Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating from the cases involving the firm in question.”
133 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 38 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Doe v. Cabrera (dcd, 2015-09-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 41 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Doe v. Cabrera (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
D.D.C. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in this case, the record indicates that neither of the two clerks in question worked on the case or even talked with the judge about it to any significant extent.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In Re: KPERS v.
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating from the cases involving the firm in question.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Omar E. Romero-Acosta, et al. v. Bottles, Kindred Spirits Inc., et al.
D.P.R. · 2026 · confidence medium
Co. of Baton Rouge, La., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d at 971 (judges have complete discretion in the use of their resources and the system is not intended to micromanage the relationship between judges and law clerks).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Damian v. Yahia Meftah Sole Prop. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Cal. · 2022 · confidence medium
Ctrs., 192 So. 3d at 504-05 . 4 Finally, Hunt I] merely assumed for the sake of argument that the limitations period might 5 || begin sometime after a receiver’s appointment, but held that even if that were true, the complaint 6 || was still filed too long after any reasonable time for investigation and discovery of the alleged 7 || fraud—which, again, is not required under Florida law, where only reasonable discovery of the 8 transfer is at issue. 783 F.2d at 1013-14; see Nat’l Auto Serv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc.
10th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 713-714 (9th Cir.1990) (holding § 455(a) did not require recusal of a district judge whose law clerk received a job offer from the plaintiff’s law firm while the case was pending because the judge screened the law clerk from the case immediately after the firm contacted the clerk); Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016 (holding a district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a recusal motion when two of his law clerks accepted job offers from a law firm representing several defendants in the case because one law clerk had no involve…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ajibola Taiwo Laosebikan v. The Coca-Cola Company
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
D.R.I. · 2007 · confidence medium
Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 783 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir.1986) (assuming that a law clerk would be prohibited from working on a case involving a law firm with which the law clerk had accepted employment); in other cases, inquiring courts have proceeded directly to the recusal question because the conflict was, unlike the present case, apparent.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Martinez
N.D. Iowa · 2005 · confidence medium
“A judge is not necessarily forbidden ... to do all that is prohibited to each of [her] clerks.” Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1015-16.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael T. Byrne v. Camran Nezhat, M.D.
11th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Because preee-dent approves the isolation of a law clerk who has accepted future employment with counsel appearing before the court (see e.g., Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1015-16) it follows that isolating a law clerk should also be acceptable when the clerk’s former employer appears before the court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael T. Byrne v. Camran Nezhat, M.D.
11th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Because precedent approves the isolation of a law clerk who has accepted future employment with counsel appearing before the court (see e.g., Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1015-16) it follows that isolating a law clerk should also be acceptable when the clerk’s former employer appears before the court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Com'n Investigation
N.M. · 1999 · confidence medium
For the same reason, a reasonable person might question Mr. Kaufman's impartiality with respect to a firm for which he agreed to work after completing his duties with the Commission. {49} On the other hand, "[w]e do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating in cases involving the firm in question." Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 714 (quoting Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U S West Communications, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission
N.M. · 1999 · confidence medium
For the same reason, a reasonable person might question Mr. Kaufman’s impartiality with respect to a firm for which he agreed to work after completing his duties with the Commission. {49} On the other hand, “[w]e do not believe that a law clerk’s acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge’s impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating in cases involving the firm in question.” Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 714 (quoting Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Physician Corp. of America Securities Litigation
S.D. Fla. · 1999 · confidence medium
For the purposes of the statute of limitations, “what matters is not when the information was actually known, but rather when in the exercise of due diligence it should have been known.” Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1014.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edwards
M.D. La. · 1999 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (7th Cir.1988) (recu-sal not required where party has retained judge’s son to represent it in an unrelated matter); cf. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (re-cusal not required where judge’s law clerk has accepted offer of future employment with law firm representing a *715 party to the case, as long as law clerk does not personally work on the case).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Federal Communications Commission
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (7th Cir.1988) (recusal not required where party has retained judge’s son to represent it in an unrelated matter); cf. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (recusal not required where judge’s law clerk has accepted offer of future employment with law firm representing a party to the case, as long as law clerk does not personally work on the ease).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southwestern Bell Telephone Company Southern New England Telephone Company Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel United States Telephone Association Ameritech Corporation U S West, Inc. Rural Telephone Coalition Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company Gte Service Corporation Gte Alaska, Incorporated Gte Arkansas Incorporated Gte California, Incorporated Gte Florida, Incorporated Gte Midwest, Incorporated Gte South, Incorporated Gte Southwest, Incorporated Gte North, Incorporated Gte Hawaiian Telephone Company, Incorporated Gte West Coast, Incorporated Contel of Minnesota, Inc. Contel of the South, Inc. Missouri Public Service Commission Gte Northwest, Incorporated Pacific Bell Nevada Bell, Intervenors on Appeal. v. Federal Communications Commission United States of America, Association for Local Telecommunications Services American Telephone and Telegraph Company Telecommunications Resellers Association the Competition Policy Institute Information Technology Association of America National Cable Television Association, Inc. Internet Access Coalition Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee Worldcom, Inc. Sprint Corporation Telco Communications Group, Inc. Excel Telecommunications, Inc. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies Time Warner Communications Holdings, Inc. MCI Telecommunications Corporation Ny Telephone New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, Intervenors on Appeal. America's Carriers Telecommunication Association, Intervenors on Appeal, Commercial Internet Exchange Association, Amicus Curiae. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company Ameritech Corporation Time Warner Communications Holdings Us Telephone Association Gte Service Corporation Gte Alaska, Incorporated Gte Arkansas, Incorporated Gte California, Incorporated Gte Florida, Incorporated Gte Midwest, Incorporated Gte South, Incorporated Gte Southwest, Incorporated Benjamin Wayne McCoin Inc. Gte Northwest, Incorporated Gte Hawaiian Telephone Company, Incorporated Gte West Coast, Incorporated Contel of Minnesota, Inc. Contel of the South, Inc. Association for Local Telecommunications Services Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Washington, D.C., Inc. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. New York Telephone Company New England Telephone and Telegraph Company Independent Telephone and Telecommunications Alliance, Intervenors on Appeal. v. Federal Communications Commission United States of America, American Telephone and Telegraph Company Telecommunications Resellers Association MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Lbc Communications, Inc. Worldcom, Inc. Competitive Telecommunications Association, Intervenors on Appeal
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (7th Cir.1988) (recusal not required where party has retained judge's son to represent it in an unrelated matter); cf. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (recusal not required where judge's law clerk has accepted offer of future employment with law firm representing a party to the case, as long as law clerk does not personally work on the case). 16 Nor is recusal automatically required where the judge's child is employed by a party to the dispute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grace v. Rosenstock
E.D.N.Y · 1996 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1987) (“Because [plaintiffs] amendment asserts an entirely new claim for relief based upon different facts it does not relate back”); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 1986) (amendment to add allegations concerning fraudulent transactions separate from transaction alleged in original complaint did not relate back); In re Kam Kuo Seafood Corp., 67 B.R. 304, 307 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986) (amended complaint does not relate back to date of filing of original complaint …
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Colton Fontán
prsupreme · 1996 · confidence medium
Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11mo Cir. 1986); Canon XI del Código de Ética Judicial, 4 L.P.R.A.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Kansas Public Employees Retirement System
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (‘We do not believe that a law clerk’s acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge’s impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating from the cases involving the firm in question.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hamid v. Waterhouse
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1015.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Bank of America Corporation, Bankamerica Corp. Bank of America Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton Concorde Finance & Investments, Grp Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec Southern Co. First American Corp., First American Bankshares Paul Adams Jack Beddow A. Vincent Scoffone T. Bertram Lance Independence Bank Manuel Noriega Fulvio Dobrich Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Bank of America Corporation, Bankamerica Corp. Bank of America Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton Concorde Finance & Investments, Grp Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec Southern Co. T. Bertram Lance Independence Bank Manuel Noriega Fulvio Dobrich Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, and First American Corp., First American Bankshares, Inc. Paul G. Adams Jack Beddow A. Vincent Scoffone Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Bank of America Corporation, Bankamerica Corp. Bank of America Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton T. Bertram Lance Independence Bank Manuel Noriega Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, First American Bankshares, Inc. Jack W. Beddow Paul G. Adams A. Vincent Scoffone, and Concorde Finance & Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec Southern Company, Inc. Wesley Company, Inc. River Oaks, Inc. River Oaks Investments, Inc. Sterling Bluff, Inc. Grp Investments N.V.
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1015.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Norman L. Young, Clyde Edward Young, Jr., A/K/A Peanuts, Clyde E. Young, Sr., A/K/A Red, Lucious Levon Banks, A/K/A Junior Banks, David Young, United States of America v. Patricia Young
11th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.1994) ("Neither the district judge's delay, nor his adverse rulings, constitute the sort of 'pervasive bias' that necessitates recusal."); United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.1988) ("Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction between court and counsel constitute pervasive bias."); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) ("We do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Young
11th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.1994) (“Neither the district judge’s delay, nor his adverse rulings, constitute the sort of ‘pervasive bias’ that necessitates recusal.”); United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.1988) (“Neither a trial judge’s comments on lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor fiiction between court and counsel constitute pervasive bias.”); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986) (“We do not believe that a law clerk’s acceptance of future employment with a …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Cooke
Bankr. D. Conn. · 1993 · confidence medium
Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., 783 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir.1986); cf. Rule 1.12, Conn.Rules of Prof.Conduct (1992), Rule 3(a), Local Rules of Civil Procedure (D.Conn.1992) (lawyer may not handle matter in which he participated “personally and substantially” while a law clerk).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milgard Tempering, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Selas Corporation of America, a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
We do not believe that a law clerk’s acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge’s impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating in cases involving the firm in question. 783 F.2d at 1016.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation
D.P.R. · 1989 · confidence medium
“If a clerk has a possible conflict of interest, it is the clerk, not the judge, who must be disqualified.” Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Chandler's Cove Inn, Ltd.
E.D.N.Y · 1988 · confidence medium
Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited "see" Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
M.D. Fla. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc. 5 F.3d 488, 492-493 (11th Cir.1993) (“The essential limitations question to be settled was ‘not when the information was actually known, but rather when in the exercise of due diligence it should have been known.’ ”) (quoting Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., 783 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir.1986) (although receiver, upon appointment, may not be expected to immediately discover fraudulent transactions, “as a matter of law” he “should have been able to turn up information from his own department’s files by April 21, 1979 — m…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gary L. Detemple
4th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011 , 1015-16 (11th Cir.1986) (clerk’s conflict of interest requires disqualification of clerk not judge).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Securities Litigation
W.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir.1986) (claims based on two allegedly fraudulent transactions did not relate back to original complaint, which alleged a separate transaction); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 747 F.Supp. 850, 855 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (claims in amended complaint relating to stock sales in December 1985 and March 1986 did not relate back to original complaint, which alleged material misstatements in connection with sale in March 1985); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Securities Litigation, 467 F.Supp. 227, 260 (…
cited Cited "see" Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated, a West Virginia Corporation v. American Cyanamid Company, a Maine Corporation, & Third Party v. Stephen McKnight Personal Representative of the Estate of Roy McKnight Third Party Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated, a West Virginia Corporation v. American Cyanamid Company, a Maine Corporation, & Third Party v. Stephen McKnight Personal Representative of the Estate of Roy McKnight Third Party
3rd Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016; Reddy v. Jones, 419 F.Supp. 1391 (W.D.N.C.1976).
cited Cited "see" In Re Cascade International Securities Litigation
S.D. Fla. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 606 F.Supp. 1348, 1363 (N.D.Ala.1985) (Rule 9(b) pleading requirements are applicable to civil RICO actions), aff'd, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Bishop v. Albertson's, Inc.
E.D. Wash. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 , 1015 (11th Cir.1986) (all which is forbidden to a judge is forbidden to the clerk); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 129 F.R.D. 409, 411-12 (D.Puerto Rico 1989) and authorities cited therein (same).
cited Cited "see" Wells v. HBO & Co.
N.D. Ga. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011 , 1014 (11th Cir.1986) (amendment concerning different incident time-barred).
discussed Cited "see" Friedlander v. Troutman
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 , 1013 n. 2 (11th Cir.1986) (dicta) ("Our decision in White, however, was based on the general similarity of blue sky actions in Alabama to actions brought under [Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]; it did not focus on the nature of the particular cause of action at hand.").
discussed Cited "see" Friedlander v. Troutman
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 , 1013 n. 2 (11th Cir.1986) (dicta) (“Our decision in White , however, was based on the general similarity of blue sky actions in Alabama to actions brought under [§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]; it did not focus on the nature of the particular cause of action at hand.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ex Parte George
Ala. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hunt v. American Bank Trust Co. of Baton Rouge , 783 F.2d 1011 , 1015 (11th Cir.1986) ("Clerks should not work on such cases, just as a judge should not hear cases in which his business associates are involved.").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sensley v. Albritton
5th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 456 ; In re Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 85 F.3d 1353, 1364-65 (8th Cir. *601 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of recusal where, inter alia, during pendency of litigation judge’s daughter accepted defendant’s offer of employment as associate attorney); see also Hunt v. American Bank & Trust of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that a judge’s law clerk’s acceptance of an employment offer made by a firm representing a party before that judge did not require recusal as that clerk was not participating in the…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Clark v. Milam
S.D.W. Va · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Clark IV, supra, 847 F.Supp. at 422 , citing Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 606 F.Supp. 1348, 1354-56 (N.D.Ala.1985), aff'd 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir.1986) (“the statute of limitations may begin to run when it is clear that the shareholders of the corporation, with an interest in redressing the wrongs against their corporation, are, or should be aware of the fraudulent activities damaging the corporation.” (emphasis added)). 15 The reason for this qualification of the doctrine of adverse domination is apparent.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Allied-Signal Inc.
1st Cir. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525 (11th Cir.1988) (“We recognize the importance that some law clerks play in the decisional process and it is for this reason that a ‘ “clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited to the Judge.” ’ ”) (quoting Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011 , 1015 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d *971 175, 179 (5th Cir.1983))), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2066 , 104 L.Ed.2d 631 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jennings v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc.
D. Me. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Hunt v. American Bank and Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir.1986); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.1984); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576 (8th Cir.1984). 5 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
W. Larry Hunt, as a Receiver of Life Insurance Company of America, Plaintiff
v.
American Bank & Trust Company of Baton Rouge, Louisiana Rolfe H. McCollister George E. McNutt Jr. Robert A. Holloway Donald A. Hayden Karl E. Rodriquez Sam Gallo and Calvin Wilson
85-7425.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Mar 3, 1986.
783 F.2d 1011
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: S.D. Florida (1)

783 F.2d 1011

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,533, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6200

W. Larry HUNT, as a Receiver of Life Insurance Company of
America, Plaintiff- Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA;
Rolfe H. McCollister; George E. McNutt, Jr.; Robert A.
Holloway; Donald A. Hayden; Karl E. Rodriquez; Sam Gallo;
and Calvin Wilson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-7425.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

March 3, 1986.

J. Gusty Yearout, Yearout, Hardy & Myers, Deborah S. Braden, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Caine O'Rear, III, W. Ramsey McKinney, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for American Bank.

Karon O. Bowdre, Rives & Peterson, Clarence M. Small, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for all other appellees except Calvin Wilson.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before VANCE, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON[*], Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNNE[**], Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

[*~1011]1

Appellant Hunt, acting as receiver of Life Insurance Company of America (LICA), brought claims under RICO, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961 to 1968, Securities Exchange Act Sec. 10(b), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78j(b), SEC rule 10b-5 and state common law against defendants for allegedly engaging in fraudulent transactions that depleted LICA's assets. The district court, 606 F.Supp. 1348, dismissed Hunt's complaint, finding that the securities and common law fraud counts were barred by the statute of limitations and that the RICO counts failed to state a claim. Although we find that Hunt otherwise stated a valid RICO claim under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), we conclude that this entire action, including the RICO counts, is time barred. Thus, we affirm.

I.

2

Hunt's claims are based on three separate transactions alleged to have been fraudulent: the Calvin Wilson, Advanced Education and TransAmerican transactions. All three took place in the mid-1970's. The former two have been the subject of litigation before: they were among various incidents of fraud alleged in two 1976 lawsuits against LICA and several of the individual defendants in this case.

3

The Alabama Department of Insurance, charged with regulating LICA, knew about all three transactions and the lawsuits no later than the end of 1977. In early 1978, the department conducted an examination of LICA. Alabama's attorney general and its securities commission also investigated the company. On December 15, 1978, the department placed LICA into receivership. As required by state law, the chief of the department's receivership division, then Charles Crawford, was appointed receiver. Appellant Hunt succeeded Crawford as receivership chief and took over as receiver for LICA in January 1980. Hunt filed the original complaint in this action, dealing solely with the Calvin Wilson transaction, on April 22, 1981. He amended the complaint on May 2, 1983 to add counts dealing with the TransAmerican and Advanced Education transactions and the first of the two RICO counts. The second RICO count was added in 1984.

II.

[*~1012]4

Hunt contends that the district court erred in holding that the common law fraud and federal securities fraud claims were brought after the expiration of the respective limitations periods of one year for the state claims, see Ala.Code. Sec. 6-2-39 (repealed Jan. 9, 1985),[1] and two years for the federal claims, see White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 629 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Ala.Code Sec. 8-6-19(e).[2] He argues that the periods did not begin to run until such time as either he or the original receiver, in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the fraud, and that there is a question of fact as to when that time came. Defendants argue, on the other hand, that the periods began to run no later than December 15, 1978--the date the original receiver was appointed--since the receiver, as chief of the insurance department's receivership division, had at least complete access to the department's information concerning the three transactions in question.

5

We need not determine precisely when the limitations period began to run, for we conclude that even under Hunt's standard his claims were filed too late. At the time the original receiver was appointed, the insurance department already knew of the Calvin Wilson and Advanced Education transactions, and also knew that these two transactions had been alleged to have been fraudulent. Even if the receiver could not have been expected to discover the causes of action involving these transactions instantaneously upon appointment, we conclude that as a matter of law the receiver should have been able to turn up information from his own department's files by April 21, 1979--more than four months after his appointment.

[*~1013]6

Although the insurance department knew of the TransAmerican transaction in 1978, there is no evidence that the department had reason to suspect at that time that it was fraudulent. Nevertheless, the counts concerning that transaction are time barred for a different reason. They were added to Hunt's original complaint on May 2, 1983--more than four years after the appointment of the first receiver--and since they concern a separate incident of fraud they do not relate back to the date of the original complaint. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d 1286, 1299-1300 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S.Ct. 701, 30 L.Ed.2d 736 (1972); Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). We do not doubt Hunt's contention that he did not become aware of the TransAmerican activities until the spring of 1983. Hunt himself, however, acknowledges that what matters is not when the information was actually known, but rather when in the exercise of due diligence it should have been known. Given that the insurance department knew that LICA had been involved with TransAmerican and was at least suspected of participation in fraudulent activities, we have no difficulty concluding that Hunt should have discovered the TransAmerican cause of action by May 1, 1981.

III.

7

Although both of Hunt's RICO counts are grounded in the three allegedly fraudulent securities transactions, the two counts allege distinct theories of recovery. The first RICO count relies directly upon the three transactions as the requisite predicate acts. The second alleges as predicate acts several instances of mail fraud, which are said to have occurred when the defendants attempted to conceal the securities transactions through the mailing of false financial statements.

8

The district court dismissed both counts primarily "for failure to allege a prior criminal conviction on the underlying predicate offenses."[3] Since the dismissal, however, the Supreme Court has issued its opinion in Sedima, in which the Court emphatically rejected the prior conviction requirement. See Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3284. Accordingly, the dismissal cannot stand on the ground relied upon below. Nevertheless, dismissal was proper if the RICO counts, like the other counts of the complaint, were barred by the statute of limitations.

[*~1014]9

The limitations question is somewhat more complicated with regard to the RICO counts than for the other counts of the complaint. At the outset, there is some room for disagreement as to the appropriate limitations period. Either the one-year common law fraud period or the two-year securities fraud period--or both, one to each count--might be said to apply. Although we are inclined to apply the shorter period,[4] we leave resolution of this issue to another day since we conclude that the RICO counts are barred even by the more generous two-year period.

10

The two-year period began to run as of the time when Hunt or his predecessor as receiver should have had knowledge of the underlying predicate acts. We have already determined that the first receiver should have known of the Calvin Wilson and Advanced Education causes of action as of April 21, 1979, and that Hunt should have known of the TransAmerican claim as of May 1, 1981. Since the RICO claim based directly upon these transactions was not filed until May 2, 1983, the claim is time barred unless it relates back to the date of the original complaint. Yet the claim cannot relate back since it depends upon allegations of two transactions--Advanced Education and TransAmerican--which were not included in the original complaint and of which the defendants consequently had no notice. See Woods, 438 F.2d at 1299-1300. Therefore, the first RICO count was untimely.

11

On the other hand, the second RICO claim, based upon allegations of mail fraud, might well relate back to the original complaint. Although the count refers to the two transactions not originally included, these additional transactions are not crucial to the count. The predicate acts of mail fraud would still have been committed had defendants mailed false financial statements intended to conceal only the Calvin Wilson transaction. Even if the count does relate back, however, it is still time barred. As we previously noted, the original receiver should have discovered the Calvin Wilson cause of action no later than April 21, 1979--more than two years prior to the filing of the original complaint. With discovery of that claim would logically have come awareness that false financial statements had been filed with the insurance department.

IV.[5]

[*~1016]12

Hunt also argues that the district judge should have recused himself because two of the judge's law clerks accepted offers of employment from the law firm representing several of the defendants while this case was pending before the court. We disagree. Absent actual bias, disqualification is necessary only if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). It is true that a reasonable person might wonder about a law clerk's impartiality in cases in which his future employer is serving as counsel. Clerks should not work on such cases, just as a judge should not hear cases in which his business associates are involved. A "clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited to the judge." Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1983); see also Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1977). A judge is not necessarily forbidden, however, to do all that is prohibited to each of his clerks. If a clerk has a possible conflict of interest, it is the clerk, not the judge, who must be disqualified. We do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating in cases involving the firm in question. Compare Hall, 695 F.2d at 179 and Miller Industries, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F.Supp. 84, 89 (S.D.Ala.1980) (disqualification of judge required where clerk continued to work on case involving future employer) with Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F.Supp. 524, 525 (S.D.Fla.1977) and Reddy v. Jones, 419 F.Supp. 1391, 1391 (W.D.N.C.1976) (disqualification not required where clerk was taken off case).

[*1016]13

In this case, the record indicates that neither of the two clerks in question worked on the case or even talked with the judge about it to any significant extent. Although the case was assigned for a time to one of the clerks, the judge characterized this assignment as "ministerial only," and removed the file from the clerk once the clerk had accepted a job with the defendants' firm. Hunt does not contend otherwise, nor does he allege any actual bias on the part of the district judge. Consequently, we conclude that the judge properly denied Hunt's motion for recusal.

[*~1015]14

AFFIRMED.

*

See Rule 3(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

**

Hon. Seybourne H. Lynne, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation

1

Since this suit was filed the limitations period applicable to the state claims has been increased to two years. See Ala.Code Sec. 6-2-38 (effective Jan. 9, 1985). The longer period would not affect our decision

2

Appellee American Bank argues that despite our holding in White applying Alabama's two-year limitations period for state blue sky actions to federal securities actions the one-year common law fraud period should be applied here because this particular securities action could not have been brought under the state securities laws. Our decision in White, however, was based on the general similarity of blue sky actions in Alabama to actions brought under Securities Exchange Act Sec. 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5; it did not focus on the nature of the particular cause of action at hand. See also infra note 4 (discussing Wilson v. Garcia, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985))

3

The court also found that "[t]he complaint fails to meet the requisite standard for particularity in pleading the proprietary injury element of a RICO action." Because we conclude that the RICO counts were barred by the statute of limitations, we need not address this finding

4

In Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir.1985), we applied Alabama's one-year limitations period for common law fraud to a RICO claim which was grounded in allegations of fraud. Nothing in that decision, however, indicates that the limitations period for fraud should apply to all RICO claims, and appellees point out that the appropriate period may depend on the nature of the particular claim in question. Under such an approach, if it were determined that the RICO claims in this case were grounded in federal securities fraud the two-year period would be applicable

This case-by-case approach, however, may be precluded by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), in which the Court held that a state's general limitations period for personal injury actions governs all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Wilson was based largely on "practical considerations." 105 S.Ct. at 1945. Noting the wide variety of claims which may be brought under the Sec. 1983 rubric, the Court stated that

[i]f the choice of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the particular facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more periods of limitations should apply to each Sec. 1983 claim. Moreover, under such an approach different statutes of limitations would be applied to the various Sec. 1983 claims arising in the same State, and multiple periods of limitations would often apply to the same case....

... [T]he legislative purpose to create an effective remedy ... is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limitations, for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral matters.

Id. at 1946-47 (footnotes omitted). This reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to RICO claims, which can be based upon an assortment of predicate criminal acts. Although there is probably no good reason to analogize RICO to the same cause of action in every state--some states, for instance, have enacted state versions of RICO which no doubt more closely resemble the federal cause of action than does common law fraud--the key lesson of Wilson seems to be that there should be applied "in each State ... the one most appropriate statute of limitations," id. at 1947, for all RICO actions.

5

Judge Lynne did not participate in the consideration or decision of this issue