identity exception in Alabama

2015This Court has stated: - “ ‘[T]he common plan, scheme, or design exception is “essentially coextensive with the identity exception," Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987), and “applies only when identity is actually at issue.” Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 123, 128-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1006 , 119 S.Ct. 522 , 142 L.Ed.2d 433 (1998).’ ” Tariq-Madyun v. State, 59 So.3d 744, 753-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (quoting Lewis v. State, 889 So.2d 623 (Ala.Crim.App.2003)).

2014See also Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987) (the common-scheme or plan exception has been held to be ‘coextensive with the identity exception’) ....'• [[Image here]] “The State argues that although Hurley’s identity was not at issue in this case because both the victim and the defense witnesses identified Hurley as being present at Hotskee’s Lounge and leaving the lounge with the victim, evidence of common scheme or plan was still admissible to rebut the special defense of consent.

2013In other words, “ ‘[ejvidence of a prior crime is admissible only when .the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and those surrounding the presently charged crime “exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.” ’ ” Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Ex parte Arthur, 472 So,2d 665, 668 (Ala.1985), quoting in turn Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155, 1161 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)). “‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admissio

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2013In other words, “ ‘[ejvidence of a prior crime is admissible only when .the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and those surrounding the presently charged crime “exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.” ’ ” Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Ex parte Arthur, 472 So,2d 665, 668 (Ala.1985), quoting in turn Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155, 1161 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)). “‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admissio

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2013See also Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438 , 66 So.2d 557 (1953); and Govan v. State, 40 Ala.App. 482 , 115 So.2d 667 (1959) (recognizing that the identity exception is applicable only where both the prior crime and the charged offense were committed in the same special or peculiar manner).

2013See also Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438 , 66 So.2d 557 (1953); and Govan v. State, 40 Ala.App. 482 , 115 So.2d 667 (1959) (recognizing that the identity exception is applicable only where both the prior crime and the charged offense were committed in the same special or peculiar manner).

2015This Court has stated: - “ ‘[T]he common plan, scheme, or design exception is “essentially coextensive with the identity exception," Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987), and “applies only when identity is actually at issue.” Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 123, 128-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1006 , 119 S.Ct. 522 , 142 L.Ed.2d 433 (1998).’ ” Tariq-Madyun v. State, 59 So.3d 744, 753-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (quoting Lewis v. State, 889 So.2d 623 (Ala.Crim.App.2003)).

2013It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” “[T]he common plan, scheme, or design exception is ‘essentially coextensive with the identity exception,’ and ‘applies only when identity is actu

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2011App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). `Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are "signature crimes" having the accused's mark and the peculiarly distinctive modus operandi so that they may be said to be the work of the same person.' Bighames v. State, 440 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). `[E]vidence of a prio

2009The physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused.'" Ex parte Baker, 780 So.2d 677, 680 (Ala. 2000), quoting United States v. Clemons, 32 F.3d 1504, 1508 (11th Cir.1994) (further citations omitted). "`[E]vidence of a prior crime is admissible only when the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and *498 those surrounding the presently charged crime "exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person."'" Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.A

2009The physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused.’ ” Ex parte Baker, 780 So.2d 677, 680 (Ala.2000), quoting United States v. Clemons, 32 F.3d 1504, 1508 (11th Cir.1994) (further citations omitted). “ ‘[Ejvidence of a prior crime is admissible only when the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and those surrounding the presently charged crime “exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.” ’ ” Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.App

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2015This Court has stated: - “ ‘[T]he common plan, scheme, or design exception is “essentially coextensive with the identity exception," Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987), and “applies only when identity is actually at issue.” Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 123, 128-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1006 , 119 S.Ct. 522 , 142 L.Ed.2d 433 (1998).’ ” Tariq-Madyun v. State, 59 So.3d 744, 753-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (quoting Lewis v. State, 889 So.2d 623 (Ala.Crim.App.2003)).

2013It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” “[T]he common plan, scheme, or design exception is ‘essentially coextensive with the identity exception,’ and ‘applies only when identity is actu

2014The identity exception is quite narrow and is applicable only when “the identity of the person who committed the charged offense is in issue and the charged offense is committed in a novel or peculiar manner.” Ex parte Baker, 780 So.2d 677, 679 (Ala.2000).

2014The identity exception is quite narrow and is applicable only when "the identity of the person who committed the charged offense is in issue and the charged offense is committed in a novel or peculiar manner." Ex parte Baker, 780 So. 2d 677, 679 (Ala. 2000).

2013In other words, “ ‘[ejvidence of a prior crime is admissible only when .the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and those surrounding the presently charged crime “exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.” ’ ” Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Ex parte Arthur, 472 So,2d 665, 668 (Ala.1985), quoting in turn Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155, 1161 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)). “‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admissio

2013In other words, “ ‘[ejvidence of a prior crime is admissible only when .the circumstances surrounding the prior crime and those surrounding the presently charged crime “exhibit such a great degree of similarity that anyone viewing the two offenses would naturally assume them to have been committed by the same person.” ’ ” Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 347 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Ex parte Arthur, 472 So,2d 665, 668 (Ala.1985), quoting in turn Brewer v. State, 440 So.2d 1155, 1161 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)). “‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admissio

2014We have stated: ‘“[T]he plan, scheme, or design exception is an'extension of the identity exception — where the charged crime and the collateral crime are committed in the same novel or peculiar manner, evidence of the collateral crime is admissible to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime.’ Register v. State, 640 So.2d 3, 6 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).

2009As the majority recognizes, the common plan, scheme, or design exception to the exclusionary rule “is essentially coextensive with the identity exception” and must be analyzed under the same standards. 3 Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987). “[T]he plan, scheme, or design exception is an extension of the identity exception — where the charged crime and the collateral crime are committed in the same novel or peculiar manner, evidence of the collateral crime is admissible to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime.” Register v. State, 640 So.2d 3, 6 (Ala.Crim.App.

2013Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive .modus o

2011Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(8) (5th ed.1996); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala.1985); Johnson v. State, 820 So.2d 842, 861 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Tyson v. State, 784 So.2d 328, 344 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 784 So.2d 357 (Ala.2000). ‘Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are “signature crimes” having the accused’s mark and the peculiarly distinctive modus op

2012When discussing this exception to the general exclusionary rule, the Alabama Supreme Court has stated: “Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a collateral act by the defendant is not admissible to prove the bad character of the defendant. '* “Evidence of prior [or subsequent] bad acts of a criminal defendant is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant.” ’ Bolden v. State, 595 So.2d 911, 913 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 595 So.2d 914 (Ala.1992) (quoting Ex parte Cofer, 440 So.2d 1121, 1124 (Ala.1983)).

2000Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a collateral act by the defendant is not admissible to prove the bad character of the defendant. "`Evidence of prior [or subsequent] bad acts of a criminal defendant is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant.'" Bolden v. State , 595 So.2d 911 , 913 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied , 595 So.2d 914 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Ex parte Cofer , 440 So.2d 1121 , 1124 (Ala. 1983)).

2003Nicks v. State, [ 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.1988).] "`Under the identity exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of ... collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are "signature crimes" having the accused's mark and the peculiarly distinctive modus operandi so that they may be said to be the work of the same person.' " Bighames v. State, 440 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).

1996See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1979), § 304. "`"Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether narrow or broad in scope." Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), citing C.

2003Nicks v. State, [ 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.1988).] "`Under the identity exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of ... collateral crimes as substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the prior crime is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-charged crime are "signature crimes" having the accused's mark and the peculiarly distinctive modus operandi so that they may be said to be the work of the same person.' " Bighames v. State, 440 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).

1996See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1979), § 304. "`"Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether narrow or broad in scope." Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), citing C.

1996See also 2 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1979), § 304. "`"Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is admissible if such evidence, considered with other evidence in the case, warrants a finding that both the now-charged crime and such other crime were committed in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme, or system, whether narrow or broad in scope." Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 , 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988), citing C.

1993McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App.1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976).' Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d 1018, 1026 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), affirmed, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988)." Perkins v. State, 580 So.2d at 8-9.

2000However, before a collateral offense can be introduced under the identity exception, two requirements must be met: 1) identity must be an issue, and 2) the collateral crime must have been committed in the "same novel and peculiar manner." As we stated in Copeland v. State , 455 So.2d 951 , 954-55 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 455 So.2d 956 (Ala. 1984): 3 "It is established in Alabama that admission of evidence of other collateral crimes may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt of the defendant.

2000"However, before a collateral offense can be introduced under the identity exception, two requirements must be met: 1) identity must be an issue, and 2) the collateral crime must have been committed in the `same novel and peculiar manner.' As we stated in Copeland v. State, 455 So.2d 951, 954-55 (Ala.Cr.