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Cal. CodesInsurance CodeDivision 1. General Rules Governing InsurancePart 1. The ContractChapter 3. Negotiations Before Execution

Cal. Insurance Code § 334 (2026)

Edition and currency
leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTleginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026) cited 1947–2026 57citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 57 opinions since 1947, 6 of them in the last five years.

Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries.

The 20 cases that cite Cal. Insurance Code § 334 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENImperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Sogomonian, 198 Cal. App. 3d 169 (Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 334 4×cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 334
“(Ins. Code, § 334; [citation].) The fact that the insurer has demanded answers to specific questions in an application for insurance is in itself usually sufficient to establish materiality as a matter of law.”
The case’s holding
Rescission of an insurance policy for material concealment extinguishes the contract ab initio and eliminates all rights of the insured, including claims for unfair claims settlement practices.
Later courts cite it for
“the consequence of rescission is not only the termination of further liability, but also the restoration of the parties to their former positions by requiring each to return whatever consideration has been received” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENMitchell v. United Nat'l Ins., 127 Cal. App. 4th 457 (Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 334 3×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 334
“Insurance Code section 334 states: “Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in…”
The case’s holding
An insurer may rescind a policy based on an insured's negligent or unintentional failure to disclose material information in an insurance application.
Later courts cite it for
“statutory framework that imposes 'heavy burdens of disclosure' 'upon both parties to a contract of insurance, and any material misrepresentation or the failure, whether intentional or unintentional, to provide requested information permits rescission of the policy by the injured party.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENDuarte v. Pac. Specialty Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 5th 45 (Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 334 1×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 334
“680 , citing Ins. Code, § 334.) *54 Thus, false representation or concealment in connection with an application for insurance provide grounds for rescission of an insurance contract from the outset.”
The case’s holding
An insurer seeking rescission for misrepresentation must show the applicant's answer was false under a reasonable reading of the question, and ambiguous application questions are construed against the insurer.
Later courts cite it for
“pursuant to the weight of authority, appellate courts review a trial court's rulings on evidentiary objections in summary judgment proceedings for abuse of discretion. ' the party challenging a trial court's evidentiary ruling has the 'burden to establish such an abuse, which we will find only if the trial court's order exceeds the bounds of reason. "where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the correct result for the decision of the trial court.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENNieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins., 181 Cal. App. 4th 60 (Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 334 1×cited by 85 cases
Where it cites § 334
“) “[Materiality, as Insurance Code section 334 tells us, must be determined ‘solely by the probable and reasonable influence’ which the admittedly undisclosed information would have had upon [the insurer’s] decision to issue the policy.”
The case’s holding
An insurer may rescind a policy for material misrepresentations or concealment regardless of intent and is not required to investigate the truthfulness of an application that raises no concerns.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established that the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.” · 7 citing courts
5
GREENThompson v. Occidental Life Ins., 9 Cal. 3d 904 (1973).
cites § 334 2×cited by 128 cases
Where it cites § 334
“(Ins. Code, § 334; Burns v. Prudential Ins.”
The case’s holding
An insurance contract is formed when the insurer receives a completed application and the initial premium payment.
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that the insurer has demanded answers to specific questions in an application for insurance is in itself usually sufficient to establish materiality as a matter of law.” · 13 citing courts
6
GREENSuperior Dispatch, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of New York, 181 Cal. App. 4th 175 (Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 334 1×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 334
“” (Ins. Code, § 334; see also id., § 360.) This is a subjective test viewed from the insurer’s perspective.”
The case’s holding
A misrepresentation or concealment is material if a truthful statement would have affected the insurer's underwriting decision.
Later courts cite it for
“a misrepresentation or concealment is material if a truthful statement would have affected the insurer's underwriting decision.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENMerced Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. v. ST. OF CALIFORNIA, 233 Cal. App. 3d 765 (Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 334 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 334
“) Materiality is to be determined solely by the probable and reasonable effect which truthful answers would have had upon the insurer (Ins. Code § 334) 1 ; i.e., was the insurer misled into accepting a risk, fixing the premium of insurance, estimating the disadvantages of the…”
The case’s holding
Rescission is available for a unilateral mistake known to and encouraged or fostered by the other contracting party, even where the mistaken party's reliance concerns a material insurance term.
Later courts cite it for
“rescission is available for a 855 unilateral mistake, when the unilateral mistake is known to the other contracting party and is encouraged or fostered by that party.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENSanta Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World Nat'l Assurance Co., 18 Cal. App. 5th 881 (Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 334 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 334
“) *887 Here, SCWW and GCES's representation that they did not accept, process, transport or discharge hazardous waste was a material fact because Allied asked questions regarding hazardous waste in its application and related correspondence, including whether SCWW and GCES…”
9
GREENTIG Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Homestore, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 4th 749 (Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 334 1×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 334
“(Ins. Code, §§ 334 [“Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his…”
The case’s holding
An insurer may rescind a directors and officers liability policy as to all insureds, including innocent nonsigners, when a signer knew of a material misrepresentation in the application.
Later courts cite it for
“governing law permits an insurer to rescind a policy when the insured has misrepresented or concealed material information in connection with obtaining insurance.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENCohen v. Penn Mut. Life Ins., 48 Cal. 2d 720 (1957).
cites § 334 2×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 334
“) The importance which defendant attached to these answers, from both the appraisal of risk and the inquiry aspects (Ins. Code, §334), was emphasized by its inquiry not only as to whether the applicant had the particular disease but whether he had “any suspicion of .”
The case’s holding
The concealment of material facts in an insurance application vitiates the contract regardless of whether an intent to deceive is present.
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that defendant put the questions in writing and asked for written answers was itself proof that it deemed the answers material” · 1 citing court
11
GREENWilson v. W. Nat'l Life Ins., 235 Cal. App. 3d 981 (Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 334 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 334
“This is a subjective test; the critical question is the effect truthful answers would have had on Imperial, not on some ‘average reasonable’ insurer.”
Later courts cite it for
“is not only true, but codified in section 10113” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENColony Ins. v. Crusader Ins., 188 Cal. App. 4th 743 (Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 334 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 334
“” (Ins. Code, § 334.) “Neglect to communicate that which a party knows, and ought to communicate, is concealment.”
13
GREENClarendon Nat'l Ins. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 442 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
cites § 334 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 334
“*935 Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries.”
14
GREENCummings v. Fire Ins. Exch., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407 (Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 334 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 334
“) 7 In its motion for summary judgment, defendant relied on Insurance Code section 334 and associated cases to support its assertion that the misrepresentations made by plaintiff are material.”
The case’s holding
Materiality of a misrepresentation in an insurance claim is determined by its prospective reasonable relevance to the insurer's inquiry rather than its ultimate effect on the claim.
Later courts cite it for
“materiality is determined by its prospective reasonable relevance to the insurer's inquiry.” · 6 citing courts
15
GREENWilliamson & Vollmer Eng'g, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins., 64 Cal. App. 3d 261 (Ct. App. 1976).
cites § 334 1×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 334
“3 Insurance Code section 334 provides: “Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or…”
The case’s holding
A claim is a money demand, and failure to disclose circumstances likely to result in such a claim constitutes material misrepresentation.
Later courts cite it for
“the term imports the assertion, demand or challenge of something as a right; the assertion of a liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of money ... a 'claim' refers to a debt due the claimant. it is a money demand.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENCentury Sur. Co. v. Crosby Ins., 124 Cal. App. 4th 116 (Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 334 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 334
“” (Ins. Code, § 334.) 5 “The completion of the contract of insurance is the time to which a representation must be presumed to refer.”
17
GREENRansom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins., 43 Cal. 2d 420 (1954).
cites § 334 1×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 334
“The fact that Ransom erroneously answered “No” to the question whether an electrocardiogram had ever been made of his heart action is immaterial. An incorrect answer on an insurance application does not give rise to the defense of fraud where the true facts, if known, would not…”
The case’s holding
A contract of insurance arises immediately upon receipt of the completed application and the first premium payment, subject to the insurer's right to terminate if the risk is unacceptable.
Later courts cite it for
“there is an obvious advantage to the company in obtaining payment of the premium when the application is made, and it would be unconscionable to permit the company, after using language to induce payment of the premium at that time, to escape the obligation which an ordinary applicant would reasonably believe had been undertaken by the insurer.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENLincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D.N.J. 2009).
cites § 334 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 334
“The Court finds that Lincoln National has sufficiently alleged facts to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.”
Later courts cite it for
“insureds begin to run afoul of the insurable interest requirement, however, when they intend at the time of the policy's issuance, to profit by transferring the policy to a stranger with no insurable interest at the expiration of the contestability period.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENCoca Cola Bottling Co. v. Columbia Cas. Ins., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1176 (Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 334 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 334
“(See Ins. Code, § 334.) Here, however, we deal with the broader problem discussed in Wilkinson : under what circumstances should we treat one policy as creating two or more entirely separate contracts of insurance.”
The case’s holding
Where an excess policy follows form and defines coverage as excess of the amount recoverable under underlying insurance, the excess insurer must drop down to cover the insolvent primary insurer's layer.
20
GREENHolz Rubber Co. v. Am. Star Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 45 (1975).
cites § 334 1×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 334
“(Ins. Code, §§ 334, 360; Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins.”
The case’s holding
Materiality of a misrepresentation is determined by the probable and reasonable effect that truthful disclosure would have had on the insurer in determining the contract terms.
Later courts cite it for
“essentially, we must decide whether the insurer was misled into accepting the risk or fixing the premium of insurance.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
194619862026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 6 cases in 2006–2007. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Cal. Ct. App.22E.D. Cal.99th Cir.7C.D. Cal.5N.D. Cal.5Cal.4S.D. Cal.3D.N.J.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 9 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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