Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971). · Go Syfert
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Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1990 · …no man shall be held ... responsible for the conduct which he could not understand to be prescribed ≈ altered
359 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 67 distinct courts.
Negative lean: 1st  ·  Positive lean: 5th, 10th, 7th, 3rd, 9th, DC, 2nd
Strongest positive: Roberts v. State of Maine (ca1, 1995-02-16) · Strongest negative: Valarie Goguen v. Joseph Smith, Sheriff of Worcester County (ca1, 1972-12-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Valarie Goguen v. Joseph Smith, Sheriff of Worcester County (6×)
1st Cir. · 1972 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
See also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 , 91 S.Ct. 1294 , 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F.Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y.1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 913 , 92 S.Ct. 1773 , 32 L.Ed.2d 113 (1972); but cf. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) 9 The Court did not rest its decisions in these cases on the Raines exception allowing void-for-vagueness attacks on prohibitions affecting First Amendment rights, supra n. 7.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Roberts v. State of Maine (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
1st Cir. · 1995 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the ___ ___________________________________ principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regula- tion.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Beck v. Edward D. Jones & Co. (3×)
C.D. Ill. · 1990 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
no man shall be held ... responsible for the conduct which he could not understand to be prescribed
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Gesicki v. Oswald (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1971 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
suspicious person
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. McDonough
Fed. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
First, “[i]f an as-applied challenge is successful, the statute may not be applied to the challenger, but is otherwise enforceable.” Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694 , 700 n.5 (8th Cir. 2021); see Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391 , 395 n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) (same) (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 , 758–59 (1988)); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng- land, 546 U.S. 320 , 329 (2006) (“It is axiomatic that a ‘stat- ute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.’” (quotin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. McDonough
Fed. Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
First, “[i]f an as-applied challenge is successful, the statute may not be applied to the challenger, but is otherwise enforceable.” Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694 , 700 n.5 (8th Cir. 2021); see Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391 , 395 n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) (same) (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 , 758–59 (1988)); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng- land, 546 U.S. 320 , 329 (2006) (“It is axiomatic that a ‘stat- ute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.’” (quotin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lamarche
N.H. · 2008 · confidence medium
“The underlying principle [of vagueness] is that no [person] should be held criminally responsible for conduct which he [or *341 she] could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971) (quotation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Byrd
La. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Greco, 583 So.2d 825, 828 (La.1991); State v. Pierre, 500 So.2d 382, 384 (La.1987); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 910 (1983); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98, 100 (1971); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926) ("a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first esse…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ball
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1993 · confidence medium
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 98, 100 (1971); State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 593 , 498 A. 2d 1217 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Timothy R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Even if an officer avoids speculation by individually questioning each person’s reason for being on the premises, the section affords no standard to guide the officer in determining which reasons constitute a valid “claim or color of legal right.” This section exhibits the same unconstitutional vagueness as a statute prohibiting presence in a public way late at night “without any visible or lawful business” (Palmer v. City of Euclid (1971) 402 U.S. 544, 545-546 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 98, 100 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 ]) or a statute prohibiting “wandering or strolling around from place to place withou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pueblo v. Hernández Colón
prsupreme · 1987 · confidence medium
Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 613, 617 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Kolender v. Lawsen, 461 U.S. 357 , 358, 361 (1983); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New York v. Earl
SCOTUS · 1977 · confidence medium
This rationale was further elaborated in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 145 (1972), where we stated: “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” As stated by Mr. Justice Stewart, "[a] policeman has a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances, and the circumstance of a person wandering the streets late at night without apparent lawful business may often present the occasion for police inquiry.” Palmer v. City of E…
discussed Cited "see" STATE OF FLORIDA v. WILLIAM CRUMBLEY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morton v. State, 988 So. 2d 698, 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ("Our constitutional analysis begins with the facts of this case, because a statute cannot logically be vague in all applications if it is not vague as applied to the actual facts." (citing Travis, 700 So. 2d at 106 )). "[O]ur principal focus is whether the appellee established below that the statute 'is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied [to him], it failed to give 'a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden . . . .' " Barnes, 686 So. 2d at 636 (alt…
examined Cited "see" McClamma v. State (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971).
examined Cited "see" Evans v. Trimble (3×)
Okla. Crim. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545-46 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); Switzer v. City of Tulsa, 598 P.2d 247, 248 (Okla.Crim.App.1979); Turner v. State, 549 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Okla.Crim.App.1976); Lock v. Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278, 279 (Okla.Crim.App.1963).
examined Cited "see" Mejia v. State (3×)
Tex. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Edward Ford, Robert Little, John Felix, Solomon Johnson, Phillip Usquiano, Marcus Thompson, E. Dene Armstrong (3×)
9th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (per curiam).
examined Cited "see" People v. Gottfurcht (6×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
The ordinance as interpreted by the majority comes within the doctrine that if a criminal statute “fails to state definite criteria of guilt, the whole constitutes an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.” (In re Blaney (1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 656 [ 184 P.2d 892 ]; see Palmer v. City of Euclid (1971) 402 U.S. 544 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 98 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 ].) Whether the ordinance be interpreted as the majority opinion dictates, or as I think it should be interpreted, I consider defendant’s contention to be sound that the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable.
examined Cited "see" City of Chicago v. Witvoet (3×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, Ohio (1971), 402 U.S. 544, 546 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 ; compare Coates v. City of Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 .
examined Cited "see" State v. Vick (3×)
Iowa · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 402 U.S. 544, 545-546 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 ; United States v. Harriss, supra; and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516 , 68 S.Ct. 665, 670 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , where the Court said: “ * * * The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.
examined Cited "see" Sands v. Wainwright (3×)
M.D. Fla. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
Thus, if a statute “. fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute”, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); see Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), then it is vague and standard-less and, as such, void for vagueness.
cited Cited "see" Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Tex. Att'y Gen. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See Palmer v. Enclid, 91 S. Ct. 1563 (1971); City of Carmel-by- the-Sea v. Young, 466 P. 2d 225 (Cal. Sup. 1970); Attorney General Opinion No. M-1039 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Guam v. SHAUNN GUMATAOTAO MANGLONA
Guam · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
To provide fair notice, “a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” Tfong, 2021 Guam 13 ¶ 15 (quoting Shimizu, 2017 Guam 11 ¶ 24); see also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Franklin v. Navient, Inc.
D. Del. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 545–46 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. Pa. Indus.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Abdalla's Tavern v. Dept. of Commerce, Unpublished Decision (6-20-2003) (3×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 385 , 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 ; see, also, Palmer v. Euclid (1971), 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 ; Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163 , 285 N.E.2d 714 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Roberts v. State of Maine (6×)
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-34 , 88 S.Ct. 254, 256-57 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (sentencing is critical stage in criminal process); see also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564-65 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (per curiam); cf. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137-39 , 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 , 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (even where sentencing court is vested with explicit sentencing discretion, sua sponte upward departure--absent prior notice to defendant--raises serious due process concerns).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. William Thomas, United States of America v. Ellen Thomas (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573, 1582 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“We examine whether Keeffe had fair notice ... that her [contemplated activity implicating First Amendment interests] was legitimately proscribed. . . .”); see also Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545-46 , 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (not First Amendment context); United States v. *195 Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (Due Process Clause requires “fair notice that ... contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chancey v. State
Ga. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U. S. 544 (91 SC 1563, 29 LE2d 98) (1971); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29 (83 SC 594, 9 LE2d 561) (1963); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (82 SC 275, 7 LE2d 285) (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (74 SC 808, 98 LE2d 989) (1954).
examined Cited "see, e.g." International Society For Krishna Consciousness Of Atlanta v. Eaves (3×)
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); Angelico v. Louisiana, 593 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1979) 24 Thornhill held that for this reason the Alabama statute reached protected expression and was overbroad.
examined Cited "see, e.g." International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves (3×)
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); Angelico v. Louisiana, 593 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1979). .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Wida (3×)
pactcomplnorthu · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed. 2d 98 (1971); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed. 2d 561 (1963).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Cameron David Bishop (3×)
10th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 , and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hawes (3×)
5th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 , 82 S.Ct. 275 , 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hawes (3×)
5th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 , 82 S.Ct. 275 , 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 , 74 S.Ct. 808 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. William F. Ray (3×)
10th Cir. · 1973 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e. g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 . 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1970) ; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 , 74 S.Ct. 808 . 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). 2 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Lloyd A. Hall v. United States (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1972 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." City of Mountlake Terrace v. Stone (2×)
Wash. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 , 29 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Palmer
v.
City of Euclid, Ohio
143.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 24, 1971.
402 U.S. 544
1971 U.S. LEXIS 42
Niki Z. Schwartz argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Joshua J. Kancelbaum., David J. Lombardo argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was William T. Monroe.
Stewart, Harlan, Douglas.
Cited by 130 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 89%
Citer courts: C.D. Illinois (3) · S.D. New York (2)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Appellant Palmer was convicted by a jury of violating the City of Euclid’s “suspicious person ordinance,” that is, of being

“[a]ny person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself.”

He was fined $50 and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The County Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed “for[*545] the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 1073 (1970).

We reverse the judgment against Palmer because the ordinance is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied to Palmer, it failed to give “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden . . . United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954).

The elements of the crime defined by the ordinance apparently are (1) wandering about the streets or being abroad at late or unusual hours; (2) being at the time without visible or lawful business;* and (3) failing to give a satisfactory explanation for his presence on the streets. Palmer, in his car, was seen late at night in a parking lot. A female left his car and entered by the front door an adjoining apartment house. Palmer then pulled onto the street, parked with his lights on, and used a two-way radio. He was not armed. He said he had just let off a friend. He was then arrested. At the station he gave three different addresses for himself and said he did not know his friend’s name or where she was going when she left his car. Palmer could reasonably be charged with knowing that he was on the streets at a late or unusual hour and that denying knowledge of his friend’s identity and claiming multiple addresses amounted to an unsatisfactory explanation under the ordinance. But in our view the ordinance gave insufficient notice to the average person that discharging[*546] a friend at an apartment house and then talking on a car radio while parked on the street was enough to show him to be “without any visible or lawful business.” Insofar as this record reveals, everything appellant did was quite visible and there is no suggestion whatsoever that what he did was unlawful under local, state, or federal law. If his conduct nevertheless satisfied the being-without-visible-or-lawful-business element of the ordinance, as the state courts must have held, it is quite unreasonable in our view to charge him with notice that such would be the construction of the ordinance. “The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, supra, at 617; Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284 (1963).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.

The ordinance seemingly requires a “business” purpose to be on the streets. But it seems irrational to construe the ordinance as permitting only visible and lawful commercial activities on the streets, thus in effect converting the ordinance into a curfew with exceptions for lawful commercial conduct. Neither the lower court nor appellee city suggests that the ordinance should be construed in this manner or that anyone would expect that it would be so construed.

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,

concurring.

While I agree with the Court that Euclid’s “suspicious person ordinance” is unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, I would go further and hold that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face.

A policeman has a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances, and the circumstance of a person wandering the streets late at night without apparent lawful business may often present the occasion for police inquiry. But in my view government does not have constitutional power to make that circumstance, without more, a criminal offense.