Davis v. Bittenbender, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Davis v. Bittenbender, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where otherwise authorized,. . . awards of attorneys' fees 'are not obviated by the fact that individual are not obligated to compensate their counsel”
48 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Polay v. McMahon (mass, 2014-06-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Polay v. McMahon
Mass. · 2014 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where otherwise authorized,. . . awards of attorneys' fees 'are not obviated by the fact that individual are not obligated to compensate their counsel
discussed Cited "see" Fox v. City of Greensboro
M.D.N.C. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
Apr. 15, 2011) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim); see Blue v. Bigos, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (“[P]roximate cause is part of a § 1983 plaintiff’s burden.” (citing Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir.1994))). 22 Courts have recognized that “where an officer presents all relevant probable cause evidence to an intermediary, such as a prosecutor, a grand jury, or a magistrate, the intermediary’s independent decision to seek a warrant, issue a warrant, or return an indictment …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Riley v. Pensabene
E.D. Va. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
Va. Apr. 15, 2011) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim); see also Blue v. Bigos, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[P]roximate cause is part of a § 1983 plaintiff's burden.”) (citing Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Herrera v. Finan
D.S.C. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Blue v. Bigos, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (“proximate cause is part of a § 1983 plaintiffs burden”); Plummer v. Goodwin, 2010 WL 419927 , *7 (D.S.C.2010) (actions of government official must have proximately caused the § 1983 plaintiffs injuries).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jerome Louis Davis
v.
M.J. Bittenbender, Detective Lieutenant McKoy Sheriff Roberts Major Adams, and Sheriff Michaels Magistrate Powhatan County Captain Carson
96-6034.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Jul 2, 1996.
89 F.3d 827
Unpublished
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 81%
Citer courts: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial… (1)

89 F.3d 827

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Jerome Louis DAVIS, Plaintiff--Appellant,
v.
M.J. BITTENBENDER, Detective; Lieutenant McKoy; Sheriff
Roberts; Major Adams, Defendants--Appellees,
and
Sheriff Michaels; Magistrate Powhatan County; Captain
Carson, Defendants.

No. 96-6034.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 31, 1996.
Decided July 2, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge. (CA-95-90-4).

Jerome Louis Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Alan Brody Rashkind, FURNISS, DAVIS, RASHKIND & SAUNDERS, Norfolk, Virginia; Richard David Caplan, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Hampton, Virginia; John Adrian Gibney, Jr., Bradley Brent Cavedo, SHUFORD, RUBIN & GIBNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

E.D.Va.

AFFIRMED.

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

1

Jerome Davis appeals from a jury verdict in favor of the Defendant on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim, alleging that the magistrate judge erred in several pre-trial rulings.[1] We affirm.

2

Davis claims that the magistrate judge erred by: (1) failing and/or refusing to subpoena requested witnesses; (2) denying Davis' motion to sever the trial; (3) denying Davis' motion for continuance; (4) denying Davis' motion for appointment of counsel; (5) not "intertain[ing] [Davis'] motion of objection to certain jury instructions;" and (6) allowing the defense to use Davis' criminal conviction. Our review reveals no error in the magistrate judge's rulings. Davis also alleges that some of the jury members were asleep during portions of his trial and that the magistrate judge used "scare tactics" to keep him from objecting. We find these scant allegations, without more, insufficient to warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict in favor of the Defendant.[2] We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

3

AFFIRMED.

1

All parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988)

2

We also deny Davis' motion to compel prison officials at Greensville Correctional Center "to either assist [him] with his ongoing litigation ... or release him back to the general population" as moot for the reason that Davis is no longer incarcerated at Greensville Correctional Center