Ex parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1996). · Go Syfert
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Ex parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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A party cannot avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal who acted within the scope of agency.

A buyer sues a car dealership and its salesman, alleging the salesman made false representations about the vehicle while acting within the scope of his agency. The buyer seeks to vacate a stay pending arbitration, arguing the salesman did not sign the contract containing the arbitration clause. The court examines whether the arbitration agreement binds a non-signatory employee sued for acts within the scope of agency. The court applies the rule that a party cannot avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal. Because the claim arises from the agency relationship and falls within the agreement's scope, the court denies the writ of mandamus.

92 citation events (61 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ex parte Procom Servs., Inc., 884 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2003)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 251 Binding effect of arbitration agreements on agents8 citing casesindividual defendant could compel arbitration of claims arising from his actions as co-defendant's employee, notwithstanding fact that he was not a signatory to arbitration agreement between plaintiff and co-defendant, because "[a] party should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely b…3 citing courts put it this way
  • Ex parte Procom Servs., Inc., 884 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2003).published 2 cites
    (A party should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal.)
  • Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Chapman, 90 So. 3d 774 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).published
    (relying on Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 143 Ga.App. 579, 581 , 239 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1977))
  • Brown v. Denson, 895 So. 2d 882 (Ala. 2004).published 2 cites
    In Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250, 251 (Ala.1996), this Court noted that "[a] party *888 should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal." Gray sued Shannon Pardue, an automobile salesman for C…
  • Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d 123 (Ala. 2002).published 3 cites
    Smith argued that under the authority of Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250, 251 (Ala.1996), `he should be able to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims against him, as a nonsignatory, because he was an agent of DAS, the only defendant wh…
  • Monsanto Co. v. Benton Farm, 813 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 2001).published
    Smith Smith argues that under the authority of Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250, 251 (Ala. 1996), he should be able to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims against him, as a nonsignatory, because he was an agent of DAS, the only defend…
  • First Amer. Title Ins. Corp. v. Silvernell, 744 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1999).published
    As this Court held in Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250, 251 (Ala.1996), "A party should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal." The analysis behind that statement is also applicable in this cu…
  • Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 181 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 1999).published
    (individual defendant could compel arbitration of claims arising from his actions as co-defendant's employee, notwithstanding fact that he was not a signatory to arbitration agreement between plaintiff and co-defendant,…)
  • Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So. 2d 984 (Ala. 1998).published
    (holding that an agent, even though a nonsignatory, was entitled to compel arbitration, based upon the principle that "[a] party should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a princ…)
q2 “that pardue, as crown's agent, while acting within the line and scope of his agency, falsely represented the condition of the vehicle gray was buying.”2 citing cases2 citing courts quote it
Other citing cases6 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Ex parte Duane Gray (Re Duane Gray
v.
Crown Pontiac, Inc.).
1951248.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
Dec 13, 1996.
Published opinion
686 So. 2d 250
1996 WL 716973
1996 Ala. LEXIS 738
Charles M. Thompson of Thompson Carson, P.C., Birmingham, for Petitioner. John Martin Galese and Jeffrey L. Ingram of John Martin Galase, P.A., Birmingham, for respondents Crown Pontiac, Inc. and Shannon Pardue.
Ingram.
Cited by 40 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 58%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Alabama (1)

Duane Gray petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson County Circuit Court to vacate its order staying his action against Crown Pontiac, Inc., and Crown's salesman, Shannon Pardue, pending arbitration. Specifically, Gray contends that because Pardue was not a signatory to the contract containing the arbitration agreement, he had no standing to compel Gray to arbitrate.

Gray argues that a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed to submit, citingEx parte Stallings Sons, Inc., 670 So.2d 861 (Ala. 1995). However, we consider the facts of Stallings to be clearly distinguishable from those of the present case. In Stallings, this Court did not allow arbitration to be forced against nonsignatories to the arbitration agreement. The petitioners inStallings were contractors involved in constructing an addition to the Bullock County Hospital. Sherlock, Smith Adams, Inc. (SS A), was the architectural firm hired by the Bullock County Hospital Board to design the project and to assist in overseeing its construction. Stallings involved two contracts. The one between the hospital board and the petitioners contained the arbitration agreement; SS A was not a signatory to that contract. The other contract was between the hospital board and SS A, and there was no arbitration clause in that contract. The contract between the petitioners and the hospital board contained no provision that specifically required the petitioners to arbitrate their differences with SS A. In fact, that contract between the hospital board and the petitioners specifically prohibited the petitioners from arbitrating their differences with SS A. Clearly, those facts are different from the facts in Gray's case.

The arbitration agreement included in the "Retail Buyer's Order" that Gray signed reads as follows:

"I hereby acknowledge and agree that all disputes and controversies of every kind and nature between myself and Crown Pontiac Nissan, Inc., arising out of or in connection with the purchase of this vehicle by me, will be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Retail Buyer's Order."

As the trial court noted in its order compelling arbitration, the thrust of Gray's complaint against Crown and Pardue is that Pardue, as Crown's agent, while acting within the line and scope of his agency, falsely represented the condition of the vehicle Gray was buying. Clearly, Gray's claim comes within the arbitration agreement, and that agreement is binding upon all the parties and is enforceable under the controlling law. SeeEx parte Gates, 675 So.2d 371 (Ala. 1996); and see Paine,Webber, Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 143 Ga. App. 579,239 S.E.2d 401 (1977) (holding that an employee — an account representative — of Paine, Webber, who was not a signatory to the contract containing the arbitration agreement, was entitled to the benefit of that agreement). A party should not be able to avoid an arbitration agreement merely by suing an employee of a principal.

Gray has not carried the burden of proof imposed on one petitioning for the writ of mandamus; therefore, the petition is denied.

WRIT DENIED.

HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur. *Page 252