Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 82-3236Mar 8, 1983

Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983)

Quick Summary

A former client waives the right to object to a conflict of interest by knowingly refraining from asserting the objection promptly.

In a wrongful death action, the defendant’s law firm had previously represented the deceased in unrelated matters. The plaintiff’s counsel was notified of this prior representation and received the client file but failed to object for over two years, only filing a motion to disqualify shortly before trial. The district court refused complete disqualification, instead bifurcating the trial to exclude the firm from the damages phase. The Ninth Circuit reviews such orders for abuse of discretion. The court applies the rule that a former client who knowingly refrains from asserting a conflict of interest objection promptly waives that right. Because the plaintiff’s delay constituted de facto consent, the court affirms the district court’s refusal to completely disqualify the firm.

121 citation events (42 in the last 25 years) across 53 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 87Reviewing court discretion on counsel disqualification34 citing cases“it is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to have waived that right.”11 citing courts quote it
  • Magin v. Solitude Homeowner's Inc., 2011 WY 102, 255 P.3d 920.published 2 cites
    (It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to h…)
  • Off. Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Valley-Vulcan Mold Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co.), 237 B.R. 322 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999).published 4 cites
    (An order disqualifying counsel or refusing to disqualify counsel will not be disturbed if the record reveals any sound basis for the [bankruptcy] court’s action.)
  • HDMI Licensing Adm'r, Inc. v. Availink Inc., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2024).published 2 cites
    “It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing 9 an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting 10 it promptly is deemed…”
  • Besang, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 3:23-cv-00113 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2023).
    Id. at 88 (holding that former client waived right to object to conflict of interest where it waited two years and six months before objecting to the representation or filing a motion to disqualify and most of the trial preparation had bee…
  • Gibson v. Wikeley Inc., No. 5:23-cv-00116 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2023).
    Per Wikeley, WFTL has not timely raised the disqualification issue in this action and/or in the bankruptcy action. [DE 27, Page ID# 785]. “[C]ourts have disallowed disqualification on the basis of waiver or estoppel where the moving party…
  • Keith v. Marrs, 2019 OK CIV APP 38, 444 P.3d 1090.published 2 cites
    ([T]he former client may expressly or impliedly waive his objection and consent to the adverse representation," and "[i]t is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opp…)
  • Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. King Chuen Tang, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2011).published
    “well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to have wai…”
  • Hana Bank v. South Pac. Petroleum Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00012 (D. Guam Aug. 13, 2010).
    In its opposition to the motion, SPPC first 3 argues that the motions to disqualify its counsel are timely. 4 It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing 5 an opposing party on the ground o…
  • CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2008).published 3 cites
    Id. at 86.
  • Local 2-1971 of Pace Int'l Union v. Cooper, 364 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D.N.C. 2005).published
    Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that the Chapter 7 Trustee waited almost two years to complain. “ ‘It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict…
Show 24 more citing cases
  • Rohm & Haas Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.N.J. 2001).published 2 cites
    (two-and-one-half year delay)
  • Off. Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Valley-Vulcan Mold Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 5 F. App'x 396 (6th Cir. 2001).unpublished
    (denying motion for disqualification where it was asserted just prior to the scheduled trial date)
  • Montgomery Academy v. Kohn, 82 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.N.J. 1999).published
    (two-and-one-half year delay)
  • United States v. Bell, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (E.D. Cal. 1999).published
    Metr o-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 36 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 , 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 327 (1995); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod.
  • City of El Paso v. Salas-Porras Soule, 6 F. Supp. 2d 616 (W.D. Tex. 1998).published 2 cites
    (waiver where disqualification not raised for more than two and half years after notice of representation and just prior to trial)
  • Pastor v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).published
    Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983).
  • Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Sims, 875 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1995).published
    Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Central Milk Producers Cooperative v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir.1978); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir.197…
  • Palumbo v. Tele-Commc'ns, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994).published
    Gygi Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 620, 621 (10th Cir.1984); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983).
  • Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993).published 4 cites
    (same, delay of two years and six months)
  • United States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (W.D. Wash. 1990).published
    In Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983), the Ninth Circuit recognized that disqualification on this ground is subject to waiver: Generally, when the district court finds a substantial relationship…
  • Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Va. 1990).published
    Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 847; Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 , 103 S.Ct. 77 , 74 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); Hull v. Celan…
  • Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988).published
    (a former client may waive his right to object to counsel of an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest where he knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly)
  • Zimmerman v. Duggan, 81 B.R. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1987).published 2 cites
    Id. at 87.
  • Berg v. Marine Trust Co., 416 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).published
    A substantial relationship will be found to exist "if the factual contexts of the two representations are similar or related.” Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985), quoting Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,…
  • Prod. Credit Ass'n of Mankato v. Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 1987).published
    See e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir.1981) (“The advice does not need to be ‘relevant’ in the evidentiary sense to be ‘substantially related.’ It need only be akin to the present action in…
  • Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1986).published
    See, e.g., Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1047-48 (9th Cir.1985); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983).
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Orson H. Gygi Co., 749 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).published
    Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983); Grahams Service Inc. v. Teamsters Local 975, 700 F.2d 420, 423 (8th Cir.1982); Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds,…
  • Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Robert R. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    (affirming denial of disqualification request where request made two years and six months after learning of potential ground for disqualification)
  • Abney v. Wal-Mart, 984 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1997).published
    (waiver where disqualification not raised for more than two and a half years after notice of representation, and raised on the eve of trial)
  • Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., Ltd., 667 A.2d 856 (Me. 1995).published
    See Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983) citing Gas-a-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1976) (such an order “will not be disturbed if the record reveals…
  • In re Ferrante, 126 B.R. 642 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).published
    See Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.1983) (citing cases); Zimmerman v. Duggan, 81 B.R. 296, 300 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987). “[A] former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an oppos…
  • In re Meridian Auto. Sys.-Composite Operations, Inc., 340 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).published
    (holding that waiver is appropriate where a former client has a valid ground for disqualification but “knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly)
  • Lennar Mare Island, LLC v. Steadfast Ins., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (E.D. Cal. 2015).published
  • Vega v. Geico Choice Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 3d 987 (D. Idaho 2022).published
    “It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to h…”
At page 88Waiver of conflict of interest after significant delay7 citing casesholding that former client waived right to object to conflict of interest where it waited two years and six months before objecting to the representation or filing a motion to disqualify and most of the trial preparation had been completed1 citing court put it this way
  • Off. Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Valley-Vulcan Mold Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co.), 237 B.R. 322 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999).published 4 cites
    See also Trust Corp., 701 F.2d at 87 (“An order disqualifying counsel or refusing to disqualify counsel will not be disturbed if the record reveals any sound basis for the [bankruptcy] court’s action.”).
  • HDMI Licensing Adm'r, Inc. v. Availink Inc., 730 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2024).published 2 cites
    Plaintiff argues that 6 its motion is not untimely because the filing delay was “minor” and “not prejudicial to 7 Defendant.” Reply at 2. 8 “It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing 9 an…
  • Besang, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 3:23-cv-00113 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2023).
    (holding that former client waived right to object to conflict of interest where it waited two years and six months before objecting to the representation or filing a motion to disqualify and most of the trial preparatio…)
  • Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993).published 4 cites
    Commonwealth Ins., 808 F.Supp. at 1208-09 (motion to disqualify denied when brought more than two years after filing of complaint and grounds of alleged conflict were known from commencement of suit); Trust Corp. of Montana, 701 F.2d at 87…
  • Bagdan v. Beck, 140 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.J. 1991).published
    Id. at 88.
  • Joseph E. Shurance v. Plan. Control Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988).published
    The clarity of the rule laid down in Troné is not affected by Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir.1983), where the court stated that there was jurisdiction under § 1292(b) because a motions panel had pr…
  • Zimmerman v. Duggan, 81 B.R. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1987).published 2 cites
    Id. at 87.
At page 86Reviewing district court's discretion on attorney disqualification3 citing casesKILKENNY, Circuit Judge: Trust Corporation of Montana (Trust Corp.), personal representative of the estate of Marlin Wagner, appeals from an order of the…opening of page *86 (no citing court says what it cites this page for) · 2 listed here
  • CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2008).published 3 cites
    Id. at 86.
  • Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Robert R. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    Cf. Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87-88 (9th Cir.1983) (affirming denial of disqualification request where request made two years and six months after learning of potential ground for disqualification).
Other citing cases12 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 2 more citing cases
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
TRUST CORPORATION OF MONTANA, Personal Representative of the Estate of Marlin Everett Wagner, on behalf of Cindy Pilecki, Kirk Wagner, Mark Wagner and Daisy Wagner, the legal heirs of Marlin Everett Wagner
v.
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
No. 82-3236.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 8, 1983.
Published opinion
R. Keith Strong, Chruch, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiff-appellant., Alexander Blewett, III, Jardin, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, Mont., for defendant-appellee.
Kilkenny, Schroeder, Wallace.
Cited by 50 opinions  |  Published
Citer courts: D. Idaho (1)
KILKENNY, Circuit Judge:

Trust Corporation of Montana (Trust Corp.), personal representative of the estate of Marlin Wagner, appeals from an order of the district court refusing to completely disqualify the law firm of Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver (Jardine firm) from proceeding as counsel for the defendant, Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper), in this wrongful death action. We affirm.

FACTS

On July 23, 1979, the law firm of Smith, Baillie and Walsh (Smith firm) filed this wrongful death action on behalf of Trust Corp. seeking recovery against Piper on the theory of strict liability. Wagner died in July, 1976, from injuries suffered in the crash of his airplane shortly after lift-off. Trust Corp. contends that the airplane, designed, manufactured and sold by Piper was defective and unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in the design of the restraint system.[1]

Piper’s counsel, the Jardine firm, had previously represented the deceased, Wagner, in a divorce and several business matters. This prior representation gave the Jardine firm access to confidential information concerning Wagner’s financial status. Recognizing the potential conflict of interest, the Jardine firm advised the Smith firm of the prior representation shortly after the complaint was filed.[2] The entire Wagner file was delivered to the Smith firm for review. At'that time, the Smith firm told the Jar-dine firm that it would review the file and contact them if there were any objections to the Jardine firm’s continued representation of Piper. The Smith firm kept the Wagner file in its possession for approximately two years and six months, until February, 1982. During this extensive period of time, no complaint or objection was communicated regarding the Jardine firm’s representation of Piper.

On September 14, 1981, more than two years after the lawsuit was filed, Trust Corp. substituted the law firm of Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams (Church firm) for the Smith firm. The Church firm, likewise, raised no objection to the prior representation until February 9, 1982, during a deposition. On February 19, 1982, just 33[*87] days prior to the scheduled trial date, Trust Corp. filed a motion to disqualify the Jar-dine firm. By this time, most of the trial preparation and discovery, which involved numerous interrogatories, the taking of approximately 20 depositions, and various motions and briefs, had been completed. Although the Jardine firm’s work product infiltrated the entire case, it was principally directed to the development of expert testimony on the issue of liability. Moreover, Trust Corp. had actually known of, but failed to object to, the Jardine firm’s representation for approximately two years and six months before filing the motion to disqualify.

The district court found that there was a possible conflict of interest between the pri- or representation and the compensatory damages feature of the trial. However, the court found no conflict of interest with respect to the liability feature of the trial. Consequently, the court ordered the trial bifurcated. The Jardine firm was permitted to proceed as counsel for Piper in the liability phase of the trial, but prohibited from preparing and presenting the compensatory damages phase of the trial.

ISSUE

Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify the Jardine firm from proceeding in this action as counsel for Piper.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court has the responsibility for controlling the conduct of attorneys practicing before it. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, etc., 658 F.2d 1355, 1358 (CA9 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990, 102 S.Ct. 1615, 71 L.Ed.2d 1850 (1982); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (CA9 1980). An order disqualifying or refusing to disqualify counsel will not be disturbed if the record reveals any sound basis for the district court’s action. Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S.Ct. 164, 50 L.Ed.2d 139 (1976). Thus, this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Trone, supra, 621 F.2d at 999.

DISCUSSION

In Troné, supra, this court adopted an attorney disqualification rule designed to implement the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to representing a party opposing a former client.[3] We held that the “relevant test for disqualification is whether the former representation is ‘substantially related’ to the current representation.” Id. at 998; see Gas-A-Tron of Arizona, supra, 534 F.2d at 1325; Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 223 (CA7 1978). “Substantiality is present if the factual contexts of the two representations are similar or related.” Trone, supra, 621 F.2d at 998. Generally, when the district court finds a substantial relationship the attorney should be disqualified. However, the former client may expressly or impliedly waive his objection and consent to the adverse representation. See In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (CA5 1976); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (CA2 1954).

It is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to have waived that right. See Central Milk Producers Co-op v. Sentry Food Stores, 573 F.2d 988, 992 (CA8 1978); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (CA10 1975). The record in this case is clear that Trust Corp. knew of the Jardine firm’s prior representation of Wagner for approximately two years and six months before objecting or filing a motion to dis[*88]qualify. Moreover, it is undisputed that early in the pretrial stages of this action, the Smith firm, after receiving the Wagner file, told the Jardine firm that it would be contacted if there were any objections to its continued representation of Piper. However, no objections were communicated until February, 1982, just prior to the scheduled trial date. Under these circumstances, we hold that Trust Corp.’s failure to object within a reasonable time, coupled with the long delay in filing a motion to disqualify, constitute a de facto consent to the Jardine firm’s continued representation of Piper and a waiver of its right to object.

As stated in Redd v. Shell Oil Co., supra, “lawyer conflict of interest problems ought to be brought up long before the date of trial in an atmosphere which does not cast a shadow over the trial itself.” 518 F.2d at 316. Trust Corp.’s failure to timely object and its lengthy delay in filing a motion to disqualify cannot be tolerated where, as here, disqualification would certainly cast a shadow over the trial. Our holding, however, is limited to deciding whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to disqualify the Jardine firm from all participation in the case. Because the appellee has not challenged the district court’s order of partial disqualification, we need not consider whether the district court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial and ordering a partial disqualification. The district court may reexamine its order on bifurcation in light of this opinion.

JURISDICTION

We note that upon certification by the district court, this court granted a petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b). Consequently, we have jurisdiction. Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (CA9 1982),is concerned with 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As such, it does not apply to this record and is not before us for review or consideration.

CONCLUSION

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

Two other lawsuits arose out of this airplane crash: Daisy Wagner v. Piper Aircraft Corp., D.C. No. CV-79-11 (resulting in a verdict in favor of Piper), aff'd by memorandum, No. 81-3593 (CA9 November 5, 1982); and Betty Mathieu v. Piper Aircraft Corp., D.C. No. CV-79-44 (settled prior to trial).

2

In an affidavit, unrefuted by Trust Corp., Alexander Blewett III, an attorney with the Jar-dine firm, explained how the Smith firm was advised of the prior representation:

“When your affiant [Blewett] received the assignment for the defense of this case from Piper Aircraft Corporation, he immediately advised Trust Corporation of Montana’s counsel, Dennis Clarke, of the law firm of Smith, Baillie & Walsh. Not only did your affiant advise Mr. Clarke of the prior representation, but your affiant fully disclosed the entire contents of the Marlin Wagner file to him. A discussion was had with Mr. Clarke by this affiant as to whether Mr. Clarke had any objection to this affiant acting as attorney for Piper Aircraft Corporation in light of this previous representation of Marlin Wagner. Mr. Clarke advised this affiant that he would discuss the matter with Mr. James R. Walsh, another attorney in his law firm, and that he would advise this affiant if he had any objection to this affiant’s representation of Piper Aircraft Corporation. Mr. Clarke kept the entire Marlin Wagner file in his possession until February, 1982, at which time he delivered the file to this affiant upon request. At no time did Mr. Clarke or Mr. Walsh voice any complaint whatsoever concerning this affiant’s representation of Piper Aircraft Corporation in this case, and therefore this affiant continued in the defense of this action.” [Emphasis supplied].
3

The Troné court stated that the disqualification rule was necessary to “implement the following canons of professional ethics: Canon 1 (maintaining integrity and confidence in the legal profession); Canon 4 (preserving confidences and secrets of a client); Canon 5 (exercise of independent professional judgment); Canon 6 (representing a client competently); Canon 7 (representing a client zealously within bounds of the law); Canon 9 (avoiding even the appearance of professional impropriety).” Trone, supra, 621 F.2d at 999.