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Cal. CodesPenal CodePart 3. Of Imprisonment and the Death PenaltyTitle 1. Imprisonment of Male Prisoners in State PrisonsChapter 8. Length of Term of Imprisonment and Paroles

Cal. Penal Code § 3000 (2026)

General Provisions — Length of Term of Imprisonment and Paroles

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leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTleginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026) cited 1944–2025 121citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 121 opinions since 1944, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (6 cases).

(a)(1)The Legislature finds and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship. It is in the interest of public safety for the state to provide for the effective supervision of and surveillance of parolees, including the judicious use of revocation actions, and to provide educational, vocational, family, and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition between imprisonment and discharge. A sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to Section 1168 or 1170 shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless waived, or as otherwise provided in this article.

(2)The Legislature finds and declares that it is not the intent of this section to diminish resources allocated to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for parole functions for which the department is responsible. It is also not the intent of this section to diminish the resources allocated to the Board of Parole Hearings to execute its duties with respect to parole functions for which the board is responsible.

(3)The Legislature finds and declares that diligent effort must be made to ensure that parolees are held accountable for their criminal behavior, including, but not limited to, the satisfaction of restitution fines and orders.

(4)For any person subject to a sexually violent predator proceeding pursuant to Article 4 (commencing with Section 6600) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, an order issued by a judge pursuant to Section 6601.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, finding that the petition, on its face, supports a finding of probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon release, shall toll the period of parole of that person, from the date that person is released by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as follows:

(A)If the person is committed to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator and subsequently a court orders that the person be unconditionally discharged, the parole period shall be tolled until the date the judge enters the order unconditionally discharging that person.

(B)If the person is not committed to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator, the tolling of the parole period shall be abrogated and the parole period shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of release from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

(5)Paragraph (4) applies to persons released by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on or after January 1, 2012. Persons released by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation prior to January 1, 2012, shall continue to be subject to the law governing the tolling of parole in effect on December 31, 2011.

(b)Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in Article 3 (commencing with Section 3040) of this chapter, the following shall apply to any inmate subject to Section 3000.08:

(1)In the case of an inmate sentenced under Section 1168 for a crime committed prior to July 1, 2013, the period of parole shall not exceed five years in the case of an inmate imprisoned for any offense other than first or second degree murder for which the inmate has received a life sentence, and shall not exceed three years in the case of any other inmate, unless in either case the Board of Parole Hearings for good cause waives parole and discharges the inmate from custody of the department. This subdivision shall also be applicable to inmates who committed crimes prior to July 1, 1977, to the extent specified in Section 1170.2. In the case of any inmate sentenced under Section 1168 for a crime committed on or after July 1, 2013, the period of parole shall not exceed five years in the case of an inmate imprisoned for any offense other than first or second degree murder for which the inmate has received a life sentence, and shall not exceed three years in the case of any other inmate, unless in either case the department for good cause waives parole and discharges the inmate from custody of the department.

(2)(A)For a crime committed prior to July 1, 2013, at the expiration of a term of imprisonment of 1 year and one day, or a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to Section 1170 or at the expiration of a term reduced pursuant to Section 2931 or 2933, if applicable, the inmate shall be released on parole for a period not exceeding 3 years, except that any inmate sentenced for an offense specified in paragraph (3), (4), (5), (6), (11), or (18) of subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall be released on parole for a period not exceeding 10 years, unless a longer period of parole is specified in Section 3000.1.

(B)For a crime committed on or after July 1, 2013, at the expiration of a term of imprisonment of 1 year and one day, or a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to Section 1170 or at the expiration of a term reduced pursuant to Section 2931 or 2933, if applicable, the inmate shall be released on parole for a period of 3 years, except that any inmate sentenced for an offense specified in paragraph (3), (4), (5), (6), (11), or (18) of subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall be released on parole for a period of 10 years, unless a longer period of parole is specified in Section 3000.1.

(3)Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in the case of any offense for which the inmate has received a life sentence pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 209, with the intent to commit a specified sex offense, or Section 667.51, 667.61, or 667.71, the period of parole shall be 10 years, unless a longer period of parole is specified in Section 3000.1.

(4)(A)Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, in the case of a person convicted of and required to register as a sex offender for the commission of an offense specified in Section 261, 264.1, 286, 287, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 288.5 or 289, or former Section 262 or 288a, in which one or more of the victims of the offense was a child under 14 years of age, the period of parole shall be 20 years and six months unless the board, for good cause, determines that the person will be retained on parole. The board shall make a written record of this determination and transmit a copy of it to the parolee.

(B)In the event of a retention on parole, the parolee shall be entitled to a review by the board each year thereafter.

(C)There shall be a board hearing consistent with the procedures set forth in Sections 3041.5 and 3041.7 within 12 months of the date of any revocation of parole to consider the release of the inmate on parole, and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 3041.5, there shall be annual parole consideration hearings thereafter, unless the person is released or otherwise ineligible for parole release. The panel or board shall release the person within one year of the date of the revocation unless it determines that the circumstances and gravity of the parole violation are such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration or unless there is a new prison commitment following a conviction.

(D)The provisions of Section 3042 shall not apply to any hearing held pursuant to this subdivision.

(5)(A)The Board of Parole Hearings shall consider the request of any inmate whose commitment offense occurred prior to July 1, 2013, regarding the length of parole and the conditions thereof.

(B)For an inmate whose commitment offense occurred on or after July 1, 2013, except for those inmates described in Section 3000.1, the department shall consider the request of the inmate regarding the length of parole and the conditions thereof. For those inmates described in Section 3000.1, the Board of Parole Hearings shall consider the request of the inmate regarding the length of parole and the conditions thereof.

(6)Upon successful completion of parole, or at the end of the maximum statutory period of parole specified for the inmate under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), as the case may be, whichever is earlier, the inmate shall be discharged from custody. The date of the maximum statutory period of parole under this subdivision and paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) shall be computed from the date of initial parole and shall be a period chronologically determined. Time during which parole is suspended because the prisoner has absconded or has been returned to custody as a parole violator shall not be credited toward any period of parole unless the prisoner is found not guilty of the parole violation. However, the period of parole is subject to the following:

(A)Except as provided in Section 3064, in no case may a prisoner subject to three years on parole be retained under parole supervision or in custody for a period longer than four years from the date of the initial parole.

(B)Except as provided in Section 3064, in no case may a prisoner subject to five years on parole be retained under parole supervision or in custody for a period longer than seven years from the date of the initial parole.

(C)Except as provided in Section 3064, in no case may a prisoner subject to 10 years on parole be retained under parole supervision or in custody for a period longer than 15 years from the date of the initial parole.

(7)The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall meet with each inmate at least 30 days prior to the inmate’s good time release date and shall provide, under guidelines specified by the parole authority or the department, whichever is applicable, the conditions of parole and the length of parole up to the maximum period of time provided by law. The inmate has the right to reconsideration of the length of parole and conditions thereof by the department or the parole authority, whichever is applicable. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or the board may impose as a condition of parole that a prisoner make payments on the prisoner’s outstanding restitution fines or orders imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 28, 1994, or subdivision (b) or (f) of Section 1202.4.

(8)For purposes of this chapter, and except as otherwise described in this section, the board shall be considered the parole authority.

(9)(A) On and after July 1, 2013, the sole authority to issue warrants for the return to actual custody of any state prisoner released on parole rests with the court pursuant to Section 1203.2, except for any escaped state prisoner or any state prisoner released prior to the prisoner’s scheduled release date who should be returned to custody, and Section 5054.1 shall apply.

(B)Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), any warrant issued by the Board of Parole Hearings prior to July 1, 2013, shall remain in full force and effect until the warrant is served or it is recalled by the board. All prisoners on parole arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the board shall be subject to a review by the board prior to the department filing a petition with the court to revoke the parole of the petitioner.

(10)It is the intent of the Legislature that efforts be made with respect to persons who are subject to Section 290.011 who are on parole to engage them in treatment.

The 20 cases that cite Cal. Penal Code § 3000 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPeople v. Bocklett, 22 Cal. App. 5th 879 (Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 3000 21×subsections: (a)(4) 15× (a)(4)(A) (a)(4)(B)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter Penal Code section 3000(a)(4) ), which tolls the parole period for an SVP on equal protection and ex post facto grounds.”
2
GREENWilliam Thornton v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014).
cites § 3000 9×subsections: (a)(1) (b)(7)cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“California law requires a period of parole or supervised release following such a prison term, Cal. Penal Code § 3000 , and when Plaintiff was released in June 2008, he received a three-year parole term.”
The case’s holding
A § 1983 action challenging parole conditions is not barred by the Heck doctrine if success would not result in speedier release or imply the invalidity of a conviction.
Later courts cite it for
“its success would release the claimant from confinement or shorten its duration.” · 9 citing courts
3
GREENPeople v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743 (1998).
cites § 3000 6×cited by 293 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“(Pen. Code, § 3000 et seq.) Without choice, there can be no voluntary consent to inclusion of the search condition.”
The case’s holding
A search of a parolee is reasonable without particularized suspicion if conducted pursuant to a search provision that is not arbitrary or oppressive.
Later courts cite it for
“arbitrary, capricious or harassing” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENPeople v. Pearl, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1280 (Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 3000 15×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“We hold the prosecution failed to meet its burden imposed by California law and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution of establishing at the suppression hearing that Pearl was on parole when the warrantless searches were conducted. Penal Code section 3000,…”
Later courts cite it for
“from and after the suspension or revocation of the parole of any prisoner and until his return to custody he is an escapee and fugitive from justice and no part of the time during which he is an escapee and fugitive from justice shall be part of his term.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENWilliam Thornton v. Arnold Schwarzeneggar, 724 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2013).
cites § 3000 12×subsections: (b)(7) 3× (a)(1) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“California law requires a period of parole or supervised release following such a prison term, Cal. Penal Code § 3000 , and when Plaintiff was released in June 2008, he received a three-year parole term.”
6
GREENWay v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty., 74 Cal. App. 3d 165 (Ct. App. 1977).
cites § 3000 4×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“(Pen. Code, § 3000.) If his parole is subsequently revoked, the prisoner may be returned to confinement for a period not exceeding six months.”
The case’s holding
Legislative restructuring of sentencing to achieve uniformity does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the governor's power to commute sentences when the reduction of terms is incidental to the legislative purpose.
Later courts cite it for
“a . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENNardell U. Carter v. Daniel McCarthy Midge Carroll, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986).
cites § 3000 3×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 121 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“On the other hand, a mandatory parole term involves the imposition of an additional adverse consequence upon the defendant — a substantial period of time during which his freedom is limited significantly commencing after the defendant has served his sentence of imprisonment.”
The case’s holding
A guilty plea is not voluntary or intelligent if the defendant is not informed of a mandatory parole term that constitutes a direct consequence of the plea.
Later courts cite it for
“only if it is 'entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences' of his plea.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENPeople v. Schmitz, 55 Cal. 4th 909 (2012).
cites § 3000 2×cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“749 , citing Pen. Code, § 3000 et seq.)9 Finding a consent analysis inapt, we adopted a totality of the circumstances balancing test to evaluate the reasonableness of a warrantless and suspicionless parole search.”
The case’s holding
A warrantless search of a vehicle based on a passenger's parole status is reasonable in areas where the officer expects the parolee could have stowed belongings or discarded items.
Later courts cite it for
“a warrantless search is unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.” · 10 citing courts
9
GREENTerhune v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 4th 864 (Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 3000 4×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“” (Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b)(1).) Describing this language as “a mandatory ‘kick-out’ provision,” the Supreme Court has stated, “The Board of Prison Terms has no discretion to grant or withhold *874 parole to a prisoner who has served a determinate term.”
The case’s holding
An administrative agency exceeds its statutory authority when it uses general parole revocation powers to address matters specifically assigned to other statutory schemes with mandatory procedural safeguards.
Later courts cite it for
“nevertheless, the conditions may govern a parolee's residence, his associates or living companions, his travel, his use of intoxicants, and other aspects of his life.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENIn re Thomson, 104 Cal. App. 3d 950 (Ct. App. 1980).
cites § 3000 7×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“BPT bases its extension on an amendment of Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (b), 1 effective January 1, 1979, which increases the applicable parole term (if there is no parole violation) from one year to three years.”
11
GREENIn re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871 (Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 3000 2×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“(Pen.Code, § 3000, subd. (b)(1).) And the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent that when murderers — who are the great majority of inmates serving indeterminate sentences — approach their minimum eligible parole date, the Board `shall normally set a parole release date.”
The case’s holding
A finding of exceptional disregard for human suffering requires the offense to be committed in a more aggravated or violent manner than is ordinarily shown in second degree murder.
Later courts cite it for
“does not convert a court reviewing the denial of parole into a potted plant.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENUnited States v. Raphyal Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004).
cites § 3000 1×cited by 238 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“§ 3561 (a)(1) prohibits a sentence of probation for individuals who commit Class A or B felonies.”
The case’s holding
An interrogation is not custodial if the suspect is informed they are free to leave and is not under arrest.
Later courts cite it for
“we review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress.” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENPeople v. London, 206 Cal. App. 3d 896 (Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 3000 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“On appeal London argues that he was entitled to be released without any parole obligation, even though his preimprisonment credit is less than the total of his prison and parole terms.”
Later courts cite it for
“a 'sentence' includes both a prison term and any parole term” · 1 citing court
14
GREENJensen v. Hernandez, 864 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
cites § 3000 5×subsections: (a)(4) 3× (b)(1)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“2d 856 (2007); (7) his sentence violated state sentencing law; (8) the “superior court clerk and/or department of corrections” violated his Constitutional rights by “adding to [his] sentence;” (9) California Penal Code § 3000 is vague and unconstitutional; (10) California Penal…”
15
GREENIn re Jeanice D., 28 Cal. 3d 210 (1980).
cites § 3000 2×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“As already noted, under Penal Code section 3046 the board was authorized to release a life prisoner on parole after seven years; Penal Code section 3000, subdivisions (b) and (d), in turn, provided that such life prisoners would be completely discharged from custody upon their…”
The case’s holding
An indeterminate sentence with a possible life maximum does not constitute imprisonment for life for purposes of statutory exclusion from mandatory diagnostic evaluation for minors.
Later courts cite it for
“a youth who is convicted of an offense carrying an indeterminate sentence with a possible life imprisonment maximum (e.g., a sentence of 'five years to life') does not fall within the 'imprisonment for life' exclusion embodied in the statute, ...” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENPeople v. Rowland, 4 Cal. 4th 238 (1992).
cites § 3000 1×cited by 350 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“) It was finally alleged for purposes of prohibiting probation or suspension of sentence that defendant committed the charged murder and rape while on state prison parole (Pen. Code, § 3000) following a prison term imposed for the “violent felonies” comprising each of the 12…”
The case’s holding
To review sufficiency under the due process clause, a court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution, the question we ask is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 17 citing courts
17
GREENIn re Morrall, 102 Cal. App. 4th 280 (Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 3000 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“(Pen. Code, §§ 3000, 3056.) A person convicted of crime has no inherent or constitutional right to conditional release before the expiration of a valid sentence.”
Later courts cite it for
“by its nature, the determination whether a prisoner should be released on parole is generally regarded as an executive branch decision. the decision, and the discretion implicit in it, are expressly committed to the executive branch.” · 2 citing courts
18
cites § 3000 1×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“15, § 468 [amending Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b), which was technically restated in § 17 of Prop.”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions merely restated in a ballot measure to satisfy constitutional reenactment requirements are not part of the measure if the legislature retains power to amend them through ordinary legislative process.
Later courts cite it for
“other indicia . . . that voters reasonably intended to limit the legislature's ability to amend that part of the statute.” · 5 citing courts
19
GREENCordell v. Tilton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
cites § 3000 4×subsections: (b)(5) 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“Plaintiffs plea agreement did not expressly incorporate California Penal Code section 3000. (See Compl.”
20
GREENPeople v. Brendlin, 45 Cal. 4th 262 (2008).
cites § 3000 1×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 3000
“(See Pen. Code, §§ 3000, subd. (b)(8), 3060.”
The case’s holding
The discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant during an unlawful seizure constitutes an intervening circumstance that attenuates the taint of the initial illegality.
Later courts cite it for
“is generally regarded as the most important because 'it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterring police misconduct.” · 7 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
194419842025

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 15 cases in 1980–1981. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Cal. Ct. App.739th Cir.21Cal.12E.D. Cal.5N.D. Cal.4Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.2C.D. Cal.1Cal. Super. Ct.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)6 cases
Nardell U. Carter v. Daniel McCarthy Midge Carroll, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986).“On the other hand, a mandatory parole term involves the imposition of an additional adverse consequence upon the defendant — a substantial period of time during which his freedom is limited significantly commencing after the defendant has served his sentence of imprisonment.”
Roulette Blair v. Daniel J. McCarthy, 881 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1989).
Price v. Schwarzenegger, 344 F. App'x 375 (9th Cir. 2009).
Price v. Schwarzenegger, 344 F. App'x 375 (9th Cir. 2009).
Elliott v. Meyers, 674 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(1)4 cases
William Thornton v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014).“California law requires a period of parole or supervised release following such a prison term, Cal. Penal Code § 3000 , and when Plaintiff was released in June 2008, he received a three-year parole term.”
James MacIel, Sr. v. Matthew Cates, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).
William Thornton v. Arnold Schwarzeneggar, 724 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2013).“California law requires a period of parole or supervised release following such a prison term, Cal. Penal Code § 3000 , and when Plaintiff was released in June 2008, he received a three-year parole term.”
Moreno v. State of California, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
(a)(4)4 cases
People v. Bocklett, 22 Cal. App. 5th 879 (Ct. App. 2018).“On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter Penal Code section 3000(a)(4) ), which tolls the parole period for an SVP on equal protection and ex post facto grounds.”
Jensen v. Hernandez, 864 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2012).“2d 856 (2007); (7) his sentence violated state sentencing law; (8) the “superior court clerk and/or department of corrections” violated his Constitutional rights by “adding to [his] sentence;” (9) California Penal Code § 3000 is vague and unconstitutional; (10) California Penal…”
People v. Bocklett, No. D071983 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).
(a)(4)(A)1 case
People v. Bocklett, 22 Cal. App. 5th 879 (Ct. App. 2018).
(a)(4)(B)2 cases
People v. Bocklett, 22 Cal. App. 5th 879 (Ct. App. 2018).
People v. Bocklett, No. D071983 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).
(b)1 case
Watson v. Clarke, 28 F. App'x 678 (9th Cir. 2002).
(b)(1)2 cases
Jensen v. Hernandez, 864 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
Pearson v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2011).
(b)(4)1 case
Valdivia v. Brown, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
(b)(5)1 case
Cordell v. Tilton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2007).“Plaintiffs plea agreement did not expressly incorporate California Penal Code section 3000. (See Compl.”
(b)(7)3 cases
William Thornton v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014).
William Thornton v. Arnold Schwarzeneggar, 724 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2013).
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001).
(b)(8)1 case
Armstrong v. Brown, 857 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
(b)(9)(B)1 case
Valdivia v. Brown, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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