United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 (1962). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
72 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: (PS) Lundstrom v. Contra Costa Health Services (cand, 2022-11-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1963 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1963 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) (PS) Lundstrom v. Contra Costa Health Services
N.D. Cal. · 2022 · confidence medium
A court has discretion to deny leave to amend due to 14 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 15 cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 16 by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. 17 v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 18 178, 182 (1962)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meza v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
E.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
Servs., LLC, 17 629 F.3d 876 , 892–93 (9th Cir.2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 18 178, 182 (1962)); see also, Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir.2016). 19 ANALYSIS 20 The Court first addresses Equifax’s arguments for dismissal of Meza’s claims under the 21 FCRA, and then addresses Equifax’s arguments for dismissal of claims arising under common 22 law. 23 I.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ross, No. Cr84-20300 (Jul. 26, 1999)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
It was held in Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 87 , 83 S.Ct. 11 94, 11 96, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1962), that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 6 violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. James Murray, Marcie Murray and Sharon Hurt
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
“Such eviden ce is ‘evidence favora ble to a n acc used ,’ Brady, 373 U.S . at 87[, 83 S. Ct. at 1196], so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S . 667, 676 , 105 S. C t. -50- 3375, 3380, 87 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richard Nixon v. Honorable Charles R. Richey, United States District Court for the District of Columbia
D.C. Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Yablonski v. UMW, supra note 35, 147 U.S. App.D.C. at 195, 454 F.2d at 1038 , See also United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18, 19 , 83 S.Ct. 11 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1, 2 (1962); In re Sanford Fork & Tool CO., 160 U.S. 247, 255 , 16 S.Ct. 291, 293 , 40 L.Ed. 414, 416 (1895). 58 . 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970). 59 . 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1) (1970). 60 . 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (4) (1970). 61 .
cited Cited "see" Bivona v. Borough of Girardville
M.D. Penn. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foman, 371 U.S. 18 | at 178.
discussed Cited "see" Goldstein v. General Motors LLC
S.D. Cal. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foman, 371 U.S. 18 at 182 (finding the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of 19 the district court, but the court must explain its reason for any denial, such as futility of 20 amendment, etc.); Chodos., 292 F.3d at 1003 (“[W]hen a district court has already granted 21 a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is 22 ‘particularly broad.’” (citation omitted)).
cited Cited "see" Klo-Zik Co. v. General Motors Corp.
E.D. Tex. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 , 83 S.Ct. 97, 102-103 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1 (1962).
examined Cited "see" Piambino v. Bailey (3×)
11th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 , 83 S.Ct. 11 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1 (1962); United States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258, 263 , 68 S.Ct. 1035, 1037 , 92 L.Ed. 1351 (1948); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 , 80 S.Ct. 863 , 4 L.Ed.2d 869 (1960); cf. Baltimore & O.R.
examined Cited "see" Piambino v. Bailey (3×)
11th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 , 83 S.Ct. 11 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1 (1962); United States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258, 263 , 68 S.Ct. 1035, 1037 , 92 L.Ed. 1351 (1948); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 , 80 S.Ct. 863 , 4 L.Ed.2d 869 (1960); cf. Baltimore & O.R.
examined Cited "see" Hewitt v. Ryan (3×)
Iowa · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 , 83 S.Ct. 11 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1 (1962).
discussed Cited "see" Connor v. Coleman (2×)
SCOTUS · 1979 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, United States v. Haley, 371 U. S. 18 (1962).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Lundy v. Pierce County Sheriff's Department
W.D. Wash. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 18 178, 182 (1962).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Joseph A. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1972 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, e. g., United States v. Haley, supra note 13 , 371 U.S. at 20 , 83 S.Ct. 11 , 9 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 136 U.S.App.D.C. 230 , 232, 420 F.2d 72, 74 (1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 1024 , 90 S.Ct. 1258 , 25 L.Ed.2d 533 (1970).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Haley
148.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 15, 1962.
371 U.S. 18
1962 U.S. LEXIS 387
Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Alan S. Rosenthal and David L. Rose for the United States., James P. Donovan for appellee in No. 148.
Goldberg.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
[*19] Per Curiam.

The order of the District Court, dated February 26, 1962, denying the motion of the United States for judgment in this action evidently rested on a misconception of the scope and effect of this Court’s per curiam opinion on the Government’s earlier appeal, 358 U. S. 644, and of its judgment issued February 24, 1959. In light of the issues tendered in the papers filed on that appeal there can be no doubt that this Court’s judgment finally established the Government’s right to the relief sought in this action, subject only to the District Court’s resolution of Haley’s procedural defense, still unadjudicated, to the effect that the Government had failed to comply with conditions requisite to the effective establishment of a wheat acreage allotment for Haley. See Jurisdictional Statement of the United States and Appellee’s Statement Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 587, October Term, 1958; Appellee’s Motion to Vacate the Court’s Judgment of February 24, 1959, denied April 27, 1959, 359 U. S. 977; and Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing, denied April 27, 1959, 359 U. S. 981.

More particularly, this Court then necessarily decided (1) that it had jurisdiction over such appeal; (2) that the relevant provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1281 et seg., embraced the conduct of Haley complained of in this action; and (3) that the Act was constitutional as applied in the premises. Under the remand ordered by this Court’s judgment of February 24, 1959, there was thus left open to the District Court only the adjudication of Haley’s above-mentioned procedural defense. The District Court erred in believing that it was not foreclosed from inquiring into this Court’s jurisdiction over the[*20] Government’s appeal and from reinstating its own original judgment in the case, which appears to have been the effect of its denial of the Government’s motion for judgment following remand. See In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 255.

The District Court’s error should be rectified without delay, and we think that the proper means for accomplishing this is by mandamus. 28 U. S. C. § 1651; see In re Potts, 166 U. S. 263; United States v. United States District Court, 334 U. S. 258, 263, 264. Accordingly, in No. 139, Misc., the Government’s motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus, and its petition for a writ of mandamus, are granted.

We shall not, however, issue a formal writ at this time, since we are confident that the District Court, once its misconception of our judgment of February 24, 1959, has been called to its attention, will promptly take steps (1) to set aside its order of February 26, 1962, denying the motion of the United States for judgment; (2) to proceed to resolve Haley’s aforesaid procedural defense; (3) if such defense is found to be insufficient, to enter a final judgment in this action in favor of the United States; and (4) if such defense is found sufficient, to enter judgment accordingly. Cf. Ex parte Northern Pac. R. Co., 280 U. S. 142, 530.

In view of our disposition in No. 139, Misc., it becomes unnecessary to consider whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Government’s appeal in No. 148, and the motion to dismiss the appeal in that case is accordingly granted and the appeal is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.