The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment intact.
The text is an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari without providing reasoning. The majority opinion does not address the merits of the constitutional challenge regarding the prosecutor's argument to the jury. A dissenting opinion argues that the death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the prosecutor minimized the jury's responsibility by stating the verdict was advisory and the judge would make the final decision. The dissent contends this shifted the jury's sense of responsibility to another decisionmaker, undermining the reliability of the death penalty determination. The Supreme Court declined to review the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment.
“Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether n…”
- Clemons v. State, 720 So. 2d 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).published“Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in…”
- Howell v. State, 627 So. 2d 1134 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).published“Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in…”
Other citing cases
- McMillan v. State, 139 So. 3d 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).published
- Jackson v. State, 33 So. 3d 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).published
- Alexander v. State, 987 So. 2d 643 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).published
- Wimberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).published
- Moody v. State, 888 So. 2d 532 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).published
- King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 2002).published
- Gamble v. State, 791 So. 2d 409 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).published
- Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).published
- Presley v. State, 770 So. 2d 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).published
- Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996).published
Show 4 more citing cases
- Guthrie v. State, 616 So. 2d 914 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).published
- Gosch v. State, 829 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).published
- Giddens v. State, 565 So. 2d 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).published
- Small v. State, 977 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998).published
v.
Alabama
Reporter's Syllabus editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion
See 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 27.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Lead Opinion
Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
Dissent
dissenting.
I continue to believe that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231-241 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But even if I did not hold this view, I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case, because the sentence was secured in flagrant violation of our decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985).
In Caldwell we vacated a sentence of death because the prosecutor “sought to minimize the jury’s sense of the importance of its role” by stressing to the jury that its verdict would be subject to appellate review. Id., at 325. The prosecutor told the jury during the sentencing phase that “your decision is not the final de-[*1242]cisión. . . . Your job is reviewable.” Ibid. We held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Id., at 328-329.
Petitioner’s sentence of death cannot be squared with our decision in Caldwell. The prosecutor in this case made the following argument to the jury at the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial:
“The opinion, which you will come to a conclusion when you go back and deliberate — Let me say this, it will be only an advisory opinion. The law provides for you to present this to the Court for their consideration. The ultimate decisions [sic] rests with Judge Reynolds. He will be the one to take whatever ruling that you send out and decide whether it will be life without parole or death by electrocution in the electric chair.” Pet. for Cert. 3.
This argument, perhaps even more baldly than the statements in Caldwell, sought to minimize the jury’s sense of its awesome responsibility to determine whether petitioner would live or die by encouraging the jury to view its verdict as merely “advisory.” This shifting of the jury’s sense of responsibility to another decisionmaker, as we explained at length in Caldwell, undermines the reliability of the jury’s decision and conditions the jury to return the death penalty. See 472 U. S., at 330-333.
That the prosecutor in this case told the jury that the trial judge would make the ultimate decision, whereas the prosecutor in Caldwell identified the appellate court as the ultimate decisionmaker, is a distinction without a difference. Caldwell makes plain that a death penalty cannot stand where the jury is led to believe that the defendant’s life rests in some other hands. The constitutional infirmity here is thus no different from that in Caldwell, and the sentence of death no less intolerable. I therefore would grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama to the extent it sustains the imposition of the death penalty.