#2
green
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
A municipality is liable under Section 1983 when an injury results from an official policy or custom but cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.
Female employees sued municipal departments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that official policies compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence. The plaintiffs sought backpay for these leaves. The court addressed whether local government entities are "persons" subject to liability under § 1983. The court holds that a municipality is liable under § 1983 when an injury is caused by the execution of an official policy or custom, whether established by lawmakers or by acts representing official policy. However, a municipality cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory based solely on the employment of a tortfeasor.
co-cited 15×
#3
green
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)
Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution rather than for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.
A respondent brought a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being detained in a jail for several days due to a mistaken identity error. The respondent alleged that the sheriff's failure to implement adequate identification procedures violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The court must determine whether a claim for relief under § 1983 can be based on an allegation of simple negligence. Because § 1983 imposes liability only for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law, the court holds that the respondent failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of a constitutional deprivation.
co-cited 9×
#4
neutral
Finley v. Murray, 454 U.S. 962 (1981)
Quick Summary
Generate summary
co-cited 8×
#5
green
City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)
Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between a city policy and the constitutional violation.
A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based solely on the unconstitutional actions of a single employee. When a plaintiff alleges that a municipality's failure to train or supervise its officers caused a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must prove that the injury resulted from an existing municipal policy or custom. Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to establish municipal liability unless the incident itself provides evidence that it was caused by an unconstitutional policy attributable to a municipal policymaker. There must be an affirmative link between the alleged policy and the specific constitutional violation.
co-cited 7×
#6
red
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
Section 1983 claims should be interpreted against the background of tort liability that holds individuals responsible for the natural consequences of their actions.
Plaintiffs sued police officers alleging that the officers broke into their home without a warrant and detained one plaintiff without arraignment, thereby depriving them of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants argued that the statute only applies to acts authorized by state law and does not include the misuse of authority. The Court holds that the phrase "under color of" any law includes the misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law. Furthermore, the federal remedy is supplementary to state remedies and does not require exhaustion of state proceedings first. The Court also finds that the statute does not extend liability to municipal corporations.
co-cited 6×
#7
green
Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
Municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity from damages liability under section 1983 based on the good faith of their officials.
A former police chief sued a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his discharge without a hearing violated his constitutional rights to due process. The Court of Appeals held that the city was entitled to qualified immunity because its officials acted in good faith. The Supreme Court reverses, holding that municipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations. Because there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations under the common law, a municipality cannot assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.
co-cited 6×
#8
green
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
The Due Process Clause is not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.
An inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a correctional deputy's negligence in leaving a pillow on a stairway caused him bodily injury. The petitioner argued that this negligent conduct deprived him of a liberty interest without due process of law. The Court considers whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated by the negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. The Court holds that the Due Process Clause is not triggered by a mere lack of due care by prison officials, as such conduct does not constitute a constitutional deprivation.
co-cited 6×
#9
yellow
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
A municipality is liable under section 1983 for failure to train employees only when the inadequacy of training amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons.
A respondent sued a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city's failure to train police officers to recognize medical needs resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional right to medical attention while in custody. The question presented is whether a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for a failure to train its employees. The Court holds that a municipality may be liable for inadequate training only when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. The Court vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remands the case for further proceedings.
co-cited 6×
#10
red
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.
Negro employees filed a class action against their union, alleging the union failed to represent them fairly by allowing discriminatory discharges and demotions. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court holds that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Because the complaint alleged specific discriminatory actions that would violate the union's statutory duty under the Railway Labor Act, the allegations were sufficient to survive dismissal.
co-cited 5×
#11
yellow
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
A party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact while all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-movant.
A teacher sued a restaurant and local police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging racial discrimination and conspiracy following her refusal of service and subsequent arrest. The district court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy claim and directed a verdict on the discrimination claim. The Supreme Court holds that a moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Because the respondent failed to foreclose the possibility of a conspiracy involving a policeman in the store, summary judgment was improper. Furthermore, a custom or usage under § 1983 must have the force of law through the persistent practices of state officials.
co-cited 5×
#12
green
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)
The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint of liberty following an arrest.
Respondents were arrested and held in custody under a prosecutor's information without a judicial determination of probable cause. The question presented is whether the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint of liberty following an arrest. The Court holds that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause for such detention, but it does not require a full adversary hearing involving counsel, cross-examination, or compulsory process. A state must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause, made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.
co-cited 5×