An ordinary traffic stop involving a modest number of questions and a simple balancing test does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda requirements.
After an officer observed a driver operating a vehicle erratically and ignoring a red light, the officer conducted a roadside stop and performed field sobriety tests. During the encounter, the driver admitted to consuming alcohol. The driver was subsequently arrested and convicted of driving under the influence. The defendant argued that his roadside statements were inadmissible because they were elicited during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The Court holds that routine roadside questioning during an ordinary traffic stop does not constitute a custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, as such stops are typically brief, occur in public view, and do not curtail a person's freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
At page 11 Applying miranda rules to traffic stops23 citing cases“ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of miranda.”
- State of Iowa v. Adam Mullen, 10 N.W.3d 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).published(holding statements made by motorist in response to officer’s question about drinking and request for field sobriety test were admissible)
- United States v. Francis Harrington, 557 F. Supp. 3d 323 (D.N.H. 2021).publishedBerkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11 (1988) (same); see also Arnott, 758 F.3d at 45 (“At their inception, Terry stops generally do not require Miranda warnings.”).
- People v. Haga (Denise), 72 Misc. 3d 130(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2021).unpublishedSince a temporary roadside detention pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop is not custodial within the meaning of Miranda v Arizona ( 384 US 436 [1966]) ( see Pennsylvania v Bruder , 488 US 9, 11 [1988]), as the District Court properly foun…
- State of Maine v. Murphy, No. KNOcr-00-128 (Me. Super. Ct Oct. 6, 2000).unpublishedBruder, 488 U.S. at 11, n.1 .
- Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 676 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1997).published The Court first reached this conclusion in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-440 (1984), and reiterated the holding of the Berkemer decision in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11 (1988), a case with facts virtually identical to th…
- Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995).published For example, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp ., a decision confirming that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, we observed that plenary review would likely "…
- Commonwealth v. Van Houtin, 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995).publishedId., citing Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11 (1988); Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42 (detention of motorist pursuant to routine traffic stop is presumptively temporary, as well as public; “there may be times,” howeve…
- Commonwealth v. Barud, 27 Pa. D. & C.4th 399 (1994).publishedThe case of Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 at 10 , 109 S.Ct. 205 at 206 , 102 L.Ed.2d 172 at 174 (1988) held that “ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda.” The case law in Pennsylvania is also clear that…
- Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994).published Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody' "); Beheler , supra , at 1124, n. 2 ("Our holding in Mathiason reflected our earlier decision in [Beckwith] , in…
- State v. Donnell, 849 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).published The Court said, 488 U.S. at 10, n. 1 , 109 S.Ct. at 207 , n. 1: We did not announce an absolute rule for all motorist detentions, observing that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not “delay formally arresting detained motorists,…
Show 13 more citing cases
- Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).published See Smith v. Ohio, 494 U. S. 541, 544 (1990) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U. S. 9, 11-12 (1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Stans…
- People v. Washington, 2025 NY Slip Op 25265 (2025).published A general rule under Miranda and its progeny is that a "temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop" does not qualify as custodial or a defendant being in custody within the meaning of Miranda ( People v Williams , 81 A…
- People v. Kulk, 103 A.D.3d 1038 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2013).published Defendant also told the officers to “place handcuffs on him and take him in.” The record supports County Court’s conclusion that Miranda warnings were not required before defendant made these statements, as he was not then “subject to cust…
- People v. Williams, 81 A.D.3d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).publishedWhat ensued was a “temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop,” which is “not custodial within the meaning of Miranda [u Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)]” (People v Myers, 1 AD3d 382, 383 [2003]; see Pennsylvania v Bruder,…
- People v. Parris, 26 A.D.3d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).publishedThe defendant’s admission to the trooper that he had smoked marijuana was made before he was in custody, so Miranda warnings were not required at that time (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). “[A] temporary roadside detention pursu…
- People v. Peterson, 22 A.D.3d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005).publishedIn light of the fact that the defendant’s initial admission to the trooper that he had been smoking marijuana and had more marijuana in the car was made before he was in custody, Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966])…
- Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).published (Ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda)
- Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989).published
- Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541 (1990).published
- State v. Easler, 471 S.E.2d 745 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996).published
- State v. Peele, 378 S.E.2d 254 (S.C. 1989).published
- State v. Castellano, 784 P.2d 287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).published
- Walkden v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).published
At page 10 Determining custody status during traffic stops for miranda purposes20 citing cases[T]he ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.’
- Juarez v. Crews, No. 8:14-cv-00065 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2024).([T]he ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.’)
- Commonwealth v. Tantillo, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 20 (Mass. App. Ct. 2023).published(traffic stops commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an atmosphere far 'less police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself)
- Commonwealth v. Earl, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 2023).published(traffic stops commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an atmosphere far 'less "police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] itself')
- Com. v. Hawa, M., No. 591 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2022).unpublished “not in custody for the purposes of Miranda”
- David Tellez-Salinas v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 140 N.E.3d 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).publishedFactors to weigh include the degree to which police controlled the scene and both the location and nature of the questioning, especially where an officer uses deceit to induce a person to incriminate himself or where the questions are “pro…
- State of Indiana v. David Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331 (Ind. 2017).publishedPennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988); (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).
- Commonwealth v. Crespo, 18 Pa. D. & C.5th 394 (2010).published “noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda”
- State v. Ricker, 2003 ND 143.publishedPennsylvania v. Bruder , 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988); Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 440 .
- Commonwealth v. Cameron, 689 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).publishedThe stop was “brief” and occurred in “public view,” and the defendant’s “ ‘freedom of action’ [was not] curtailed to ‘a degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass, at 332 n.7, quoting from Pennsylvania v.…
- Vanhouton v. Commonwealth, 676 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1997).published The Court first reached this conclusion in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-440 (1984), and reiterated the holding of the Berkemer decision in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 11 (1988), a case with facts virtually identical to th…
Show 9 more citing cases
- State v. Donnell, 849 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).published The Court said, 488 U.S. at 10, n. 1 , 109 S.Ct. at 207 , n. 1: We did not announce an absolute rule for all motorist detentions, observing that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not “delay formally arresting detained motorists,…
- State v. Washington, 402 S.E.2d 851 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).published (motorist stopped for erratic driving)
- State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1990).publishedIn doing so, a footnote in the Bruder opinion explained that Berkemer had not announced “an absolute rule for all motorist detentions” and had declared “that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not ‘delay formally arresting detain…
- Commonwealth v. Toanone, 553 A.2d 998 (Pa. 1989).published Accordingly, Berkemer’s rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda , governs this case. — U.S. at—, 109 S.Ct. at 206-07 , 102 L.Ed.2d at 176-77 (footnotes omitted).
- People v. Cristobal, No. C072061 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015).unpublished (pre-arrest questioning during roadside, driving under the influence investigation does not involve custody for purposes of Miranda)
- Wilson v. State, 432 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).published
- Livingston v. State, 564 A.2d 414 (Md. 1989).published
- State of Texas v. Ortiz, Octavio, 382 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).published
- State of Missouri v. Harvey D. Harris, 581 S.W.3d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).published
explaining that a traffic stop does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda
- Com. v. Hall, J., No. 915 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2024).unpublished(explaining that a traffic stop does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda)
- Com. v. El-Amin, A., No. 1881 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2024).unpublished(explaining that a traffic stop does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda)
102 L. Ed. 2d at 174 cited at this page1 citing case
- Commonwealth v. Barud, 27 Pa. D. & C.4th 399 (1994).publishedThe case of Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 at 10 , 109 S.Ct. 205 at 206 , 102 L.Ed.2d 172 at 174 (1988) held that “ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda.” The case law in Pennsylvania is also clear that…
109 S. Ct. at 207 Requiring vigilance against delayed motorist arrests1 citing case“that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not ‘delay formally arresting detained motorists, and ... subject them to sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention”
- State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1990).published“that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not ‘delay formally arresting detained motorists, and ... subject them to sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention”
109 S. Ct. at 206 cited at this page1 citing case
- State v. Wilkinson, 785 P.2d 1139 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).published Ed. 2d 172, 176-77 , 109 S. Ct. 205, 206 (1988).
At page 12 Determining custody for traffic stop interrogation1 citing case“S. 420, 440-442 (1984), the Court concluded that Miranda warnings are not required during a traffic stop unless the citizen is taken into custody; that there is no bright-line rule for determining when detentions short of formal arrest constitute custody; and that "the only relevant inquiry is how…”
- Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1 (1989).publishedThis Court has debated the appropriateness of performing an “error-correcting function,” see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U. S. 9, 12-13 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
At page 14 “that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not 'delay formally arresting detained motorists, and ... subject them to sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention.”0 citing cases
Other citing cases
- State v. Martin, 2019-Ohio-5147.published
- Commonwealth v. Crombie, 111 N.E.3d 1111 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).published
- Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 97 N.E.3d 671 (Mass. 2018).published
- Sluss v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.3d 279 (Ky. 2014).published
- State of Maine v. Maier, No. CUMcr-13-06823 (Me. Super. Ct Mar. 5, 2014).unpublished
- United States v. Rodriguez, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D.N.M. 2011).published
- Commonwealth v. Becla, 904 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).published
- United States v. Viezca, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Ala. 2008).published
- People v. Burton, 651 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).published
- United States v. Newton, 181 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).published
Show 4 more citing cases
- State v. Calkins, 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12490 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001).unpublished
- State v. Gracia, 719 A.2d 1196 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).published
- State v. Salisbury, 498 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).published
- Abernathy v. State, 963 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).published
v.
Bruder
Lead Opinion
Because the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this case is contrary to Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984), we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.
In the early morning of January 19, 1985, Officer Steve Shallis of the Newton Township, Pennsylvania, Police Department observed respondent Thomas Bruder driving very erratically along State Highway 252. Among other traffic violations, he ignored a red light. Shallis stopped Bruder’s vehicle. Bruder left his vehicle, approached Shallis, and when asked for his registration card, returned to his car to obtain it. Smelling alcohol and observing Bruder’s stumbling movements, Shallis administered field sobriety tests,[*10] including asking Bruder to recite the alphabet. Shallis also inquired about alcohol. Bruder answered that he had been drinking and was returning home. Bruder failed the sobriety tests, whereupon Shallis arrested him, placed him in the police car, and gave him Miranda warnings. Bruder was later convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. At his trial, his statements and conduct prior to his arrest were admitted into evidence. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, 365 Pa. Super. 106, 528 A. 2d 1385 (1987), on the ground that the above statements Bruder had uttered during the roadside questioning were elicited through custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed for lack of Miranda warnings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the State’s appeal application.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, which involved facts strikingly similar to those in this case, the Court concluded that the “noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda” Id., at 440. The Court reasoned that although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation. Second, the Court emphasized that traffic stops commonly occur in the “public view,” in an atmosphere far “less ‘police dominated’ than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself.” Id., at 438-439. The detained motorist’s “freedom of action [was not] curtailed to ‘a degree associated with formal arrest.’” Id., at 440 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). Accordingly, he was not entitled to a recitation of his constitutional rights prior to arrest, and his roadside responses to questioning were admissible.[1]
[*11] The facts in this record, which Bruder does not contest, reveal the same noncoercive aspects as the Berkemer detention: “a single police officer ask[ing] respondent a modest number of questions and requesting] him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists.” 468 U. S., at 442 (footnote omitted).[2] Accordingly, Berkemer1 s rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda, governs this case.[3] The judgment of the Pennsylvania Superior Court that evidence was inadmissible for lack of Miranda warnings is reversed.
It is so ordered.
We did not announce an absolute rule for all motorist detentions, observing that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not “delay formally arresting detained motorists, and . . . subject them to sustained[*11] and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 440 (1984).
Reliance on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A. 2d 517 (1980), to which we referred in Berkemer, see 468 U. S., at 441, and n. 34, is inapposite. Meyer involved facts which we implied might properly remove its result from Berkemer’s application to ordinary traffic stops; specifically, the motorist in Meyer could be found to have been placed in custody for purposes of Miranda safeguards because he was detained for over half an hour, and subjected to questioning while in the patrol car. Thus, we acknowledged Meyer’s relevance to the unusual traffic stop that involves prolonged detention. We expressly disapproved, however, the attempt to extrapolate from this sensitivity to uncommon detention circumstances any general proposition that custody exists whenever motorists think that their freedom of action has been restricted, for such a rationale would eviscerate Berkemer altogether. See Berkemer, supra, at 436-437.
We thus do not reach the issue whether recitation of the alphabet in response to custodial questioning is testimonial and hence inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
Dissent
dissenting.
1 agree with Justice Stevens that the Court should not disturb the decision of the court below, and accordingly I join his dissent. I write separately to note my continuing belief that it is unfair to litigants and damaging to the integrity and accuracy of this Court’s decisions to reverse a decision summarily without the benefit of full briefing on the merits of[*12] the question decided. Rhodes v. Stewart, ante, p. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U. S. 265, 269 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U. S. 3, 7 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I therefore dissent from the Court’s decision today to reverse summarily the decision below.
Dissent
with whom
Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.The Court explains why it reverses the decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in this drunken driving case, but it does not explain why it granted certiorari.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 440-442 (1984), the Court concluded that Miranda warnings are not required during a traffic stop unless the citizen is taken into custody; that there is no bright-line rule for determining when detentions short of formal arrest constitute custody; and that “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation,” 468 U. S., at 442. The rule applied in Pennsylvania is strikingly similar to this Court’s statement in Berkemer. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained in this case:
“In Pennsylvania, ‘custodial interrogation does not require that police make a formal arrest, nor that the police intend to make an arrest. . . . Rather, the test of custodial interrogation is whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.’ Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 307, 412 A. 2d 517, 521 (1980) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562, 570, 375 A. 2d 1260, 1264 (1977)....
“In Commonwealth v. Meyer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the driver of a car involved in an accident who was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and who was told by police to wait at the scene until additional police arrived was in custody for[*13] purposes of Miranda. The Meyer court reasoned that because the defendant had a reasonable belief that his freedom of action had been restricted, statements elicited before he received his Miranda warnings should have been suppressed. 488 Pa. at 307, 412 A. 2d at 522.” 365 Pa. Super. 106, 111-112, 528 A. 2d 1385, 1387 (1987).
In its Berkemer opinion, this Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A. 2d 517 (1980), with approval. 468 U. S., at 441, n. 34. Thus, there appears to be no significant difference between the rule of law that is generally applied to traffic stops in Pennsylvania and the rule that this Court would approve in other States.
There is, however, a difference of opinion on the question whether the rule was correctly applied in this case. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania was divided on the issue. See 365 Pa. Super., at 117, 528 A. 2d, at 1390 (Rowley, J., concurring and dissenting). It was therefore quite appropriate for the prosecutor to seek review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. That court summarily denied review without opinion. See 518 Pa. 635, 542 A. 2d 1365 (1988). That action was quite appropriate for the highest court of a large State like Pennsylvania because such a court is obviously much too busy to review every arguable misapplication of settled law in cases of this kind.
For reasons that are unclear to me, however, this Court seems to welcome the opportunity to perform an error-correcting function in cases that do not merit the attention of the highest court of a sovereign State. See, e. g., Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380 (1984) (per curiam); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U. S. 1112 (1983) (per curiam). Although there are cases in which “there are special and important reasons” for correcting an error that is committed by another court, see this Court’s Rule 17.1, this surely is not such a case. The Court does not suggest that this case involves an[*14] important and unsettled question of federal law or that there is confusion among the state and federal courts concerning what legal rules govern the application of Miranda to ordinary traffic stops. Rather, the Court simply holds that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania misapplied our decision in Berkemer to “[t]he facts in this record.” Ante, at 11. In my judgment this Court’s scarce resources would be far better spent addressing cases that are of some general importance “beyond the facts and parties involved,” Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U. S. 364, 368 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), than in our acting as “self-appointed . . . supervisors of the administration of justice in the state judicial systems,” Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S., at 385 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, because I would not disturb the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania — which, incidentally, is the court to which the petitioner asks us to direct the writ of certiorari — I respectfully dissent.