Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999). · Go Syfert
Search
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary.”
137 citation events (126 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Decker v. Infante (mied, 2025-09-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Decker v. Infante
E.D. Mich. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yapoujian v. Stancil
D. Colo. · 2025 · confidence medium
Tafoya explained, “It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999)) (alteration omitted); see also Martinez v. Gabriel, No. 10-cv- 02079-CMA-MJW, 2012 WL 1719767 , at *2 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Madera v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 2025 · confidence medium
See Kane v. Mount Pleasant Central School District, 80 F.4th 101 , 104 (2d Cir. 2023); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lisi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
E.D.N.Y · 2025 · confidence medium
Finally, as the Second Circuit makes clear, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.”’ Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067 , 1075 (2d Cir.1993); see also Cason v. Valentine, No. 16CV3710, 2023 WL 394886 , at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gagne v. Barrington Police Department
D.N.H. · 2025 · confidence medium
Jan. 13, 2022) (quoting Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)); see Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the original unknown ‘John Doe’ defendants amounted to adding a new party” for purposes of Rule 15(c)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Schulte v. United States of America (3×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
Even more significantly, the Government overlooks Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999), in which the Second Circuit explicitly held that the prison mailbox rule — which provides that a document is “deemed filed . . . when it is delivered to prison officials” — does “appl[y] to an FTCA administrative filing.” Id. at 152; accord Censke v. United States, 947 F.3d 488 , 492-93 (7th Cir. 2020).4 As the Tapia-Ortiz Court explained, the prison mailbox rule “is founded on the notion that unlike other litigants, the pro se prisoner litigant cannot personally ensure receipt of h…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cabello-Setlle v. County of Sullivan
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
Dec. 29, 2010) (“Federal courts have the discretion to deem a claim abandoned when a defendant moves to dismiss that claim and the plaintiff fails to address in [her] opposition papers defendants’ arguments for dismissing such a claim.”). originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stennett v. New York City Administration For Children's Services
E.D.N.Y · 2023 · confidence medium
P. 15(c), does not apply, as “an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly- added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.” See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Although a defendant can initially be named as a John Doe defendant, failure to fully name that defendant within the applicable statute of limitations period requires dismissal of the claim.”); Hyde v. Arresting Officer Caputo, No. 98 CV 6722(FB)(ASC), 2001 WL 521699…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Curtis v. Rockland County Drug Task Force
S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shawn Murphy v. Strafford County et al.
D.N.H. · 2022 · confidence medium
“It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the original unknown ‘John Doe’ defendants amounted to adding a new party” for purposes of Rule 15(c)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leo v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Similarly, “[t]he statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy v. Strafford County Department of Corrections
D.N.H. · 2022 · confidence medium
“It is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the original unknown ‘John Doe’ defendants amounted to adding a new party” for purposes of Rule 15(c)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Torres-Acevedo v. Blair
N.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tigano, III v. United States of America
E.D.N.Y · 2021 · confidence medium
“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake Cretacci v. Joe Call
6th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (civil complaints); Jones v. Bertrand, 171 F.3d 499 , 501–02 (7th Cir. 1999) (habeas corpus petitions); In re Flanagan, 999 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1993) (appeals of bankruptcy order); Tapia–Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (administrative filings under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hasan v. Onondaga County
N.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Liverpool v. Davis
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 ); see also Ceara, 916 F.3d at 213 (upholding lower court ruling that “Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended complaint adding new defendants to relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.” (quoting Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 )).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harlow v. Shipe
N.D.N.Y. · 2019 · confidence medium
However, most importantly, the Circuit "has interpreted the rule to preclude relation back for amended complaints that add new defendants, where the newly added defendants were not originally named because the plaintiff did not know their identities." Hogan, 738 F.3d at 517 (citing Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. Fischer
W.D.N.Y. · 2016 · confidence medium
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (“[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Cuellar v. Love, No. 11-cv-3632 (NSR), 2014 WL 1486458 , at *5 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 2014) (“Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted in New York based on personal injuries, such as Plaintiffs claims premised on excessive force, are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ganek v. Leibowitz
S.D.N.Y. · 2016 · confidence medium
“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hogan v. Fischer
2d Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Accolla v. United States Government
S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · confidence medium
Tapia-Orbiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hickey v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young-Flynn v. Kelly
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · confidence medium
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has noted, “even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.’” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 470 (2d Cir.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey A. Walker v. David Jastremski, Charles Buerer, Frank Halloran, and Tedja Tjandra
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (civil complaints), modified on other grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.1994); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per cu-riam) (administrative complaints); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.2001) (habe-as petitions).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sidney v. Wilson
S.D.N.Y. · 2005 · confidence medium
As Defendants point out, the Second Circuit has held that, “even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.’ ” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Colorado Capital v. Owens
E.D.N.Y · 2005 · confidence medium
Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eck v. Gallucci (2×)
D. Conn. · 2004 · confidence medium
Cir.1999) (per curiam). [Although [the plaintiff] filed his complaint naming the defendant officers as “John Does” within the three-year statute of limitations period, “[i]t is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Id. at 151-52. (quoting Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colombo v. S.C. Department of Social Services (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 2004 · confidence medium
However, the relation-back doctrine does not apply where the defendants were not originally named merely “because plaintiff did not know their identities.” Tap ia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tapia-Ortiz v. United States
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
In that appeal, we applied the "prison mailbox" rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 , 108 S.Ct. 2379 , 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir. 1993), to Tapia-Ortiz’s administrative filing and concluded that plaintiff had satisfied the two-year statute of limitations, Tapia-Ortiz v. John Doe, 171 F.3d at 152.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy
unknown court · 2003 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. Stinson, No. 01-0117, 28 Fed.Appx. 71, 72 , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1462 , at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2002); Bove v. New York City, No. 99-9181, 2000 WL 687720 , at *1, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11895 , at *3 (2d Cir. May 24, 2000); Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Stinson
2d Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
We have previously noted that “even when a suit is brought by a pro se litigant, ‘an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities.’ ” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (quoting Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 470 (2d Cir.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Casim Noble v. Walter R. Kelly, Superintendent
2d Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
As the district court noted, the prison mailbox rule has been extended to a variety of circumstances, including administrative filings, see Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam), service of discovery responses, see Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir.1993), motions for reconsideration under Fed.
discussed Cited "see" Leroy John v. NYPD
E.D.N.Y · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989)); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that New York’s three-year statute of limitations applies to both Section 1983 and Bivens claims).
cited Cited "see" LATAM Airlines Group S.A., et al.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" Cason v. Federal Protective Service Officer Valentine
E.D.N.Y · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
Feb. 27, 2019); see Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 151-52 (2d Cir. 1999 (holding that even where a plaintiff has filed a complaint naming John Doe Defendants “within the three-year statute of limitations period, it is familiar law that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent the statutes of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued”); see also Hogan, 738 F.3d at 517 (holding a plaintiff cannot circumvent New York’s three-year statute of limitations by filing a complaint against a ‘John Doe’ def…
cited Cited "see" Ceara v. Deacon
2d Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe , 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 ) (addressing a typical "John Doe" complaint).
cited Cited "see" Paulin v. Figlia
S.D.N.Y. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir.1999).
cited Cited "see" Southerland v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996). 13 .
discussed Cited "see" Southerland v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996). 20 1 the same procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth 2 Amendment as does Southerland.
cited Cited "see" Southerland v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996). .
cited Cited "see" Southerland v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466 , 468-70 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996). 11 .
cited Cited "see" THUNDER ISLAND AMUSEMENTS, INC. v. Ewald
N.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 , 109 S.Ct. 573 , 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989)).
discussed Cited "see" Schwartz v. Town of Plainville
D. Conn. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
The court went on to add, “Rule 15(c) explicitly allows the relation back of an amendment due to a ‘mistake’ concerning the identity of the parties (under certain circumstances), but the failure to identify individual defendants when the plaintiff knows that such defendants must be named cannot be characterized as a mistake.” Id.; see Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir.1999) (same); *195 Reed v. Hartford Police Dep’t, No. 3:03cv2147 (SRU)(WIG), 2006 WL 2349591 , at *5-*6 (D.Conn.
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Constantellis
2d Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapiar-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir.1999); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466 , 470 (2d Cir.1995), modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" Phillips Ex Rel. Green v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 (2d Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs excessive force claims as time-barred because the officers named in the original complaint as “John Does” were not specified until two years *725 after the statute of limitations had run); Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067 , 1075 (2d Cir.1993) (“ ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statues of limitations.... ”); Johnson v. Constantellis, No. 03 Civ. 1267, 2005 WL 2291195 , at *23 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited "see" Abdel-Whab v. ORTHOPEDIC ASS'N OF DUTCHESS
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 151 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 , 109 S.Ct. 573 , 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989)); Kronisch v. *306 United States, 150 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir.1998); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see" Pablo Fernandez v. Christopher Artuz
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
Fernandez, 175 F.Supp.2d at 684 n. 1; see Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 152 n. 1 (2d Cir.1999) (applying rule to filing of administrative claims under FTCA, but noting that the Houston principle does not apply when there is a "specific statutory regime to the contrary”); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (applying rule to § 1983 complaints filed by state prisoners), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" Ben-Siyon Ish Yerushalayim v. United States Department of Corrections
2d Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150 , 151 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" Robinson v. Goord
2d Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1999) (for statute of limitations purposes, pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint is deemed filed when delivered to prison officials); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 269-70 , 108 S.Ct. 2379 , 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (same for notice of appeal from denial of habeas relief); Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 F.2d 985, 987-88 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the Houston rule ordinarily applies to other civil filing deadlines).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz
v.
John Doe, Dea Agents, Michael Kevin McGurk Dea Agent, Miles Sonn, U.S. Customs Agent, Alan Bradford Payne, U.S. Customs Agent, Dominick Gerand, U.S. Customs Agent, United States of America
98-6103.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 26, 1999.
171 F.3d 150
Cited by 53 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 77%
Citer courts: E.D. Michigan (1)

171 F.3d 150

Juan Antonio TAPIA-ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John DOE, DEA Agents, Michael Kevin McGurk, DEA Agent, Miles
Sonn, U.S. Customs Agent, Alan Bradford Payne,
U.S. Customs Agent, Dominick Gerand,
U.S. Customs Agent, Defendants-Appellees,
United States of America, Defendant.

Docket No. 98-6103

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued March 18, 1999.
Decided March 26, 1999.

Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, White Deer, PA.

Charles P. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney (Deborah B. Zwany, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: McLAUGHLIN, CALABRESI, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.[*]

PER CURIAM:

[*~150]1

Plaintiff-appellant Juan Antonio Tapia-Ortiz, pro se, appeals from an order dated April 16, 1998, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Thomas C. Platt, J.). The court granted summary judgment for the defendants-appellees--named and unnamed officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")--and dismissed as time-barred Tapia-Ortiz's Bivens action alleging that the officers had used excessive force while arresting him in 1991. We affirm this part of the district court's judgment. With respect to Tapia-Ortiz's claim that the district court misconstrued his motion to withdraw the United States as a party to the Bivens action as a motion to withdraw his suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, we conclude that the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA claim is not time-barred. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA action.

BACKGROUND

2

Tapia-Ortiz was arrested on September 7, 1991, and charged with various drug offenses of which he was eventually convicted. On September 4, 1993, less than two years after his arrest, Tapia-Ortiz mailed an administrative complaint from prison to the DEA alleging that the arresting officers had used excessive force against him. This administrative claim was received by the DEA on September 8, 1993, more than two years after the alleged incident, and was denied on the merits.

3

Tapia-Ortiz then timely filed a Bivens action in district court against "John Doe (DEA Agents)." On June 20, 1996, almost two years after the statute of limitations for Bivens actions had run, he filed an amended complaint that specifically identified some of the "John Doe" officers by name. Also in 1996, Tapia-Ortiz added the United States to the suit as a defendant in a federal "Tort Claim action." But in 1997, he changed his mind and moved the district court "to withdraw the United States as a defendant in this Bivens action," and the motion was granted. (emphasis added) Since the district court made no reference to Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA claim in its final judgment, we assume that the court construed this motion as withdrawing Tapia-Ortiz's entire FTCA action against the United States, rather than as a motion to withdraw the United States only as a party to the Bivens action (brought against the individual DEA officers).

4

Shortly thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for the named and unnamed officers. The court held that Tapia-Ortiz's failure to name specifically any defendants within the three-year statute of limitations period for a Bivens action rendered the suit time-barred.

DISCUSSION

[*~151]5

First, we address the Bivens claim. The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Although Tapia-Ortiz filed his complaint naming the defendant officers as "John Does" within the three-year statute of limitations period, "[i]t is familiar law that 'John Doe' pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes of limitations because replacing a 'John Doe' with a named party in effect constitutes a change in the party sued." Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted). And even when a suit is brought by pro se litigant, "an amended complaint adding new defendants [cannot] relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not know their identities." Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir.1995). Tapia-Ortiz's failure until two years after the expiration of the statute of limitations period to name specifically in his complaint the officers who allegedly violated his rights is therefore fatal to his Bivens claim.

6

We next turn to the question of whether Tapia-Ortiz actually withdrew his FTCA claim against the United States when he moved the district court "to withdraw the United States as a party to this Bivens action." It is well-established that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally in favor of the pro se litigant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). There are indications in the record that Tapia-Ortiz understood at the time that he added the United States as a party that it would be in his suit just as part of an FTCA claim. On that reading, Tapia-Ortiz could not have intended to withdraw the United States from the Bivens action in which it was not a part. On the other hand, his motion of withdrawal did specify that he was withdrawing the United States only in the Bivens action. Given the ambiguity of Tapia-Ortiz's filings before the district court, we believe that the court should not, without further inquiry, have construed his motion as a motion to withdraw the FTCA claim.

7

The government argues that even if Tapia-Ortiz did not withdraw his FTCA suit, that action is time-barred. A claim made under the FTCA must be made to the appropriate federal agency within two years of the date the claim accrued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). Tapia-Ortiz's administrative complaint was not received by the DEA until September 8, 1993, which was one day after the two-year statute of limitations period had run. But the administrative claim was mailed by Tapia-Ortiz to the DEA from prison on September 4, 1993, a few days before the two-year filing deadline.

8

We have held that a pro se prisoner's § 1983 complaint is deemed filed, for statute of limitations purposes, when it is delivered to prison officials. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 682 (2d Cir.1993) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)). This rule is founded on the notion that "[u]nlike other litigants, the pro se prisoner litigant cannot personally ensure receipt of his legal documents by the court clerk." Id. at 682. Since, with regard to the difficulties inherent in being a pro se prisoner litigant, we see no difference between the filing of a court action and the filing of an administrative claim, we hold that Dory applies to an FTCA administrative filing.[1] It follows that Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA claim, which was mailed from prison before the statute of limitations period had run, is not time-barred.

[*~152]9

The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment on the Bivens action is affirmed. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on Tapia-Ortiz's FTCA suit.

*

The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation

1

Houston does not apply, of course, when there is a specific statutory regime to the contrary. See Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993) (declining to apply the Houston principle to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") due to the explicit language of the IAD)