vagueness doctrine in West Virginia

2000See id. ; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'" (second and third alterations in original)); Button, 371 U.S. at 432

2000See id. ; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'" (second and third alterations in original)); Button, 371 U.S. at 432

1996For instance, in syllabus point 2 of State v. DeBerry, 185 W.Va. 512 , 408 S.E.2d 91 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984 , 112 S.Ct. 592 , 116 L.Ed.2d 616 (1991), this Court held that " '[a] criminal statute must be set out with sufficient definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute and to provide adequate standards for adjudication.’ Syl. pt. 1, State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111 , 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974).” This standard clearly follows the first reason to apply the vagueness rule expressed in Grayned, supra. 11 .

1996For instance, in syllabus point 2 of State v. DeBerry, 185 W.Va. 512 , 408 S.E.2d 91 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984 , 112 S.Ct. 592 , 116 L.Ed.2d 616 (1991), this Court held that " '[a] criminal statute must be set out with sufficient definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute and to provide adequate standards for adjudication.’ Syl. pt. 1, State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111 , 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974).” This standard clearly follows the first reason to apply the vagueness rule expressed in Grayned, supra. 11 .

2004Faheen by Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted).

2004Faheen by Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted).

1984See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); see also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 472-73 (1966); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 906 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940).

1984See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); see also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 472-73 (1966); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 906 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940).

1984Because ambiguity in the regulation of speech may inhibit citizens from fully exercising their fundamental constitutional rights by causing them to “ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone,’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1473 (1958), than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377, 385 (1964), the vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity” in the free speech context than in other contexts.

1984Because ambiguity in the regulation of speech may inhibit citizens from fully exercising their fundamental constitutional rights by causing them to “ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone,’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1473 (1958), than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377, 385 (1964), the vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity” in the free speech context than in other contexts.

1984See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); see also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 472-73 (1966); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 906 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940).

1984See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974); see also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 , 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1410 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469, 472-73 (1966); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 906 , 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1221 (1940).

1984Because ambiguity in the regulation of speech may inhibit citizens from fully exercising their fundamental constitutional rights by causing them to “ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone,’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1473 (1958), than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377, 385 (1964), the vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity” in the free speech context than in other contexts.

1984Because ambiguity in the regulation of speech may inhibit citizens from fully exercising their fundamental constitutional rights by causing them to “ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone,’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1473 (1958), than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 , 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1323 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377, 385 (1964), the vagueness doctrine “demands a greater degree of specificity” in the free speech context than in other contexts.

2000When a statute involves the "economic regulation" of business, it is "subject to a less strict vagueness test." Id. at 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 .

2000When a statute involves the "economic regulation" of business, it is "subject to a less strict vagueness test." Id. at 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 .

2000Cf. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988, 993-94 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (ruling that "courts must permit" facial challenge when there is significant risk of chilling First Amendment speech because chill "`can be effectively alleviated only through a facial challenge'" (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 , 108 S.Ct. 2138 , 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988))).

2000Cf. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 58 F.3d 988, 993-94 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (ruling that “courts must permit” facial challenge when there is significant risk of chilling First Amendment speech because chill “ ‘can be effectively alleviated only through a facial challenge’ ” (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 , 108 S.Ct. 2138 , 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988))).

2000Thus, Screws “recognized that the expansive language of due process that provides a basis for judicial review is, when incorporated by reference into § 242, generally ill-suited to the far different task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal liability,” Lanier, 117 S.Ct. at 1225 (unanimous decision), but that the use of a strict scienter requirement could sufficiently mitigate this ambiguity. .The Court in Guest relied on Screws to reject a similar vagueness challenge to a prosecution for conspiracy to deprive black citizens of rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause.

2000See id. ; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'" (second and third alterations in original)); Button, 371 U.S. at 432

2000See id. ; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts."); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 ("[W]here a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'" (second and third alterations in original)); Button, 371 U.S. at 432

1988The court in In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C.App.1977), in upholding the constitutionality of the rule against a vagueness claim, stated: “The rule was written by and for lawyers.

1984As a matter of basic procedural due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926); see also Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, 160 W.Va. 318, 323 , 234 S.E.2d 893 , 896 (1977); State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 117 , 208 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1974).

1984As a matter of basic procedural due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926); see also Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, 160 W.Va. 318, 323 , 234 S.E.2d 893 , 896 (1977); State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 117 , 208 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1974).

1984As a matter of basic procedural due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926); see also Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, 160 W.Va. 318, 323 , 234 S.E.2d 893 , 896 (1977); State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 117 , 208 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1974).

1984Recently, in Garcelon v. Rutledge, 173 W.Va. 572 , 318 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1984), this Court discussed the application of the vagueness doctrine in the free speech context: A doctrine which has emerged as a tool for protecting the exercise of expression and association rights has evolved from a fundamental principle of procedural due process.

1984Recently, in Garcelon v. Rutledge, 173 W.Va. 572 , 318 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1984), this Court discussed the application of the vagueness doctrine in the free speech context: A doctrine which has emerged as a tool for protecting the exercise of expression and association rights has evolved from a fundamental principle of procedural due process.

1984As a matter of basic procedural due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926); see also Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety, 160 W.Va. 318, 323 , 234 S.E.2d 893 , 896 (1977); State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 117 , 208 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1974).