Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). · Go Syfert
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Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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A conviction cannot be sustained on appeal by a limiting construction if the defendant was originally tried under an unconstitutionally broad construction of the law.

A petitioner was convicted of criminal libel for publishing a pamphlet containing critical statements about local officials. The trial court defined the offense as any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt public morals, or lead to indictable acts. Although the state appellate court attempted to apply a narrower, constitutional definition of criminal libel during the appeal, the Supreme Court holds that a conviction cannot be sustained if the defendant was originally tried under an unconstitutionally broad construction of the law. Because the trial was conducted under a vague and indefinite definition of criminal libel, the conviction is unconstitutional.

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cited 4× by 3 distinct cases, 1976–2023 · 3 courts · …where an accused is tried and convicted under a broad construction of an act which would make it unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be sustained on appeal by a limiting construction which eliminates the unconstitutional features of the act, as the trial took place under the… ✓
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1991 · 2 courts · …any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act, which, when done, is indictable, ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1997 · 2 courts · …any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace. ✓
822 citation events (89 in the last 25 years) across 98 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re Adoption of A.C.B. (Slip Opinion) (ohio, 2020-02-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) In re Adoption of A.C.B. (Slip Opinion) (3×)
Ohio · 2020 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Defrancesco v. Robert C. Robbins
9th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
“The right to speak freely . . . [is] one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Siders v. City of Brandon
5th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
“The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Neuman, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Rockport Area Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Keith Hamilton, Gemma Anthony, and Jennifer Bradshaw, as Executive Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Rockport Area Association of Realtors, Inc.
Tex. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides “The right to speak freely and to promote a diversity of ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Villarreal v. City of Laredo
5th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “[t]he right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966) (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vlaming v. West Point School Board
unknown court · 2023 · confidence medium
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012) (recognizing that the “requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause” and that “[w]hen speech is involved, rigorous adherence to [due- process] requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HONEYFUND.COM INC v. DESANTIS
N.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
Thus, while “[v]ague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity,” “[w]hen First Amendment rights are involved,” this Court must “look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Baccala
Conn. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 [ 86 S. Ct. 1407 , 16 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Golb
NY · 2014 · confidence medium
Criminal libel has long since been abandoned (see Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 69 [1964]), not least of all because of its tendency in practice to penalize and chill speech that the constitution protects (see Ashton v Kentucky, 384 US 195, 200-201 [1966]), and it has been decades since New York’s criminal libel statute was repealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Discipline of Schaefer
Nev. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 20 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). 21 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266-67 ; Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355, 362 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1948) (noting that an individual is “chargeable with knowledge of the scope of subsequent interpretation” of a statute); Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 , 273- *512 74 (1940); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 456 (1939); Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 172 (1933); Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 17-18 (1931); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. B.C. (2×)
Ill. · 1997 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d at 471 , 86 S. Ct. at 1409.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Asquith v. City of Beaufort (2×)
unknown court · 1995 · confidence medium
See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 367 U.S. 513 , 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684 , 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1303 , 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968); Ashton v. Kentucky, supra 384 U.S. at 195, 200-201 , 86 S.Ct. at 1407, 1410-1411 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 , 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120 , 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-152 , 80 S.Ct. 215, 217-218 , 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 68 S.Ct. 665 , 92 L.Ed.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ryan (2×)
Colo. · 1991 · confidence medium
We said in Cantwell v. Connecticut, [ 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) ], that such a law must be “narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil,” 310 U.S., at 307 [ 60 S.Ct. at 905 ], and that a conviction for an utterance “based on a common law concept of the most general and undefined nature,” id., at 308 [ 60 S.Ct. at 905 ], could not stand. 384 U.S. at 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. at 1410-11 (footnotes omitted); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Madison v. Baumann (2×)
Wis. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
The court pointed out that a conviction under the ordinance could be supported solely upon the "malice or animosity of a cantankerous neighbor," id. at 1227 (quoting Miller v. Valley Forge Village, 374 N.E.2d 118, 122 (N.Y. 1978) (Cooke, J. dissenting)), or the "boiling point of a particular person," id. (quoting Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. New York Trap Rock Corp.
NY · 1982 · confidence medium
Among other things, for instance, the disjunctive definition of “unnecessary noise” as “any excessive or usually loud sound or any sound which * * * annoys * * * a person” (emphasis added) impermissibly would support a conviction on any sound which annoys another person, for it could rest solely upon the “malice or animosity of a cantankerous neighbor” (Miller v Valley Forge Vil., 43 NY2d 626, 632 [Cooke, J., dissenting]) or “boiling point of a particular person” (Ashton v Kentucky, 384 US 195, 200 [Douglas, J.], supra), situations which are the product, not only of imprecise s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) South Florida Free Beaches v. City of Miami, Fla.
S.D. Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
The instruction which the Court found vague defined criminal libel as “any writing calculated to create a disturbance of the peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act, which when done, is indictable.” 384 U.S. at 198 , 86 S.Ct. at 1409 (emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System
S.D. Fla. · 1979 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 472 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-551 , 85 S.Ct. 453 , 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 481, 482 (1965).” Television is “press.” While there is “. . . no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment,” 10 it is nonetheless “. . . the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People Ex Rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (2×)
Cal. · 1976 · confidence medium
When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech and of the press suffer.” (Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 200 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 473 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 ].) Moreover, the vagueness and subjectivity of present obscenity doctrine impose particularly severe burdens on freedom of expression if, as the majority holds, obscenity doctrine may be imported into public nuisance proceedings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walter C. Royal v. Superior Court of New Hampshire, Rockinghan County
1st Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
And while the danger to others might be cured by a narrowing construction on appeal, 15 the unfairness of Royal’s standard-less arrest, prosecution and trial could not. “[W]here an accused is tried and convicted under a broad construction of an Act which would make it unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be sustained on appeal by a limiting construction which eliminates the unconstitutional features of the Act, as the trial took place under the unconstitutional construction of the Act.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1409 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471 (1966). 16 Whatev…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckley v. Valeo
D.C. Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
"When First Amendment rights are involved," a court must "look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, 384 U.S. at 200 , 86 S.Ct. at 1410 (footnote omitted). 160 Section 437a, with a "purpose of influencing" and a "design( ) to influence" as criteria undertaking to partially shape its operation, does not meet the governing standards.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckley v. Valeo (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
“When First Amendment rights are involved,” a court must “look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.” Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, 384 U.S. at 200, 86 S.Ct. at 1410 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Handler
D. Maryland · 1974 · confidence medium
Ashton at 198, 86 S.Ct. 1407 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Flinn
W. Va. · 1974 · confidence medium
We said in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, that such a law must be ‘narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil’ * * Ashton v. Kentucky, supra at 200-01.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karlan v. City of Cincinnati
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
In striking down a similar construction in Gooding v. Wilson , we said: “‘[T]o make an offense of conduct which is “calculated to create disturbances of the peace” leáves wide open the standard of responsibility.’ ” 405 U. S. 518, 527 , quoting Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Goguen (2×)
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
The court's reference to verbal communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969). [27] E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966). [28] Brief for Appellant 22. [29] With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two published opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney General. 4 Op. Atty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.
Fla. Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade Cty. · 1972 · confidence medium
When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grayned v. City of Rockford
SCOTUS · 1972 · confidence medium
Necessarily, we must consider the facial constitutionality of the ordinance in effect when appellant was arrested and convicted. [3] E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 287 (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 230-232 (1951); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89 (1921); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grayned v. City of Rockford
SCOTUS · 1972 · confidence medium
E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 684-685 (1968); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 (1966); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90-91 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 559-560 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 261-264 (1937).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cohen v. California (2×)
SCOTUS · 1971 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 200 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 550-551 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marvin Livingston v. Bernard Garmire, Etc.
5th Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Kentucky, 1966, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 ], and Ter-miniello [v. City of Chicago, 1949, 337 U.S. 1 , 69 S.Ct. 894 , 93 L.Ed. 1131 ]. *1056 303 F.Supp. at 955 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
The United States Supreme Court has applied the rule quite indiscriminately in cases involving vagueness, overbreadth or both. ( Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra, 394 U.S. 147, 153-155 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 162, 168-170 ]; Gregory v. Chicago, supra, 394 U.S. 111, 121-122 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 134, 141-142 ] (concurring opinion); Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, 384 U.S. 195, 198 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471 ]; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 176, 179-180 , 86 S.Ct. 211 ]; Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. 347, 352-353 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 894, 899-900 ].) If the statute cannot be saved by an …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Kay
Cal. · 1970 · confidence medium
(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 ] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including "any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace"); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483 , 85 S.Ct. 453 ] ("breach of peace" offense defined as "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet"); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702 , 83 S.Ct. 680 ] ("breach of peace" defined as "a violation of pub…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Kay
Cal. · 1970 · confidence medium
(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 ] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483 , 85 S.Ct. 453 ] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702 , 83 S.Ct. 680 ] (“breach of peace” defined as “…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alfred Wright, .V the City of Montgomery, Alabama
5th Cir. · 1969 · confidence medium
See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-617 , 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of U. of St. of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 602 , 87 S.Ct. 675, 683 (1967); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-201 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 (1966) ; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 86 S.Ct. 211 (1965) ; Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 , 85 S.Ct. 453, 462-463 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-509 , 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 (1964); N. A. A. C.
discussed Cited "see" Frese v. Formella (2×)
1st Cir. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966) (trial court defined criminal libel as "any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public - 11 - morals, or lead to any act, which, when done, is indictable");3 Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087 , 1088 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973) (statute prohibited mailing post cards containing "language of libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or threatening character, or [language] calculated by the terms or manner or style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another"); Gottschalk v.…
discussed Cited "see" Frese v. NH Attorney General
D.N.H. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (holding that Kentucky’s common law crime of criminal libel was unconstitutionally void, as no court case had redefined the crime’s sweeping language in understandable terms, leaving prosecution decisions to be made on a case to case basis); see also Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1097 (8th Cir. 1973) (voiding as vague statute punishing “libelous, scurrilous, defamatory words” written on the outside of an envelope”).
discussed Cited "see" Robert Frese v. Gordon J. MacDonald, In his official capacity only as Attorney General of the State of New Hampshire
D.N.H. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (holding that Kentucky’s common law crime of criminal libel was unconstitutionally void, as no court case had redefined the crime’s sweeping language in understandable terms, leaving prosecution decisions to be made on a case to case basis); see also Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1097 (8th Cir. 1973) (voiding as vague 21 statute punishing “libelous, scurrilous, defamatory words” written on the outside of an envelope”).
examined Cited "see" Carico Investments, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (3×)
S.D. Tex. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966).
examined Cited "see" State v. Ramsey (4×)
S.C. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d. 469 (1966).
examined Cited "see" Musselman v. Commonwealth (6×)
Ky. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Walker (3×)
E.D. La. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Lynch (2×)
Mich. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v Kentucky, 384 US 195, 198 ; 86 S Ct 1407 ; 16 L Ed 2d 469 (1966); Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 382 US 87, 91-92 ; 86 S Ct 211 ; 15 L Ed 2d 176 (1965).
examined Cited "see" State v. Crane (3×)
Or. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 US 195, 200 , 86 S Ct 1407 , 16 L Ed 2d 469 (1966); State v. Hodges, supra 254 Or 26 .
examined Cited "see" City of Portland v. Arndorfer (3×)
Or. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L J 437 (1921), and recent cases collected in the Annotation of Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 US 195 , 86 S Ct 1407 , 16 L Ed 2d 469, at 1231 (1966). "2.
examined Cited "see" City of Portland v. Anderson (3×)
Or. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L J 437 (1921), and recent cases collected in the Annotation of Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 US 195 , 86 S Ct 1407 , 16 L Ed 2d 469, at 1231 (1966). "2.
examined Cited "see" Collin v. Smith (3×)
N.D. Ill. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966).
examined Cited "see" Tollett v. United States (9×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
8th Cir. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966).
examined Cited "see" Ray Allen Tollett v. United States (3×)
8th Cir. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 469 (1966).
cited Cited "see" State v. Kasnett
Ohio · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ashton v. Kentucky (1966), 384 U. S. 195 ; Giacco v. Pennsylvania (1966), 382 U. S. 399 ; Wright v. Georgia (1963), 373 U. S. 284 ; United States v. Cardiff (1952), 344 U. S. 174 .
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Mason
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See n.l, supra. The majority incorrectly staes that Garrison is the only recent criminal libel case decided by the Supreme Court, overlooking Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966), which, although not dealing with a state statute, did hold that the Kentucky courts’ application of the common-law crime of libel was unconstitutional.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ashton
v.
Kentucky
619.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 16, 1966.
384 U.S. 195
1966 U.S. LEXIS 1644
Ephraim London argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Dan Jack Combs and Melvin L. Wulf., John B. Browning, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert Matthews, Attorney General.
Douglas, Harlan.
Cited by 251 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 70%
Citer courts: Ohio Supreme Court (3)
Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was sentenced to six months in prison and fined $3,000 for printing a pamphlet found to be prohibited by the common law of criminal libel in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, with three judges dissenting, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 405 S. W. 2d 562. We granted certiorari (382 U. S. 971) and reverse.

Petitioner went to Hazard, Kentucky, in 1963, where a bitter labor dispute raged, to appeal for food, clothing and aid for unemployed miners. The challenged pamphlet, which had a limited circulation, stated concerning Sam L. Luttrell, Chief of Police of Hazard:

“Six weeks ago I witnessed a plot to kill the one pro-strike city policeman on the Hazard Force. Three of the other cops were after him while he was on night-duty. It took 5 pickets guarding him all night long to keep him from getting killed, but they could not prevent him from being fired, which he was three weeks ago. Another note on the City Police: The Chief of the force, Bud Luttrell, has a job on the side of guarding an operator’s home for $100 a week. Its against the law for a peace officer to take private jobs.”

It said concerning Charles E. Combs, the Sheriff:

“The High Sheriff has hired 72 deputies at one time, more than ever before in history; most of them hired because they wanted to carry guns. He, Sheriff Combs, is also a mine operator — in a recent Court decision he was fined $5,000 for intentionally blinding a boy with tear-gas and beating him while he was locked in a jail cell with his hands cuffed. The[*197] boy lost the sight of one eye completely and is nearly blind in the other. Before the trial Sheriff Combs offered the boy $75,000 to keep it out of court, but he refused. Then for a few thousand dollars Combs probably bought off the jury. The case is being appealed by the boy to a higher court — he wants $200,000. Combs is now indicted for the murder of a man — voluntary manslaughter. Yet he is still the law in this county and has the support of the rich man because he will fight the pickets and the strike. The same is true of the State Police. They escort the scabs into the mines and hold the pickets at gunpoint.”

And it said respecting Mrs. W. P. Nolan, co-owner of the Hazard Herald:

“The town newspaper, the Hazard Herald, has hollered that 'the commies have come to the mountains of Kentucky’ and are leading the strike. The Herald was the recipient of over $14,000 cash and several truckloads of food and clothing which were sent as the result of a CBS-TV show just before Christmas. The story was on the strike and aid was supposed to be sent to the pickets in care of the Hazard Herald, however the editor, Mrs. W. P. Nolan, is vehemently against labor — she has said that she would rather give the incoming aid to the merchants in town than to the miners. Apparently that is what she has done, for only $1100 of the money has come to the pickets, and none of the food and clothes. They are now either still under lock and key, or have been given out to the scabs and others still.”

The indictment charged “the offense of criminal libel” committed “by publishing a false and malicious publication which tends to degrade or injure” the three named[*198] persons. The trial court charged that “criminal libel is defined as any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act, which, when done, is indictable.”

The court also charged that malice is “an essential element of this offense” and falsity as well.

The Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of conviction adopted a different definition of the offense of criminal libel from that given the jury by the trial court. It ruled that the element of breach of the peace was no longer a constitutional basis for imposing criminal liability. It held that the common-law crime of criminal libel in Kentucky is “the publication of a defamatory statement about another which is false, with malice.”

We indicated in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, that where an accused is tried and convicted under a broad construction of an Act which would make it unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be sustained on appeal by a limiting construction which eliminates the unconstitutional features of the Act, as the trial took place under the unconstitutional construction of the Act. We think that principle applies here. Petitioner was tried and convicted according to the trial court’s understanding of Kentucky law, which defined the offense as “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace . . . .”

We agree with the dissenters in the Court of Appeals who stated that: “. . . since the English common law of criminal libel is inconsistent with constitutional provisions, and since no Kentucky case has redefined the crime in understandable terms, and since the law must be made on a case to case basis, the elements of the crime are so indefinite and uncertain that it should not be enforced as a penal offense in Kentucky.”

The case is close to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, involving a conviction of the common-law crime[*199] of inciting a breach of the peace. The accused was charged with having played in the hearing of Catholics in a public place a phonograph record attacking their religion and church. In reversing we said: “The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. . . . Here we have a situation analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application.” Id., at 308.

In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, we held unconstitutional an ordinance which as construed punished an utterance as a breach of the peace “if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.” Id., at 3. We set aside the conviction, saying:

“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
“Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It[*200] may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” Id., at 4.

Convictions for “breach of the peace” where the offense was imprecisely defined were similarly reversed in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 236-238, and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 551-552. These decisions recognize that to make an offense of conduct which is “calculated to create disturbances of the peace” leaves wide open the standard of responsibility. It involves calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, not an appraisal of the nature of the comments per se. This kind of criminal libel “makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from violence.” Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 151 (1954).

Here, as in the cases discussed above, we deal with First Amendment rights. Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. [1] When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer. [2] We[*201] said in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, that such a law must be “narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil,” 310 U. S., at 307, and that a conviction for an utterance “based on a common law concept of the most general and undefined nature,” id., at 308, could not stand.

All the infirmities of the conviction of the common-law crime of breach of the peace as defined by Connecticut judges are present in this conviction of the common-law crime of criminal libel as defined by Kentucky judges.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
1

International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553; Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451; Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399. Cf. Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344; Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423.

2

Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479.