green
Positive treatment
8.7 score
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Cade v. United States
(2×)
See Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241, 1244 (D.C.2005) (citing Hill v. United States, 664 A.2d 347 , 353 n. 10 (D.C.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065 , 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jimenez Ex Rel. Estate of Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp.
(2×)
See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 913 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065 , 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996) (holding that a district court’s curative instructions to the jury with respect to a prosecutor’s statements cured any possible prejudice of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights).
discussed
Cited "see"
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald HOUSER, Defendant-Appellant
(2×)
See United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1430 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996). 4 .
cited
Cited "see"
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6651, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,897 United States of America v. Marvin Henson, United States of America v. Bruce L. Suiters
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 696 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Armstrong
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 , 1401 -5- (9th Cir. 1995) ("While the district court's decision to give a specific intent instruction for a general intent crime may have created a 'windfall' for the defendant, it did not entitle him to a diminished capacity defense, which is only cognizable for specific intent crimes."), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Elwood M. Armstrong
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir.1995) ("While the district court's decision to give a specific intent instruction for a general intent crime may have created a 'windfall' for the defendant, it did not entitle him to a diminished capacity defense, which is only cognizable for specific intent crimes."), cert. denied 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996). 16 Armstrong's application for a certificate of appealability is DENIED and this appeal is DISMISSED.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 696 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
Mary K. Hudson v. United States
See United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1431 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
Robert B. Orr v. United States
See United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1431 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Phillips
See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 913 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that although prosecutor's erroneous remark that defendant had pled guilty to one of the charges in the indictment certainly could have misled the jury by implying that defendant tacitly admitted he was guilty of other charges in the indictment, reversal was unwarranted where other Harrison factors militated against finding of substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Gerald Phillips
See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 913 (4th Cir.1995) (finding that although prosecutor's erroneous remark that defendant had pled guilty to one of the charges in the indictment certainly could have misled the jury by implying that defendant tacitly admitted he was guilty of other charges in the indictment, reversal was unwarranted where other Harrison factors militated against finding of substantial prejudice), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jorge Lopez Camacho
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996). 40 As pointed out by the Government, several courts have already held that § 924(c) applies even where the predicate offense has, as an element, the use of a firearm.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Anthony D. Williamson, A/K/A Ant, A/K/A Sebago, United States of America v. Melody Annette Niblett, United States of America v. Emjadia Porter, A/K/A Justice, A/K/A Troy Miller, United States of America v. Gregory Todd Harrell
See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 919 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996); United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 323-24 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 796 (1996). 12 Muse's testimony established that Williamson and Harrell jointly sold crack and that Williamson and Harrell jointly traveled to New York to obtain cocaine to be cooked into crack.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Williamson
See United States v. Morsley , 64 F.3d 907, 919 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996); United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 323-24 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Arnold L.H. Ambers, Jr., A/K/A Heavy
(2×)
Nevertheless, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 , 918 n. 10 (4th Cir.1995) (commenting on “the broad latitude afforded a trial judge in controlling cross-examination”), cert…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Ambers
Nevertheless, "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confron- tation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross- examination based on concerns about, among other things, harass- ment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or inter- rogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 , 918 n.10 (4th Cir. 1995) (commenting on"the broad lati- tude afforded a trial judge in controlling cross-examination"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
cited
Cited "see"
John Story v. United States
See United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1431 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter A. BEIERLE, Defendant-Appellant
See United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 696 (1996). 1 Had count II not been dismissed, Beierle could have received a consecutive sentence of ten years for this violation.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Delgado-Garcia
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1065 , 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996) (upholding district court decision to not review objections filed after 15 day period specified in the local rules); United States v. Michalek, 819 F.Supp. 250, 260-61 (W.D.N.Y.1993) (local ten-day period for filing objections to PSR satisfies due process and failure to file timely objections amounts to valid waiver of objections), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1536 (2d Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Gilmore v. United States
(2×)
See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 664 A.2d 347 , 351 n. 7 (D.C.1995), ce rt. denied, 516 U.S. 1065 , 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996) ("prior inconsistent statements were not admissible as substantive evidence but only to contest credibility”); Brewer v. United States, 609 A.2d 1140, 1141 (D.C.1992); Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542, 549 (D.C.1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Frank Kahled Burgos, United States of America v. Alexio Burnard Gobern
(2×)
Compare id. (asserting that Burgos's "counsel conceded at oral argument that the guilty verdict was not irrational"). 5 Our decision in United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996), is not to the contrary.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Peralta
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 749 , 133 L.Ed.2d 696 (1996); United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 226 (6th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Antoine Dwayne Wells
We evaluate whether a court abused its discretion in denying a substitution motion by considering three factors: "[t]imeliness of the motion; adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and whether the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense." Id. (quoting Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108 ); see also United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996). 10 Although Wells requested new counsel by sending the court a handwritten note rather than by filing a motion,…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Wells
We evaluate whether a court abused its discretion in denying a substitution motion by considering three factors: "[1] [t]imeliness of the motion; [2] adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and[3] whether the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense." Id. (quoting Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108 ); see also United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sheffey
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 95-6938.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 8, 1996.
Cited by 27 opinions | Published
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.