36 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanicola v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Appellant next argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it “does not contain language sufficiently and reasonably definite to fairly apprise the citizens of Florida as to when they could be charged with possession of a firearm by a violent criminal,” thereby requiring them to “guess as to whom th[e] statute applies.” “A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Sanicola v. State, 384 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla.1980) 1997“A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Sanicola v. State, 384 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla.1980) (citations omitted). | 4 | 7 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Brown, 629 So.2d at 842 ; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). 1999See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997); Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978). | 3 | 3 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences1998In order to overcome a void-for-vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). 1998In order to overcome a void-for-vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). | 2 | 9 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences1993See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 1993See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine). | 2 | 4 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvillegreen2 sentences1984The United States Supreme Court has summed up the void-for-vagueness doctrine in similar language: It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), is void for vagueness. 1984The United States Supreme Court has summed up the void-for-vagueness doctrine in similar language: It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), is void for vagueness. | 1 | 4 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2000See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); accord State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); Wilburn v.. State, 763 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 2000See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); accord State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); Wilburn v.. State, 763 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Brakegreen2 sentences2019See State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice.”). 116 See S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966 , 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. 2019See State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice.”). 116 See S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966 , 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 2 |
Parker v. Levygreen2 sentences2004It is well settled that "[w]hen a person has received fair warning from a criminal statute that certain conduct is prohibited, that person may not attack the vagueness of the statute simply because it does not give `similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit.' " Barnes, 686 So.2d at 636 -37 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). 2004It is well settled that "[w]hen a person has received fair warning from a criminal statute that certain conduct is prohibited, that person may not attack the vagueness of the statute simply because it does not give `similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit.' " Barnes, 686 So.2d at 636 -37 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). | 1 | 2 |
S.M. v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice.”). 116 See S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966 , 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. 2019See State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice.”). 116 See S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966 , 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Sessions v. Dimayagreen1 sentence2018Cf. Dimaya , 138 S.Ct. at 1232 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The implacable fact is that this isn't your everyday ambiguous statute. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barnesgreen2 sentences2004To sustain a void for vagueness claim, Defendants must have established below that the statute "is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied [to Defendants], it failed to give `a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.'" Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (citations omitted); see also State v. Barnes, 686 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). 2004It is well settled that "[w]hen a person has received fair warning from a criminal statute that certain conduct is prohibited, that person may not attack the vagueness of the statute simply because it does not give `similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit.' " Barnes, 686 So.2d at 636 -37 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2000See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); accord State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); Wilburn v.. State, 763 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Wilburn v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); accord State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); Wilburn v.. State, 763 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mark Marks, PAgreen1 sentence1999See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997); Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Trushin v. Stategreen1 sentence1998“A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1982); see Mitro, 700 So.2d 643 ; State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 697 So.2d 509 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mitrogreen1 sentence1998“A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1982); see Mitro, 700 So.2d 643 ; State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 697 So.2d 509 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dickinsongreen1 sentence1996In State v. Dickinson, 370 So.2d 762, 762-63 (Fla. 1979), we concluded that "Sections 812.012 to 812.028, Florida Statutes (1977), are constitutionally sound because reasonable persons have adequate notice of the types of conduct proscribed by these statutes." Dickinson was charged with dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019. | 1 | 1 |
Greenway v. Stategreen1 sentence1994"In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged." United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. at 33 , 83 S.Ct. at 598 (citation omitted); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 , 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2562 , 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Greenway v. State, 413 So.2d 23, 24 (Fla. 1982); State v. Olson, 586 So.2d 1239, 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Olsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| SE FISHERIES v. Dept. of Nat. Resourcesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. ELgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wershowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Connally v. General Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1992Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. [ 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)], supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 1992Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. [ 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)], supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). | 3 | 1991–1992 |
State v. Rou
green
2 sentences1999See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997); Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978). 1997See Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978). | 2 | 1997–1999 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1996Furthermore, "a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Mitchell, 652 So.2d at 477 (quoting Laurence H. 1996Furthermore, “a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Mitchell, 652 So.2d at 477 (quoting Laurence H. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences1992Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. [ 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)], supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 1992Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. [ 455 U.S. 489 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)], supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 , 92 S.Ct. 839 , 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Glaubius v. State
green
1 sentence2019Ct. App. 2015) (citing § 772.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2012)). 117 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 118 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 119 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 120 Glaubius, 688 So. 2d at 916 . 22 other contexts, Florida laws are much more forgiving where one party is the cause of a lack of evidence favorable to the other party. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Skilling v. United States
green
2 sentences2018In Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358 , 403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Court-in rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge-recognized that the "case law's current" requires courts if possible "to construe, not condemn, [legislative] enactments." The Court there pointed generally to the well-established rule that "before striking a ... statute as impermissibly vague" courts should "consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction," id. at 405 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , and specifically to "the familiar principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim 2018In Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358 , 403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Court-in rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge-recognized that the "case law's current" requires courts if possible "to construe, not condemn, [legislative] enactments." The Court there pointed generally to the well-established rule that "before striking a ... statute as impermissibly vague" courts should "consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction," id. at 405 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , and specifically to "the familiar principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cleveland v. United States
green
2 sentences2018In Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358 , 403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Court-in rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge-recognized that the "case law's current" requires courts if possible "to construe, not condemn, [legislative] enactments." The Court there pointed generally to the well-established rule that "before striking a ... statute as impermissibly vague" courts should "consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction," id. at 405 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , and specifically to "the familiar principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim 2018In Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358 , 403, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Court-in rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge-recognized that the "case law's current" requires courts if possible "to construe, not condemn, [legislative] enactments." The Court there pointed generally to the well-established rule that "before striking a ... statute as impermissibly vague" courts should "consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction," id. at 405 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , and specifically to "the familiar principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of crim | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Lanier
green
2 sentences2013The void-for-vagueness doctrine flows from the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and “bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean- mg and differ as to its application.’ ” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connolly v. Gen. 2013The void-for-vagueness doctrine flows from the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and “bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean- mg and differ as to its application.’ ” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connolly v. Gen. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Palmer v. City of Euclid
green
2 sentences2004To sustain a void for vagueness claim, Defendants must have established below that the statute "is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied [to Defendants], it failed to give `a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.'" Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (citations omitted); see also State v. Barnes, 686 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). 2004To sustain a void for vagueness claim, Defendants must have established below that the statute "is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied [to Defendants], it failed to give `a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.'" Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 , 91 S.Ct. 1563 , 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (citations omitted); see also State v. Barnes, 686 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Britt v. State
green
1 sentence2001In Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), this court rejected appellant's void-for-vagueness challenge to the conditions contained in subsections 948.03(5)(a)(2) and (a)(6). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Perkins v. State
green
1 sentence1999Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1313 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Conforti
green
1 sentence1998“A statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny under a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1982); see Mitro, 700 So.2d 643 ; State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 697 So.2d 509 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Evans green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Harriss green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Reynolds v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Roth v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Sandstrom v. Leader green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.