Miranda warning in Indiana

2025“The Supreme Court of the United States’s groundbreaking Miranda v. Arizona decision adopted the now-famous ‘Miranda warnings.’ 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).” B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 230 (Ind. 2018).

2025“The Supreme Court of the United States’s groundbreaking Miranda v. Arizona decision adopted the now-famous ‘Miranda warnings.’ 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).” B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 230 (Ind. 2018).

2018Loving v. State , 647 N.E.2d 1123 , 1125 (Ind. 1995). *843 The triggering requirement for a Miranda warning is "custodial interrogation." State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331 , 335 (Ind. 2017). [32] " 'Interrogation' for the purposes of Miranda constitutes questions, words, or actions that the officer knows or should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id.

2013Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 (citations and quotation marks omitted); 4 Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1126 (Ind.1995) (where police handcuffed defendant and took him to police station for questioning as witness to fatal shooting, police questions regarding defendant’s name, current address, date of birth, and social security number did not require Miranda warnings); Hatcher v. State, 274 Ind. 230, 232-33 , 410 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (1980) (“An offi *678 cer may ask routine questions for the purpose of obtaining basic identifying information without giving Miranda warnings.”); Castil

2026“Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him.” Id. (citing Trice, 766 N.E.2d at 1183 (citation omitted)).

2026See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 , 188 n.3, 133 S. Ct. 2174 , 2182 n.3 (2013) (“[D]ue process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).”) (plurality opinion); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 295 , 106 S. Ct. 634, 639, 6

2018In determining whether a person was in custody or deprived of freedom such that Miranda warnings are required, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Luna, 788 N.E.2d at 833 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2018Our Supreme Court concluded, “a person who goes voluntarily for a police interview, receives assurances that he is not under arrest, and leaves after the interview is complete has not been taken into ‘custody’ by virtue of an energetic interrogation so as to necessitate Miranda warnings.” Luna, 788 N.E.2d at 834 . [20] In Luna, our Supreme Court relied on Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).

2017Following Seibert, in Drummond v. State, 831 N.E.2d 781, 783-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), and King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), we determined that a defendant’s statement was inadmissible when a defendant only received Miranda warnings after he was subjected to a custodial interrogation and had made incriminating statements. [30] Schafer’s argument that he received Miranda warnings midstream during his questioning by Detective Schemenaur at the police station is contradicted by the record.

2012See, e.g., King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (“Because King was subjected to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warning, the pre- Miranda statements are inadmissible and should be suppressed.”).

2017“As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Id. at 675 ; see also P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Miranda warnings are only required, however, where a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.” (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980))).

2015P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). [14] Miranda warnings are meant to preserve the Fifth Amendment rights of a person during “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2016With respect to the requirement to give Miranda warnings, we have previously held that “[r]ights under Miranda apply only to custodial interrogation.” Richardson v. State, 794 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002)). “[U]nder Miranda, ‘interrogation’ includes express questioning and words or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1512-CR-2373 | November 4, 2016 Page 24 of 30 actions on the part of the police that the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. (citing White,

2016With respect to the requirement to give Miranda warnings, we have previously held that “[r]ights under Miranda apply only to custodial interrogation.” Richardson v. State, 794 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002)). “[U]nder Miranda, ‘interrogation’ includes express questioning and words or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1512-CR-2373 | November 4, 2016 Page 24 of 30 actions on the part of the police that the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. (citing White,

2012“However, as a general rule, when a juvenile who is not in custody gives a statement to police, neither the safeguards of Miranda warnings nor the juvenile waiver statute is implicated.” S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. 4 denied.

2012The State maintains that KF.’s statement to Mother was admissible because it “was nothing more complicated than a statement by a party opponent.” State’s Br. at 17. “[A]s a general rule, when a juvenile who is not in custody gives a statement to police, neither the safeguards of Miranda warnings nor the juvenile waiver statute is implicated.” S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (emphasis added), trans. denied; see also S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (explaining that Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a person is both in cus

2017See Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (“[G]iving an arrestee Miranda warnings [] does not sufficiently inform him of his right to consult with counsel prior to consenting to a search”).

2017Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (noting the requirement of a Pirtle advisement and that a Miranda warning is insufficient). [10] Couch argues that she was in custody when she agreed to the search and that because she was not informed of her right to consult with counsel, she did not tender valid consent.

2018Officer Flynn testified that he did not direct Dowler in any questioning, that when Dowler decided to bring in D.Z. for questioning, he was not in the office at the time of questioning, that he had a conversation with D.Z. after Dowler’s conversation, and that he entered Dowler’s office only after Dowler had exited, spoke to D.Z., and eventually let D.Z. know he was being charged. [32] While it may be true that schools are different than they used to be, I would hold on these facts as this Court did in C.D., 947 N.E.2d at 1022-1023 ; S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 679-680 ; and G.J. v. State, 716 N.E.2d

2018Officer Flynn testified that he did not direct Dowler in any questioning, that when Dowler decided to bring in D.Z. for questioning, he was not in the office at the time of questioning, that he had a conversation with D.Z. after Dowler's conversation, and that he entered Dowler's office only after Dowler had exited, spoke to D.Z., and eventually let D.Z. know he was being charged. [32] While it may be true that schools are different than they used to be, I would hold on these facts as this Court did in C.D ., 947 N.E.2d at 1022-1023 ; S.G. , 956 N.E.2d at 679-680 ; and G.J. v. State , 716 N.E.

2026“We note that a Doyle violation is actually a violation of the Due Process Clause’s prohibition against fundamental unfairness, not a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Bevis v. State, 614 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 , 291 n.7, 106 S. Ct. 634, 638-639 , 639 n.7 (1986)). [35] With respect to the prosecutor’s question during the cross-examination of Hollingsworth, defense counsel objected and asserted during the sidebar, “I’m just going to ask that they not be permitted to go under this line of ques

2008See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 629 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 (“due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda silence”); Bevis v. State, 614 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) (“we believe it is apparent on the face of these questions that they were unlimited, general questions directed without distinction to Mildred’s silence both before and after she was given Miranda warnings.

2018Our Supreme Court concluded, “a person who goes voluntarily for a police interview, receives assurances that he is not under arrest, and leaves after the interview is complete has not been taken into ‘custody’ by virtue of an energetic interrogation so as to necessitate Miranda warnings.” Luna, 788 N.E.2d at 834 . [20] In Luna, our Supreme Court relied on Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).

2018See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96 (noncustodial situation not converted to one where Miranda applies simply because, absent formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, questioning took place in a coercive environment, and, officer’s false statement about finding defendant’s fingerprints at the scene had “nothing to do with whether [defendant] was in custody for purposes of Miranda); see also Luna, 788 N.E.2d at 834 (requirement of Miranda warnings is not to be imposed simply because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect). [22] We conclude that based on the totality of the

2017“As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Id. at 675 ; see also P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Miranda warnings are only required, however, where a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.” (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980))).

2017“As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Id. at 675 ; see also P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Miranda warnings are only required, however, where a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.” (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980))).

2018In determining whether a person was in custody or deprived of freedom such that Miranda warnings are required, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Luna, 788 N.E.2d at 833 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2014“In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 2 Miranda warnings given to a person subject to a custodial interrogation include, inter alia, an advisement “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . 8 associated w

2013Hatcher v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980) (observing that general on-the-scene questioning that relates to the facts of the crime does not typically implicate the Miranda rule). 9 Nonetheless, even if the trial court erred in admitting Franklin’s statements into evidence, the error was harmless and Franklin’s conviction can still be affirmed.

2013Hatcher v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980) (observing that general on-the-scene questioning that relates to the facts of the crime does not typically implicate the Miranda rule). 9 Nonetheless, even if the trial court erred in admitting Franklin’s statements into evidence, the error was harmless and Franklin’s conviction can still be affirmed.

2014Those procedural safeguards have come to be known as “Miranda warnings.”2 See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2177 (2013); Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 914 (Ind. 2003).

2013We need not address whether the testimony concerning Pittman’s right to remain silent resulted in a Doyle violation because Pittman cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different given the 1 In Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 2003), our supreme court discussed our United States Supreme Court’s decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and stated: In Doyle, the Supreme Court held, “[T]he use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process

2015“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are not themselves, rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self- incrimination [is] protected.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2002Nevertheless, in Price v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind.1992), this Court recognized that a public-safety exception to the Miranda rule exists when officers "have an immediate concern for the safety of the general public in that an armed weapon remained undiscovered." Our ruling in Price was similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 , 104 S.Ct. *1002 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), in which a suspect in an armed rape was found wearing an empty shoulder holster.

2017Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1605-CR-1143 | March 21, 2017 Page 13 of 31 statement was given without the benefit of his Miranda warnings and the second statement was obtained pursuant to interrogation tactics condemned in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-14 (2004).

2017Id. at 617 . [9] Indiana courts have consistently applied Seibert to hold a defendant’s post- Miranda statements inadmissible in situations where a defendant has been interrogated prior to receiving Miranda warnings and confessed or made Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 05A02-1512-CR-2359 | February 21, 2017 Page 5 of 18 incriminating statements, and then repeated those statements after receiving Miranda warnings.

2018Ed. 2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1708-CR-1804 | May 3, 2018 Page 5 of 9 86 (1980), or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 606–607, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 , 71 L.

2018Ed. 2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1708-CR-1804 | May 3, 2018 Page 5 of 9 86 (1980), or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 606–607, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 , 71 L.

2018“Miranda warnings do not need to be given when the person questioned has not been placed in custody.” Johansen v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Ind. 1986).

2012“Miranda warnings do not need to be given when the person questioned has not been placed in custody.” Johansen v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Ind. 1986).

2014However, any subsequent statements made to Detective Whitler were admissible.4 By way of analogy, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the United States Supreme Court determined that a voluntary statement, given after the police provided a subject with Miranda warnings, is admissible, regardless of the fact that the suspect already made statements before receiving the warnings.

2013The State concedes the statements Kelly made before Chief Kiphart read her the Miranda warning should be suppressed, but it contends that her post -Miranda statements are admissible under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) and that Seibert is inapposite here.

2026See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 , 188 n.3, 133 S. Ct. 2174 , 2182 n.3 (2013) (“[D]ue process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).”) (plurality opinion); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 295 , 106 S. Ct. 634, 639, 6

2026See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 , 188 n.3, 133 S. Ct. 2174 , 2182 n.3 (2013) (“[D]ue process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).”) (plurality opinion); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 295 , 106 S. Ct. 634, 639, 6

2020See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); see also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980) (holding that “Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him[]”). [11] Though the State contends that Investigator Kilgore’s response was appropriate to describe the steps she took as part of her investigation, we find that her response was ill-advised and had little relevance.

2017“Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1701-CR-169 | September 18, 2017 Page 4 of 8 assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him.” Id. at 1183 (quoting Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 , 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980)).