In re Penrod
A secured creditor's lien is extinguished by the confirmation of a reorganization plan unless the plan or the confirming order expressly preserves the security interest.
Hog farmers filed for Chapter 11 reorganization, and their plan provided for the full payment of a secured creditor’s claim but remained silent regarding the creditor’s lien on the hogs. After confirmation, the farmers sold the hogs without remitting proceeds to the creditor, who sued to enforce the lien. The bankruptcy court held the lien extinguished and enjoined the creditor. The issue is whether a secured creditor’s lien survives confirmation of a reorganization plan that makes provision for the claim but does not expressly preserve the security interest. The court applies 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), which provides that property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors unless the plan or confirming order states otherwise. Because the creditor participated in the proceeding and the plan addressed its claim, the lien was extinguished by confirmation. The court affirms the judgment below.
At page 463Interpreting section 1141(c) regarding lien extinguishment42 citing cases“property dealt with by the plan”
- Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enter., Inc.), 507 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2007).published ([UJnless the plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a hen is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation.)
- Winchell v. Town of Wilmington (In re Winchell), 200 B.R. 734 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).published (hens pass through bankruptcy unaffected ... unless they are brought into the bankruptcy proceeding and dealt with there)
- Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published“secured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.”
- Acme Energy Servs., Inc. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published“secured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.”
- Acme Energy Servs., Inc. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published“secured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.”
- Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Manuel Babilonia Santiago, BAP No. PR 19-048 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2020).unpublished“Section 1141(c) provides with immaterial exceptions that ‘except as provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests…
- Gan B, LLC v. Sims, 575 B.R. 375 (N.D. Ill. 2017).publishedIll. 2017) (reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision to lift the automatic stay after the debtors defaulted on Chapter 11 plan payments; noting that the tax purchaser had extinguished its pre-petition lien in favor of a right to payment u…
- In re Turner, 558 B.R. 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).published In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1995).
- In re Batista-Sanechez, 502 B.R. 227 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).published (Docket No. 238 at 5.) In In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.1995) the Seventh Circuit refers to the disallowance of a late filed proof of claim in Tamow as being excessive punishment.
- In re Brisco, 502 B.R. 212 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).publishedId. at 531 (citing Matter of Penrod 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.1995)).
Show 32 more citing cases
- Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. Miss. 2012).published Id. (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995)).
- In re S. White Transp., Inc., 455 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011).published In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463 (emphasis added); see also In re Ahern, 507 F.3d at 823 (“liens constitute one of the interests that section 1141(c) extinguishes”) (emphasis added).
- In re Gluth Bros. Const., Inc., 426 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).publishedThe Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified the principle that liens survive a bankruptcy proceeding, stating that “[t]hey do — unless they are brought into the bankruptcy proceeding and dealt with there.” In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459,…
- Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008).publishedAs applied to liens *648 and security interests, this means that “unless the plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a lien is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation.” In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (…
- Airadigm Comm Inc v. FCC, No. 07-2212 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008).publishedAs applied to liens and security interests, this means that “unless the 10 Nos. 07-2212, 07-2430 & 07-2529 plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a lien is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation.” In…
- In re Worldcom, Inc., 382 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).published(holding that section 1141(c) covers liens and “that unless the plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a lien is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation)
- Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc.), 396 B.R. 747 (W.D. Wis. 2007).publishedMatter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995).
- Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 372 B.R. 894 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006).publishedMatter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.1995); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 (37) and (51) (defining “lien” and “security interest”).
- In re Wampler, 345 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).published As Judge Posner recently demonstrated in In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir.1995), this “old saw” is actually far too broad, for there are many ways in which liens may be affected by bankruptcy proceedings.
- Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., Debtor. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Union Entities, (Two Cases). Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., & the Plan Comm., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Stovall, 256 B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).published
- Merchants Grain, Inc. ex rel. Mahern v. Adkins (In re Merchants Grain, Inc.), 184 B.R. 52 (S.D. Ind. 1995).published
- TOR Husjord Shipping v. Port Isabel/San Benito Navigation Dist. (In re Burton Sec. S.A.), 202 B.R. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1996).published
- Harker v. Troutman (In re Troutman Enter., Inc.), 244 B.R. 761 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).published
- Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Union Entities, 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Aguirre, 548 B.R. 525 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).published
- In re Simon, 83 F.3d 433 (10th Cir. 1996).published
- Universal Suppliers, Inc. v. Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc. (In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001).published
- In re Richard Hamlett, Debtor. Richard Hamlett, Debtor-Appellant v. Amsouth Bank, 322 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2003).published
- In re Siemers, 205 B.R. 583 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997).published
- In re Echevarria, 212 B.R. 26 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1997).published
- Shook v. CBIC (In re Shook), 278 B.R. 815 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).published
- United States v. Lincoln Sav. Bank (In re Com. Millwright Serv. Corp.), 245 B.R. 603 (N.D. Iowa 2000).published
- Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99, 22 P.3d 784.published
- Hamlett v. Amsouth Bank, No. 02-1642 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2003).published
- In re Arnold, 483 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).published
- Phifer v. City of Milwaukee (In re Phifer), 547 B.R. 288 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2016).published
- In re Beta Int'l, Inc., 210 B.R. 279 (E.D. Mich. 1997).published
- In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 251 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).published
- Coffin v. Malvern Fed. Sav. Bank, 189 B.R. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1995).published
- In re Greater Am. Land Resources, Inc., 452 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2011).published
At page 462Secured creditor participation and rights in bankruptcy45 citing casesallowing extinguishment of lien without adversary proceeding
- Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Manuel Babilonia Santiago, BAP No. PR 19-048 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2020).unpublished“Section 1141(c) provides with immaterial exceptions that ‘except as provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests…
- In re Flournoy, 570 B.R. 293 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017).publishedIn re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995).
- Kohout v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Kohout), 560 B.R. 399 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2016).publishedIll. 2013) (“ ‘Liens are property rights and the forfeiture of such rights is disfavored.' ”) (quoting Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995)).
- In re Turner, 558 B.R. 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).published In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1995).
- United Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vitro Asset Corp. (In re Vitro Asset Corp.), 539 B.R. 108 (N.D. Tex. 2015).publishedAhern, 507 F.3d at 823 (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995); FDIC v. Union Entities (In re Be-Mac Transp.
- Monroe v. Seaway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Monroe), 509 B.R. 613 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).publishedBut the Seventh Circuit has construed 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (e)’s similar “free and clear” language to mean that if a plan provides for the lienholder’s claim without preserving the lien, the plan eliminates the lien: “[T]he default rule for [l…
- In re N. New England Tel. Operations LLC, 504 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).published (requiring that secured creditor had filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding)
- In re Batista-Sanechez, 502 B.R. 227 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).published (Docket No. 238 at 5.) In In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir.1995) the Seventh Circuit refers to the disallowance of a late filed proof of claim in Tamow as being excessive punishment.
- Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 725 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2013).publishedIt then explained that courts were split on whether active participation was required, see id. (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995)), or whether “the only participation necessary is that the creditor receive notice of the…
- Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Transp., Inc. (In re S. White Transp., Inc.), 473 B.R. 695 (S.D. Miss. 2012).published Id. (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995)).
Show 31 more citing cases
- Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc., 616 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2010).publishedThe default rule is that a lien is extinguished as part of a plan of reorganization unless the plan says otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (c) (property dealt with by a plan is “free and clear of all claims and interest of creditors”); Matter of…
- Thompson v. Florida Wood Treaters, Inc., 52 V.I. 986 (D.V.I. 2009).publishedBut this is not to say that the lien is sure to escape unscathed from the bankruptcy.” In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995).
- JCB, INC. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2008).published Forms, 341 F.3d at 743 , quoting In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995).
- Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc.), 396 B.R. 747 (W.D. Wis. 2007).publishedMatter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir.1995).
- Griffin v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 356 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).published Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462. .
- In re Ramsey, 356 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).published However, as the Davis dissent observed, Davis's factual finding was false, which raises another criticism of Andersen and res judicata by ambush. [21] Novastar fails to address this omission. [22] 11 U.S.C. § 506 (d)(2); Matter of Tarnow,…
- In re Bryant, 323 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005).publishedHowever, "like most generalizations about law, the principle that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected cannot be taken literally.” In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462-63 (7th Cir.1995).
- In re Muma Servs., Inc., 322 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).published(concluding that chapter 11 plan of reorganization can modify lien, force holder to accept indubitable equivalent, or even extinguish lien)
- Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Harnish, 224 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998).published
- Chase Auto. Fin., Inc. v. Kinion (In re Kinion), 207 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 2000).published
- Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jardine Ins. Servs. Texas, Inc., 104 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1997).published
- In re Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., Debtor. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Union Entities, (Two Cases). Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., & the Plan Comm., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Be-Mac Transp. Co., Inc., 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Merchants Grain, Inc. ex rel. Mahern, 93 F.3d 1347 (7th Cir. 1996).published
- Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Dial Bus. Forms, Inc., 341 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2003).published
- Wills v. Heritage Bank (In re Wills), 226 B.R. 369 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).published
- In re Stovall, 256 B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).published
- Meadowbrook Estates v. McElvany, Inc. (In re Meadowbrook Estates), 246 B.R. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2000).published
- In re Phoenix Petroleum Co., 278 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).published
- In re Swanson, 312 B.R. 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).published
- Merchants Grain, Inc. ex rel. Mahern v. Adkins (In re Merchants Grain, Inc.), 184 B.R. 52 (S.D. Ind. 1995).published
- City of Chicago v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 203 B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997).published
- In re Ramey, 301 B.R. 534 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003).published
- TOR Husjord Shipping v. Port Isabel/San Benito Navigation Dist. (In re Burton Sec. S.A.), 202 B.R. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1996).published
- In re Addison Props. Ltd. P'ship, 185 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).published
- McRoberts v. Transouth Fin. (In re Bell), 194 B.R. 192 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996).published
- In re Nat'l Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000).published
- Harker v. Troutman (In re Troutman Enter., Inc.), 244 B.R. 761 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).published
- In re Immel, 436 B.R. 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).published
- Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Union Entities, 83 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- In re Aguirre, 548 B.R. 525 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).published
At page 461Liens passing through bankruptcy unaffected36 citing casesA secured creditor can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and enforce his lien in the usual way, which would normally be by bringing a foreclosure action in a state court. This is the principle that liens pass through the bankruptcy unaffected.
- Richard Alexander v. Kondaur Capital, No. 11-1797 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011).unpublished(A secured creditor can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and enforce his lien in the usual way, which would normally be by bringing a foreclosure action in a state court. This is the principle that liens pass t…)
- Richard L. Alexander v. Prime Asset Fund II, No. 11-1798 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011).unpublished(A secured creditor can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and enforce his lien in the usual way, which would normally be by bringing a foreclosure action in a state court. This is the principle that liens pass t…)
- Hang, No. 24-02130 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2026).(noting the presumption that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected)
- Vang, No. 24-02153 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2026).(noting the presumption that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected)
- Cynthia M. Seymore, No. 19-22084 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 27, 2023).(noting the presumption that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected)
- Myers v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 2:22-cv-00478 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2023).This is the principle that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.” Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1995).
- United States v. Dawley, No. 3:23-cv-00809 (S.D. Ill. June 6, 2023).Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 , 417-19 (1992); Matter of Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (bankruptcy discharge extingui…
- City of Concord v. N. New England Tel. Operations LLC, 795 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2015).published I The longstanding background rule has been that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.” Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 , 112 S.Ct. 773 , 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1995).
- In re Moehring, 485 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013).published(In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 559-61 (6th Cir.2003); and In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir.1995).
- Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A., 696 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2012).published See Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir.1996) (collecting examples); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir.1995).
Show 20 more citing cases
- River East Plaza, Ll v. LNV Corpora, 669 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012).publishedIn re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-63 (7th Cir.1995).
- In re Alexander, 435 F. App'x 563 (7th Cir. 2011).unpublishedSee 11 U.S.C. § 506 (d)(2); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1995) (“A secured creditor can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and enforce his lien in the usual way, which would normally be by bringing a foreclosure action in…
- In re Wampler, 345 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).published As Judge Posner recently demonstrated in In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir.1995), this “old saw” is actually far too broad, for there are many ways in which liens may be affected by bankruptcy proceedings.
- In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).publishedHarmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461-462 (7th Cir.1995)).
- Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- Richard M. Fogel v. Samuel Zell, 221 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000).published
- Laura Anne Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).published
- Ralph M. Cox v. Zale Delaware, Inc., 239 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2001).published
- In re Smith & Kourian, 216 B.R. 686 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997).published
- In re Henline, 242 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1999).published
- Sterling Packaging Corp. v. Systec Corp. (In re Sterling Packaging Corp.), 265 B.R. 701 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001).published
- Barnes v. Sawyer (In re Barnes), 326 B.R. 832 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2005).published
- In re Golladay, 391 B.R. 417 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).published
- In re Harnish, 224 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998).published
- Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Artra Grp., Inc. v. Artra Grp., Inc. (In re Artra Grp., Inc.), 300 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).published
- Lindskog v. M & I Bank FSB (In re Lindskog), 451 B.R. 863 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011).published
- In re Pajian, 785 F.3d 1161 (7th Cir. 2015).published
- In re Pajian, 508 B.R. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).published
- In re Hrubec, 544 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).published
- In re Jones, 555 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2016).published
[S]ecured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.
- Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published([S]ecured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.)
- Acme Energy Servs., Inc. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published([S]ecured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.)
- Acme Energy Servs., Inc. v. Sandra H. Staley, 569 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).published([S]ecured creditors commonly give up their preexisting liens for other interests in the reorganized firm.)
At page 464Interpreting creditor status and property rights in bankruptcy plans2 citing casesNardulli & Sons Inc., 836 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.1988), the plan denominated the creditor as a “secured creditor” and explicitly recognized its security…
- In re Harnish, 224 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998).published
- In the Matter of June M. Heath, Debtor. Joseph M. Black, Tr. v. United States Postal Serv., 115 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1997).published
Other citing cases
- Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Theodore, 584 B.R. 627 (D. Vt. 2018).published
This appeal raises an issue of bankruptcy law that one might have supposed had been settled long ago. It is whether, when a plan of reorganization makes provision for the payment of a secured creditor’s claim but does not say whether the creditor’s security interest (lien) is extinguished, the security interest survives, in accordance with the old saw that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.”
Hog farmers named Penrod executed a promissory note to Mutual Guaranty Corporation (actually to its predecessor, but we can ignore that detail) for $150,000, secured by the Penrods’ hogs. A year later, the Pen-rods filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, owing Mutual Guaranty $132,000. Mutual Guaranty filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Penrods, neither objecting to the claim nor questioning the validity of Mutual Guaranty’s lien, filed a plan of reorganization which designated Mutual Guaranty as a “Class 3 creditor” — in fact as the only Class 3 creditor. Class 3 creditors, the plan states, “will be paid in full, with interest at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum. Payments to this Class shall be paid on a monthly basis commencing sixty (60) days after Confirmation. Furthermore, said payments shall be based upon a seven (7) year amortization.” That is all that the plan, or the order confirming it, says about Mutual Guaranty’s interest.
Shortly after the plan went into effect, the Penrods’ hogs became infected with “pseudo-rabies” virus, a disease of the reproductive system that causes the females infected with it to miscarry. Hogs so stricken cannot be kept for breeding purposes; all they are good for is food (human food, we note with some anxiety). So the Penrods sold their hogs for slaughter — without remitting the proceeds to Mutual Guaranty, as the security agreement accompanying the promissory note had required. Mutual Guaranty brought suit in a state court to enforce a hen in the proceeds. The Penrods responded by asking the bankruptcy court to hold Mutual Guaranty in contempt for violating the order confirming the plan of reorganization, which the Penrods claim extinguished Mutual Guaranty’s hen. The bankruptcy court agreed that the hen had been extinguished and enjoined (the court’s term was “precluded,” but as far as we can tell it meant the same thing) Mutual Guaranty from attempting to enforce it. The district court affirmed.
A secured creditor can bypass his debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding and enforce his hen in the usual way, which would normally be by bringing a foreclosure action in a state court. This is the principle that hens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21, 6 S.Ct. 917, 918, 29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992); In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160, 167 (7th Cir.1992). If the creditor follows this route, the discharge in bankruptcy will not impair his hen. Dewsnup v. Timm, supra, 502 U.S. at 416-17, 112 S.Ct. at 778; In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.1984). Alternatively, he may decide to collect his debt in the bankruptcy proceeding, and to this end may file a proof of claim in that proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). He will do this if he is underse-cured, for in that case merely enforcing his hen would not enable him to collect the en[*462]tire debt owed him. His only chance of recovering any part of the amount by which the debt exceeds the value of the lien would be to share in the distribution of the debtor’s estate to the unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a); In re Tarnow, supra, 749 F.2d at 465.
A secured creditor may be dragged into the bankruptcy involuntarily, because the trustee or debtor (if there is no trustee), or someone who might be liable to the secured creditor and therefore has an interest in maximizing the creditor’s recovery, may file a claim on the creditor’s behalf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b), (c); In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1987). He may participate in the bankruptcy in order to try to get the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(d)) lifted to the extent of allowing him to enforce his hen; for the stay applies to the enforcement of hens. He may want to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding (and so may decide to file a claim) simply because he wants to make sure that the debtor’s estate is not administered in a way that will diminish the value, as distinct from threatening the existence, of his hen. In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir.1992).
The secured creditor does not, by participating in the bankruptcy proceeding through filing a claim, surrender his hen. But this is not to say that the hen is sure to escape unscathed from the bankruptcy. We have mentioned the automatic stay. If the secured creditor’s claim is challenged in the • bankruptcy proceeding and the court denies the claim, the creditor will lose the hen by operation of the doctrine of collateral estop-pel. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d); In re Tarnow, supra, 749 F.2d at 465-66. He may be forced in the plan of reorganization to swap his hen for an interest that is an “indubitable equivalent” of the hen. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); In re James Wilson Associates, supra, 965 F.2d at 172. And in some circumstances he may even be compelled to surrender his hen without receiving anything in return. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(d), 1129(a)(10), (b)(1). And, of course, he can consent to its discharge. The right is implicit in 11 U.S.C. § 1126, and is anyway obvious. It is a frequent element of a plan of reorganization, as we are about to see.
Nothing we have said so far is controversial, and we can take one more step without inviting controversy. A plan of reorganization can expressly preserve preexisting hens, such as that of Mutual Guaranty in this case. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1). Conversely, it can expressly abrogate some or all of those hens with the full consent of the lienholders; and this is common. A reorganization alters the capital structure of the bankrupt enterprise. Bondholders and other creditors, along with shareholders, exchange their notes, claims, and shares for new securities in the reorganized firm. For recent examples, see Sullivan & Long v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir.1995); In re Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 301 (7th Cir.1994). Bondholders often give up their bonds and associated security agreements in exchange for common stock in the reorganized corporation, thus exchanging a secured for an unsecured interest. By now it should be clear that like most generalizations about law, the principle that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected cannot be taken literally.
The question we must decide in this ease is whether preexisting liens survive a reorganization when the plan (or the order confirming it) does not mention the liens. What in other words is the default rule when the plan is silent? We acknowledge this to be a difficult question. Liens are property rights and the forfeiture of such rights is disfavored. But when lienholders participate in a bankruptcy proceeding, and especially in a reorganization, they know that their liens are likely to be affected, and indeed altered. The issue here, moreover, is what the proper rule for interpreting silence is rather than in what circumstances a lien can be taken away from someone who has expressed his desire to retain it.
We have concluded that the default rule for secured creditors who file claims for which provision is made in the plan of reorganization is extinction and is found in the Code itself. Section 1141(c) provides with immaterial exceptions that “except as provid[*463]ed in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.” The term “interest” is not defined in the Code, but a hen is defined as an interest in property, 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), and there is no doubt that a security interest is an interest, and it is defined as a “hen created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). So section 1141(c) must cover liens, In re Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 68 B.R. 71, 79 (D.Minn.1986), and must mean, therefore, that unless the plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a hen is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation. This is provided, we emphasize, that the holder of the hen participated in the reorganization. If he did not, his hen would not be “property dealt with by the plan,” and so the section would not apply. One could argue that the quoted phrase should be equated to “property of the estate,” defined in section 541 to include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case” (emphasis added), and that at the start of the bankruptcy proceeding the hens of the secured creditors are not the debtor’s property — which indeed they are not. Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir.1984); In re Interstate Motor Freight System, 86 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1988). But the suggested equation is not especiahy plausible. Property dealt with by the plan is property dealt with by the plan, whether it was part of the debtor’s estate when bankruptcy was first declared or was tossed into the pot later. As we have said, secured creditors commonly give up their preexisting hens for other interests in the reorganized firm. A plan of reorganization that does this “deal[s] with” the hens. Or does it? For it could be argued that the plan in this case dealt with the secured creditor’s claim, but not with its lien. But this interpretation would be inconsistent with the rest of section 1141(c) — that the property dealt with by the plan is, after confirmation of the plan, to be “free and clear of ah claims and interests of creditors” (and others). On the view pressed by Mutual Guaranty, the assets of the reorganized entity would continue to be burdened by secured creditors’ claims by virtue of their hens even if the plan made provision for those claims.
Our suggested interpretation reconciles the language of section 1141(c) with the principle, which we have pointed out cannot be maintained without careful qualification, that hens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. They do — unless they are brought into the bankruptcy proceeding and dealt with there. The interpretation makes practical sense as well. It lowers the costs of transacting with the reorganized firm, thus boosting the chances that the reorganization will succeed. By studying the plan of reorganization a prospective creditor of or investor in the reorganized firm can tell whether any hens that creditors whose interests in the new entity are defined in the plan may have had against its bankrupt predecessor survive as encumbrances on the assets of the new firm. The cases that support a contrary interpretation are cases in which the courts were, we respectfully suggest, mesmerized by a formula (“hens pass through bankruptcy unaffected”). E.g., Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69 B.R. 122 (S.D.Ga.1985); United Presidential Life Ins. Co. v. Barker, 31 B.R. 145 (N.D.Tex.1983); In re Eakin, 153 B.R. 59 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993). They are none of them appellate cases, and there are plenty of cases that take our view. E.g., In re Arctic Enterprises, Inc., supra, 68 B.R. at 80; In re Johnson, 139 B.R. 208, 216 (Bankr.D.Minn.1992). Oddly, none of the cases on either side is an appellate case, the ones cited by Mutual Guaranty being readily distinguishable. The secured creditor in In re Tamow, supra, did not participate in the reorganization, except to file a late claim against the debtor. The bankruptcy court disallowed the hen because the claim was late — an excessive punishment — not because the plan of reorganization had dealt with the property constituted by the creditor’s hen. It had not; in fact no plan had yet been confirmed. Nor had the plan in Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 186, 188-89 (3d Cir.1987), made provision for the secured creditor; the debtor had never even hsted the property subject to the hen as an asset of the estate. In General Electric Credit Corp. v. [*464] Nardulli & Sons Inc., 836 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.1988), the plan denominated the creditor as a “secured creditor” and explicitly recognized its security interest. In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1985), not cited by Mutual Guaranty — no doubt because it did not involve a plan of reorganization or cite section 1141(c) — is nevertheless its best case. It arose under an analogous provision of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c), which governs plans under Chapter 13 — a counterpart to Chapter 11, only for individuals rather than firms. Simmons relied heavily on our decision in Tamow, but Tamow did not involve the interpretation of a plan of reorganization: there was none. For other grounds of distinction between Simmons and the present case, see In re Wolf, 162 B.R. 98, 108 n. 16 (Bankr.D.N.J.1993).
There is nothing to Mutual Guaranty’s suggestion that our interpretation raises a question under the due process or takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment because a hen is property within the meaning of the clause. It is, United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76-77, 103 S.Ct. 407, 411-12, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982), but Mutual Guaranty' could have protected it by appealing from the order confirming the plan of reorganization. We recognize that since the law was not clear with respect to the survival of the hen of a creditor who is provided for in the plan without mention of his hen, Mutual Guaranty may not have realized when the plan was adopted that its hen was in jeopardy. Conceivably this might give Mutual Guaranty an equitable defense to the complete extinction of the hen, but it has not presented such a defense. It has staked its all on persuading us that its hen survived the bankruptcy proceeding intact.
AFFIRMED.