Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981). · Go Syfert
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Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
52 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People of Michigan v. Muhammad Altantawi (mich, 2021-02-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Muhammad Altantawi
Mich. · 2021 · confidence medium
For these reasons, I believe that our Court also has the duty to “examine independently the errors confessed” and make a determination on the merits of an error in order to avoid leaving the “proper administration of the criminal law . . . to the stipulation of parties.” Young, 315 US at 258-259 . 2 See Mariscal v United States, 449 US 405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I harbor serious doubt that our adversary system of justice is well served by this Court’s practice of routinely vacating judgments which the Solicitor General questions without any independent examinatio…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ogles
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1996); Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 544-45 (1990); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 405-06 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mabel A. Akers v. Anthony J. Principi
Vet. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision to deny en banc review. 7 As the Supreme Court has stated, in the context of its own review: "All Members of the Court are agreed that we 'should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error.'" Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1996) (quoting Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Ex Rel. Lawrence v. Chater (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1996 · confidence medium
All Members *171 of the Court are agreed that we "should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error," Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stutson v. United States
SCOTUS · 1996 · confidence medium
While “we ‘should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error,’ ” Lawrence, ante, at 171 (quoting Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), this excep *196 tional combination of circumstances presents ample justification for a GVR order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diaz-Albertini v. United States
SCOTUS · 1991 · confidence medium
I have previously questioned the wisdom of automatically vacating a Court of Appeals judgment favorable to the Government when the Solicitor General confesses error in this Court, see Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or of vacating a Court of Appeals’ judgment in favor of the Government when the Solicitor General concedes that the analysis of the Court of Appeals may have been wrong but considers the result correct.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Staff Sergeant WILLIAM L. MITCHAM
A.C.C.A. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Marsical v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (Rhenquist, J. dissenting). 6
cited Cited "see" Nunez v. United States
SCOTUS · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
examined Cited "see" Nunez v. United States (3×)
SCOTUS · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 407 , 101 S.Ct. 909 , 66 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
examined Cited "see" State v. Ervin (3×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 , 101 S.Ct. 909 , 66 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Alvarado v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (dissenting opinion).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Hand (3×)
cma · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 , 101 S.Ct. 909 , 66 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); United States v. Gorham, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 89 , 25 C.M.R. 351 (1958) ; United States v. Wagner, 8 U.S.C.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Abel A. Mariano, Jr., United States of America v. Barry Butterworth (3×)
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 , 101 S.Ct. 909 , 66 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (per curiam); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 , 62 S.Ct. 510, 511-12 , 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942); see also United States v. Udo, 963 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing a failure to depart pursuant to § 5K1.1 in circumstances analogous to those presented in this case). 4 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Abel Mariano Jr.
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per curiam); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1942); see also United States v. Udo, 963 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a failure to depart pursuant to 5K1.1 in circumstances analogous to those presented in this case). 6 depart under section 5K2.0.4 See id. at 349-53.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
George Mariscal
v.
United States
80-5618.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 19, 1981.
449 U.S. 405
Per Curiam, Rehnquist, White.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

PER CURIAM.

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

This case arises on a petition for certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed petitioner’s conviction on 10 counts of interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314, and on 12 counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1 1341. 626 F. 2d 868. The court affirmed the interstate transportation convictions on the merits, and declined to address the “rather complex issues” presented by the mail fraud convictions, invoking the discretionary “concurrent sentence” doctrine. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6-7; see Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 848, n. 16 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 787-793 (1969). In light of the Solicitor General’s concession in this Court that the mail fraud convictions were invalid, Memorandum in Opposition 4-5, we grant the motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit affirming the mail fraud convictions, and remand for reconsideration of the applicability of the “concurrent sen[*406] tence” doctrine to a conviction conceded by the United States to be erroneous.

It is so ordered.

Justice White dissents, essentially for the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting, opinion.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

There is a certain irony in the fact that I authored for the Court the opinion in United States v. Maze, 414 U. S. 395 (1974), which affirmed an opinion written by the present Solicitor General when he was a judge for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversing certain mail fraud convictions. Nonetheless, I think that a more important principle is at stake here than whether or not the mail fraud convictions are proper. That larger issue is whether this Court should mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error, and vacate the conviction and request that the Government present its “confession of error” to the Court of Appeals which it had earlier persuaded to affirm the conviction.

One may freely concede that with 93 United States Attorneys and 11 Courts of Appeals, there will be differing views as between prosecutors, as well as between prosecutors and courts, as to legal issues presented in criminal cases. But the Executive is one branch of the Government, and the Judiciary another. The Office of the Solicitor General, while having earned over the years a reputation for ability and expertise in presenting the Government’s claims to this Court, is nonetheless a part of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, not of the Judicial Branch. I think it ill behooves this Court to defer to the Solicitor General’s suggestion that a Court of Appeals may have been in error after another representative of the Executive Branch and the Justice De[*407] partment has persuaded the Court of Appeals to reach the result which it did.

The Office of the Solicitor General may be quite faithfully performing its obligations under our system by calling our attention to what it perceives to be errors in the decisions of the courts of appeals. But I harbor serious doubt that our adversary system of justice is well served by this Court’s practice of routinely vacating judgments which the Solicitor General questions without any independent examination of the merits on our own. With the increasing caseloads of all federal courts, there is a natural temptation to “pass the buck” to some other court if that is possible. Congress has given us discretionary jurisdiction to deny certiorari if we do not wish to grant plenary consideration to a particular case, a benefit that other federal courts do not share, but it has not to my knowledge moved the Office of the Solicitor General from the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to the Judicial Branch. Until it does, I think we are bound by our oaths either to examine independently the merits of a question presented for review on certiorari, or in the exercise of our discretion to deny certiorari. Because the Court exercises neither of these alternatives here, I dissent.