Tapia-Ortiz v. John Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999).

Tapia-Ortiz v. John Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite

green Positive treatment published Quoted verbatim 2× 36.8 score

140 citation events (130 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.

Strongest positive: Decker v. Infante, No. 2:19-cv-11654 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2025)

Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of

1999 2012 2026

How cited ↗

Cited for

At page 152 Limitation on using john doe pleadings to circumvent statutes44 citing cases“even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, 'an amended complaint adding new defendants cannot relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.”9 citing courts quote it

Decker v. Infante, No. 2:19-cv-11654 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2025).
(Houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary.)
Setala v. J.C. Penney Co., 40 P.3d 886 (Haw. 2002).published
“since, with regal'd to the difficulties inherent in being a pro se prisoner litigant, we see no difference between the filing of a court action and the filing of an administrative claim, we hold that the mailbox rule ap…”
Frazier, No. 1:25-cv-01175 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2026).
“is deemed filed, for statute of limitations purposes, when it is delivered to prison officials”
Yapoujian v. Stancil, No. 1:23-cv-02703 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2025).
Tafoya explained, “It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Garrett v. Fleming, 3…
Lisi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:19-cv-07317 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2025).
Finally, as the Second Circuit makes clear, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party…
Gagne v. Barrington Police Dep't, No. 1:23-cv-00403 (D.N.H. Jan. 24, 2025).
Jan. 13, 2022) (quoting Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)); see Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the original unknown ‘Jo…
Schulte v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-04042, 2024 WL 708196 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2024). 3 cites
Even more significantly, the Government overlooks Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999), in which the Second Circuit explicitly held that the prison mailbox rule — which provides that a document is “deemed filed . . . when it is…
Cabello-Setlle v. Cnty. of Sullivan, No. 7:21-cv-07477 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024).
Dec. 29, 2010) (“Federal courts have the discretion to deem a claim abandoned when a defendant moves to dismiss that claim and the plaintiff fails to address in [her] opposition papers defendants’ arguments for dismissing such a claim.”).…
Stennett v. New York City Admin. For Child.'s Servs., No. 1:21-cv-01069 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023).
“an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly- added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities”
Curtis v. Rockland Cnty. Drug Task Force, No. 7:21-cv-04294 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2022).
Id. (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Show 34 more citing cases

Shawn Murphy v. Strafford Cnty., 2022 DNH 007 (D.N.H. 2022).published
“It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (…
Murphy v. Strafford Cnty. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:19-cv-01162 (D.N.H. Jan. 13, 2022).
“It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (…
Torres-Acevedo v. Blair, No. 9:21-cv-00052 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2021).
The Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Hasan v. Onondaga Cnty., No. 5:18-cv-00806 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020).
Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Liverpool v. Davis, 442 F. Supp. 3d 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).published
Id. (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 ); see also Ceara, 916 F.3d at 213 (upholding lower court ruling that “Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended complaint adding new defendants to relate…
Harlow v. Shipe, No. 5:18-cv-01215 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2019).
However, most importantly, the Circuit "has interpreted the rule to preclude relation back for amended complaints that add new defendants, where the newly added defendants were not originally named because the plaintiff did not know their…
Cruz v. Fischer, 175 F. Supp. 3d 33 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).published
([i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.)
Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2013).published
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 .
Hickey v. City of New York, 173 F. App'x 893 (2d Cir. 2006).unpublished
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999).
Young-Flynn v. Kelly, 234 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published
“even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identit…”
Jeffrey A. Walker v. David Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2005).published
See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (civil complaints), modified on other grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.1994); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per cu-riam) (administrative complaints); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F…
Sidney v. Wilson, 228 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
“even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identit…”
Colorado Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999).
Eck v. Gallucci, 321 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 2004).published 2 cites
Cir.1999) (per curiam). [Although [the plaintiff] filed his complaint naming the defendant officers as “John Does” within the three-year statute of limitations period, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circu…
Colombo v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 221 F.R.D. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published 2 cites
However, the relation-back doctrine does not apply where the defendants were not originally named merely “because plaintiff did not know their identities.” Tap ia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999).
Tapia-Ortiz v. United States, 79 F. App'x 465 (2d Cir. 2003).unpublished
In that appeal, we applied the "prison mailbox" rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 , 108 S.Ct. 2379 , 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir. 1993), to Tapia-Ortiz’s administrative filing and concluded th…
Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy, 212 F.R.D. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).published
See Johnson v. Stinson, No. 01-0117, 28 Fed.Appx. 71, 72 , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1462 , at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2002); Bove v. New York City, No. 99-9181, 2000 WL 687720 , at *1, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11895 , at *3 (2d Cir. May 24, 2000); Ta…
Johnson v. Stinson, 28 F. App'x 71 (2d Cir. 2002).unpublished
“even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identit…”
Casim Noble v. Walter R. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001).published
As the district court noted, the prison mailbox rule has been extended to a variety of circumstances, including administrative filings, see Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam), service of discovery responses, s…
Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 2004).published
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1999).published
Murphy v. West, 533 F. Supp. 2d 312 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).published
MacCharulo v. Gould, 643 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).published
Sweet v. Wende Corr. Facility, 514 F. Supp. 2d 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).published
Noble v. Kelly, 89 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).published
Gilmore v. Goord, 360 F. Supp. 2d 528 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).published
Blake Cretacci v. Joe Call, 988 F.3d 860 (6th Cir. 2021).published
Robinson v. Goord, 48 F. App'x 820 (2d Cir. 2002).unpublished
Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 81 F. Supp. 3d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).published
Reed v. Sheppard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 429 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).published
Cimino v. Glaze, 228 F.R.D. 169 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).published
United States v. Chucks Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001).published
Vineyard v. Cnty. of Nassau, 329 F. Supp. 2d 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published
William Longenette v. Peter Krusing William E. Perry, 322 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2003).published

At page 151 Relating back amendments to statute of limitations21 citing cases“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years”3 citing courts quote it

Rodriguez, No. 1:24-cv-02326 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2026).
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).
Gee, No. 1:24-cv-01300 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2026).
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1999).
Leo v. New York State Dep't of Env't Conservation, No. 6:20-cv-07039 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2022).
“[t]he statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years”
Tigano, III v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 3d 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2021).published 2 cites
“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years”
Ganek v. Leibowitz, 167 F. Supp. 3d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published
“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years”
Accolla v. United States Gov't, 636 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).published
Tapia-Orbiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.1999).
Eck v. Gallucci, 321 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 2004).published 2 cites
Cir.1999) (per curiam). [Although [the plaintiff] filed his complaint naming the defendant officers as “John Does” within the three-year statute of limitations period, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circu…
John, No. 1:25-cv-03879 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2025).
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989)); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that New York’s three-year statute of limitations applies to bo…
Madera v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-02903 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2025).
See Kane v. Mount Pleasant Central School District, 80 F.4th 101 , 104 (2d Cir. 2023); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).
Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012).published
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996). 13 .

Show 11 more citing cases

Southerland v. City of New York, 652 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2012).published
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996). 20 1 the same procedural due process claim under the…
Southerland v. City of New York, 667 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2011).published
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996). .
Thunder Island Amusements, Inc. v. Ewald, 650 F. Supp. 2d 195 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).published
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 , 109 S.Ct. 573 , 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989)).
John E. Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2000).published
Kielczynski v. United States Cent. Intelligence Agency, 128 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).published
Jefferson v. Harris, 170 F. Supp. 3d 194 (D.D.C. 2016).published
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1999).published
Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2000).published
Rudaj v. Treanor, 522 F. App'x 76 (2d Cir. 2013).unpublished
Zook v. Legenhousen, No. 3:22-cv-00510 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2022).
Walker v. Flynn, No. 5:22-cv-00400 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2022).

At page 150 “the statute of limitations for bivens actions arising in new york is three years.”0 citing cases6 citing courts quote it

Other citing cases9 with no pin cite or quoted language on record

LATAM Airlines Grp. S.A., No. 20-11254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2023).unpublished
Cason v. Fed. Prot. Serv. Officer Valentine, No. 2:16-cv-03710 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2023).
Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2019).published
Paulin v. Figlia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).published
Southerland v. City of New York, 652 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2011).published
Schwartz v. Town of Plainville, 483 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 2007).published
Johnson v. Constantellis, 221 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2007).unpublished
Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published
Abdel-whab v. Orthopedic Ass'n of Dutchess, 415 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published

Treatment classes

Mentioned in passing 59

Cited as authority (rule) 37

Cited "see" 26

Cited "see, e.g." 16

Cited as authority (quoted) 2

Treatment by court

nysd	0R/0Y/19G	31
ca2	0R/0Y/22G	30
nyed	0R/0Y/13G	21
nywd	0R/0Y/7G	13
nynd	0R/0Y/5G	11
ca3	0R/0Y/0G	6
ctd	0R/0Y/3G	6
nhd	0R/0Y/3G	3
ca1	0R/0Y/1G	2
ca6	0R/0Y/2G	2
ca7	0R/0Y/0G	2
cod	0R/0Y/1G	2

Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…

Juan Antonio TAPIA-ORTIZ
v.
John DOE, DEA Agents, Michael Kevin. McGurk, DEA Agent, Miles Sonn, U.S. Customs Agent, Alan Bradford Payne, U.S. Customs Agent, Dominick Gerand, U.S. Customs Agent, United States of America

Docket No. 98-6103.

Docket on CourtListener (RECAP)

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Mar 26, 1999.

Published opinion

171 F.3d 150

1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5315

Google Scholar ↗ | CourtListener ↗

Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, White Deer, PA., Charles P. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney (Deborah B. Zwany, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Calabresi, Gibson, McLaughlin.

Cited by 2 opinions | Published

1 passage pin-cited by 1 case

Citer courts: E.D. Michigan (1)

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-appellant Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, appeals from an order dated April 16, 1998, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Thomas C. Platt, J.). The court granted summary judgment for the defendants-appellees — named and unnamed officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) — and dismissed as time-barred Tapia-Ortiz’s Bivens action alleging that the officers had used excessive force while arresting him in 1991. We affirm this part of the district court’s judgment. With respect to Tapia-Ortiz’s claim that the district court misconstrued his motion to withdraw the United States as a party to the Bivens action as a motion to withdraw his suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, we conclude that the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that Tapia-Ortiz’s FTCA claim is not time-barred. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate Tapia-Ortiz’s FTCA action.

BACKGROUND

Tapia-Ortiz was arrested on September 7, 1991, and charged with various drug offenses of which he was eventually convicted. On September 4, 1993, less than two years after his arrest, Tapia-Ortiz mailed an administrative complaint from prison to the DEA alleging that the arresting officers had used excessive force against him. This administrative claim was received by the DEA on September 8, 1993, more than two years after the alleged incident, and was denied on the merits.

Tapia-Ortiz then timely filed a Bivens action in district court against “John Doe (DEA Agents).” On June 20, 1996, almost two years after the statute of limitations for Bivens actions had ran, he filed an amended complaint that specifically identified some of the “John Doe” officers by name. Also in 1996, Tapia-Ortiz added the United States to the suit as a defendant in a federal “Tort Claim action.” But in 1997, he changed his mind and moved the district court “to withdraw the United States as a defendant in this Bivens action,” and the motion was granted, (emphasis added) Since the district court made no reference to Tapia-Ortiz’s FTCA claim in its final judgment, we assume that the court construed this motion as withdrawing Tapia-Ortiz’s entire FTCA action against the United States, rather than as a motion to withdraw the United States only as a party to the Bivens action (brought against the individual DEA officers).

Shortly thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for the named and unnamed officers. The court held that Tapia-Ortiz’s failure to name specifically any defendants within the three-year statute of limitations period for a Bivens action rendered the suit time-barred.

DISCUSSION

First, we address the Bivens claim. The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Although Tapia-Ortiz filed his complaint[*152] naming the defendant officers as “John Does” within the three-year statute of limitations period, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted). And even when a suit is brought by pro se litigant, “an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.” Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir.1995). Tapia-Ortiz’s failure until two years after the expiration of the statute of limitations period to name specifically in his complaint the officers who allegedly violated his rights is therefore fatal to his Bivens claim.

We next turn to the question of whether Tapia-Ortiz actually withdrew his FTCA claim against the United States when he moved the district court “to withdraw the United States as a party to this Bivens action.” It is well-established that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally in favor of the pro se litigant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). There are indications in the record that Tapia-Ortiz understood at the time that he added the United States as a party that it would be in his suit just as part of an FTCA claim. On that reading, TapiaOrtiz could not have intended to withdraw the United States from theBivens action in which it was not a part. On the other hand, his motion of withdrawal did specify that he was withdrawing the United States only in the Bivens action. Given the ambiguity of Tapia-Ortiz’s' filings before the district court, we believe that the court should not, without further inquiry, have construed his motion as a motion to withdraw the FTCA claim.

The government argues that even if Tapia-Ortiz did not withdraw his FTCA suit, that action is time-barred. A claim made under the FTCA must be made to the appropriate federal agency within two years of the date the claim accrued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). Tapia-Ortiz’s administrative complaint was not received by the DEA until September 8, 1993, which was one day after the two-year statute of limitations period had run. But the administrative claim was mailed by TapiaOrtiz to the DEA from prison on September 4, 1993, a few days before the two-year filing deadline.

We have held that a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is deemed filed, for statute of limitations purposes, when it is delivered to prison officials. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)). This rule is founded on the notion that “[u]nlike other litigants, the pro se prisoner litigant cannot personally ensure receipt of his legal documents by the court clerk.” Id. at 682. Since, with regard to the difficulties inherent in being a pro se prisoner litigant, we see no difference between the filing of a court action and the filing of an administrative claim, we hold that Dory applies to an FTCA administrative filing.^[1] ’ It follows that Tapia-Ortiz’s FTCA claim, which was mailed from prison before the statute of limitations period had run, is not time-barred.

The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment on the Bivens action is affirmed. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on Tapia-Ortiz’s FTCA suit.

Houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary. See Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) (de-dining to apply the Houston principle to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD”) due to the explicit language of the IAD).

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