Thomas H. Roberts, D/B/A A.C. Elec. v. I.B.E.W. Local 910 Afl-Cio, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
Thomas H. Roberts, D/B/A A.C. Elec. v. I.B.E.W. Local 910 Afl-Cio, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
74 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Garcia v. Sklar (nysb, 2022-01-27)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. Sklar
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
(Trial Tr. at 40:17–19.) Garcia’s counsel could have subpoenaed Feerst despite Feerst being “physically available only to the opponent.” Ranish, 89 F. 3d at 826 (citations omitted).
cited Cited "see" Herrera v. Artuz
S.D.N.Y. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. Hollins, 884 F.Supp. 758, 761-62 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arkim v. Irvin
W.D.N.Y. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
This language is in accord with similar language approved by the Second Circuit as “sufficient balancing language.” United States v. Matias, supra, 836 F.2d at 750 (citing United States v. Vega, 589 F.2d 1147 , 1154 & n. 6 (2d Cir.1978)) (“[A] defendant’s vital interest in the outcome of his trial is not inconsistent with the ability to render truthful testimony ... [; a] defendant’s testimony is to be judged in the same way as that of any other witness.”); see also Jones v. Hollins, 884 F.Supp. 758, 767 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hauf v. Internal Revenue Service
N.D.N.Y. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Raymo v. Textron, Inc., 846 F.Supp. 203, 206 (N.D.N.Y.1994) (plaintiffs motion for new trial denied where plaintiff failed to provide documents necessary to review issue), aff'd, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir.1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas H. Roberts, D/B/A A.C. Electric
v.
I.B.E.W. Local 910 Afl-Cio
95-7276.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Nov 21, 1995.
89 F.3d 826
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Unpublished

89 F.3d 826

NOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23.
Thomas H. ROBERTS, d/b/a A.C. Electric, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
I.B.E.W. LOCAL 910 AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-7276.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge ).

APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD W. WEYLAND, Madonna, Saxer, Anderson & Wolinsky, Plattsburgh, New York.

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: CHARLES E. BLITMAN, Blitman & King, Syracuse, New York.

N.D.N.Y.

AFFIRMED.

Before JAMES L. OAKES, J. DANIEL MAHONEY and JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judges.

1

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York and was argued by counsel.

2

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

3

Plaintiff-appellant Thomas H. Roberts, d/b/a A.C. Electric ("Roberts") appeals from an order entered February 27, 1995 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York that granted a motion by defendant-appellee I.B.E.W. Local 910 AFL-CIO ("Local 910") for summary judgment and denied Roberts' cross-motion for summary judgment. Roberts' complaint sought a declaratory judgment that no contractual relationship existed between him and Local 910, and punitive and compensatory damages. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Chief Judge McAvoy on the record at a hearing held February 13, 1995. See Roberts v. I.B.E.W. Local 910 AFL-CIO, No. 94-CV-963, transcript of hearing (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1995). Local 910's motion for double costs and attorney fees pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 38 is denied.