vagueness doctrine in Alaska

2026It raises several concerns: the lack of standards for when 130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 131 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”). 132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 133 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. -35- 7801 advocacy on a particular issue “indirectly identifies” a ballot proposition; the Commission’

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2025We review the constitutionality of the ordinance de novo.29 Lorenz’s claim is governed by our decision in Stevens v. Matanuska- Susitna Borough.30 In Stevens, we addressed a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance that prohibited “amplified noise or vibration during certain hours of the day and night that c[ould] be plainly heard or felt on neighboring property such that it disturb[ed] a person of normal sensibilities.”31 The defendant, who was convicted of violating the ordinance, argued that it failed to give constitutionally adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and that it would lead

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2026It raises several concerns: the lack of standards for when 130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 131 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”). 132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 133 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. -35- 7801 advocacy on a particular issue “indirectly identifies” a ballot proposition; the Commission’

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2011See also Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926) (declaring that statutory definitions can withstand a vagueness challenge "notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ").

2011See also Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127-28 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926) (declaring that statutory definitions can withstand a vagueness challenge "notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ").

1988See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 , 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2446-48 , 49 L.Ed.2d 310, 319-21 (1976) (in which, under the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge, stating that “even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the ordinances on other litigants, they are unquestionably applicable to these respondents”).

1988See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 , 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2446-48 , 49 L.Ed.2d 310, 319-21 (1976) (in which, under the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge, stating that “even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the ordinances on other litigants, they are unquestionably applicable to these respondents”).

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2023We have explained that even if a statute might in some contexts be too vague to give adequate notice, it “may still pass muster if: (a) there can be no question as to its applicability to the particular offense involved, and (b) a construction may be placed upon the statute so that in the future the type of offenses coming within its purview may reasonably be understood.”121 The regulation of economic activity — such as through antipollution statutes — typically survives a vagueness challenge as long as there is “legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be g

2026It raises several concerns: the lack of standards for when 130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 131 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”). 132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 133 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. -35- 7801 advocacy on a particular issue “indirectly identifies” a ballot proposition; the Commission’

2026It raises several concerns: the lack of standards for when 130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 131 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”). 132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 133 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. -35- 7801 advocacy on a particular issue “indirectly identifies” a ballot proposition; the Commission’

2026It raises several concerns: the lack of standards for when 130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 131 FCC. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253-54 (2012); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“If . . . the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”). 132 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 133 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. -35- 7801 advocacy on a particular issue “indirectly identifies” a ballot proposition; the Commission’

2025We review the constitutionality of the ordinance de novo.29 Lorenz’s claim is governed by our decision in Stevens v. Matanuska- Susitna Borough.30 In Stevens, we addressed a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance that prohibited “amplified noise or vibration during certain hours of the day and night that c[ould] be plainly heard or felt on neighboring property such that it disturb[ed] a person of normal sensibilities.”31 The defendant, who was convicted of violating the ordinance, argued that it failed to give constitutionally adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and that it would lead

2025We review the constitutionality of the ordinance de novo.29 Lorenz’s claim is governed by our decision in Stevens v. Matanuska- Susitna Borough.30 In Stevens, we addressed a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance that prohibited “amplified noise or vibration during certain hours of the day and night that c[ould] be plainly heard or felt on neighboring property such that it disturb[ed] a person of normal sensibilities.”31 The defendant, who was convicted of violating the ordinance, argued that it failed to give constitutionally adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and that it would lead

2025We review the constitutionality of the ordinance de novo.29 Lorenz’s claim is governed by our decision in Stevens v. Matanuska- Susitna Borough.30 In Stevens, we addressed a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance that prohibited “amplified noise or vibration during certain hours of the day and night that c[ould] be plainly heard or felt on neighboring property such that it disturb[ed] a person of normal sensibilities.”31 The defendant, who was convicted of violating the ordinance, argued that it failed to give constitutionally adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and that it would lead

2011See also Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991, 997-99 (Alaska 2008) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the phrase "without provocation"), and Panther v. State, 780 P.2d 386, 390-91 (Alaska App.1989) (rejecting the contention that there is no objectively ascertainable distinction between a "deviation" from the applicable standard of care and a "gross deviation" from the same standard of care).

2011See also Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991, 997-99 (Alaska 2008) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the phrase "without provocation"), and Panther v. State, 780 P.2d 386, 390-91 (Alaska App.1989) (rejecting the contention that there is no objectively ascertainable distinction between a "deviation" from the applicable standard of care and a "gross deviation" from the same standard of care).

2000See Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 146 (6th Cir.1993); Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir.1981); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 542 F.2d at 30 ; Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975); see also, eg., Georgia Pacific Corp. v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir.1994) ("'When considering remedial legislation such as the OSH Act and its implementing regulation, the purported vagueness of a standard is judged in light of its application to the facts of the case."). 54 .

2000See Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 146 (6th Cir.1993); Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir.1981); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 542 F.2d at 30 ; Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975); see also, eg., Georgia Pacific Corp. v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir.1994) ("'When considering remedial legislation such as the OSH Act and its implementing regulation, the purported vagueness of a standard is judged in light of its application to the facts of the case."). 54 .

2000See, eg., Ray Evers Welding Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 726, 732 (6th Cir.1980) ("Industry standards and customs are not entirely determinative of reasonableness because there may be instances where a whole industry has been negligent in [following safety procedures]."); General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453 , 464 (1st Cir.1979). j 55 .

2000See Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 146 (6th Cir.1993); Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir.1981); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 542 F.2d at 30 ; Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975); see also, eg., Georgia Pacific Corp. v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir.1994) ("'When considering remedial legislation such as the OSH Act and its implementing regulation, the purported vagueness of a standard is judged in light of its application to the facts of the case."). 54 .

2000See Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 146 (6th Cir.1993); Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir.1981); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 542 F.2d at 30 ; Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975); see also, eg., Georgia Pacific Corp. v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir.1994) ("'When considering remedial legislation such as the OSH Act and its implementing regulation, the purported vagueness of a standard is judged in light of its application to the facts of the case."). 54 .

1998In addressing the vagueness challenge, we observed that the summary “described clearly, if generally, what the proposed ordinance would accomplish,” id. at 462 , and we reasoned that greater specificity could not be countenanced.

1998In addressing the vagueness challenge, we observed that the summary "described clearly, if generally, what the proposed ordinance would accomplish," id. at 462 , and we reasoned that greater specificity could not be countenanced.

1997“The fact that the statute might reach first amendment activities is not sufficient; the statute must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity.” Dischner, 974 F.2d at 1511 -12 & n. 7 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute, a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case).

1997“The fact that the statute might reach first amendment activities is not sufficient; the statute must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity.” Dischner, 974 F.2d at 1511 -12 & n. 7 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8); see also Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute, a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case).