Wayne McNair Hargrove, Michael Till-ery, William Robinson, Paulette Ashton, and Maria Teresa Starr appeal, on a variety of grounds, their convictions for violations of federal laws prohibiting possession and distribution of cocaine. We affirm.
I
The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether Hargrove has standing to suppress evidence seized from an automobile that he was driving. Hargrove, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued, was stopped by police after a brief chase. The officers removed him from the automobile and placed him under arrest. After Hargrove was handcuffed, one of the officers found behind the front seat a paper bag that contained three plastic sacks of cocaine.
[*413] During the suppression hearing the government introduced evidence that a subsequent check of the car’s license plates revealed that the car had been reported stolen in Michigan. Examination by a government’s witness disclosed that the vehicle identification numbers had been changed. Hargrove presented no evidence to rebut this testimony, nor did he claim that he owned the bag containing the cocaine. Without ruling on the government’s objection to Hargrove’s standing to suppress the evidence, the court summarily ruled that the search was valid and admitted evidence of the seizure of the cocaine.
We find no error in admission of this evidence, but we base our conclusion on Hargrove’s lack of standing to contest the search. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), the Court held that to establish standing for asserting a violation of the fourth amendment, a person must show a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.” 100 S.Ct. at 2553. Although Salvucci was decided after Hargrove’s case was tried, the Supreme Court had previously discussed the application of this principle to persons present in stolen automobiles. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141 n.9, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429 n.9, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Court criticized two decisions that “inexplicably have held that a person present in a stolen automobile at the time of a search may object to the lawfulness of the search of the automobile.”
Arguably, the evidence of the stolen car report and the alteration of the identification numbers would have been insufficient to convict Hargrove of possession of a stolen vehicle. Nevertheless, in view of his burden to establish standing to contest the search at the suppression hearing, it sufficed at the very least to require him to show, if he could, that he acquired the car innocently. This he failed to do.
We therefore hold that Hargrove did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car he was driving and that he lacked standing to object to a search of the vehicle. Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pitts, 588 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1979); Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1975).
Furthermore, we conclude that Hargrove had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the paper bag found behind the front seat of the car. One who can assert no legitimate claim to the car he was driving cannot reasonably assert an expectation of privacy in a bag found in that automobile. Whether a person has an expectation of privacy in a container that is searched is not determined by his subjective beliefs. His expectation must be objectively reasonable. A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container, such as a paper bag. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 151-52, 99 S.Ct. at 423-24 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 486-88 (2d Cir. 1980). Consequently, Hargrove lacked standing to challenge the search of the bag and the seizure of the cocaine it contained.
The appellant’s reliance on Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), is misplaced. Although Sanders dealt with the need for a warrant to search luggage removed from a taxi, the standing of the defendants to contest the search was not in question. 442 U.S. at 761 n.8, 99 S.Ct. at 2592.
II
The other assignments of error merit only brief comment.
The appellants complain that during the voir dire of the jury the trial court erred in not asking specific questions they proffered. In their brief the appellants do not point to the omission of any specific proffered question that is essential for an adequate voir dire. Instead, they insist that they were denied an impartial jury because the court did not ask the questions they proposed. We find no error in the court’s rejection of[*414] the proposed questions since its own examination of the jury was adequate. Indeed, in response to the court’s questions, five jurors said that their views about narcotics would prejudice them, and they were excused. See generally United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
III
The appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to question the jury to determine whether any had read a newspaper article concerning the case. The day the paper carried the article, defense counsel told the court they had seen one of the jurors carrying a copy. Counsel described the article as “very inaccurate and highly prejudicial” but did not specify in what respect it was prejudicial or tender it to the court. The court declined to question the jury, and the appellants did not move for a mistrial or new trial because of this incident.
Because the appellants never tendered the article to the court, they have not established an evidentiary basis for a new trial on this ground. See United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1974) (dictum).
IV
Ashton contends that federal officers and local police violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109 by failing to knock and announce themselves before they entered her apartment when they executed a search warrant. Ashton and another witness, who were inside the apartment at the time of the search, testified they did not hear the officers knock or announce themselves. Several of the officers involved in the search and the manager of the apartment building, who accompanied the police, testified that the officers did knock and announce themselves. The trial court resolved this conflict in favor of the government. Its determination of credibility cannot be overturned.
V
Starr asserts that she was denied her rights to due process, to confront witnesses, and to effective assistance of counsel because the trial court denied her motion for the disclosure of an informant’s identity and address. The informant introduced a detective to Starr, and he saw Starr sell cocaine to the officer. Although Starr could not foretell what the informant’s testimony would be, she contended that he might have established an entrapment defense by contradicting the detective’s testimony. The government alleges that the informant was a citizen concerned about drug traffic who was not paid for his information.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), requires the government to disclose an informant’s identity when disclosure would be helpful to the defense or essential to a fair trial. The Supreme Court explained that no fixed rule regarding disclosure is possible: “Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony and other relevant factors.” 353 U.S. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628.
Starr knew the informant’s identity. She had in fact worked with him. His presence was not necessary to a fair trial because the evidence, including the testimony of one of Starr’s witnesses, precluded any entrapment defense. Applying the principles set forth in Roviaro, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying her motion.
Starr also contends that the trial court should have granted her motion for a new trial on the ground that the government had improperly suppressed evidence by concealing the informant. Although the court denied Starr’s motion for disclosure of the informant’s name and address, it directed the government to have him available for the trial. The informant, however, fearing for his safety, had moved away from his apartment. His contact, a drug enforcement agent, did not know where the[*415] informant was staying, and the government did not have him present at the trial.
During the trial, Starr requested a subpoena for the informant. That evening the informant called the agent at the agent’s home to inquire about a marshal’s appearance at his parents’ house. The agent told the informant that a subpoena for him had been issued. The next day the marshal reported that he had been unable to serve the subpoena. Later that day, the informant came to the United States Attorney’s office, but counsel had already begun summation. The government’s trial attorney was not notified of the informant’s presence.
Although the government must make a reasonable effort to secure an informant’s presence at trial, it is not required to guarantee that he will appear. United States v. Leon, 487 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1973). Here the government made a reasonable effort to obtain the informant, and the trial court properly held that it was not guilty of any concealment.
VI
Robinson, complaining that he was prejudiced by a joint trial, assigns error to the district court’s denial of a severance at the conclusion of the government’s ease. He based his motion on the fact that there was less evidence against him than against his co-defendants.
Robinson was charged with conspiracy and two substantive counts that were also alleged as overt acts of the conspiracy. Therefore, joinder was proper. Fed.R. Crim.P. 8(b). Although his co-defendants appear to have been more deeply involved in the crime, the evidence against Robinson was sufficient to establish his guilt on all three of the counts pertaining to him. The record does not indicate that he was convicted simply by innuendo because his associates were plainly guilty. Accordingly, Robinson was not entitled to a severance. United States v. McGruder, 514 F.2d 1288, 1289 (5th Cir. 1979). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Robinson’s motion. See Cataneo v. United States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1948).
AFFIRMED.