Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Stand. Oil Co.
The issuance of an administrative complaint is not final agency action because it is not a definitive statement of position with concrete legal consequences for day-to-day business.
A respondent challenges the issuance of a Federal Trade Commission complaint, alleging the Commission lacked the requisite reason to believe a violation occurred. The respondent seeks judicial review of the complaint before the conclusion of administrative adjudication. The Court holds that the issuance of a complaint is not final agency action because it is not a definitive statement of position and lacks the legal force or practical effect on day-to-day business characteristic of regulations. Because the complaint merely initiates proceedings, it is an intermediate step that must await review of the final agency order.
At page 242Distinguishing complaint burden from final agency action69 citing cases“piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary.”
- Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. R.R.R.B., No. 24-2547 (8th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025).published(It is firmly established that agency action is not final merely because it has the effect of requiring a party to participate in an agency proceeding.)
- Nation v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 819 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2016).published (Although [the burden of responding to agency enforcement] certainly is substantial, it is different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final agency action.)
- Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consum. Prod. Saf. Comm'n, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003).published (Judicial review ... should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before adjudication concludes.)
- Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989).published ([s]erving only to initiate the proceedings, the issuance of the complaint ... ha[d] no legal force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories , nor any comparable effect upon Socal’s daily bus…)
- Cochran v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194 (5th Cir. 2021).published Op. 20-21. 90 challenge.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22-23; see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 , 244 n.11 (1980) (“[T]he possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursu…
- Michelle Cochran v. SEC, 969 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2020).published The benefit of agency expertise should instead be assessed by looking at the overall case, so this factor accounts for the possibility that the agency’s resolution of other issues “may obviate the need to address the constitutional challen…
- Roger Wilson v. EI DuPont de Nemours & Co, 710 F. App'x 57 (3d Cir. 2018).unpublished (Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise ... [and] leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon compl…)
- Tianjin Magnesium Intern. Co. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).published Because the ‘inconvenience and expense’ associated with a trade remedy proceeding ‘are inherent in the administrative and judicial review process [they] cannot therefore constitute manifest inadequacy for what is the normal jurisdictional…
- United States v. President St. Regis Mgmt. Co., 451 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2006).published (Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise ... [and] leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon compl…)
- United States ex rel. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C.-St. Regis Mgmt. Co., 451 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2006).published (Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise ... [and] leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon compl…)
Show 51 more citing cases
- GTE North Inc. v. McCarty, 978 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ind. 1997).published “judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise”
- Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. USSEC, No. 25-4000 (10th Cir. July 31, 2026).published The Court acknowledged that it takes a “flexible view of finality” in the APA context and recognized that “the issuance of the complaint is definitive on the question whether the Commission avers reason to believe that the respondent to th…
- Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Becerra, No. 2025-0113 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2025).publishedAccordingly, pre-mature “judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action” and, even assuming that Teva’s APA claim is meritorious, “immediate judicial review would deny the [agency] ‘an opportunity…
- W. Towboat Co. v. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., No. 2022-2665 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2025).published Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
- Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Russell Vought, 149 F.4th 762 (D.C. Cir. 2025).published Under these circumstances, immediate judicial review would deny the Bureau “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes.” FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
- Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986).published
- Cec Energy Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Virgin Islands. Appeal of Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Virgin Islands, 891 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1989).published
- Univ. of Washington Med. Ctr. v. Becerra, No. 2024-2998 (D.D.C. June 17, 2025).published
- N.H. Lottery Comm'n v. Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019).published
- Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Herman, 176 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1999).published
- FL Power & Light v. EPA, No. 95-1093 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 1998).published
- G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Philip A. Hawman & Hawman Farms, Inc., 870 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1989).published
- Pub. Citizen v. Off. of the United States Trade Representatives, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).published
- Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 998 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1993).unpublished
- Essex Cnty. v. Zagata, 695 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1998).published
- Belle Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).published
- Pebble Ltd. P'ship v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, 604 F. App'x 623 (9th Cir. 2015).unpublished
- Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 335 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2003).published
- Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005).published
- United States v. Loy, No. 99-3827 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2001).
- San Francisco Herring Ass'n v. Usdoi, 946 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2019).published
- Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 986 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2021).published
- Gulfport Energy Corp. v. FERC, 41 F.4th 667 (5th Cir. 2022).published
- Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180 (Vet. App. 1991).published
- Alabama v. Bowen, 659 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1986).published
- Cillie v. Esper, No. 3:19-cv-00334 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2020).
- Kelerchian v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 655 F. Supp. 3d 334 (E.D. Pa. 2023).published
- Mashni v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 535 F. Supp. 3d 475 (D.S.C. 2021).published
- Vision Imp. Grp., LLC v. Fresh Grp., Ltd., No. 7:21-cv-00295 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2021).
- Liquidia Tech., Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., No. 2024-2428 (D.D.C. May 2, 2025).published
- Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. P United States Dep't of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D.N.H. 2025).published
- Carter/mondale Presidential Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 711 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1983).published
- Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council v. Dep't of Energy, 511 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1981).published
- Spannaus v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 641 F. Supp. 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).published
- Air California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981).published
- Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010).published
- Pfizer Inc v. Shalala, Donna E., 182 F.3d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1999).published
- Rhode Island Dep't of Env't Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2002).published
- Rhode Island Dep't of Env't Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002).published
- U.S. Ass'n of Importers of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 413 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).published
- Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Comm'r, Food & Drug Admin., & Aspirin Found. of Am., Inc, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984).published
- Canada Coal Co. v. Stiltner, 866 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1989).published
- Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).published
- Her Majesty The Queen In Right Of Ontario v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).published
- Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2003).published
- Nat'l Mediation Bd. v. Cont'l Airlines Corp. (In re Cont'l Airlines Corp.), 50 B.R. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1985).published
- Indus. High. Corp. v. Danielson, 796 F. Supp. 121 (D.N.J. 1992).published
- Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 573 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Me. 2008).published
- NJ Univ Med. v. Inspector Gen HHS, No. 03-1268 (3d Cir. Oct. 17, 2003).published
- Wisconsin Voters All. v. Kamala Harris, 28 F.4th 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2022).published
- Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Rehnquist, 46 F. App'x 124 (3d Cir. 2002).unpublished
At page 244Litigation expense does not constitute irreparable injury59 citing casesMere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” (internal quotation omitted)
- Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Illinois Mine Subsidence Ins. Fund, No. 3:20-cv-03281 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2025).(Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury)
- Doe, John v. Gundersen Lutheran Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:23-cv-00694 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2024).(It is established that the costs of ongoing litigation . . . are not irreparable injury.)
- Earl v. Boeing Co., No. 4:19-cv-00507 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2021).(the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government)
- Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States, 2009 CIT 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).(the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government)
- Cochran v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194 (5th Cir. 2021).published “the possibility that socal's challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.”
- Michelle Cochran v. SEC, 969 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2020).published “the possibility that socal's challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.”
- Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).published “the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government”
- Tianjin Magnesium Intern. Co. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).published “we do not doubt that the burden of defending this proceeding will be substantial. but the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government”
- Abitibi-Consol. Inc. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).published “mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.”
- Banks, No. 2:65-cv-16173 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2026).Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981) (first citing Spiegel v. City of Houston, 636 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981); and then citing Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1975)). 29 F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co.,…
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- Centerline Logistics Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 2026-2773 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2026).publishedBureau, 849 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he expense and disruption of defending [oneself] in protracted adjudicatory proceedings” is not an irreparable harm.” (second alteration in original) (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal…
- In re Ecto World LLC, No. 26-132 (Fed. Cir. June 11, 2026).unpublished(explaining that expenses and burdens of defending action do not constitute irreparable harm)
- In re Wisconsin & Milwaukee Hotel LLC, No. 24-21743 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2026). (Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” (quoting Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974)))
- Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 986 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2021).published
- Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Env't Prot. Agency, 669 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1982).published
- Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).published
- In re Classic Indus., No. 2009-M895 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2009).unpublished
- In re Freescale Semiconductor Inc., No. 2008-M875 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2008).unpublished
- Gibson v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1982).published
- Atl. Richfield Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 769 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1985).published
- UST, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987).published
- In re Amsted Indus. Inc., 1 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 1993).published
- Calgene, Inc. v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 14 F.3d 612 (Fed. Cir. 1993).published
- C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Interventional Tech., Inc., 39 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994).unpublished
- Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 43 F.3d 1483 (10th Cir. 1994).published
- In re Jock Hamilton & United Chem. Corp., 82 F.3d 432 (Fed. Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Entergy v. State of Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2000).published
- Maersk Container v. Jackson, No. 97-1056 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1997).unpublished
- Sharp Elec. Corp. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).published
- Kimberly-Clark Pennsylvania, LLC v. Delaware Cnty. Reg'l Water Quality Control Auth., 527 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2007).published
- Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., No. 2009-1662 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2010).published
- In re Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., 212 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2000).published
- AT&T Broadband, LLC v. Int'l Brohd Elec, No. 02-1950 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 2003).published
- Nat'l Presto v. Norgle, Charles R., No. 03-1873 (7th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003).published
- Sherwood v. Marquette Transp. Co., 587 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2009).published
- Robert Carey V., No. 11-60021 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2012).unpublished
- John Doe Co. v. Consum. Fin. Prot. Bureau, 849 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2017).published
- Thorp v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 2018-1071 (D.D.C. June 22, 2018).published
- M S Int'l v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2020).published
- Founders Ins. v. Everest Nat'l Ins., 41 A.D.3d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).published
- Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 2017-1371 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022).published
- Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023).published
- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 723 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2024).published
- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24-5054, 2024 WL 1549732 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2024).published
- Leachco v. Consum. Prod. Saf. Comm'n, 103 F.4th 748 (10th Cir. 2024).published
- Montana Med. Ass'n v. Knudsen, 591 F. Supp. 3d 905 (D. Mont. 2022).published
- Fitzmorris v. NH Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:21-cv-00025 (D.N.H. Jan. 22, 2024).
- Leachco, Inc. v. Consum. Prod. Saf. Comm'n, No. 6:22-cv-00232 (E.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2022).
- Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00450, 2019 WL 4257108 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2019).
- Charmoli v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No. 22-02130 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 13, 2023).
- Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023).published
- Fredricks v. Council of the Inspectors Gen. of Integrity & Efficiency (\CIGIE\")", No. 1:23-cv-00442 (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2023).
- Cymbidium Restoration Trust v. Am. Homeowner Pres. Trust Series AHP Servicing, No. 2:24-cv-00025 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2024).
- Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Great Am. E&S Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Ill. 2025).published
- United States v. State of Texas, 144 F.4th 632 (5th Cir. 2025).published
- Traffic Jam Events v. FTC, No. 21-60947 (5th Cir. July 10, 2025).unpublished
- Emily Fitzmorris v. New Hampshire Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Comm'r Lori Weaver, 2024 DNH 003 (D.N.H. 2024).published
- Wisconsin Voters All. v. Kamala Harris, 28 F.4th 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2022).published
At page 239Interpreting finality in administrative agency actions40 citing casesholding agency’s issuance of an administrative complaint was not subject to review until final agency action despite its evident assumption that the propriety of the initial charging decision would not be subject to administrative review
- Soundboard Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 888 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2018).published ([C]ases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the ‘finality’ element in a pragmatic way.)
- Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Jackson, No. 2010-1220 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2011).published (Finality resulting from the practical effect of an ostensibly non-binding agency proclamation is a concept [this Circuit has] recognized in the past.)
- Presidio Mun. Dev. Dist. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 2026-2146 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2026).published“In other words, an agency action is final if, as the Supreme Court has said, it is ‘definitive’ and has a ‘direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day business’ of the party 13 challenging it.” National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U…
- ICON EV LLC v. United States, 2026 CIT 55 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2026).publishedThe imposition of interim measures in this case is more like a regulation with immediate and direct effect on ICON’s day-to-day business, see id. (impact of the regulation upon the petitioners was “sufficiently direct and immediate as to r…
- Luna Gutierrez v. Noem, No. 2025-1766, 2025 WL 3496390 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2025).publishedCo. of N.M., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M. 2003); and then quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)).
- Global Health Council v. Donald J. Trump, No. 2025-0402 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2025).publishedTrade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)).
- Richardson v. INS, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998).published
- Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983).published
- Indep Petro Assn v. Babbitt, Bruce, 235 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 2001).published
- Fourth Br Assoc v. FERC, No. 00-1173 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2001).published
Show 28 more citing cases
- Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 786 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1986).published
- Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 911 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1990).published
- Booker T. Wade, Jr. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 976 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992).unpublished
- Water Works, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 37 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994).published
- Sun Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 113 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Nc St. Bd. of Regis. for Pro. Eng. v. FTC, 615 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.C. 1985).published
- Virginia Beach Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Reich, 881 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Va. 1995).published
- Cascade Conservation League C. M.A. Segale, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Wash. 1996).published
- New Jersey Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 2d 497 (D.N.J. 1998).published
- Hall v. Leavitt, No. 2008-1715 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2009).published
- Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, Afl-Cio v. Chao, No. 2006-0677 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2009).published
- Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2008).published
- Patrick Acker v. Env't Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002).published
- Oregon Nat. Desert Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008).published
- Balde v. Duke, No. 2017-1976 (D.D.C. July 3, 2018).published
- Ashford Univ., LLC v. Sec'y of Vets. Affairs, 951 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020).published
- Humane Soc'y of the United States v. AGRI, 41 F.4th 564 (D.C. Cir. 2022).published
- North Carolina State Bd. of Reg. for Prof'l Engineers & Land Surveyors v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 615 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.C. 1985).published
- Ace Black Ranches, LLC v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, No. 1:21-cv-00214 (D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2022).
- Washington v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., No. 1:19-cv-04724 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2020).
- Doe v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 490 F. Supp. 3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).published
- Not an LLC v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 2:22-cv-00747, 2022 WL 2073340 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2022).
- MCR Oil Tools v. TRAN, 110 F.4th 677 (5th Cir. 2024).published
- S. Utah Wilderness All. v. US Dep't of the Interior, No. 2:19-cv-00297 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2021).
- State of Texas v. DHS, No. 23-50869 (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2024).published
- Columbia Riverkeeper v. Caswell, Jr., No. 3:24-cv-00868 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2025).
At page 241Determining finality of administrative agency action35 citing cases“threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings.”
- Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998).published (By its terms, the Commission's averment of 'reason to believe' that [the respondent] was violating the Act is not a definitive statement of position. It represents a threshold determination that further inquiry is warr…)
- Territorial Court of U.S. Virgin Islands v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 54 F. App'x 339 (3d Cir. 2002).unpublished “the extent to which the respondent may challenge the complaint and its charges prove that the averment ... is not 'definitive”
- Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC v. United States, No. 2025-0375 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2026).publishedRelatedly, “‘the extent to which [a] [party] may challenge’ an action before the agency may also indicate how definitive the determination is.” Or. Health & Sci., 2025 WL 1707630 , at *5 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co., 449…
- W. Towboat Co. v. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., No. 2022-2665 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2025).published Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
- Edward Heymer v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Grp., No. 24-2111 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2025).publishedHowever, allegations made by the FTC in a complaint reflect “a threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings” rather than “a definitive statement of position.” FTC v. Standard Oil…
- Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984).published
- Nc St. Bd. of Regis. for Pro. Eng. v. FTC, 615 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.C. 1985).published
- Virginia Beach Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Reich, 881 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Va. 1995).published
- North Carolina State Bd. of Reg. for Prof'l Engineers & Land Surveyors v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 615 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.C. 1985).published
- Eastman Kodak Co. v. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 704 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1983).published
Show 24 more citing cases
- Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986).published
- Cec Energy Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Virgin Islands. Appeal of Pub. Serv. Comm'n of the Virgin Islands, 891 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1989).published
- Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Comm'r, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).published
- Trafalgar v. Cuomo, No. 97-2152 (1st Cir. Oct. 29, 1998).published
- Ammex v. Cox, No. 01-2518 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).published
- Clean Air Council v. E. Scott Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).published
- Arch Coal, Inc. v. R. Alexander Acosta, 888 F.3d 493 (D.C. Cir. 2018).published
- Michael Bent v. Patricia Lashway, No. 17-35962 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018).unpublished
- Fontanez v. Berber, No. 2021-2073 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2022).published
- Harper v. Werfel, 118 F.4th 100 (1st Cir. 2024).published
- MacHie v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 2025-0835 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2025).published
- Univ. of Washington Med. Ctr. v. Becerra, No. 2024-2998 (D.D.C. June 17, 2025).published
- Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Scott Bessent, 152 F.4th 162 (4th Cir. 2025).published
- N.H. Lottery Comm'n v. Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019).published
- Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 1:24-cv-03111 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2025).
- Borg-Warner Prot. Servs. Corp. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 245 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2001).published
- Carter/mondale Presidential Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 711 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1983).published
- Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council v. Dep't of Energy, 511 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1981).published
- Valley Indus. Servs., Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 570 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Cal. 1983).published
- Jerome Milton, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 734 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1990).published
- Spannaus v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 641 F. Supp. 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).published
- Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consum. Prod. Saf. Comm'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2001).published
- Air California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981).published
- Nerium Int'l, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, No. 1:19-cv-07189 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2020).
At page 243Determining final agency action status and judicial review limits20 citing cases“we think, however, that socal and the court of appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.”
- Aerosource, Inc. v. Slater, 142 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 1998).published (But the Commission’s refusal to reconsider its issuance of the complaint does not render the complaint a ‘definitive’ action.)
- Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998).published “every respondent to a commission complaint could make the claim that plaintiff made. judicial review of the averments in the commission's complaints should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before adju…”
- Pan Am. v. EPA, No. 95-1780 (1st Cir. Sept. 6, 1996).published (final agency action" status designed to promote "administrative efficiency)
- Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).published “so-cal and the court of appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.”
- Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 663 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1981).published “we think, however, that socal and the court of appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.”
- Triple R Farms, LLC v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 5:26-cv-00087 (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2026).First, “[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 101 S. Ct. 488, 495 (1980) (quoting Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing C…
- Harper v. Werfel, 118 F.4th 100 (1st Cir. 2024).published
- Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).published
- Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Env't Prot. Agency, 669 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1982).published
- Alabama Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 993 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1993).published
Show 9 more citing cases
- Md. Comm'n on Human Rel. v. BG & E. CO., 459 A.2d 205 (Md. 1983).published
- Ford v. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n, 979 S.W.2d 897 (Ark. 1998).published
- Julious Mosley v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2017).published
- Midship Pipeline v. FERC, 45 F.4th 867 (5th Cir. 2022).published
- Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 459 A.2d 205 (Md. 1983).published
- McGuire v. Zoning Bd., 26 Am. Samoa 2d 59 (1994).published
- Bd. of Dental Examiners of Alabama v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, No. 2:20-cv-01310 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2021).
- Scheibe v. Wayne Cnty., No. 5:24-cv-00432 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2025).
- Air California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981).published
At page 246Determining appealability of preliminary agency orders11 citing casesan order that would merge with any final decision on the merits is not appealable under Cohen
- Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 663 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1981).published See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 , 101 S.Ct. 488, 495 , 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (“We think, however, that Socal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.”).
- Calgene, Inc. v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 14 F.3d 612 (Fed. Cir. 1993).published
- Amrep Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985).published
- Patlex Corp. v. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).published
- Kerr Mfg. Co. v. Centrix, Inc., 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).unpublished
- US West Commc'ns, Inc. v. Hamiton, 224 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2000).published
- Gov't of the People's Repub. of China v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007).published
- Gen. Offshore Corp. v. Farrelly, 743 F. Supp. 1177 (D.V.I. 1990).published
- Dean L. Buntrock v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 347 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2003).published
- Logicon, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 776 (Ct. Cl. 1991).published
Show 1 more citing case
- Zipper v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, No. 1:24-cv-21060 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2024).
At page 238Determining final agency action under the APA8 citing casesfiling of complaint commencing agency enforcement action was not final agency action
- D.N.N., No. 1:25-cv-01613 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2025).(ECF No. 89 at p. 16.) The court cabins its analysis to the Government’s arguments asserted. “meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its power.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (…
- Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984).published
- Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).published
- Minard Run Oil Co. v. United States Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011).published
- Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. La. 1989).published
- Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 297 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2003).published
- Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 298 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2003).published
- Jarkesy v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).published
At page 240Determining finality of agency action and complaints3 citing casesissuing complaint not final agency action because represents start of process
- Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. USSEC, No. 25-4000 (10th Cir. July 31, 2026).published The Court acknowledged that it takes a “flexible view of finality” in the APA context and recognized that “the issuance of the complaint is definitive on the question whether the Commission avers reason to believe that the respondent to th…
- Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2007).published
- Wynnewood Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-60425 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2023).published
[T]he possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.
- Cochran v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194 (5th Cir. 2021).published ([T]he possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.)
- Michelle Cochran v. SEC, 969 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2020).published ([T]he possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.)
the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government
- Sahaviriya Steel Indus. Pub. Co. v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).published (the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government)
- Tianjin Magnesium Intern. Co. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).published (we do not doubt that the burden of defending this proceeding will be substantial. But the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government)
So-cal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.
- Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).published (So-cal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.)
- Gulf Oil Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 663 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1981).published (We think, however, that Socal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality.)
Other citing cases
- Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005).published
- Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, 95 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1996).published
- Mader Constr. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 607 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).published
v.
Standard Oil Company of California
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission is “final agency action” subject to judicial review before administrative adjudication concludes.
[*234] I
On July 18, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission issued and served upon eight major oil companies, including Standard Oil Company of California (Socal),[1] a complaint averring that the Commission had “reason to believe” that the companies were violating § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45,[2] and stating the Commission’s charges in that respect.[3] The Commission issued the complaint under authority of § 5 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b), which provides:
“Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any . . . person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing . . .
An adjudication of the complaint’s charges began soon there[*235]after before an Administrative Law Judge, and is still pending.
On May 1, 1975, Socal filed a complaint against the Commission in the District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the Commission had issued its complaint without having “reason to believe” that Socal was violating the Act.[4] Socal sought an order declaring that the issuance of the complaint was unlawful and requiring that the complaint be withdrawn. Socal had sought this relief from the Commission and been denied.[5] In support of its allegation and request, Socal recited a series of events that preceded the issuance of the complaint and several events that followed. In Socal’s estimation, the only inference to be drawn from these events was that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence when it issued the complaint to warrant a belief that Socal was violating the Act.
The gist of Socal’s recitation of events preceding the issuance of the complaint is that political pressure for a public explanation of the gasoline shortages of 1973 forced the Commission to issue a complaint against the major oil companies despite insufficient investigation. The series of events began on May 31, 1973. As of that day, the Commission had not[*236] examined any employees, documents, or books of Socal’s, although the Commission had announced in December 1971, that it intended to investigate possible violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the petroleum industry.
On May 31, Senator Henry M. Jackson, then Chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and of the Permanent Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Government Operations, requested the Commission “to prepare a report within thirty days regarding the relationship between the structure of the petroleum industry and related industries and the current and prospective shortages of petroleum products.” Immediately the Commission subpoenaed three Soeal officers to testify before it, and they did so in late June. This examination was the Commission’s only inquiry as to Socal’s books and records, and the only interview of a Socal officer, prior to the issuance of the complaint.[6] On July 6, the Commission sent to Senator Jackson a “Preliminary Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Its Investigation of the Petroleum Industry,” requesting that the report not be made public because it had not yet “been evaluated or approved by the Commission.” On July 9, Senator Jackson informed the Commission by letter that he intended to publish the report as a congressional committee reprint unless the Commission explained by July 13 why public release of the report would be improper. The Commission responded on July 11 that public release of the report, which the Commission characterized as “an internal staff memorandum,” would be “inconsistent with [the Commission’s] duty to proceed judiciously and responsibly in determining what, if any, action should be taken on the basis of the staff investigation.” On July 13, Senator Jackson released the report for publica[*237]tion by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. On July 18, the Commission issued its complaint.
The subsequent events recited by Socal in its complaint were intended to confirm that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence before issuing its complaint to determine that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. One subsequent event was the issuance on August 27 of a report by the Office of Energy Advisor of the Department of the Treasury, concluding that the Commission’s staff report was wrong in implying that the major oil companies had contrived the gasoline shortages. The report recommended that the complaint be withdrawn. A second event was Senator Jackson’s statement in January 1974, at the conclusion of congressional hearings about the shortages, that he had found no “hard evidence” that the oil companies had created shortages. In addition to these expressions of doubt about the allegations of the Commission’s complaint, Socal recounted the several failures of the Commission’s complaint counsel in the adjudication to comply with orders of the Administrative Law Judge to identify the witnesses and documents on which the Commission intended to rely. The complaint counsel admitted that most of the evidence and witnesses the Commission hoped to introduce were yet to be secured through discovery, and he moved to relax the Commission’s procedural rules for adjudication in order to allow such extensive discovery. In certifying this motion to the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge recommended “withdrawal of this case from adjudication — that is, dismissal without prejudice— so that it may be more fully investigated.” The Commission denied the complaint counsel’s motion and declined to follow the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendations.
The District Court dismissed Socal’s complaint on the ground that “a review of preliminary decisions made by administrative agencies, except under most unusual circumstances, would be productive of nothing more than chaos.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 596[*238] F. 2d 1381 (1979). It held the Commission’s determination whether evidence before it provided the requisite reason to believe is “committed to agency discretion” and therefore is unreviewable according to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a)(2). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the District Court could inquire whether the Commission in fact had made the determination that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. If the District Court were to find upon remand that the Commission had issued the complaint “solely because of outside pressure or with complete absence of a ‘reason to believe’ determination,” 596 F. 2d, at 1386, then it was to order the Commission to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals further held that the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action” under § 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704.
We granted the Commission’s petition for a writ of cer-tiorari because of the importance of the questions raised by Socal’s request for judicial review of the complaint before the conclusion of the adjudication. 445 U. S. 903 (1980). We now reverse.
II
The Commission averred in its complaint that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. That averment is subject to judicial review before the conclusion of administrative adjudication only if the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action” or otherwise was “directly reviewable” under § 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704. We conclude that the issuance of the complaint was neither.[7]
[*239] A
The Commission’s issuance of its complaint was not “final agency action.” The Court observed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967), that “[t]he cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the 'finality’ element in a pragmatic way.” In Abbott Laboratories, for example, the publication of certain regulations by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was held to be final agency action subject to judicial review in an action for declaratory judgment brought prior to any Government action for enforcement. The regulations required manufacturers of prescription drugs to print certain information on drug labels and advertisements. The regulations were “definitive” statements of the Commission’s position, id., at 151, and had a “direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day business” of the complaining parties. Id., at 152. They had “the status of law” and “immediate compliance with their terms[*240] was expected.” Ibid. In addition, the question presented by the challenge to the regulations was a “legal issue ... fit for judicial resolution.” Id., at 153. Finally, because the parties seeking the declaratory judgment represented almost all the parties affected by the regulations, “a pre-enforcement challenge . . . [was] calculated to speed enforcement” of the relevant Act. Id., at 154. Taking “a similarly flexible view of finality,” id., at 150, and in view of similar pragmatic considerations, the Court had held the issuance of administrative regulations to be “final agency action” in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 (1942), Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S. 40 (1956), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956).[8] The issuance of the complaint in this case, however, is materially different.
[*241] By its terms, the Commission’s averment of “reason to believe” that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive statement of position. It represents a threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings. To be sure, the issuance of the complaint is definitive on the question whether the Commission avers reason to believe that the respondent to the complaint is violating the Act.[9] But the extent to which the respondent may challenge the complaint and its charges proves that the averment of reason to believe is not “definitive” in a comparable manner to the regulations in Abbott Laboratories and the cases it discussed.
Section 5 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b), in conjunction with Commission regulations, 16 CFR §§ 3.41-3.46 (1980), and § 5 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 554 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), requires that the complaint contain a notice of hearing at which the respondent may present evidence and testimony before an administrative law judge to refute the Commission’s charges. Either party to the adjudication may appeal an adverse decision of the administrative law judge to the full Commission, 5 U. S. C. §577; 16 CFR §3.52 (1980); see 15 U. S. C. §45 (c), which then may dismiss the complaint. See 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c). If instead the Commission enters an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the challenged practice, the respondent still is not bound by the Commission’s decision until judicial review is complete or the opportunity to seek review has lapsed. 15 U. S. C. §45 (g).[10] Thus, the averment of reason to believe is a prerequisite to a definitive agency position on the question whether Socal violated the Act, but itself is a determination only that adjudicatory proceedings will com[*242]mence. Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948).
Serving only to initiate the proceedings, the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe has no legal force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, nor any comparable effect upon Socal’s daily business. The regulations in Abbott Laboratories forced manufacturers to “risk serious criminal and civil penalties” for noncompliance, 387 U. S., at 153, or “change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; . . . destroy stocks of printed matter; and . . . invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies.” Id., at 152. Socal does not contend that the issuance of the complaint had any such legal or practical effect, except to impose upon Socal the burden of responding to the charges made against it. Although this burden certainly is substantial, it is different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final agency action.
In contrast to the complaint’s lack of legal or practical effect upon Socal, the effect of the judicial review sought by Socal is likely to be interference with the proper functioning of the agency and a burden for the courts. Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975). Intervention also leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary. McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 195 (1969). Furthermore, unlike the review in Abbott Laboratories, judicial review to determine whether the Commission decided that it had the requisite reason to believe would delay resolution of the ultimate question whether the Act was violated. Finally, every respondent to a Commission com[*243]plaint could make the claim that Socal had made. Judicial review of the averments in the Commission’s complaints should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before adjudication concludes.
In sum, the Commission’s issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive ruling or regulation. It had no legal force or practical effect upon Socal’s daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation. And immediate judicial review would serve neither efficiency nor enforcement of the Act. These pragmatic considerations counsel against the conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action.”
B
Socal relies, however, upon different considerations than these in contending that the issuance of the complaint is “final agency action.”
Socal first contends that it exhausted its administrative remedies by moving in the adjudicatory proceedings for dismissal of the complaint. By thus affording the Commission an opportunity to decide upon the matter, Socal contends that it has satisfied the interests underlying the doctrine of administrative exhaustion. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 765. The Court of Appeals agreed. 596 F. 2d, at 1387. We think, however, that Socal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality. By requesting the Commission to withdraw its complaint and by awaiting the Commission’s refusal to do so, Socal may well have exhausted its administrative remedy as to the averment of reason to believe. But the Commission’s refusal to reconsider its issuance of the complaint does not render the complaint a “definitive” action. The Commission’s refusal does not augment the complaint’s legal force or practical effect upon Socal. Nor does the refusal diminish the concerns for efficiency and enforcement of the Act.
[*244] Socal also contends that it will be irreparably harmed unless the issuance of the complaint is judicially reviewed immediately. Socal argues that the expense and disruption of defending itself in protracted adjudicatory proceedings constitutes irreparable harm. As indicated above, we do not doubt that the burden of defending this proceeding will be substantial. But “the expense and annoyance of litigation is 'part of the social burden of living under government.’ ” Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n, 304 U. S. 209, 222 (1938). As we recently reiterated: “Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 24 (1974).
Socal further contends that its challenge to the Commission’s averment of reason to believe can never be reviewed unless it is reviewed before the Commission’s adjudication concludes. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of the complaint “is likely to become insulated from any review” if deferred until appellate review of a cease-and-desist order. 596 F. 2d, at 1387. Socal also suggests that the unlawfulness will be “insulated” because the reviewing court will lack an adequate record and it will address only the question whether substantial evidence supported the cease-and-desist order.[11]
We are not persuaded by this speculation. The Act ex[*245]pressly authorizes a court of appeals to order that the Commission take additional evidence.[12] 15 U. S. C. § 45(c). Thus, a record which would be inadequate for review of alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint can be made adequate. We also note that the APA specifically provides that a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action,” 5 U. S. C. § 704, and that the APA also empowers a court of appeals to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 706. Thus, assuming that the issuance of the complaint is not “committed to agency discretion by law,”[13] a court of appeals reviewing a cease-and-desist order has the power to review alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint. We need not decide what action a court of appeals should take if it finds a cease-and-desist order to be supported by substantial evidence but the complaint to have been issued without the requisite reason to believe. It suffices to hold that the possibility does not affect the application of the finality rule. Cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Cory., 327 U. S. 540, 545 (1946).
[*246] c
There remains only Socal’s contention that the claim of illegality in the issuance of the complaint is a “collateral” order subject to review under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). It argues that the Commission’s issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe “fall[s] in that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in th'e action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Id., at 546. In that diversity case, a District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring shareholders bringing a derivative suit to post a security bond for the defendant’s litigation expenses. This Court held that the District Court’s order was subject to immediate appellate review under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Giving that section a “practical rather than a technical construction,” the Court concluded that this order “did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment.” 337 U. S., at 546.
Cohen does not avail Socal. What we have said above makes clear that the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will merge in, the Commission’s decision on the merits. Therefore, review of this preliminary step should abide review of the final order.
Ill
Because the Commission’s issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal has violated the Act is not “final agency action” under § 10 (c) of the APA, it is not judicially reviewable before administrative adjudication concludes.[14] [*247] We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the dismissal of the complaint. c
r, . , ,7 It is so ordered.
Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The other seven respondents to the complaint were Exxon Corp., Texaco, Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Shell Oil Corp., and Atlantic Richfield Co. In re Exxon Corporation, et al., Docket No. 8934.
Section 5 of the Act, as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 45, provides in pertinent part:
“(a) ... (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”
The Commission charged that the eight companies had “maintained and reinforced a noncopipetitive market structure in the refining of crude oil into petroleum products,” had “exercised monopoly power in the refining of petroleum products,” and had followed “common courses of action in accommodating the needs and goals of each other throughout the petroleum industry.”
Socal invoked federal-court jurisdiction under 5 U. S. C. § 704 and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1346, 1361, and 2201.
The Commission had denied Socal’s motion to dismiss the complaint on February 12, 1974. The Commission also had denied Socal’s motion for reconsideration, stating:
“[I]t has long been settled that the adequacy of the Commission’s 'reason to believe’ a violation of law has occurred and its belief that a proceeding to stop it would be in the 'public interest’ are matters that go to the mental processes of the Commissioners and will not be reviewed by the courts. Once the Commission has resolved these questions and issued a complaint, the issue to be litigated is not the adequacy of the Commission’s pre-complaint information or the diligence of its study of the material in question but whether the alleged violation has in fact occurred. That is the posture of the instant matter.” In re Exxon Corp., 83 F. T. C. 1759, 1760 (1974).
On July 6, 1973, the Commission subpoenaed certain of SocaPs books and records, but the complaint was issued before those records were produced. The subpoena was quashed on July 27, 1973, by the commencement of adjudication.
In addition to contending that the issuance of the complaint is not “final” agency action, the Commission argues that' the issuance is not “agency action” under § 2 (g) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 551 (13), and that, if agency action, it is “committed to agency discretion by law” under § 10. 5 U. S. C. §701 (a)(2).
We agree with Socal and with the Court of Appeals that the issuance of the complaint is “agency action.” The language of the APA and its legis[*239]lative history support this conclusion. According to § 10 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (b) (2), “agency action” has the meaning given to it by §2, 5 U. S. C. § 551. That section provides that “ 'agency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (13), and also that “ 'order’ means the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making . . . .” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (6). According to the legislative history of the APA:
“The term 'agency action’ brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the language of the judicial-review provisions of section 10 and to assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction. In that respect the term includes the supporting procedures, findings, conclusions, or statements or reasons or basis for the action or inaction.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 255 (1946). We conclude that the issuance of the complaint by the Commission is “a part of a final disposition” and therefore is “agency action.”
In view of our conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was not “final agency action,” we do not address the question whether the issuance of a complaint is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §701 (a) (2).
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, the Court held reviewable a regulation of the Federal Communications Commission proscribing certain contractual arrangements between chain broadcasters and local stations. The Commission did not have authority to regulate such contracts; its regulation asserted only that the Commission would not license stations which maintained such contracts. In a challenge to the regulation before any enforcement action had been brought, the Court noted that the regulations had “the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after/’ that they were “promulgated by order of the Commission,” and that “the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity.” 316 U. S., at 418-419.
In Frozen Food Express v. United States, the Court held reviewable an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission specifying commodities that were deemed not to be “agricultural . . . commodities.” The carriage of such commodities exempted vehicles from ICC supervision. The order was held to be “final agency action” in a challenge brought by a carrier transporting commodities that the ICC’s order had not included in its terms.
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court also held reviewable as “final agency action” a Federal Communications Commission regulation announcing a policy not to issue television licenses to applicants already owning five such licenses. The rulemaking was complete and “operate [d] to control the business affairs of Storer.” 351 U. S., at 199.
The Commission held as much in its order denying Socal’s motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss. See n. 5, supra.
Possible judicial review also includes review in this Court upon a writ of certiorari. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (g).
The Court of Appeals additionally suggested that the complaint would be “insulated” from review because the alleged unlawfulness would be moot if Socal prevailed in the adjudication. These concerns do not support a conclusion that the issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe is “final agency action.” To the contrary, one of the principal reasons to await the termination of agency proceedings is “to obviate all occasion for judicial review.” Supra, at 242; McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 195 (1969). Thus, the possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it.
Section 5 (c), as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c), provides in pertinent part:
“If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may see proper.”
Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, we do not hold that the issuance of the complaint is reviewable agency action. We leave open the question whether the issuance of the complaint is unreviewable because it is “committed to agency discretion by law.” See n. 7, supra.
By this holding, we do not encourage the issuance of complaints by the Commission without a conscientious compliance with the “reason to believe” obligation in 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b). The adjudicatory proceedings[*247] which follow the issuance of a complaint may last for months or years. They result in substantial expense to the respondent and may divert management personnel from their administrative and productive duties to the corporation. Without a well-grounded reason to believe that unlawful conduct has occurred, the Commission does not serve the public interest by subjecting business enterprises to these burdens.
Concurrence
concurring in the judgment.
“Agency action” is a statutory term that identifies the conduct of executive and administrative agencies that Congress intended to be reviewable in federal court.[1] In general, the term encompasses formal orders, rules, and interpretive decisions that crystallize or modify private legal rights.[2] Agency action that is merely “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate” is subject to judicial review at the termination of the proceeding in which the interlocutory ruling is made.[3] Today[*248] the Court holds that an agency decision to initiate administrative proceedings is in the interlocutory category. In a footnote, ante, at 238-239, n. 7, the Court determines whether the decision is ever reviewable and in the body of the opinion the Court determines when it is reviewable.
In my opinion, Congress did not intend to authorize any judicial review of decisions to initiate administrative proceedings. The definition of “agency action” found in 5 U. S. C. § 551 (13) plainly contemplates action that affects legal rights in some way. As the Court points out, ante, at 242, the mere issuance of a complaint has no legal effect on the respondent’s rights. Although an agency’s decision to file a complaint may have a serious impact on private parties who must respond to such complaints, that impact is comparable to that caused by a private litigant’s decision to file a lawsuit or a prosecutor’s decision to present evidence to a grand jury. A decision to initiate proceedings does not have the same kind of effect on legal rights as “an agency rule, order, license [or other sanction].”[4] I am aware of nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act, or its history, that indicates that Congress intended to authorize judicial review of this type of decision.
[*249] The practical consequences of the Court’s contrary holding — that the Commission’s prelitigation decision, although not reviewable now, will be reviewable later[5] — confirms my opinion that the Court’s decision does not reflect the intent of Congress. If the Commission ultimately prevails on the merits of its complaint, Socal surely will not be granted immunity because the Commission did not uncover the evidence of illegality until after the complaint was filed. On the other hand, if Socal prevails, there will be no occasion to review the contention that it now advances, because the only relief it seeks is a dismissal of the Commission’s complaint. Socal is surely correct when it argues that unless review is available now, meaningful review can never be had.
The Court’s casual reading of the Administrative Procedure Act is unfortunate for another reason. The disposition of a novel and important question of federal jurisdiction in a footnote will lend support to the notion that federal courts have a “carte blanche” authorizing judicial supervision of almost everything that the Executive Branch of Government may do. Because that notion has an inevitable impact on the quantity and quality of judicial service, federal judges should be especially careful to construe their own authority strictly. I therefore respectfully disagree with the Court’s perfunctory analysis of the “agency action” issue. I do, however, concur in its judgment because I am persuaded that the Commission’s decision to initiate a complaint is not “agency action” within the meaning of § 10 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 702 provides in part:
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”
Section 701 (b)(2) provides:
“For the purposes of this chapter—
“(2) ‘person’, ‘rule’, ‘order’, ‘license’, ‘sanction’, ‘relief’, and ‘agency action’ have the meanings given them by section 551 of this title.” Section 551 (13) provides:
“ ‘agency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”
Section 704 provides in part:
“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”
See n. 2, supra. The Court’s partial quotation of the definition of the term “order” in 5 U. S. C. § 551 (6), see ante, at 239, n. .7, implies that the Court regards the initial step in a proceeding as a “part” of the final order terminating the proceeding. In my opinion that is a rather plain misreading of the definition. An ordinary reader would interpret “part” of an order to refer to one of several paragraphs or sections in that document, not to actions that preceded the entry of the order. Under a contrary reading, presumably the Commission’s action in filing a brief directed to some preliminary issue in the proceeding would be considered “part” of the agency action terminating the proceedings and therefore subject to judicial review. Section 551 (6) reads, in full, as follows:
“‘order’ means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing.”
Because judicial review of the Commission’s decision is not specifically proscribed by statute, the decision to file a complaint will be reviewable later unless the Commission, by a showing of “clear and convincing” evidence, can overcome the strong presumption against a determination that its action was “committed to agency discretion” under 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a)(2). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975).