substantive due process violation in New York

2021"To state a substantive due process claim in the land-use context, petitioner must allege (1) the deprivation of a protectable property interest and (2) that the governmental action was wholly without legal justification" ( Matter of Upstate Land & Props., LLC v Town of Bethel , 74 AD3d 1450, 1452 [3d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val. , 2 NY3d 617, 627-628 [2004]; Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 52-53 [1996]; Jones v Town of Carroll , 122 AD3d 1234 , 1239 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 910 [2015]).

2021With respect to the second prong of the substantive due process claim, " 'only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense' " ( Bower Assoc. , 2 NY3d at 628 ).

2021"To state a substantive due process claim in the land-use context, petitioner must allege (1) the deprivation of a protectable property interest and (2) that the governmental action was wholly without legal justification" ( Matter of Upstate Land & Props., LLC v Town of Bethel , 74 AD3d 1450, 1452 [3d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val. , 2 NY3d 617, 627-628 [2004]; Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 52-53 [1996]; Jones v Town of Carroll , 122 AD3d 1234 , 1239 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 910 [2015]).

2005While a claim alleging a substantive due process violation pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 requires a constitutionally-protected property interest in the benefit sought to be conferred (see Zahra v Town of Southold, 48 F3d 674, 680 [1995]; Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 52 [1996]), a regulatory taking claim, legally distinct (see Penn Cent.

2014With respect to the first cause of action, in order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, a party must establish both “deprivation of a vested property interest” and that the challenged governmental action was “wholly without legal justification” (Glacial Aggregates LLC, 14 NY3d at 136 ; see Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 59 [2011]; Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 627 [2004]).

2014With respect to the first cause of action, in order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, a party must establish both “deprivation of a vested property interest” and that the challenged governmental action was “wholly without legal justification” (Glacial Aggregates LLC, 14 NY3d at 136 ; see Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 59 [2011]; Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 627 [2004]).

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2014Here, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs established that the 2007 Law impaired their vested property rights based upon the analysis in Jones I ( 15 NY3d at 142 ), we conclude that plaintiffs have “failed to allege facts demonstrating that [the Town’s] actions were ‘wholly without legal justification’ ” (Fike v Town of Webster, 11 AD3d 888, 890 [2004], quoting Bower, 2 NY3d at 627 ; see Raynor, 18 NY3d at 59 ).

2014Here, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs established that the 2007 Law impaired their vested property rights based upon the analysis in Jones I ( 15 NY3d at 142 ), we conclude that plaintiffs have “failed to allege facts demonstrating that [the Town’s] actions were ‘wholly without legal justification’ ” (Fike v Town of Webster, 11 AD3d 888, 890 [2004], quoting Bower, 2 NY3d at 627 ; see Raynor, 18 NY3d at 59 ).

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2000Corp. v Town of Hyde Park (supra, at 131) determined that, although plaintiff in that case had been treated “shabbily and unfairly,” plaintiff lacked a “legitimate claim of entitlement to the * * * zoning classification.” We agree with that court’s conclusion that, if due process protection were expanded as plaintiff urges, “any owner of zoned land, which presumably includes the vast majority of landowners, would be entitled to assert a claim * * * alleging a substantive due process violation each time a local governing body rezoned * * * land under questionable or unfair circumstances” (DLC M

1999Corp. v Town of Hyde Park, 163 F3d 124 , 130 [2d Cir 1998].) Whether the owner was deprived of a property right in violation of the substantive due process principle “begin [s]” with the question whether the property right asserted is cognizable under the Federal Constitution.

1999(Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 199-200 [1985]; Southview Assocs. v Bongartz, 980 F2d 84, 96-97 [2d Cir 1992], cert denied 507 US 987 [1993].) A substantive due process claim is premature when, instead of seeking mandamus relief, plaintiff “went along with the political process until it was too late.” (Covington Ct. v Village of Oak Brook, 77 F3d 177, 179 [7th Cir 1996], citing River Park v City of Highland Park, 23 F3d 164 , 167 [7th Cir 1994]; see, Orange Lake Assocs. v Kirkpatrick, 21 F3d 1214 , 1224-1225 [2d Cir 1994] [same].) Therefore, plaiptiffs

1999(See also, Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 199-200 , supra; Orange Lake Assocs. v Kirkpatrick, 21 F3d 1214 , 1225, supra [“a substantive due process claim is not ripe for review absent the rendering of a final decision by the governmental entity”].) Even if the substantive due process claim as it relates to the large-lot single-family and patio-home proposal is ripe for review, plaintiff still does not have a cause of action under this theory.

2026In order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, the plaintiff must establish: (1) "deprivation of a vested property interest"; and (2) "that the challenged governmental action was wholly without legal justification" ( Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire , 14 NY3d 127, 136 ; see Nicolakis v Rotella , 24 AD3d 739, 740 ).

2019We therefore modify the order accordingly. "[I]n order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, a party must establish both deprivation of a vested property interest' and that the challenged governmental action was wholly without legal justification' " ( Jones III , 122 AD3d at 1239, quoting Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire , 14 NY3d 127, 136 [2010]).

2021"To state a substantive due process claim in the land-use context, petitioner must allege (1) the deprivation of a protectable property interest and (2) that the governmental action was wholly without legal justification" ( Matter of Upstate Land & Props., LLC v Town of Bethel , 74 AD3d 1450, 1452 [3d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val. , 2 NY3d 617, 627-628 [2004]; Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 52-53 [1996]; Jones v Town of Carroll , 122 AD3d 1234 , 1239 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 910 [2015]).

2019We therefore modify the order accordingly. "[I]n order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, a party must establish both deprivation of a vested property interest' and that the challenged governmental action was wholly without legal justification' " ( Jones III , 122 AD3d at 1239, quoting Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire , 14 NY3d 127, 136 [2010]).

2015In evaluating such a challenge, courts ask if there is a rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate state interest (see Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 54 [1975]).

1988That theory of substantive due process was "relegated to obscurity in Nebbia v New York ( 291 US 502 )” (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 67 , supra; see also, West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379 ; 2 Rotunda, Nowak and Young, op. cit., § 15.3, at 48-49; Tribe, op. cit., § 8-7, at 581-586).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 , cert denied 530 US 1276 ; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 ; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 , affd 58 NY2d 1069 ).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 [1987]; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 1069 [1983]).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 , cert denied 530 US 1276 ; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 ; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 , affd 58 NY2d 1069 ).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 [1987]; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 1069 [1983]).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 , cert denied 530 US 1276 ; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 ; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 , affd 58 NY2d 1069 ).

2012As plaintiffs correctly concede, ensuring the financial viability of nursing homes and protecting the welfare of their vulnerable residents constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose (see generally Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 292 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; Matter of Hodes v Axelrod, 70 NY2d 364, 371-372 [1987]; Village of Herkimer v Axelrod, 88 AD2d 704, 706 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 1069 [1983]).

2003“The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” (Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 348 [1976] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) By contrast, a claim of a substantive due process violation bars “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US 833, 840 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, 331 [1986].) “We have emphasized time and again that

2003“The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” (Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 348 [1976] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) By contrast, a claim of a substantive due process violation bars “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” (County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US 833, 840 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, 331 [1986].) “We have emphasized time and again that

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2026The substantive due process violation claimed here, the delay in commencing SORA proceedings, is an executive act, and we must therefore determine whether such conduct "shocks the conscience" ( County of Sacramento v Lewis , 523 US 833, 846 [1998]; Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina , 607 F3d 864, 880 [1st Cir 2010]; see also People v Lingle , 16 NY3d 621, 632 [2011]).

2026In order to establish a substantive due process violation in the land-use context, the plaintiff must establish: (1) "deprivation of a vested property interest"; and (2) "that the challenged governmental action was wholly without legal justification" ( Glacial Aggregates LLC v Town of Yorkshire , 14 NY3d 127, 136 ; see Nicolakis v Rotella , 24 AD3d 739, 740 ).

2026A property owner acquires vested rights to the existing zoning status of his or her land when he or she "has undertaken substantial construction and made substantial expenditures prior to the effective date of the amendment" ( Matter of Lombardi v Habicht , 293 AD2d 474, 475-476 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 47 ).

2025That is, the substantive component "forbids the government [from] infring[ing] certain fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided" ( Reno v Flores , 507 US 292, 302 [1993] [emphasis in the original]).

2025Substantive due process cares not about the type of hearing provided; rather, a substantive due process analysis queries whether the government may deprive a person from exercising a right ( Washington v Glucksberg , 521 US 702, 719 [1997]).

2023Co. of Wis. v Glidden Co., 284 US 151, 158-159 [1931] [to uphold a law against a substantive due process challenge, “it is enough that, when the statute is read in the light of circumstances generally known . . . , the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment is not excluded”]).

2023The Court upheld the extension of incarceration for those offenders willing to live in a SARA-compliant shelter. - 15 - - 16 - No. 47 prohibition results in incarceration and has a disproportionate impact on offenders seeking housing in New York City (see Johnson, 36 NY3d at 206 [observing that “New York City's SARA-compliant shelters have a vacancy rate of 0.4%, indicative of the high demand for shelter housing in New York City generally, as well as the considerable number of SARA-subject sex offenders seeking such housing”]; Gonzalez v Annucci, 32 NY3d 461, 472 [2018] [acknowledging “the int

2023As Supreme Court concluded, insofar as respondent's policy restricts the alienation of their equity and assets, petitioners have identified a cognizable property interest subject to due process protections ( see Matter of Loudon House LLC v Town of Colonie , 123 AD3d 1406, 1409 [3d [*4]Dept 2014]).

2023While an individual’s liberty interest may indeed be diminished during those periods, that point weighs more significantly in a substantive due process inquiry than an Ex Post Facto challenge (see Weaver v Graham, 450 US 24, 29-30 [1981] [“Evaluating whether a right has vested is important for claims under the . . .

2022Protection , 75 AD3d 935, 939 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 16 NY3d 710 [2011]).

2021Applying the appropriate standard of review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that petitioner made sufficient allegations that the 2016 Law was "without legal justification and motivated entirely by political concerns" to state a cause of action for deprivation of substantive due process ( Magee , 88 NY2d at 53 ; see generally Acquest Wehrle, LLC v Town of Amherst , 129 AD3d 1644, 1648 [4th Dept 2015], appeal dismissed 26 NY3d 1020 [2015]).