respondeat superior doctrine in Massachusetts

2017"The test for determining whether an individual is a public employee is the same as that used to establish 'whether an agent is a servant for whose negligent acts a principal may be liable under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.' " McNamara v. Honeyman , 406 Mass. 43 , 48 (1989), quoting from Kelley v. Rossi , 395 Mass. 659 , 661 (1985).

2002The Supreme Judicial Court has declared that the legal principles are the same in both these contexts: “The legal principles that govern the determination of whether the doctor was a "public employee" of the city and, therefore, freed from liability to the plaintiff by G.L.c. 258, §2, are the same as those that have determined whether an agent is a servant for whose negligent acts a principal may be liable under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior." Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. at 661 .

2017"The test for determining whether an individual is a public employee is the same as that used to establish 'whether an agent is a servant for whose negligent acts a principal may be liable under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.' " McNamara v. Honeyman , 406 Mass. 43 , 48 (1989), quoting from Kelley v. Rossi , 395 Mass. 659 , 661 (1985).

2011Turning to the case now before the court, Dr. Patnaude returns to the frequently stated proposition that “[t]he test for determining whether an individual is a public employee is the same as that used to establish whether an agent is a servant for whose negligent acts a principal may be liable under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.” McNamara, 406 Mass. at 48 (internal quotations omitted).

1994Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to §1983 actions, Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2266 (1991), Priestly must prove that Baran and Henderson, as supervisors, performed acts or omissions which “affirmatively link” them to the acts of the offending employee.

1993Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1990).

2023Assocs., 438 Mass. 317, 319-20 (2002) ("Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 'an employer . . . should be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employee, or servant, committed within the scope of employment'").

2018Similarly, the master who must put an instrument into his servant's hands in order to get his business done ... must also bear the loss if the servant causes harm to a stranger in the use of that instrument as the business is transacted." (Citations omitted.) See also Dias , 438 Mass. at 320 , 780 N.E.2d 447 ("The doctrine of respondeat superior in the Commonwealth ... evolved to place the burden of liability on the party better able to bear that burden"); GTE Prods.

2002Therefore, in both these contexts, the appellate courts of Massachusetts have asked essentially the same question — who, if anyone, “had power of control or direction over the professional conduct of the physician.” Kapp v. Ballantine, 380 Mass. 186, 195 (1980) (determining whether hospital was vicariously liable for electric shock therapy conducted by doctors on staff of the hospital).

1999The term doctor-patient relationship (as a predicate for the applicability of § 60B) crept into the law, it appears, in Kapp v. Ballantine, 380 Mass. 186, 193 (1980), where — in a case which did not turn on the issue — we summarized the law as follows: “A plaintiff’s offer of proof as to negligence will prevail before a malpractice tribunal, under the Little directed-verdict test, (1) if a doctor-patient relationship is shown, (2) if there is evidence that the doctor’s performance did not conform to good medical practice, and (3) if damage resulted therefrom.” We offered as authority Little v.

1999According to the Alves court, “[t]he town was not liable for the acts of its officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the immunity of the town implied immunity of its board of selectmen, and the members of the board were not personally liable for the acts of town employees.” Id. at 58 , quoting Oeschger v. Fitzgerald, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 472, 474 (1974).

1980Oeschger v. Fitzgerald, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474 (1974). *59 The complaint did not allege any acts of misfeasance on the part of the defendants Moore and Phillips.

1999The insurer moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) or for a new trial, on the strength of Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481-484 (1991), which held that, where a defendant principal is liable to an injured plaintiff only derivatively, i.e., by reason of the negligent actions of its agent and pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, a general release given in separate settlement by the plaintiff to the agent precludes any further action against the principal.

1994See Elias, supra at 483 .

1986Trum v. Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 438 (1952).

1972Trum v. Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 438 .

2017"The basic question is whether a person is subject to the direction and control of a public employer." Williams v. Hartman , 413 Mass. 398 , 400 (1992), quoting from Smith v. Steinberg , 395 Mass. 666 , 667 (1985).

2001In the case of a physician, the court examines whether a public employer directs and controls the physician’s treatment of the patient. 5 See McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. at 48; Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. at 669.

1974Moynihan v. Todd, 188 Mass. 301, 304-305 (1905).

1925While it is reasonable that these individuals should be held liable for their negligence to anyone injured by it, (see Moynihan v. Todd, 188 Mass. 301 ,) it is not thought to be reasonable that a municipality or a public officer, who is engaged upon a public work conducted for the benefit of the people and not for gain, should be held hable for the negligence of his [its]' servants or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Kerr v. Brookline, 208 Mass. 190, 191 .

2024See Id. at 216; accord Silverwood Partners, LLC v. Wellness Partners, LLC, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 856 , 861–862 (2017).

2013See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 9-11 (1985); Hohenleitner v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc., 435 Mass. 424, 431-432 (2001). 10 By contrast, “[generally speaking, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm caused to another by the independent contractor’s negligence, except where the employer retained some control over the manner in which the work was performed.” Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut.

2013See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 9-11 (1985); Hohenleitner v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc., 435 Mass. 424, 431-432 (2001). 10 By contrast, “[generally speaking, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm caused to another by the independent contractor’s negligence, except where the employer retained some control over the manner in which the work was performed.” Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut.

2011See Zimmerman, 441 Mass. at 150 .

2009Petrell v. Shaw, 453 Mass. 377, 384 (2009).

1998Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 398 Mass. 854, 859-60 (1986); Restatement 2d of Agency, §228 (1958).

1998See Vicarelli v. Business Intern., Inc., 973 F.Supp. 241, 247 (D.Mass. 1997).

1995See Doe v. Bland-ford, 402 Mass. 831 (1988).

1994Contrast Taplin v. Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 3 (1983) (agent’s statutory immunity does not extend to principal against whom liability is sought under the doctrine of respondeat superior).

1992While liability can be imposed upon the defendants- in their individual capacities under § 1983 based on their official acts, Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 364 (1991), it must be based on their own acts or omissions amounting at the least to reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others and not on acts or omissions of others under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1990Roach v. Hinchcliff, 214 Mass. 267, 270 (1913), see also G.Lc. 203, §14A.

1983See *4 O’Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 301 Mass. 145, 147 (1938) (intrafamily immunity did not protect negligent family member’s employer from liability); Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 553 (1937) (same); Raynor v. Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 121 (1938) (statutory immunity of municipal employee did not free city from liability); Maynard v. Madison, 101 Wis. 2d 273, 283 (1981) (same); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 (b) (1958).