Galvan v. McCollister, 580 P.2d 1324 (Kan. 1978). · Go Syfert
Galvan v. McCollister, 580 P.2d 1324 (Kan. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Norwest Capital Management & Trust Company as Administrator of the Estate of Louis M. Altringer, Deceased v. United States (ca8, 1987-09-18)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Norwest Capital Management & Trust Company as Administrator of the Estate of Louis M. Altringer, Deceased v. United States (3×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
8th Cir. · 1987 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
a director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts by reason of his official character
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baltimore Police Department v. Cherkes
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 215 Cal.App.2d 155, 158 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 124 (1963) (noting that a chief of police may not be held liable for the wrongful acts of subordinates not done at his discretion) (citing Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199 , 205 P. 113 (1922)); Brown v. City of Shreveport, 129 So.2d 540, 544 (La.App.1961) (refusing to hold a police chief vicariously liable for the actions of police officers) (quoting Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628 , 188 So. 722, 724 (1939)); Moser v. Bertram, 115 N.M. 766 , 858 P.2d 854, 856 (1993) (holding that co-employees are not liable *333 for each oth…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moser v. Bertram
N.M. · 1993 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United States, 828 F.2d 1330, 1344 (8th Cir.1987) (stating that “the negligence of an employee will not be imputed to a co-employee in the absence of tortious conduct of his own”); Northrop v. Lopatka, 610 N.E.2d 806, 810 (1993) (finding no vicarious liability between two agents of the same principal); Galvan v. McCollister, 224 Kan. 415 , 580 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1978) (stating that “[t]he universal legal rule is that a servant or other agent is not liable for the dereliction of a fellow worker or agent under agency principles”); Morgan…
cited Cited "see" DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co.
Mass. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Galvan v. McCollister, 224 Kan. 415 (1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mary Galvan, Appellant,
v.
Roger L. McCollister, Appellee
48,761.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Jul 15, 1978.
580 P.2d 1324
1978 Kan. LEXIS 311
Fred W. Phelps, Jr., of Fred W. Phelps, Chartered, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Fred W. Phelps was on the brief for the appellant., Jerry R. Palmer, of Stumbo, Stumbo, Palmer, McCallister & Buening, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
Owsley.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Eighth Circuit (1)

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Owsley, J.:

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Roger L. McCollister. The facts indicate that plaintiff Mary Galvan was sued by Ed Marling Stores, Inc., for failure to pay money due on an installment sales contract. Plaintiff contacted the Legal Aid Society of Topeka, Inc., to obtain legal representation. A staff attorney, Larry Rute, agreed to represent her. On June 12, 1975, plaintiff was contacted by Rute by telephone and was told Marling’s would settle its lawsuit if she would make a $250.00 cash payment. Pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff allegedly delivered $250.00 in cash in an unmarked envelope to the Legal Aid office that afternoon and gave it to a secretary.

About one week later, plaintiff called her attorney, who advised her he had not received the money. An investigation was made and the money did not turn up. The secretary denies the plaintiff gave her any envelope or money. Subsequently, Legal Aid denied plaintiff had brought the money to its office.

Plaintiff filed suit against the Legal Aid Society, Roger McCollister, and the secretary who allegedly received the money. On a motion for summary judgment the trial court dismissed McCollister from the action. Plaintiff appeals from that order. For the reasons set forth below we hold the trial court was correct.

Plaintiff’s theory in her cause of action was that the money had been either embezzled or negligently lost by defendants. Plaintiff[*416] further alleged a contractual relationship between McCollister and plaintiff. In discovery, plaintiff admitted she had absolutely no evidence that McCollister knew about, took, lost, or had any contact with her money. She further admitted she had no contact with him until approximately one month after the alleged loss of money.

The only issue before this court is whether McCollister is potentially liable for the loss by virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior. McCollister was the chief staff attorney and executive director of the Legal Aid Society. He did not have an attorney-client relationship with plaintiff, nor is there any evidence to connect him directly with the loss. The only possible source of liability is through the doctrine of respondeat superior, which we believe is inapplicable. As stated in McFeeters v. Renollet, 210 Kan. 158, 161, 500 P.2d 47 (1972), “[A] director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts by reason of his official character.”

The universal legal rule is that a servant or other agent is not liable for the dereliction of a fellow worker or agent under agency principles. The reporter’s notes in the Appendix to Restatement (Second) of Agency § 358 (1958) state:

“The cases are unanimous in holding that a servant or other agent is not liable for the derelictions of fellow workers or other agents of the same principal. In the absence of wrongful directions or wrongful control or some other element involving wrongful conduct, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to agents who are not masters. On the other hand, the rule stated herein should be contrasted with the rule with reference to the liability of an agent or servant for his subagents or subservants, as stated in § 362. . . (p. 602.)

Plaintiff also argues McCollister is liable because of the fact he is an attorney and is jointly liable for the acts of his fellow attorneys, citing the professional corporation law of Kansas, K.S.A. 17-2706, et seq. The argument has no merit. Defendant was an employee of the Legal Aid Society, a nonprofit corporation, and as such the professional corporation act applicable to attorneys does not apply.

Further arguments of plaintiff have been considered and are held to be without merit.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.