particularity requirement in Minnesota

2016The particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment prevents a “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038-39 (1971), and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

2016The particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment prevents a “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038-39 (1971), and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

2016The particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment prevents a “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038-39 (1971), and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

2016The particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment prevents a “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038-39 (1971), and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

2026Because these determinations are often fact-specific, we afford “a degree of flexibility to the particularity requirement.” State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn. 1993).

2024Because these determinations are often fact specific, we afford “a degree of flexibility to the particularity requirement.” State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn. 1993).

2024The first premise is correct: “a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Groh, 540 U.S. at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5 (1984)).

2016“A particular warrant also assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 , 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004) (quotation omitted). “[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement . . . is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 3424 , 3427 n.5 (1984).

2024And in making the particularity determination, we grant the issuing judge “considerable deference.” See Miller, 666 N.W.2d at 713 .

2016A warrant written with particularity has the effect that, “[a]s to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Id. “[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement . . . is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 3424 , 3427 n.5 (1984). “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the 7 crime under investigation and whether a more precise des

2026Because officers must be “as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit,” Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d at 674 , they should have tailored the application to the weeks leading up to the murder—to ascertain whether there was any evidence of intent or planning—to the date when Bonnell and his co-conspirators were arrested and thus no longer had access to their accounts. 18 The warrant authorizing the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts goes far beyond the three-month temporal limitation in Sardina-Padilla and lacks any subject matter or time limitati

2003In State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn.1990), we acknowledged that at the time the warrant was sought the officers “did not definitely know all of the circumstances surrounding [the victim’s] disappearance although they were then in possession of sufficient facts to establish probable cause that he was the victim of foul play and that appellant was involved.” In that case we held the district court did not err by admitting evidence that was seized pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the defendant’s residence and the seizure of “personal property belonging to [the victim]

2026We have acknowledged that “a temporal limitation may make a warrant sufficiently particular, even if the authorized search is otherwise broad as to subject matter.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 600 (Minn. 2024).

2026Because officers must be “as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit,” Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d at 674 , they should have tailored the application to the weeks leading up to the murder—to ascertain whether there was any evidence of intent or planning—to the date when Bonnell and his co-conspirators were arrested and thus no longer had access to their accounts. 18 The warrant authorizing the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts goes far beyond the three-month temporal limitation in Sardina-Padilla and lacks any subject matter or time limitati

2026This particularity requirement “prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 795 (Minn. 2000).

2016The particularity clause prevents “general or exploratory” searches, State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 795 (Minn. 2000), and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another,” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

2018The particularity requirement's purpose is "to minimize the risk that officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the place intended by the magistrate." State v. Gonzales , 314 N.W.2d 825 , 827 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted).

2018See, e.g. , id. (holding that a search warrant that stated an incorrect street name satisfied the particularity requirement, concluding that the officer could reasonably locate the intended house because the warrant listed the correct house number, another person pointed the officer to the correct house, and the correct street was located by the street listed on the search warrant); State v. Kessler , 470 N.W.2d 536 , 539 (Minn.App. 1991) (determining that a search warrant listing an incorrect house number satisfied the particularity requirement when the defendant did not suffer prejudice, the

2026As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” McNeilly, 6 N.W.3d at 175 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circumstances.” Id. at 176 (alteration in original).

2026As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” McNeilly, 6 N.W.3d at 175 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circumstances.” Id. at 176 (alteration in original).

2024In support of this contention, McNeilly cites United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995).

2024In other words, the particularity requirement prevents “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (quotation omitted)). 22 “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circums

2024In other words, the particularity requirement prevents “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (quotation omitted)). 22 “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circums

2024In other words, the particularity requirement prevents “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (quotation omitted)). 22 “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circums

2024In other words, the particularity requirement prevents “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (quotation omitted)). 22 “[W]hen determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular, the circumstances of the case must be considered, as well as the nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circums

2024The particularity requirement “limit[s] the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, . . . ensur[ing] that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).

2016When presented with a search warrant application, the issuing judge, must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).

2016When presented with a search warrant application, the issuing judge, must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).

2015Federal courts have stated that “[t]he modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, 8 and accordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing the quotation from Otero and suggesting that, given the nature of modern computer files, “[i]f anyth

2015Federal caselaw therefore requires that “warrants for computer searches must affirmatively limit the search to evidence of specific federal crimes or specific types of material.” Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132 (quotation omitted).

2015See id. (“As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”).

2015The particularity requirement also “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 , 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004) (quotation omitted). 6 Where a party challenges a district court’s issuance of a search warrant, “[the] appellate court reviews [the] district court’s decision to issue a warrant only to consider whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 8

2015The particularity requirement also “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 , 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004) (quotation omitted). 6 Where a party challenges a district court’s issuance of a search warrant, “[the] appellate court reviews [the] district court’s decision to issue a warrant only to consider whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 8

2015“The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 3424 , 3427 n.5 (1984). “[A] [s]earch warrant is facially invalid [under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions] if it does not describe the items to be seized, and evidence obtained pursuant to such a warrant must be suppressed.” State v. Herbst, 395 N.W.2d 399, 399-400 (Minn. App. 1986).

2015Federal courts have stated that “[t]he modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, 8 and accordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing the quotation from Otero and suggesting that, given the nature of modern computer files, “[i]f anyth

2012The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “the circumstances required to be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b) are the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir.1999).

2003State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn.1993) (‘We have recognized that there is a degree of flexibility to the particularity requirement.”); State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Minn.1977) (“A warrant can only be as specific as the nature of the materials sought will allow.”).

2003State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn.1993) ("We have recognized that there is a degree of flexibility to the particularity requirement."); State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Minn.1977) ("A warrant can only be as specific as the nature of the materials sought will allow.").

1993In State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn.1990), we commented that “A warrant which describes things in broad or generic terms may be valid ‘when the description is as specific as the circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit.’ ” [Quoting United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir.1985) ].

1993In State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 1990), we commented that "A warrant which describes things in broad or generic terms may be valid `when the description is as specific as the circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit.'" [Quoting United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir.1985)].