green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
8.8 score
“he resolution of conflicting testimony is within the exclusive province of the trial court”
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Steiner v. Bran Park Associates
he resolution of conflicting testimony is within the exclusive province of the trial court
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Murphy v. Board of Education of the Rochester City School District
Id. at 322 (noting that plaintiff teacher “did not have a right to ... remain in the position of library teacher, be appointed staff developer, have two periods per day to prepare for her classes or to keep her belongings in a particular place area”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Adams v. New York State Education Department
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156 , 168 (2001), Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
National Western Life Insurance v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection
See Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 192 Conn. 638, 648 , 474 A.2d 752 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S. Ct. 328 , 83 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
\ BD\" v. DeBuono"
Id.; see also Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998); accord Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1984); (Where plaintiff “had the right to make written submissions on disputed issues of fact and law and had, following the deprivation, [Article 78 of the New York Practice Law and Rules] procedures available to compel a full-scale evi-dentiary hearing on its claims,” those procedures satisfy due process.); Irwin v. City of New York, 902 F.Supp. …
cited
Cited "see"
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,497 John D. Marks v. Cdw Computer Centers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, F/k/a Mpk Computing, Inc., and Michael P. Krasny
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.1984), certiorari denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 ; Tornera, 511 F.2d at 510-511 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Federico v. BD. OF EDUC. OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Neighborhood Action Comm., 101 F.3d at 881; see Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); Interboro Inst., Inc. v. Foley, 985 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1993); Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.1990); Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 , 109 S.Ct. 220 , 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
Federico v. Board of Education of the Public Schools
Neighborhood Action Comm., 101 F.3d at 881; see Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); Interboro Inst., Inc. v. Foley, 985 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1993); Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.1990); Campo v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 843 F.2d 96, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 , 109 S.Ct. 220 , 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988).
cited
Cited "see"
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,218, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3050, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5110, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7454 Julius Gray Leroy William Rodewald v. First Winthrop Corp. Winthrop Financial Co., Inc. Winthrop Securities Co., Inc. 353 San Francisco Associates
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp.
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Beate Bernheim v. Jeffrey Litt
(2×)
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.) (finding that an Article 78 proceeding satisfied the due process requirement of providing a hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984). 17 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection is "a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 , 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2691 , 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).
cited
Cited "see"
John Schleck and Robert Kraft v. Ramsey County, Suzanne Alliegro, Michael Moriarity and Kathleen Mahoney
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984) (school district is a state actor for § 1983 purposes). 9 .
cited
Cited "see"
Castro v. New York City Board of Education
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Bryan
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 931 (2d Cir.1980); International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 , 87 S.Ct. 2031 , 18 L.Ed.2d 975 (1967).
discussed
Cited "see"
Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Bruce A. Bryan
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 931 (2d Cir.1980); International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 , 87 S.Ct. 2031 , 18 L.Ed.2d 975 (1967).
discussed
Cited "see"
Strong v. Board Of Ed. Of Uniondale Ufsd
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.) ("[i]f there is no factual dispute between the employer and the employee, a hearing is meaningless"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 (the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguard is one important consideration). 19 Moreover, as we have noted, adequate "post-deprivation" procedures are available to protect Strong's property interest in her tenured teaching position.
discussed
Cited "see"
Strong v. Board of Education
See Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.) (“[i]f there is no factual dispute between the employer and the employee, a hearing is meaningless”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 (the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguard is one important consideration).
discussed
Cited "see"
Reinhardt v. Massachusetts Department of Social Services
See Campo v. New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir.) (“ ‘[S]o long as appellant had a reasonable time in which to seek Article 78 relief, he cannot make a legitimate claim of due process violation because his claim now may be barred.’ ” (quoting Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 , 1135 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984))), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 220 , 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988); Surowitz v. New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 376 F.Supp. 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (“[W]here it is plaintiff’s ow…
discussed
Cited "see"
Reinhardt v. COM. OF MASS. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERV.
See Campo v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir.) ("`[S]o long as appellant had a reasonable time in which to seek Article 78 relief, he cannot make a legitimate claim of due process violation because his claim now may be barred.'" (quoting Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 , 1135 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984))), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 220 , 102 L.Ed.2d 211 (1988); Surowitz v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 376 F.Supp. 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y.1974) ("[W]here it is plaintiff's own election which…
cited
Cited "see"
Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc., an Oregon Corporation v. Krack Corporation, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant/third-Party v. Metal-Matic, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, Third-Party
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,816 General Builders Supply Company v. River Hill Coal Venture
See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.) (the question of when alleged wrongdoing should have been discovered may be decided as a matter of law only when uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates that plaintiff should have discovered the fraudulent conduct outside of the limitations period), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Jenkins v. McMickens
Accord Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Wilson v. Paine
See also Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 826 F.Supp. 1273, 1276 (D.Kan.1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Smith
See also Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); Adams v. Clarke, 22 F.2d 957 (9th Cir.1927); Cf. Schilling v. Parman, 35 F.2d 780, 781 (D.Or.1928) (holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on claims against the former directors of a failed national bank until the former directors of the bank no longer controlled the bank).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Segerson v. Cons. Comm. of the Town of Redding, No. 31 61 00 (Jan. 24, 1995)
"The decision as to whether a particular interest is sufficient to disqualify . . . is necessarily a factual one and depends upon the circumstances of the particular case." Cioffoletti v. Planning Zoning Commission, 209 Conn. 544 , 554 , 552 A.2d 796 (1989); Keiser v. Redding Conservation Commission, Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. 31 42 06 July 11, 1994, Riefberg, J.) (discussing commission member David Pattee's alleged conflict of interest as Chairman of the Conservation Commission and a member of the Redding Water Pollution Control Commission (WPCC)); see also Gayno…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer
Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 , 87 S.Ct. 2031 , 18 L.Ed.2d 975 (1967)); see also Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hecht, 833 F.Supp. 529, 533 (D.Md.1993); 13 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 826 F.Supp. 1273, 1276 (D.Kan.1993).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.
See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984); IIT & Int’l Inv.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Huang v. Sentinel Government Securities
See also Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 329 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984) (when claim should have been discovered may be determined as a matter of law only when “uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the fraudulent conduct.”) Given the above, the various statutes of limitation periods cannot be said to have commenced, as a matter of law, prior to the criminal indictment becoming public in late 1983.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Courtemanche v. Enlarged City School District
Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 , 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (holding that “root requirement” of due process generally dictates hearing prior to termination of employment) with Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1134-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 , 105 S.Ct. 328 , 83 L.Ed.2d 265 (1984), cited with approval in Campo v. New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.1988) (denying teacher’s section 1983 claim, based on his allegedly coerced resignation, since availability of Article 78 hearing under New York law…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
v.
Mosesian
v.
Mosesian
No. 84-334.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 29, 1984.
Published
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Connecticut (1)
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.