Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham
An arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him receives the same deference as his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
An employer challenged a labor arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his authority because the submitted issue was labeled 'Seniority & Recall' rather than 'discharge.' The employer contended the arbitrator lacked the power to determine whether employees were discharged or laid off. The court held that an arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Because the arbitrator's determination was a plausible interpretation of the submission and the agreement, the award was upheld.
At page 285Deference to arbitrator's interpretation of submission scope47 citing casesWe now hold that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
- HollyFrontier v. United Steel Paper, 132 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2025).published (Application of this rule [deferring to an 35 Appellate Case: 23-8046 Document: 71-1 Date Filed: 03/25/2025 Page: 51 arbitrator’s interpretation of a submission] is especially apt in the instant case, where [the company…)
- Arizona Educ. Ass'n v. Arizona Educ. Ass'n Staff Org., No. 2:23-cv-02325 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2024).(We now hold that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue 26 submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded [to] his interpretation of the 27 collective bargaining agreement.)
- Perez v. Discover Bank, No. 3:20-cv-06896 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2021).(interpreting the 2 issue submitted often requires construction of the agreement itself, a job clearly for the 3 arbitrator.)
- 3535 LV Newco LLC v. Int'l All. of Theatrical Stage Employees, No. 2:23-cv-01274 (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2025).The issue to be decided at arbitration was “. . . at which time the show was reformatted 25 to have a Magi operate the hand-held video camera instead of an IATSE bargaining unit 1 member, cause the Company to be in violation of the CBA?” (…
- CoreCivic of Tennessee v. Int'l Union, Sec., Police & Fire Professionals of Am., No. 2:21-cv-00410 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2022).Scope of the Issues Submitted 26 “[A]n arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to [her] is 27 entitled to the same deference accorded [her] interpretation of the [CBA].” Pack Concrete, 28 Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2…
- Cristo v. Charles Schwab Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01843, 2021 WL 6051825 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021).(permitting a plenary review of 9 arbitration would undermine Congress's policy of favoring arbitration as an expeditious 10 and relatively inexpensive means of resolving disputes)
- First Student, Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 959, No. 3:18-cv-00305 (D. Alaska Sept. 26, 2019). Case No. 3:18-cv-00305-SLG, First Student, Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 959 Master (Articles 1 through 49) without the consent of the Employer and the National Union Committee” and (2) the Local Agreement’s language that “the authority of the…
- Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Nat'l Football League, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).publishedAnd “an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United Food & C…
- W. Sugar Coop. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union 190, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (D. Mont. 2016).published“[A]n arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”
- Minnesota Nurses Ass'n v. North Mem'l Health Care, 822 F.3d 414 (8th Cir. 2016).publishedAll the same, “an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the [CBA].” John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Wo…
Show 33 more citing cases
- United Nurses of Child.'s Hosp. v. Rady Child.'s Hosp.-San Diego, 611 F. App'x 906 (9th Cir. 2015).unpublished“arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him ... the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”
- Reg'l Local Union No. 846 v. Gulf Coast Rebar, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 997 (D. Or. 2015).publishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989).
- Am. Med. Response v. Nat'l Emergency Med. Servs. Ass'n, 529 F. App'x 814 (9th Cir. 2013).unpublished“the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”
- Kenneth H. Hughes, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Dev. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Haw. 2009).published Respondent neglects to note, however, that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of an issue submitted is “entitled to the same deference accorded the arbitrator’s interpretation of [an agreement].” Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham,…
- Tp. of Wyckoff v. Pba Local 261, 976 A.2d 1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).publishedInt'l Union, 973 F. 2d 276, 280 (4th Cir.1992); Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F. 2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989); Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 25, 144 F. 3d 855, 857 (D.C.Cir.1998).
- United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 174, 274 F. App'x 504 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989). “[Cjourts are not at liberty to substitute their own interpretation of the parties’ submission for that of the arbitrator.” Ass’n of W.
- Asociacion De Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico v. Union Internacional De Trabajadores De La Industria De Automoviles, 515 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.P.R. 2007).publishedInt’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 155 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.1998); Madison Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 144 F.3d 855, 857-58 (D.C.Cir.1998); El Dorado, 961 F.2d at 321 ; Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 86…
- Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 442 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2006).published (describing “congressional policy in favor of expeditious and relatively inexpensive means of settling [disputes]” (internal quotation marks omitted))
- Peabody W. Coal Co. v. Dist. 22, 99 F. App'x 116 (9th Cir. 2004).unpublishedSheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison Indus., Inc. of Arizona, 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.1996); Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989).
- Federación Cent. De Trabajadores v. Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.P.R. 2002).publishedInt’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 155 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.1998); Madison Hotel v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 144 F.3d 855, 857-58 (D.C.Cir.1998); El Dorado Technical Serv. v. Union General De Trabajadores, 961 F.…
- Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Rest Empl, No. 96-7270 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 1997).publishedSee El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union General De Trabajadores de P.R., 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1992); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Trans- portation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 1992); Pa…
- Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 25, Afl-Cio, 128 F.3d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1997).published See El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union General De Trabajadores de P.R., 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir.1992); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 280 (4th Cir.1992); Pack C…
- Boston & Maine v. Bhd., No. 95-2344 (1st Cir. Aug. 30, 1996).published(deferring to the arbitrator's ruling that submitted "seniority and recall" issue also allowed consideration of propriety of discharge)
- Boston & Maine Corp. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 94 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1996).published (deferring to the arbitrator’s ruling that submitted ‘seniority and recall’ issue also allowed consideration of propriety of discharge)
- Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 552 N.W.2d 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).publishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1989).
- Columbia Aluminum Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 8147, 922 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Wash. 1995).published “an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”
- Granite State Packing v. Local 633, No. CV-94-156-JD (D.N.H. Sept. 5, 1995).publishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1989); or contrary to public policy, Misco, 484 U.S. at 42 , 108 S. C t . at 373.
- Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Lloyd K. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994).publishedWe take note of the view expressed by our sister circuits that the arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issues submitted to him is entitled to the same judicial deference accorded his interpretation of the agreement being arbitr…
- McKesson Corp. v. Local 150 Ibt, 969 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1992).published(treating a procedural issue not specifically submitted to the arbitrator as necessarily before him and affirming his implicit resolution of the issue)
- El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union Gen. De Trabajadores De Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317 (1st Cir. 1992).publishedSee Dorado Beach Hotel, 959 F.2d at 4; Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989).
- Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union & Local Union No. 4-522, 777 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. La. 1991).published“holdpng] that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”
- McKesson Corp. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local Union No. 150, 795 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Cal. 1991).publishedThe arbitrator’s award must be upheld unless: (1) the arbitrator’s decision does not “draw[ ] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” and the arbitrator is dispensing “his own brand of industrial justice,” United Steelworkers…
- Anshen v. Jefferies & Co., 925 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1991).unpublishedThe scope of review for an arbitrator's decision is "extremely narrow." Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989).
- Federated Dep't Stores v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494 (9th Cir. 1990).published There are three articulated exceptions to the general rule of deferring to the arbitrator's decision: (1) when the arbitrator's award does not "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and the arbitrator is dispensing "hi…
- McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co. v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 142, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Haw. 2008).published(We now hold that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.)
- Ass'n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers, Local 78 v. Rexam Graphic, Inc., 221 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2000).published See Pack Concrete, 866 F.2d at 285; see also Line Drivers, Pickup & Delivery Local Union No. 81 v. Roadway Express, 152 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.1998).
- Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesmen's Union, 60 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1995).published(holding that "an arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement)
- United Transp. Union v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 882 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).publishedSee Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir.1989).
- Amgen, Inc. v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999).publishedCir. 1998), expounded on Waverly, stating, “[a]n arbitrator’s view of the issues submitted to him for arbitration therefore receives the same judicial deference as an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Madis…
- Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. MacHinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989).published
- Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1993).published
- Tristar Pictures, Inc. v. Dir.'s Guild of Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1998).published
- AAK USA Richmond Corp. v. Warehouse Union Local 6, ILWU, No. 3:22-cv-01007 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2022).
At page 284Arbitration of employment disputes under collective bargaining agreements5 citing casessites, and two of its mixer truck drivers, Walter Cunningham and Christopher Olmsted. Cunningham and Olmsted are both members of Teamsters Local No. 2 (the…
- Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1996).published Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir.1989).
- Prudential Real Est. Affiliates, Inc. v. Prudential MGM Realty, Inc., 959 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1992).unpublishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir.1989).
- Regal Auto Body Shop, Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio, Dist. Lodge 190 Local Lodge 1414, Int'l Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio, Dist. Lodge 190 Local Lodge 1414 v. Regal Auto Body Shop, Inc., 947 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1991).unpublishedPack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir.1989).
- Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991).published See Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 284 (9th Cir.1989); Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 823 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.1987); New Meiji Market v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union #905, 789…
At page 286Deferring to arbitrator's definition of issue submitted4 citing casesdeferring to the arbitrator’s "plausible interpretation” of the scope of the issue submitted
- Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Ashland, Inc., 967 A.2d 166 (D.C. 2009).published(deferring to the arbitrator’s "plausible interpretation” of the scope of the issue submitted)
- Columbia Aluminum Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 8147, 922 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Wash. 1995).published However, “an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 285…
- Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1992).publishedBy submitting such a broad issue without any limitations as to permissible sources of authority, the parties likewise ceded to the arbitrator the duty of defining the precise “contours of the issue[] submitted.” Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunn…
- Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp. v. Int'l Union, 914 F.2d 1493 (4th Cir. 1990).unpublished See Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir.1989).
v.
Walter T. CUNNINGHAM, and Christopher W. Olmsted, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, and Teamsters Local No. 2, a labor organization, Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
This appeal involves the validity of a labor arbitration award finding that Pack Concrete, Inc. (Pack) improperly discharged two employees. Pack petitioned the district court to vacate the award, contending that the issue submitted for arbitration was limited solely to questions of layoff and recall, and that the arbitrator therefore exceeded his authority by finding the employees had been discharged. The district court upheld the award. We affirm.
I.
This case arises from an employment dispute between Pack, a company which delivers pre-mixed concrete to construction[*284] sites, and two of its mixer truck drivers, Walter Cunningham and Christopher Olmsted. Cunningham and Olmsted are both members of Teamsters Local No. 2 (the Union), the collective bargaining agent for Pack’s employees.
Pack and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which requires arbitration of “any dispute involving the interpretation, application, or alleged violation of a provision of this Agreement.” Article XII of the CBA provides that employees cannot be discharged without just cause and sets forth procedures which Pack must follow to discharge a worker. Article IX further requires Pack to respect seniority rights in laying off and rehiring workers, “subject to competency and ability being equal in the judgment of the employer.”
In February, 1985, Pack sent letters to Cunningham and Olmsted, stating: “Efficiency and economy of seasonal operations requires [sic] the reduction of our working forces and, regrettably, we hereby notify you of your discharge effective February 1, 1985.” The letters then instruct the employees to file new job applications in order to be considered for future employment.
The Union construed the letters to be discharge notices and demanded that the employees be reinstated. It subsequently infomed Pack by letter of its intention to submit the matter to arbitration. In March, 1985, Pack responded by claiming the two employees had been laid off, rather than discharged. Cunningham and Olmsted then presented oral grievances, alleging violations of their seniority rights by virtue of Pack’s failure to rehire them. Pack denied these grievances.
The Union protested the failure to rehire Olmsted and Cunningham and again informed Pack that it intended to submit the grievance to arbitration. The Union then sent a form to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service requesting a panel of arbitrators. The form calls for the party making the request to supply general information about the dispute, and in the space provided for a description of the type of issue to be arbitrated, the Union stated: “Seniority & Recall.”
In August, 1985, the arbitrator issued his decision, concluding that Olmsted and Cunningham had been discharged, not laid off, and that their discharge violated the procedures required by the CBA. The arbitrator ordered Pack to reinstate the two employees with full seniority and awarded them back pay and fringe benefits. The arbitrator also directed Pack to state more clearly its intention in future letters regarding layoffs and discharges.
Pack filed a petition to vacate the award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Sec. 10(d), on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue which had not been submitted to him. Specifically, Pack argued that because the issue submitted for arbitration was limited to “seniority and recall,” the arbitrator lacked authority to find a discharge and to frame remedies accordingly. Pack also claimed the Union had not followed proper filing procedures and attacked the arbitrator’s attempt to dictate the content of future letters. After consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the Union, affirming the award to Cunningham and Olmsted.[1]
Pack timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Union filed a notice of limited cross-appeal, agreeing with the district court’s conclusion, but challenging two of the court’s factual findings. We have jurisdiction over an appeal of a district court’s grant of summary judgment confirming a labor arbitration award. 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 185(a) (West 1978); 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1291 (West Supp.1988).
II.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment confirming an arbitration award. Local Joint Exec. Board of Las Vegas v. Riverboat [*285] Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir.1987).
The scope of review of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely narrow. Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 823 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.1987). “As long as the arbitrator’s award ‘draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement’ and is not merely ‘his own brand of industrial justice,’ the award is legitimate.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, —, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370, 98 L.Ed.2d 286, 298 (1987) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)). “[I]f on its face, the award represents a plausible interpretation of the contract, judicial inquiry ceases and the award must be enforced.” George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 722 F.2d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir.1984).
An arbitrator’s authority is limited, however, by the principle that where an arbitrator “exceeds the boundary of the submission to him, the award will be held invalid.” La Mirada Trucking v. Teamsters Local Union 166, 538 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 787, 50 L.Ed.2d 778 (1977). This circuit has not delineated the standard by which a federal court should review an arbitrator’s determination of his own authority as defined by the submitted issue.
We now hold that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. This approach is consistent with well-established principles of federal labor law and is supported by the decisions of those circuits that have considered the issue, each of which has adopted a deferential standard of review.[2]
In our view, deference to an arbitrator’s interpretation of a submission follows from the Supreme Court’s directive that “when the subject matter of a dispute is arbitra-ble, ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator.” Misco, 484 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 372, 98 L.Ed.2d at 298 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 918, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 909 (1964)). Application of this rule is especially apt in the instant case, where Pack’s argument is not that the discharge issue was not arbi-trable or even factually unrelated to the dispute, but rather that the Union mislabeled the issue when it requested the panel.
The technical nature of Pack’s argument highlights the considerations of federal labor policy favoring deference to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the issue submitted. Failure to adopt this standard would require the judiciary “to determine, case by case, the exact scope of submission in the endless number of grievances and disputes that inevitably occur between employers and employees.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir.1982).[3] As the Mobil court warned, permitting such plenary review would “undermine[] the congressional policy in favor of expeditious and relatively inexpensive means of settling grievances, and thus of promoting labor peace.” Id. Furthermore, interpreting the issue[*286] submitted often requires construction of the agreement itself, a job clearly for the arbitrator. Id.; John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 918, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 909 (1964).[4]
We are persuaded that the same policies which have led this court to defer to an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement weigh strongly in favor of deferring to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the contours of the issues submitted. We therefore review with great deference the arbitrator’s conclusion that the issue before him permitted a determination that the February 1, 1985 letters constituted notices of discharge, not layoff.
III.
In arguing that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the submission, Pack relies on a provision of the collective bargaining agreement requiring the arbitrator to consider only issues submitted in writing.[5] Because the arbitration request form submitted by the Union labeled the issue as "seniority and recall,” Pack concludes "the issue submitted did not involve any discharge issue” and suggests that the Union abandoned its discharge grievance prior to arbitration.[6]
The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the discharge issue has been an integral part of the dispute ever since Cunningham and Olmsted received the February, 1985 letters from Pack. In any event, the Union argues, its correspondence with Pack protesting the letters as improper discharges and noticing its intent to arbitrate meet the CBA “in writing” requirement.
Pack offers no authority for its contention that the “in writing” requirement was not met by the Union letters specifically raising the discharge claim. And contrary to Pack’s suggestion, the record does not indicate that the Union abandoned the discharge issue prior to arbitration. The record reflects only that Pack informed the Union the letters were layoff notices and, subsequently, the Union labeled the issue as “Seniority and Recall” on its arbitration panel request form. The arbitrator’s memorandum of decision indicates that the Union raised the question of discharge in its statement of issues, and notes that Pack presented a narrower view of the submission. The arbitrator concluded that the February 1, 1985 letter “plays a pivotal, if not a controlling, part in this case” and interpreted the submission as including a determination of the nature of the letter.
Given the strong interdependence of the discharge and layoff issues in this dispute, and the absence of any clear indication of what the “in writing” provision requires, the arbitrator’s conclusion that the Union had properly submitted the discharge issue was, at minimum, a “plausible interpretation” of both the issue submitted and of the collective bargaining agreement. George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 722 F.2d at 1477. Therefore, under the highly deferential standard we now apply to such decisions, we find that the arbitrator herein did not exceed his authority by deciding that Pack improperly discharged Cunningham and Olmsted. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court upholding the arbitration award is[*287] affirmed.[7]
AFFIRMED.
The district court did, however, vacate the arbitrator's award regarding the content of future discharge and layoff letters. Neither party challenges that decision.
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir.1982); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Texas Steel, 639 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir.1981); Waverly Mineral Prods. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 633 F.2d 682, 685-86 (5th Cir.1980); Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Systems, 573 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir.1978); Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 896-97 (4th Cir.1961).
In Mobil, the issue submitted was whether the employer had “cause” to discharge an employee. 679 F.2d at 301. The arbitrator ruled for the employee, based on mitigating evidence not known to Mobil prior to discharge. Id. Mobil challenged the award, contending that "cause” could only be evaluated based on what Mobil knew at the time, and that the submission limited the arbitrator’s authority to consideration of such evidence. The Court of Appeals refused to overturn the award, ruling that "the deference that is accorded to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement should also be accorded to an arbitrator’s interpretation of the issue submitted.” Id. at 302.
Parties to collective bargaining agreements are of course free to prevent claim misinterpretation by setting their own procedural rules for arbitrators to follow. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, —, 108 S.Ct. 364, 371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286, 299 (1987). Encouraging such recourse to the collective bargaining process, rather than to the courts, fully comports with federal labor policy.
The sentence of the agreement on which Pack relies provides: “The Arbitrator shall consider and decide only the specific issues submitted in writing and shall have no power or authority to add to, subtract from, amend or modify any of the terms of this agreement.”
Pack also contends that if we choose to uphold the arbitrator’s award, the case must be remanded to clarify the relief granted. This issue, however, was not raised below. As a general rule, this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Bolker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985). Because the facts of this case do not fall within any of the limited exceptions to this rule, see id., we do not reach the merits of this argument.
In its limited cross-appeal, the Union objects to two of the findings made by the district court, but otherwise agrees with the result reached therein. In view of our present holding, we do not reach the issues raised on the cross-appeal.