Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
A court may determine as a matter of law that alleged misrepresentations are immaterial if they are insignificant, constitute obvious hyperbole, or are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.
Individual investors sued a computer manufacturer and its officers for securities fraud, alleging that the company’s prospectus and other communications contained material misrepresentations regarding growth, inventory, and tax liabilities. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial as a matter of law and that the fraud was not pleaded with sufficient particularity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that a court may determine materiality as a matter of law when the alleged misrepresentations are insignificant in the total mix of information, constitute obvious hyperbole or puffery, or are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements that render the statements immaterial. The court also affirmed the dismissal for failure to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).
At page 546Standard for dismissing complaint under rule 12(b)(6)127 citing casesalso considering whether there is an “insuperable bar to relief’ on the claim
- Shafer v. Lippert, No. 4:25-cv-00665 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2025).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Cori Nations Photography LLC v. Reedy Press, LLC, No. 4:25-cv-00505 (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2025).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Madison v. SP Plus Corp., No. 4:25-cv-00231 (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2025).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Pelletier v. Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:25-cv-00025 (E.D. Mo. May 12, 2025).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Jordan v. Bell, No. 4:21-cv-01242 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2025).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Carter v. Fredrickson, No. 2:24-cv-00039 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Bey v. Poettker Constr., No. 4:23-cv-00911 (E.D. Mo. June 4, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Thompson v. Replacements, Ltd., No. 4:23-cv-00246 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 25, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Reppert v. Guerrero, No. 4:23-cv-00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Glore v. Potosi R-III Sch. Dist., 722 F. Supp. 3d 950 (E.D. Mo. 2024).publishedAdditionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
Show 110 more citing cases
- Bey v. Poettker Constr., No. 4:23-cv-00911 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Reed v. Bd. of Educ. City, No. 4:23-cv-01039 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 16, 2024).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Gibson v. Hadzic, No. 4:22-cv-00163 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2023).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Ivanovich v. City of Union Missouri, No. 4:22-cv-01011 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 1, 2023).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Manson v. Robinson, No. 4:22-cv-00649 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12, 2023).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Trident Steel Corp. v. Siffin, No. 4:20-cv-00932 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2023).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Bextermueller News Distributors, Inc. v. Lee Enter., Inc., No. 4:22-cv-00344, 2023 WL 2187465 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2023).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Bouton v. State of Missouri, No. 2:22-cv-00010 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2023).The Court must make “all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” − 6 − show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,…
- Conner v. Scaglione, No. 4:21-cv-00385 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2022).Additionally, “[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parne…
- Gaydos v. Gully Transp., Inc., No. 4:21-cv-00388, 2021 WL 5298679 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2021).Additionally, “[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parne…
- Gonzalez v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 1:21-cv-00009 (N.D. Iowa June 10, 2021).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that] there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gate…
- Emerson v. Capital One, NA, No. 4:20-cv-00004 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2021).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Id. (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).
- Pinebrook Holdings, LLC v. Narup, No. 4:19-cv-01562 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 4, 2020).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Id. (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).
- Memhardt v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01076 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 2020).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.”1 Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 20…
- King v. Skolness, 624 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2020).published“a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available”
- Montgomery v. Regions Bank, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-03187 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 2020).Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes…
- Ball-Bey v. Chandler, No. 4:18-cv-01364 (E.D. Mo. May 8, 2020).“Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 200…
- Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 228 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2000).published
- Lusby v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D.N.D. 2000).published
- Richard J. Rodney v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 143 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1998).published
- Migliaccio v. K-Tel Int'l, Inc., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- Kushner v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 317 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003).published
- Jemmco Inv. v. Conagra Foods, 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003).published
- Chambers v. Amdocs Ltd., 390 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 2004).published
- Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2008).published
- Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Mo. 2009).published
- Montgomery v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 238 B.R. 806 (D. Minn. 1999).published
- Fikse v. State of Iowa Third Jud. Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 633 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Iowa 2009).published
- In re Medtronic Inc., Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2009).published
- Landmen Partners Inc. v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 659 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).published
- Hogue v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Iowa 2007).published
- Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. Prod. Input Solutions, L.L.C., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- Williams v. Sec. Nat. Bank of Sioux City, IA., 293 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Iowa 2003).published
- Jones v. Cassey's Gen. Stories, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (S.D. Iowa 2008).published
- Arrington v. Richardson, 660 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Iowa 2009).published
- Dethmers Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Iowa 1998).published
- Graham v. Bryce Corp., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (E.D. Ark. 2004).published
- Adler v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 13 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Iowa 1998).published
- Schuster v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (N.D. Iowa 2005).published
- Shirley Med. Clinic, P.C. v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Johnson v. Be & K Constr. Co., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (S.D. Iowa 2009).published
- Haines v. Verimed Healthcare Network, LLC, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2009).published
- In re JP Morgan Chase Sec. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- Sioux Biochemical, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Iowa 2005).published
- Dible v. Scholl, 410 F. Supp. 2d 807 (N.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Ong ex rel. Ong IRA v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2004).published
- Waln ex rel. Waln v. Todd Cnty. Sch. Dist., 388 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D.S.D. 2005).published
- Hoffman v. UBS-AG, 591 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- Kinkaid v. John Morrell & Co., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Iowa 2004).published
- In re S1 Corp. Sec. Litig., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2001).published
- John Morrell & Co. v. Halbur, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Iowa 2007).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Guenthner, 395 F. Supp. 2d 835 (D. Neb. 2005).published
- Int'l Motor Contest Ass'n v. Staley, 434 F. Supp. 2d 650 (N.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Dorr v. Weber, 635 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Iowa 2009).published
- Cochran v. Gehrke Constr., 235 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Iowa 2002).published
- In re Stellent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 326 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Minn. 2004).published
- Ebert v. Clarke, 320 F. Supp. 2d 902 (D. Neb. 2004).published
- Catholic Order of Foresters v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (N.D. Iowa 2004).published
- Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Iowa 2001).published
- Armstrong v. Am. Pallet Leasing Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Iowa 2009).published
- Young v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Iowa 2008).published
- Holt v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- Remmes v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Johnson v. Dollar Gen., 778 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009).published
- Hussaini v. Gelita USA, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Iowa 2010).published
- In re Iowa Ready-Mix Concrete Antitrust Litig., 768 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 282 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).published
- Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury Cnty., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Iowa 1999).published
- MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Start Enter., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 969 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- In re St. Jude Med., Inc., Sec. Litig., 629 F. Supp. 2d 915 (D. Minn. 2009).published
- Van Natta v. Sara Lee Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Iowa 2006).published
- McLeodUSA Telecomm. Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 677 (N.D. Iowa 2007).published
- Remmes v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Iowa 2005).published
- Schuster v. Anderson, 413 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Iowa 2005).published
- Webster Indus., Inc. v. Northwood Doors, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Iowa 2002).published
- Gart v. Electroscope, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D. Minn. 1998).published
- JKP Foods, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 966 (E.D. Ark. 2006).published
- Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Iowa 1999).published
- In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Minn. 2003).published
- Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Iowa 1999).published
- In re Eng'g Animation Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. Iowa 2000).published
- In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Mo. 1999).published
- Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Iowa 2001).published
- McFarland v. McFarland, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (N.D. Iowa 2010).published
- Arkansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Harman Int'l Indus. Inc., 791 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 2015).published
- Jerry Fields v. AMDOS Ltd., No. 04-1100 (8th Cir. Dec. 2, 2004).published
- In re Medtronic, Inc. Shareholder Litig.., No. A15-858 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2016).unpublished
- Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2013 Ark. 124, 426 S.W.3d 455.published
- Pound v. Stereotaxis, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (E.D. Mo. 2014).published
- Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 112 F. Supp. 3d 817 (N.D. Iowa 2015).published
- Waterman v. GCC All. Concrete, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- D.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (S.D. Iowa 2008).published
- In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 878 (D. Minn. 2011).published
- Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Capella Educ. Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Minn. 2012).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. True North Fin. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Minn. 2012).published
- Benedetto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2013).published
- Blazek v. United States Cellular Corp., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2011).published
- IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2013).published
- Weimer v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Iowa 2007).published
- Kuiper v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Iowa 2007).published
- Risdal v. Cherokee City Chief of Police, No. 5:19-cv-04007 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 24, 2020).
- Direct Biologics v. Kimera Labs, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-02039 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2020).
- Direct Biologics v. Kimera Labs, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-02039 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2020).
- Garland v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 4:19-cv-01765 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2020).
- Rice v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:19-cv-03166 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2020).
- SEC v. Patel, 2008 DNH 054 (D.N.H. 2008).published
- SEC v. Patel, 2008 DNH 055 (D.N.H. 2008).published
- SEC v. Patel, 2008 DNH 056 (D.N.H. 2008).published
- Larry R. Romine v. Acxiom Corp., 296 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2002).published
At page 550Requiring particularity for allegations of fraud under rule 9(b)58 citing cases“[a]fter a complaint is dismissed, the right to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) terminates”
- Rios Rosa v. Stange, No. 1:22-cv-00126 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2023).“[a]fter a complaint is dismissed, the right to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) terminates”
- Williams v. Merdinian, No. 2:22-cv-00061 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2022).Civ. P. 15(a) terminates.” Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir.1997) (citation omitted).
- Williams v. Merdinian, No. 2:22-cv-00034 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2022).“[a]fter a complaint is dismissed, the right to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) terminates”
- Perkins v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:22-cv-00500 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2022).Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997).
- Hastings v. Smartmatch Ins. Agency LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00228 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 1, 2022).(dismissing a claim against “controlling shareholders” on Rule 9(b) grounds because “the Defendants [were] left to guess which controlling shareholders were responsible for this alleged fraud)
- Kunin v. Saint Luke's Health Sys., Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00945 (W.D. Mo. July 14, 2022).“[a]lthough a motion to amend a complaint should be freely given under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), ‘different considerations apply to motions filed after dismissal”
- Kraft v. Essentia Health, 604 F. Supp. 3d 813 (D.N.D. 2022).publishedTrooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997)).
- Twin Med LLC v. Skyline Healthcare LLC, No. 4:19-cv-00415 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 12, 2022).Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997)).
- Bergman v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 0:20-cv-02693 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2021).Minn. 2010) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also United States ex rel.
- Kraft v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 4:20-cv-04111, 2021 WL 3186153 (D.S.D. July 28, 2021).([A] district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow amendment of pleadings to change the theory of a case if the amendment is offered after summary judgment has been granted against the party, and no…)
Show 43 more citing cases
- Burnett v. Am. Int'l Indus., No. 3:20-cv-03046 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 26, 2020).The Eighth Circuit has also held pleadings alleging fraud “insufficient under Rule 9(b) where defendants were ‘left to guess’ who was ‘responsible for the alleged fraud.’” Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1030 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Par…
- Cervantes v. Fowler Foods Inc, No. 3:20-cv-00237 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 25, 2020).P. 15(a) terminates.” Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
- Doe v. North Homes, Inc., No. 0:18-cv-03419 (D. Minn. May 11, 2020).P. 15(a) terminates.” Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 550 (8th Cir 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
- In re K-Tel Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D. Minn. 2000).published
- In re Eng'g Animation Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. Iowa 2000).published
- In re Grand Casinos, Inc., Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1997).published
- Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001).published
- Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1999).published
- Merry v. Prestige Capital Markets, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Minn. 2013).published
- Kranz v. Koenig, 240 F.R.D. 453 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Andrew J. Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002).published
- TROOIEN v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2010).published
- Frederick Briehl v. Gen. Motors, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999).published
- Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cabool Transp., Inc., Third Party Cabool Transp., Inc., Fourth Party v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., Fourth Party, 292 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2002).published
- United States v. United States, 317 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2003).published
- United States ex rel. Keshav S. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006).published
- United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard USA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2009).published
- Coyne's & Co. v. ENESCO, LLC, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (D. Minn. 2008).published
- Brown v. North Cent. F.S., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Iowa 1997).published
- Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 880 (D. Minn. 2011).published
- In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2000).published
- Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981 (D. Minn. 2006).published
- Kranz v. Koenig, 484 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Bank of Montreal v. Avalon Capital Grp., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2010).published
- In re Keithley Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ohio 2002).published
- Schultz v. Tomotherapy Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 780 (W.D. Wis. 2009).published
- Stewart v. Knab, 544 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D. Ohio 2008).published
- Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. v. Travelers Ins., 292 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2003).published
- Norman Banks v. Ameren UE, 234 F. App'x 416 (8th Cir. 2007).unpublished
- Bruce Munro v. Lucy Activewear, Inc., 899 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2018).published
- Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 289 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).published
- United States v. Balliet, 21 F. App'x 534 (8th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Blaes v. Johnson & Johnson, 71 F. Supp. 3d 944 (E.D. Mo. 2014).published
- United States v. Hawley, 544 F. Supp. 2d 787 (N.D. Iowa 2008).published
- United States v. R.J. Zavoral & Sons, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Minn. 2012).published
- Stumm v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Minn. 2012).published
- J.D. Fields & Co. v. Nucor-Yamato Steel, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Ark. 2013).published
- Mastr Asset Backed Sec. Trust 2006-He3 ex rel. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. WMC Mortg., LLC, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Minn. 2013).published
- Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 545 (D. Colo. 1998).published
- Prairie River Home Care, Inc. v. Procura, LLC, No. 0:17-cv-05121 (D. Minn. July 30, 2018).
- ARP Wave, LLC v. Salpeter, No. 0:18-cv-02046 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2020).
- First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Ruba, No. 4:16-cv-04007 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2019).
At page 549Determining materiality of misrepresentations under rule 9(b)59 citing cases“time, place and contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation”
- MHC Mut. v. Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P., 761 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2014).published(Only by discarding common sense and ignoring the multitude of explicit - 21 - and on-point warnings contained in Gateway’s prospectus could investors have been misled . . . .)
- In re Bellsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2005).published Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd., 297 F.3d at 1189 ; Parnes, 122 F.3d at 547 (“Alleged misrepresentations may also present or conceal such insignificant data that, in the total mix of information, it simply would not matter to a reasonable investo…
- LaCrue, No. 2:25-cv-04175 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2026).Id. (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 549 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also Moore’s Federal Practice § 9.03[1][g] (Rule 9(b) may be satisfied “if the pleader identifies the available information on which the allegation of fraud…
- Smith v. Humphrey, No. 8:24-cv-00271 (D. Neb. May 29, 2025).“ensures that a defendant is given sufficient notice of the allegations against him to permit the preparation of an effective defense”
- Polaris Experience, LLC v. 3 Wheel Rentals Tampa LLC, No. 0:23-cv-02843 (D. Minn. July 10, 2024).“time, place and contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation”
- Vara v. Spanabel, No. 19-04397 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2020).Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1107 , 1036 n.25 (4th Cir. 1997)(quoting Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 549 (8th Cir. 1997)).
- Martino-Catt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 213 F.R.D. 308 (S.D. Iowa 2003).published
- Migliaccio v. K-Tel Int'l, Inc., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- In re Eng'g Animation Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. Iowa 2000).published
- Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Iowa 2001).published
Show 41 more citing cases
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- Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001).published
- In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 295 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- Chen v. Navarre Corp., 299 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- Jay Syverson v. Firepond, Inc., 383 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2004).published
- Drobnak v. Andersen Corp., 561 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2009).published
- In re Moneygram Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 947 (D. Minn. 2009).published
- WESI, LLC v. Compass Env't, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2007).published
- United States v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2007).published
- Gold v. Winget (In re NM Holdings Co.), 407 B.R. 232 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009).published
- Shiboleth ex rel. Yerushalmi, Shiboleth, Yisraeli, & Roberts, LLP v. Yerushalmi (In re Yerushalmi), 393 B.R. 288 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- Durns v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 264 B.R. 13 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001).published
- Brown ex rel. Rhiner v. Kerkhoff, 504 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D. Iowa 2007).published
- In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006).published
- Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 954 (D. Minn. 2000).published
- Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2004).published
- Reding v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Mo. 2005).published
- US ex rel. Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2002).published
- In re Ancor Commc'ns, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 1998).published
- In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Ark. 2000).published
- US ex rel. SCHUHARDT v. Washington Univ., 361 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D. Mo. 2003).published
- Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1999).published
- Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. bioMérieux, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Mathstar, Inc. v. Tiberius Capital II, LLC, 712 F. Supp. 2d 870 (D. Minn. 2010).published
- Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, 781 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2015).published
- Daniel Chen v. Navarre Corp., 295 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. Davis, 20 F. Supp. 3d 694 (S.D. Iowa 2014).published
- Toomey v. Dahl, 63 F. Supp. 3d 982 (D. Minn. 2014).published
- Johnson v. Bobcat Co., 175 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (D. Minn. 2016).published
- Baker v. Best Buy Stores, LP, 812 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).published
- Merry v. Prestige Capital Markets, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Minn. 2013).published
- Qwest Commc'ns Co. v. Free Conferencing Corp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 2014).published
- Kranz v. Koenig, 240 F.R.D. 453 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Streambend Props. III, LLC v. Sexton Lofts, LLC, 297 F.R.D. 349 (D. Minn. 2014).published
- Krautkramer v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., Inc., No. 0:19-cv-02559 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2020).
- Hammerschmidt v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Minn. 2022).published
- Chen v. Target Corp., No. 0:21-cv-01247 (D. Minn. May 19, 2022).
- Hennessey v. Kohls Corp., No. 4:19-cv-01866 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2020).
- Midland States Bank v. Ygrene Energy Fund Inc., 564 F. Supp. 3d 805 (E.D. Mo. 2021).published
- S&K Leimkuehler, Inc. v. Barcel USA, LLC, No. 4:18-cv-00686 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2018).
- Tillman v. Capital One Auto Fin., No. 0:24-cv-00570 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2024).
At page 547Determining materiality of statements as puffery49 citing cases“some statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon them.”
- In re Bellsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2005).published (Alleged misrepresentations may also present or conceal such insignificant data that, in the total mix of information, it simply would not matter to a reasonable investor.)
- Bellinger v. Labs. Topco LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00695 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2024).“are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon them”
- Police Officers Pension Fund v. Meredith Corp., 16 F.4th 553 (8th Cir. 2021).publishedExamples of corporate puffery include forecasts of “significant growth,” Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997), claims that a company is “recession-resistant,” id., and boasts that a company is “leading the race,”…
- Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).published
- Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).published
- Richard J. Rodney v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 143 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1998).published
- Migliaccio v. K-Tel Int'l, Inc., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002).published
- In re Medtronic Inc., Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2009).published
- In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Minn. 2003).published
- In re Eng'g Animation Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. Iowa 2000).published
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- ECA v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 07-1786 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2009).published
- Detroit Gen. Ret. Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 621 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2010).published
- ECA, Local 134 IBEW Jt. Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009).published
- NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 536 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008).published
- Hutchison v. CBRE Realty Fin., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D. Conn. 2009).published
- In re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 719 Pension Fund v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D. Ind. 2009).published
- In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig., 705 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D.N.J. 2010).published
- In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp. 2d 871 (W.D.N.C. 2001).published
- In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.N.J. 2007).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 1999).published
- Taubenfeld v. Hotels. Com, 385 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 2004).published
- Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Conn. 1999).published
- Cutsforth v. Renschler, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (M.D. Fla. 2002).published
- In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- In re Towne Servs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2001).published
- In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc. Sec. Litig., 502 F. Supp. 2d 884 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Nev. 1999).published
- In re Duke Energy ERISA Litig., 281 F. Supp. 2d 786 (W.D.N.C. 2003).published
- In re Azurix Corp. Sec. Litig., 198 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Tex. 2002).published
- Smith v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va. 2003).published
- In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901 (D.N.J. 1998).published
- Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547 (W.D. Pa. 2006).published
- In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D. Wash. 2003).published
- Druskin v. Answerthink, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2004).published
- Statesman II Apts., Inc. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 662 (Fed. Cl. 2006).published
- Nathanson v. Polycom, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Cal. 2015).published
- Muncy v. Intercloud Sys., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 3d 621 (E.D. Ky. 2015).published
- In re Target Corp., 275 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Minn. 2017).published
- McDonald v. Compellent Tech., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 725 (D. Minn. 2011).published
- Rochester Laborers Pension Fund v. Monsanto Co., 883 F. Supp. 2d 835 (E.D. Mo. 2012).published
- Macomb Cnty. Employees v. Stratasys Ltd., 864 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2017).published
- Wigginton v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-00212 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2020).
At page 545Dismissal for failure to state claim under rule 12(b)(6)19 citing casescomparing reserves for dubious accounts receivable to total assets
- Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).published
- Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 228 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2000).published
- Modern Equip. Co. v. Cont'l W. Ins., 146 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Iowa 2001).published
- Jackson v. Travelers Ins., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (S.D. Iowa 1998).published
- Cagin v. McFarland Clinic, P.C., 317 F. Supp. 2d 964 (S.D. Iowa 2004).published
- Dillon v. Brown Cnty., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Neb. 2002).published
- S.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 399 F. Supp. 2d 963 (D. Minn. 2005).published
- Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Canterbury v. Fed.-Mogul Ignition Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- In re K-Tel Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D. Minn. 2000).published
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- Bublitz v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Iowa 2001).published
- Lusby v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D.N.D. 2000).published
- Principal Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Big Fin. & Ins. Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).published
- Lunde v. Schultz, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Iowa 2014).published
- Martino-Catt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 213 F.R.D. 308 (S.D. Iowa 2003).published
At page 548Applying the bespeaks caution doctrine to securities fraud claims20 citing cases[C]autionary language must relate directly to that by which plaintiffs claim to have been misled." (internal quotations omitted)
- In re Bellsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2005).published Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd., 297 F.3d at 1189 ; Parnes, 122 F.3d at 547 (“Alleged misrepresentations may also present or conceal such insignificant data that, in the total mix of information, it simply would not matter to a reasonable investo…
- Carpenters' Pension Fund of IL v. Michael Neidorff, 30 F.4th 777 (8th Cir. 2022).published“[C]autionary language must ‘relate directly to that by which plaintiffs claim to have been misled”
- Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Iowa 2006).published
- Richard J. Rodney v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 143 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1998).published
- Gart v. Electroscope, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D. Minn. 1998).published
- In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Rochester Laborers Pension Fund v. Monsanto Co., 883 F. Supp. 2d 835 (E.D. Mo. 2012).published
- Hunt v. All. North Am. Gov't Income Trust, Inc., 159 F.3d 723 (2d Cir. 1998).published
- Halperin v. eBanker USA.COM, Inc., 295 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002).published
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- In re Patterson Companies, Inc. Sec., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2007).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).published
- In re Metris Companies, Inc., Sec. Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2006).published
- Olczyk v. Cerion Tech., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999).published
- Ridler v. Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 982 (D. Minn. 2016).published
At page 551Denying leave to amend complaint under rule 12(b)(6)3 citing cases“Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying them leave to amend their complaint after it had been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). y.”
- In re Target Corp., 275 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (D. Minn. 2017).published
- In re Alamosa Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2005).published
- Carpenters' Pension Fund v. Target Corp., 955 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2020).published
v.
GATEWAY 2000, INC.; Theodore W. Waitt; Richard D. Snyder; James Cravens; George H. Krauss; Douglas L. Lacey; Norman W. Waitt, Jr., Appellees; Faye Martin ANDERSON, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. GATEWAY 2000, INC.; Theodore W. Waitt; Richard D. Snyder; James Cravens; George H. Krauss; Douglas L. Lacey, Appellees
The Plaintiffs are individual investors [3] who purchased Gateway 2000, Inc. (Gateway) stock soon after the stock was publicly offered. The stock subsequently decreased in value after Gateway revealed disappointing earnings, and the Plaintiffs brought this securities fraud suit against Gateway and Gateway’s corporate officers, directors, and principal shareholders (Defendants). [4] The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated securities laws by misrepresenting facts in Gateway’s prospectus, registration statement, and other company communications and by committing fraud on the market. The district court [5] dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. After dismissal, the Plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint, which the district court denied. The Plaintiffs now appeal, and we affirm.
I.
Gateway, founded in 1985 by Theodore Waitt and Michael Hammond, is a South Dakota-based manufacturer and direct marketer of personal computers. Gateway was initially created as a Subchapter S corporation, and the bulk of Gateway’s stock was held by Theodore Waite and his brother Norman. The company grew dramatically between 1985 and 1993, reaching sales of more than a billion dollars per year. [6] On December 7, 1993, Gateway became a public corporation and, pursuant to a registration statement and prospectus, offered stock to the public.
While expressing confidence in its likely continued growth, see Prospectus (Dec. 7, 1993) at 6, Gateway’s prospectus contains a variety of warnings to prospective-investors. The prospectus explains that,
[although the Company anticipates significant growth in the future, it does not expect its growth to continue at the rates previously experienced. The Company’s operating results for the fourth quarter of 1993 are expected to reflect the growth historically experienced by the Company in its fourth quarters, although not necessarily at the rates previously experienced.
Prospectus at 3. In addition, the front cover of the prospectus contains, in bold type, a reference to “Risk Factors.” The text of the[*543] prospectus includes a description of sixteen risk factors. These risk factors include:
Short Product Life Cycles
To maintain its competitive position in the PC industry, the Company must continue to introduce new products and features that address the needs and preferences of its target consumer markets. The PC industry is characterized by short product life cycles resulting from rapid changes in technology and consumer preference and declining product prices. In 1993, the Company has introduced numerous new products and features. There can be no assurance that these products or features will be successful, that the introduction of new products or features by the Company or its competitors will not materially and adversely affect the sale of the Company’s existing products or that the Company will be able to adapt to future changes in the PC industry....
Management of Growth
From its inception, the Company has experienced a rapid rate of growth. Although the Company attempts to forecast growth accurately, the Company has experienced, and may continue to experience, problems with respect to the size of its work force and production facilities and the adequacy of its management information systems and inventory controls. These problems can result in a high backlog of product orders and delays in customer service and support....
Potential for Fluctuating Operating Results
The PC industry generally has been subject to seasonality and to significant quarterly and annual fluctuations in operating results. The Company’s operating results are also subject to such fluctuations. Fluctuations can result from a wide variety of factors affecting the Company and its competitors, including new product developments or introductions, availability of components, changes in product mix and pricing and product reviews and other media coverage....
Potential Liability for Sales, Use or Income Taxes
The Company does not collect or remit sales and use taxes with respect to its sales in any state other than the State of South Dakota, where its physical plant and employees are located. It does not pay income taxes in any state (South Dakota currently has no corporate income tax) and pays franchise taxes only to Delaware and South Dakota. Taxing authorities in certain other states have solicited information from the Company to determine whether the Company has sufficient contacts with such states as would require payment of income taxes or collection of sales and use taxes from customers in those states. The Company has not paid any such income or sales and use taxes for any prior period, nor has it established any reserves for payment of such taxes. The Company believes that any amount it might ultimately be required to pay for prior periods would not have a material adverse impact on its results of operations or financial condition, but there can be no assurance that there would not be such an effect.
In the future, the Company may be required to collect sales and use taxes or to pay state income and franchise taxes in states other than South Dakota. Although any requirement to collect sales or use taxes in the future could negatively affect the Company’s sales, the Company believes the collection of such taxes would not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s results of operations or financial condition. However, there can be no assurance that there would not be such an effect....
Absence of Public Market and Possible Volatility of Stock Price
There has been no public market for the Common Stock prior to the Offerings, and there can be no assurance that a significant public market for the Common Stock will develop or will continue after the Offerings. The market price for the Company’s Common Stock may be highly volatile. The Company believes factors such as product announcements by the Company, or its competitors or suppliers, or quarterly variances in financial results could cause[*544] the market price of the Common Stock to fluctuate substantially____
Prospectus at 7-10.
Gateway offered 11.7 million shares of stock at a price of $15 per share. Roughly half of the income generated by the stock sales was distributed to the Waite brothers, in part to satisfy Gateway-related tax liabilities. In the months that followed, Gateway stock climbed to a high of $24-3/4 price per share.
The fourth quarter results of 1993, which were announced on February 10, 1994, showed $545.9 million in revenues, an increase of 36% over the third quarter of 1993 and 54% over the fourth quarter of 1992. The first quarter of 1994 showed $615.9 million in revenues, but a decline in per share earnings. Following the announcement of the decline in earnings, price per share of Gateway stock dropped from $20-7/16 to $15-1/2. The earnings per share dropped again during the second quarter of 1994, and the price of Gateway stock plummeted to $9-1/4 per share on June 23, 1994. The announced reasons for Gateway’s reduced earnings included product transitions, unanticipated sales mix, and technical problems with a new line of portable computers. To address these problems, the company took cash reserves and wrote-down against inventory and accounts receivables of $20 million.
Between June 27, 1994, and July 1, 1994, the Plaintiffs filed three identical class-action complaints against the Defendants. The actions were consolidated in the district court, and the Plaintiffs were given leave to file an amended complaint. [7] In count I of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege violations by the Defendants of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in a registration statement) (Section 11). In count II of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege a violation by the Defendants of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (misrepresentation or omission of material fact in a prospectus or communication) (Section 12(2)). In count III of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege a violation by the Defendants of Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (liability for controlling persons) (Section 15). In count IV of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege a violation by the Defendants of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and SEC Rule 10b-5 (fraudulent security transaction) (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). In count V of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege a violation by the Defendants of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (liability for controlling persons) (Section 20(a)).
As the basis for these assertions, the Plaintiffs allege — based almost exclusively on information and belief — that the Defendants engaged in a variety of wrongdoing to artificially inflate the price of Gateway stock. The Plaintiffs contend that in Gateway’s prospectus the Defendants: (1) overstated earnings in 1993 and 1994 by failing to adequately reserve for uncollectible accounts receivable, failing to make adequate reserves for product returns, and failing to write down inventories in a timely fashion; (2) misrepresented Gateway’s prospect for growth; (3) misrepresented the existence and extent of obsolete and defective inventories; (4) misrepresented that Gateway’s reserves for doubtful accounts receivable were adequate, thereby overstating Gateway’s assets by at least $6.8 million; (5) misrepresented the quality of Gateway’s new portable computers, which suffered from malfunctioning track-balls and malfunctioning power supplies; (6) misrepresented serious deficiencies of Gateway’s purchasing and inventory control systems, management information and order systems, and management and forecasting procedures; and (7) misrepresented Gateway’s obligations to pay sales taxes to states other than South Dakota.
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants committed fraud by meeting with and misleading security analysts and by issuing press releases, broker’s reports, an An[*545] nual Report, and a first quarter report which were misleading. The Plaintiffs also allege that the individual defendants who controlled Gateway Service Corporation (GSC) had GSC purchase Gateway products at inflated prices, thereby artificially inflating Gateway’s profits.
The district court issued two decisions disposing of this case. The first decision dismissed the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Following this dismissal, the Plaintiffs filed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) motions, and sought to file another amended complaint. The district court’s second decision denied the Plaintiffs’ Rules 59(e) and 60(b) motions and denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their first amended complaint after dismissal.
In dismissing the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, the district court held that all of the Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud failed to state the circumstances of fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court accordingly struck count IV of the Plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations. The district court further held that, based on the bespeaks caution doctrine, most of the of the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial as a matter of law, and that liability could therefore not attach. The district court also held that a failure to discount $6.8 million from a company with assets of $343,769,000 and earnings of $68,645,000 was not material as a matter of law. The district court therefore dismissed count II of the complaint, which alleged Section 11 violations, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The district court originally dismissed count I of the complaint, which alleged Section 11 violations, because the Plaintiffs failed to refer to material misrepresentations or omissions in the registration statement, but instead referred only to the prospectus. In its second decision, the district court held that, even if this was an improper basis for dismissing count I, the district court would have dismissed count I because all of the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial. [8]
Because the Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, Section 11, and Section 12(2) counts had been dismissed, the district court also dismissed counts III and V, which alleged controlling person liability under Section 15 and Section 20(a), for failure to state a claim.
In its second decision, the district court examined the Plaintiffs’ proposed complaint and determined that the Plaintiffs’ modifications did not save the complaint. Relying on much the same reasoning as in its first decision, the district court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b), that the bespeaks caution doctrine rendered immaterial most of the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations, and that the Defendants’ alleged failure to discount $6.8 million was immaterial in light of Gateway’s earnings and assets.
The Plaintiffs now appeal. On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the district court misapplied the bespeaks caution doctrine when it dismissed the Plaintiffs’ Section 11 and Section 12(2) claims for lack of materiality. The Plaintiffs also argue that materiality is necessarily a jury question and that the district court erred in ruling on materiality as a matter of law. In addition, the Plaintiffs contend that, because their complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement, the district court erred in dismissing their Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and in denying the Plaintiffs leave to amend.
II.
In reviewing a dismissal under[*546] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [9] this Court “is constrained by a stringent standard____ A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir.1982) (quotations and citations omitted). In addition,
[a] complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts that a plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. Thus, as a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
To present a cognizable claim for securities fraud, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant made misrepresentations that were material. See Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 208-09 (4th Cir.1994). Accordingly, a complaint that alleges only immaterial misrepresentations presents an “insuperable bar to relief,” Fusco, 676 F.2d at 334 (quotations omitted), and dismissal of such a complaint is proper.
The Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in determining the materiality of the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations as a matter of law, because materiality is necessarily a factual question for a jury to decide. We disagree.
A misrepresentation or omission is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32, 108 S.Ct. 978, 983, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988) (quotations and citations omitted). In many circumstances, of course, this presents a factual question for a jury to decide. See, e.g., In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 621 (8th Cir.1991) (“Determination of whether a misrepresentation would have the effect of defrauding the market and inflating the stock price is a jury question. The trier of fact is uniquely competent to determine materiality, as that inquiry requires delicate assessments of inferences a reasonable investor would draw from a given set of facts.” (citations and quotations omitted)). Where a reasonable investor could not have been swayed by an alleged misrepresentation, however, a court may determine, as a matter of law, that the alleged misrepresentation is immaterial. See, e.g., Hillson, 42 F.3d at 211.
There are a variety of reasons why an alleged misrepresentation or omission may, as a matter of law, be immaterial. Some matters are such common knowledge that a reasonable investor can be presumed to understand them. Id. at 213-14 (“It is not a violation of any securities law to fail to disclose a result that is obvious even to a person with only an elementary understanding of the stock market.” (quotations and citations omitted)). For example, “[a]s a general matter, investors know of the risk of obsolescence posed by older products forced to compete with more advanced rivals. ‘[TJeehnical obsolescence of computer equipment in a field marked by rapid technological advances is information within the public domain.’ ” In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., [*547] 948 F.2d 507, 513 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,502 at 93,202, 1989 WL 222969 (N.D.Cal.1989) (parentheses omitted)).
Alleged misrepresentations may also present or conceal such insignificant data that, in the total mix of information, it simply would not matter to a reasonable investor. In this case, the district court concluded, and we agree, that the Defendants’ alleged overstatement of assets by $6.8 million was immaterial as a matter of law. Taken in context, this amount represented only 2% of Gateway’s total assets. It seems clear that a reasonable investor, faced with a high-risk/ high-yield investment opportunity in a company with a history of very rapid growth, would not have been put off by an asset column that was 2% smaller. While there may certainly be many cases where this amount of money would be material and would dramatically affect the total mix of information relied on by a reasonable investor, this simply is not the situation in this case.
Furthermore, some statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon them. “The role of the materiality requirement is not to attribute to investors a childlike simplicity but rather to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the omitted information significant at the time.” Hillson, 42 F.3d at 213 (quotations and citation omitted). The Hillson court explained that “soft, puffing statements generally lack materiality because the market price of a share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely on these statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate a fraud on the market.” Id. at 211 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Lasker v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam) (statements that a company would not “compromise its financial integrity,” had a “commitment to create earnings opportunities,” and that these “business strategies would lead to continued prosperity” were “precisely the type of puffery that this and other circuits have consistently held to be inaetionable.” (quotations omitted)); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir.1995) (Use of phrase “recession-resistant” “is simply too vague to constitute a material statement of fact.... It is a promotional phrase used to champion the company but is devoid of any substantive information. Just as indefinite predictions of ‘growth’ are better describe as puffery rather than as material statements of fact, describing a company as ‘recession-resistant’ lacks the requisite specificity to be considered anything but optimistic rhetoric. Its lack of specificity precludes it from being deemed material; it contains no useful information upon which a reasonable investor would base a decision to invest.” (citation omitted)).
The Plaintiffs’ complaint is filled with allegations that precisely these types of “puffing” statements made by the Defendants in Gateway’s prospectus and other communications were misrepresentations. For example, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ projection in Gateway’s prospectus of “significant growth” was misleading. See Am. Compl. at 38, 44-45. As the Fourth Circuit has explained,
Predictions on future growth ... will almost always prove to be wrong in hindsight. If a company predicts twenty-five percent growth, that is simply the company’s best guess as to how the future will play out. As a statistical matter, twenty percent and thirty percent growth are both nearly as likely as twenty-five. If growth proves less than predicted, buyers will sue; if growth proves greater, sellers will sue. Imposing liability would put companies in a whipsaw, with a lawsuit almost a certainty. Such liability would deter companies from discussing their prospects, and the securities markets would be deprived of the information those predictions offer. We believe that this is contrary to the goal of full disclosure underlying the securities laws, and we decline to endorse it.
Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir.1993). Accordingly, any misrepresentation regarding the Defendants’ prediction of “significant growth” is immaterial.
[*548] Finally, a defendant’s alleged misrepresentations or omissions may be immaterial as a matter of law if accompanied by sufficient cautionary statements. The “bespeaks caution doctrine,” created by this Court in Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n. 28 (8th Cir.1977), and recently reaffirmed in Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243, 245-46 (8th Cir.1991), provides that
when an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the “total mix” of information the document provided investors. In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.
In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir.1993). The cautionary language must “relate directly to that by which plaintiffs claim to have been misled.” Kline v. First Western Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir.1994); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2760, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991) (noting that “not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow.”).
A dismissal of a securities fraud complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted under the bespeaks caution doctrine only where “the documents containing defendants’ challenged statements include enough cautionary language or risk disclosure that reasonable minds could not disagree that the challenged statements were not misleading.” Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.1995) (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original), cert. denied,— U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1422, 134 L.Ed.2d 547 (1996).
In this case, the district court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ Section 11 and Seetion 12(2) claims, contained in counts I and II of the Plaintiffs’ complaint, because the Defendants’ cautionary statements rendered immaterial all of their alleged misrepresentations. “We can say that the prospectus here truly bespeaks caution because, not only does the prospectus generally convey the riskiness of the investment, but its warnings and cautionary language directly address the substance of the statements the plaintiffs challenge.” In re Trump, 7 F.3d at 372.
For example, in their complaint, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants misrepresented Gateway’s obligations to pay sales taxes to states other than South Dakota. While never asserting that Gateway was liable for, or actually paid, non-South Dakota sales taxes prior to the December 7, 1993 public offering of stock, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants had entered into negotiations with various states regarding Gateway’s obligations to pay non-South Dakota sales taxes. See Am. Compl. at 43. [10] In Gateway’s prospectus, the Defendants specifically warned that “[tjaxing authorities in certain other states have solicited information from the Company to determine whether the Company has sufficient contacts with such states as would require payment of income taxes or collection of sales and use taxes from customers in those states. The Company has not ... established any reserves for payment of such taxes.... In the future, the Company may be required to collect sales and use taxes or to pay state income and franchise taxes in states other than South Dakota.” Prospectus at 9. Clearly, any reasonable investor would be on notice that Gateway faced potential state tax liability for states other than South Dakota, and could not have been misled by the prospectus to believe that Gateway did not face such potential liability.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs’ allegation that the quality and desirability of Gateway’s portable computer products was misrepresented does not constitute a material misrepresentation in light of the Defendants’ cau[*549] tionary statements. The Defendants went to great lengths to warn potential investors that, due to the nature of a volatile industry, new product lines of computers represent a risky venture. See id. at 7. Specifically referencing the “numerous new products and features” that Gateway introduced in 1993, the prospectus warned that “[t]here can be no assurance that these products or features will be successful----” Id. In light of this explicit cautionary statement, no reasonable investor could have been misled that Gateway’s new portable products, which represented a small fraction of Gateway’s total sales, were anything but a risky venture.
Furthermore, the Defendants provided explicit warnings which render immaterial the alleged misrepresentations regarding Gateway’s obsolete and defective inventories, deficiencies in Gateway’s purchasing and inventory control systems, management information and order systems, and management and forecasting procedures. Gateway’s prospectus advised that, “[although the Company attempts to forecast growth accurately, the Company has experienced, and may continue to experience, problems with respect to the size of its work force and production facilities and the adequacy of its management information systems and inventory controls. These problems can result in a high backlog of product orders and delays in customer service and support----” Id. Any reasonable investor apprised of these warnings would not be misled to believe that Gateway did not face potential problems in these areas.
Only by discarding common sense and ignoring the multitude of explicit and on-point warnings contained in Gateway’s prospectus could investors have been misled by the misrepresentations allegedly made by the Defendants in Gateway’s prospectus. Because a reasonable investor would not have ignored such warnings, these alleged misrepresentations are immaterial as a matter of law. [11]
III.
The Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, contained in count IV of their complaint, for the Plaintiffs’ failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. We disagree.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally.” In the context of securities litigation, this particularity requirement serves three purposes:
First, it deters the use of complaints as a pretext for fishing expeditions of unknown wrongs designed to compel in terrorem settlements. Second, it protects against damage to professional reputations resulting from allegations of moral turpitude. Third, it ensures that a defendant is given sufficient notice of the allegations against him to permit the preparation of an effective defense.
Weisburgh v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 638, 642 (D.Minn.1994), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir.1995) (unpublished) (per curiam).
This Court has explained that, for Rule 9(b), “ ‘Circumstances’ include such matters as the time, place and contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what was obtained or given up thereby. ... [C]onclusory allegations that a defendant’s conduct was fraudulent and deceptive are not sufficient to satisfy the rule.” Commercial Property Invs., Inc. v. Quality Inns Int’l, Inc., 61 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.1990) (“[T]he circumstances [constituting fraud] must be pleaded in de[*550] tail. This means the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story. None of this appears in the complaint, although the flood of information released about Continental Bank since 1984 offers ample fodder if there is indeed a tale to tell.” (quotations omitted)); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir.1982) (“The location of other allegedly false statements is said to be a ‘pamphlet,’ ‘promotional material,’ or a ‘typical life-care contract.’ These allegations are not sufficiently particular to satisfy Rule 9(b).” (footnote omitted)), superseded and reinstated in relevant part on rehearing en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.1983); In re Lifecore Biomedical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 159 F.R.D. 513, 516 (D.Minn. 1993) (Rule 9(b) requires that “the complaint must allege the time, place, speaker and sometimes even the content of the alleged misrepresentation.”). Where “allegations of fraud are explicitly or, as in this case, implicitly, based only on information and belief, the complaint must set forth the source of the information and the reasons for the belief.” Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir.1991).
We agree with the district court that the Plaintiffs’ complaint is entirely lacking in the particularity required by Rule 9(b). For example, the Plaintiffs allege that:
In an effort to boost Gateway’s earnings and thereby increase the marketability of Gateway stock, the Controlling Shareholders caused [Gateway Service Corporation] to purchase $6 million of product from Gateway at prices far in excess of their fair market value, which had a material favorable effect on Gateway’s razor-thin net margins. Likewise, [Gateway Service Corporation] sold Gateway $4 million of products and services at lower than fair market value in a similar attempt to improve Gateway’s financial performance in advance of the Offering. A significant amount of these fraudulent transactions took place in the third quarter of 1993, artificially boosting Gateway’s unaudited financials just pri- or to the Offering.
Am. Compl. at 41.
This allegation of fraud is simply not particularized. Plaintiffs fail to identity the goods and services allegedly purchased and sold by Gateway at deflated and inflated prices. The Plaintiffs fail to allege the amount of fraudulent profit allegedly obtained by Gateway. Athough the Plaintiffs declare that a total of $10,000,000 in goods and services were bought and sold, the Plaintiffs fail to provide the source for the gross amounts they allege. The Plaintiffs provide the barest clue as to when the alleged fraud took place, and the Defendants are left to guess which controlling shareholders were responsible for this alleged fraud. Neither this nor the Plaintiffs’ other allegations of fraud meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements, and the district court properly struck them. [12]
IV.
Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint with prejudice and denying them leave to amend their complaint after its dismissal. We disagree.
Athough a motion to amend a complaint should be freely given under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “different considerations apply to motions filed after dismissal.” Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir.1993). The Humphreys court explained that:
Ater a complaint is dismissed, the right to amend under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) terminates. Leave to amend may still be granted, but a district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow amendment of pleadings to change the theory of a case if the amendment is offered after summary judgment has been granted against the party, and no valid reason is shown for the[*551] failure to present the new theory at an earlier time.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
The Plaintiffs in this case have failed to provide any valid reason for failing to amend their complaint prior to the grant of summary judgment against them. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying them leave to amend their complaint after it had been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
y.
While it is unfortunate that the Plaintiffs in this case lost money in their investments, their misfortune alone does not create a viable cause of action. “The federal securities laws should not be mistaken for insurance against risky investments; the federal reporters are replete with failed attempts to do just that. Securities laws protect investors against fraud; they do not provide investors with a recourse against unsuccessful management strategies.” Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir.1995). As the district court noted, Judge Frank Easterbrook’s description of the litigation in another case succinctly and accurately describes the instant case as well:
The story in this complaint is familiar in securities litigation. At one time the firm bathes itself in a favorable light. Later the firm discloses that things are less rosy. The plaintiff contends that the difference must be attributable to fraud. “Must be” is the critical phrase, for the complaint offers no information other than the differences between the two statements of the firm’s condition. Because only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflects fraud, Plaintiffs may not proffer the different financial statements and rest. Investors must point to some facts suggesting that the difference is attributable to fraud.
DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627 (quoted in part at Mem. Op. and Order II at 14). The Plaintiffs in this case have simply failed to produce an actionable complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of their claims against the Defendants.
. The Plaintiffs are Ari Pames, who purchased 50 shares of Gateway common stock after December 7, 1993, and before June 23, 1994; Deborah Slyne, who purchased 300 shares of Gateway common stock during the same period; Corey Emert, who purchased 200 shares of Gateway common stock during the same period; Faye Martin Anderson, who purchased 500 shares of Gateway common stock during the same period; Craig Langweiler, who purchased 200 shares of Gateway common stock during the same period; and Edward R. Pepper, who purchased 7000 shares of Gateway common stock during the same period. The Plaintiffs sought certification as a class, but this motion was denied as moot by the district court when it dismissed their complaint. See Mem. Op. and Order I at 17.
. The Plaintiffs also brought suit against Goldman Sachs & Co. and Painewebber, Inc., which underwrote Gateway's offer of stock to the public. The Plaintiffs' claims against the underwriters were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on January 17, 1995.
. The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.
. In its prospectus, Gateway describes itself as
the leading direct marketer of personal computers in the United States. The Company develops, markets, manufactures and supports a product line of IBM-compatible desktop, notebook and subnotebook PCs for use by businesses, individuals, government agencies and educational institutions. On October 1, 1993, the Company entered the European market with the opening of a facility in Dublin, Ireland. Founded in 1985, Gateway 2000 has sold over 1.3 million PCs and has increased its net sales from approximately $11.8 million in 1988 to over $1.5 billion for the twelve months ended September 30, 1993.
Prospectus (Dec. 7, 1993) at 3.
. The district court ordered that the record in this case be sealed, and the parties’ briefs were filed under seal. See Clerk’s Order (July 19, 1996) at 1. The parties have agreed that the briefs no longer need to be sealed. Accordingly, we order that the briefs in this case be unsealed.
. The Plaintiffs argue, and we agree, that the district court erred in dismissing count I for the Plaintiffs’ failure to refer specifically to Gateway’s registration statement in their complaint. The Defendants have acknowledged that Gateway’s prospectus was filed as part of its registration statement, see Appellees’ Br. at 3, and the Plaintiffs’ reference in their complaint to the prospectus necessarily referred to the registration statement as well. As is discussed below, however, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of count X on the alternative basis provided in the district court's second memorandum decision.
. In granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court considered the prospectus which accompanied Gateway's December 7, 1993 offer of stock to the public. See Mem. Op. and Order I at 11. Normally, a district court's decision to consider matters outside of the pleadings will transform a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). However, "[i]n the event that a plaintiff alleges a claim based on a prospectus, as is the case here, the court may consider the prospectus in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if the prospectus was not attached to the complaint....” Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 808 F.Supp. 1037, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (citing cases); see also In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n. 9 (3d Cir.1993) ("[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document." (quotations and citation omitted)).
. At oral argument, the Defendants represented that, during the first quarter of 1994, well after the December 7, 1993 public offering of stock, Gateway entered into an agreement with various states to pay non-South Dakota sales taxes.
. Relying on Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995), the Defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that relief under Section 11 and Section 12(2) is unavailable to those who purchase stock from the open market rather than directly from a company at a public offering. Because the Plaintiffs did not allege that they purchased the stock from Gateway during the public offering, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim. Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint on other grounds, we decline to consider this argument.
. Because the Plaintiffs presented no actionable claim for violation of Section 11, Section 12(2), Section 10(b), or Rule 1 Ob-5, the claims for controlling person liability were also properly dismissed. See Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter. Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir.1989) (Section 15); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir.1986) (Section 20(a)).