vagueness doctrine in Ohio

2018"The burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it." Id. , citing State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502 , 2007-Ohio-4642 , 873 N.E.2d 306 , ¶ 17. {¶ 31} In this case, we do not find that the phrase "such dog" in R.C.G.O. 91.50(D)(2) presents a plain or obvious error that warrants a reversal of Smith's conviction on grounds of vagueness. "[W]hen a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbit

2018"The burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it." Id. , citing State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502 , 2007-Ohio-4642 , 873 N.E.2d 306 , ¶ 17. {¶ 31} In this case, we do not find that the phrase "such dog" in R.C.G.O. 91.50(D)(2) presents a plain or obvious error that warrants a reversal of Smith's conviction on grounds of vagueness. "[W]hen a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbit

2012A primary concern underpinning the vagueness doctrine is that “ ‘[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.’ ” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 , 102 S.Ct.1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 , quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.E.2d 222 (1972).

2012A primary concern underpinning the vagueness doctrine is that “ ‘[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.’ ” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498 , 102 S.Ct.1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 , quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.E.2d 222 (1972).

2004VOID FOR VAGUENESS {¶ 35} Appellants' second argument is that Ord. 539.07(b) is impermissibly vague. "[A]n enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 . {¶ 36} "Under the vagueness doctrine, which is premised on the Fourteenth Amendment due-process requirement that a `law give fair notice of offending conduct,' a statute is void for vagueness if it `"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" * * * [or if] it encourages arbitrar

2004VOID FOR VAGUENESS {¶ 35} Appellants' second argument is that Ord. 539.07(b) is impermissibly vague. "[A]n enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 . {¶ 36} "Under the vagueness doctrine, which is premised on the Fourteenth Amendment due-process requirement that a `law give fair notice of offending conduct,' a statute is void for vagueness if it `"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" * * * [or if] it encourages arbitrar

1999The vagueness doctrine is "not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties of drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited." Pendrey , 18 Ohio St.3d at 27 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky (1972), 407 U.S. 104 , 110 ).

1998The vagueness doctrine is not, however, "a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited." Colten v. Kentucky (1972), 407 U.S. 104 , 110 .

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2019“Under the vagueness doctrine, statutes which do not fairly inform a person of what is prohibited will be found unconstitutional as violative of due process.” State v. Carrick, 131 Ohio St.3d 340 , 2012- Ohio-608, 965 N.E.2d 264 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Reeder, 18 Ohio St.3d 25, 26 , 479 N.E.2d 280 (1985) and Connally v. Gen.

2017Athens No. 13CA50, 2014-Ohio-3483 , ¶ 10, 2014 WL 3940296 . {¶ 22} "Under the vagueness doctrine, statutes which do not fairly inform a person of what is prohibited will be found unconstitutional as violative of due process." State v. Carrick , 131 Ohio St.3d 340 , 2012-Ohio-608 , 965 N.E.2d 264 , ¶ 14 ; State v. Reeder , 18 Ohio St.3d 25 , 26, 479 N.E.2d 280 (1985), citing Connally v. Gen.

2013The vagueness doctrine is premised on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” Id. at ¶17 citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

2013The vagueness doctrine is premised on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” Id. at ¶17 citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).

1994Professor Fallon notes that, although the majority in Kolender rejected “the dissent's view,” which would confine a vagueness challenge (unlike an overbreadth challenge) to a statute’s constitutionality "as applied,” the court "has sent mixed signals as to whether a party may challenge a statute [that] clearly applies to her conduct, on the ground that it would be impermissibly vague as applied to the different conduct of someone else.” Fallon, supra, at 904, fn. 309 (comparing Gooding v. Wilson [1972], 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 , with Broadrick, supra). 7 .

1994Professor Fallon notes that, although the majority in Kolender rejected “the dissent's view,” which would confine a vagueness challenge (unlike an overbreadth challenge) to a statute’s constitutionality "as applied,” the court "has sent mixed signals as to whether a party may challenge a statute [that] clearly applies to her conduct, on the ground that it would be impermissibly vague as applied to the different conduct of someone else.” Fallon, supra, at 904, fn. 309 (comparing Gooding v. Wilson [1972], 405 U.S. 518 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 , with Broadrick, supra). 7 .

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2020Although the vagueness doctrine is more commonly applied in reviewing criminal laws and First Amendment claims, we have recognized that the prohibition against vague laws also applies “in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.” Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 87 ; see also United States v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2323 , 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (“In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all”); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (

2020Although the vagueness doctrine is more commonly applied in reviewing criminal laws and First Amendment claims, we have recognized that the prohibition against vague laws also applies “in any case in which the statute challenged substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.” Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 87 ; see also United States v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2323 , 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (“In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all”); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 , 86 S.Ct. 1407 , 16 L.Ed.2d 469 (

2002State v. Gaines (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 230 , 234 . {¶ 16} A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

1999State v. Gaines (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 230 , 234 .

1997The vagueness doctrine serves three purposes: “[F]irst, to provide fair warning to the ordinary citizen so behavior may comport with the dictates of the statute; second, to preclude arbitrary, capricious and generally discriminatory enforcement by officials given too much authority and too few constraints; and third, to ensure that fundamental constitutionally protected freedoms are not unreasonably impinged or inhibited.” Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d at 270 , 581 N.E.2d at 554 ; State v. Powell (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 157, 163-164 , 621 N.E.2d 1328, 1331-1333 .

1997The vagueness doctrine serves three purposes: “[F]irst, to provide fair warning to the ordinary citizen so behavior may comport with the dictates of the statute; second, to preclude arbitrary, capricious and generally discriminatory enforcement by officials given too much authority and too few constraints; and third, to ensure that fundamental constitutionally protected freedoms are not unreasonably impinged or inhibited.” Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d at 270 , 581 N.E.2d at 554 ; State v. Powell (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 157, 163-164 , 621 N.E.2d 1328, 1331-1333 .

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2011Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).” Hill v. Colorado (2000), 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 . {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has identified the second reason as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine: “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ Smith [v. Goguen (1974) ], 415 U.S. [566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 ]. * * * Where the leg

2011Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).” Hill v. Colorado (2000), 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 . {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has identified the second reason as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine: “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ Smith [v. Goguen (1974) ], 415 U.S. [566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 ]. * * * Where the leg

2017State v. Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 532, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). *92 {¶ 31} If the statute is being challenged as applied to the circumstances of a particular case, the challenger "contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted * * * [is] unconstitutional." State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17.

2017State v. Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 532, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). *92 {¶ 31} If the statute is being challenged as applied to the circumstances of a particular case, the challenger "contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted * * * [is] unconstitutional." State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17.

2011Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).” Hill v. Colorado (2000), 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 . {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has identified the second reason as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine: “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ Smith [v. Goguen (1974) ], 415 U.S. [566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 ]. * * * Where the leg

2011Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).” Hill v. Colorado (2000), 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 . {¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has identified the second reason as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine: “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’ Smith [v. Goguen (1974) ], 415 U.S. [566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 ]. * * * Where the leg

2003State v. Dario (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 232 , 236 .

2001State v. Dario (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 232 , 236 .

2002The court was asked to determine whether the phrase “to disturb the peace and quiet” was so subjective and dependent on the personal sensitivities of the listener that, essentially, the ordinance provided no measurable standard of conduct. 4 Ohio St.3d at 63 , 4 OBR 150, 446 N.E.2d 449 . {¶ 13} The Dorso court stated: {¶ 14} “[W]e construe the Cincinnati ordinance at issue to prohibit the playing of music, amplification of sound, etc., in a manner which could be anticipated to offend the reasonable person, i.e., the individual of common sensibilities.

1987United States v. Harriss, supra. In Dorso, supra, the court upheld a noise ordinance against a vagueness claim based upon ordinance language proscribing the playing or rendition of music of any kind, singing, loud talking, amplification of sound, and other noises “in such a manner to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood * * *.” The court stated the following *142 at 63, 4 OBR at 153, 446 N.E. 2d at 452 : “* * * [H]ere we adopt the approach taken by our counterpart in State v. Chaplinsky (1941), 91 N.H. 310 , 18 A. 2d 754 , and subsequently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court

2001Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 28, 32 [30 OBR 33, 36, 505 N.E.2d 966, 970 ] * * *.

1992Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 28, 32 , 30 OBR 33, 36, 505 N.E.2d 966, 970 .