Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906 (Ga. 1992). · Go Syfert
Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906 (Ga. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
199 citation events (186 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: HERRING v. CITY OF THOMASVILLE (gamd, 2020-07-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) HERRING v. CITY OF THOMASVILLE (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
M.D. Ga. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the county commission has the power and the duty to issue a budget.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) MONCUS v. LASALLE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC D/B/A LASALLE CORRECTIONS (2×)
M.D. Ga. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the county commission has the power and the duty to issue a budget.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Michael Leslie Lake v. Michael Skelton (4×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
11th Cir. · 2016 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
ajlthough the county commission has the power and the duty to issue a budget, the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties
cited Cited as authority (rule) Langston Austin v. Glynn County, Georgia
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
While a county “may remove some funds from a sheriff’s budget,” it may not remove “all funds.” Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Ga. 1992) (emphasis in original).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Langston Austin v. Glynn County, Georgia
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
While a county “may remove some funds from a sheriff’s budget,” it may not remove “all funds.” Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Ga. 1992) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oqueshia Andrews v. Carmel Biggers, Jr. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Chaffin v. Calhoun, 415 S.E.2d 906, 907 (Ga. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michelle Keene v. Chris Pine
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
That is why a county commission has the ability under state law unilaterally to cut the sheriffs budget, even though the cut represents “a substantial portion of the Sheriffs budget and will reduce the Sheriffs law enforcement capability,” Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202 , 415 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1992), and indeed even to the point where layoffs become necessary, Wilson, 396 S.E.2d at 904-05 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Channell v. Houston
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
See Bd. of Commrs. of Dougherty County v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 176-178 (1) ( 598 SE2d 437 ) (2004); Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Board of Commissioners v. Stewart
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
Although the board sets the sheriffs budget, it cannot “ ‘dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties.’ Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992).” Hill, supra at 16, 17 (1) (a).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Powell v. Barrett
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See id. at 1323; see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 791 , 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1740 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997) (“The county’s payment of the sheriffs salary does not translate into control over [the sheriff], since the county neither has the authority to change [the sheriffs] salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely.”); Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202 , 415 S.E.2d 906, 907-08 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The Board sets the Sheriffs budget but “may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of *17 his duties.” Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992). “[T]he Constitution has made the sheriff independent from the County, notwithstanding thé designation of the sheriff as a county officer.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Brown, 276 Ga. App. at 856 (1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Satilla Health Services, Inc. v. Bell
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
OCGA § 9-5-8.” Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 204 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992). “[A] trial court’s discretion in granting or denying an injunction will not be disturbed on appeal as an abuse of discretion unless there was no evidence upon which to base the ruling or it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law.” (Citation omitted.) Atlanta Area Broadcasting v. James Brown Enterprises, 263 Ga. App. 388, 393 ( 587 SE2d 853 ) (2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Dorsey
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Thus, the sheriff was held entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from a § 1983 suit brought by an inmate who alleged excessive use of force; the county was not party to the appeal. 24 Grech, supra at 1347 (V) (A). 25 Bd. of Commrs. of Dougherty County v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176,177 (1) ( 598 SE2d 437 ) (2004), citing Wilson, supra. Accord Mayo v. Fulton County, 220 Ga. App. 825 (1) ( 470 SE2d 258 ) (1996). 26 (Punctuation omitted.) Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992), citing OCGA§ 15-16-10 (a) (8) and Wolfe v. Huff, 232 Ga. 44, 45 ( 205 SE2d 254 ) (1974). 27 Chaffin, sup…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Grech v. Clayton County, GA (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
In Chaffin , the county, over the sheriff's objection, shifted the responsibility for patrolling and drug enforcement to the new county police department and reduced the sheriff's budget by forty-seven percent. 262 Ga. at 202, 204 , 415 S.E.2d 906 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorsey v. Adams
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Because there was no finding of contempt against the sheriff, we will not consider his brief in this appeal from the contempt order against the county. 2 See OCGA § 15-16-10; Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992). 3 In re Brant, 230 Ga. App. 283, 284 (1) ( 496 SE2d 321 ) (1998). 4 R.R.R.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Manders v. Lee (3×)
11th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Bd. of Comm’rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 482 , 396 S.E.2d 903, 903 (1990) (“The sheriff ... is an elected, constitutional officer; he is subject to the charge of the General Assembly and is not an employee of the county commission.”); Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 , 415 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1992); Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 499 , 202 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1973).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Willie Santonio Manders v. Thurman Lee (8×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Bd. of Comm'rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 482 , 396 S.E.2d 903, 903 (1990) ("The sheriff ... is an elected, constitutional officer; he is subject to the charge of the General Assembly and is not an employee of the county commission."); Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 , 415 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1992); Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 499 , 202 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1973). 45 The Georgia Constitution also prevents county governing authorities from taking any action affecting the sheriff's elective county office.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Boswell v. Bramlett
Ga. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Griffies, 272 Ga. at 508 ; Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Griffies v. Coweta County
Ga. · 2000 · confidence medium
Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Patrick Middleton (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
III (b) (2) (“Unless otherwise provided by law . . . [n]o municipality may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [e.g., police protection] or provide any service listed therein outside its own boundaries except by contract with the county or municipality affected.”). 9 Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 644 (2) ( 419 SE2d 922 ) (1992); see Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992) (explaining that duties of the sheriff are defined in OCGA § 15-16-10, and include not only the enumerated duties 6 effecting the proper discharge of his dutie…
examined Cited "see" Willie Santonio Manders v. Thurman Lee (5×)
11th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
Bd. of Comm'rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 482 , 396 S.E.2d 903 (1990) ("The sheriff ... is an elected, constitutional officer; he is subject to the charge of the General Assembly and is not an employee of the county commission."); see Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203 , 415 S.E.2d 906 (1992); Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 499-500 , 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973). 27 In contrast to the State's authority and control over sheriffs, Georgia's Constitution grants counties no legislative power or authority over sheriffs and expressly prevents counties from controlling or affecting the she…
discussed Cited "see" Covington v. D. L. Pimper Group, Inc. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
OCGA § 9-5-8; see Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 204 ( 415 SE2d 906 ) (1992).
discussed Cited "see" Covington v. DL Pimper Group, Inc. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
NOTES [1] (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. Sermons, 236 Ga. 400 , 223 S.E.2d 816 (1976); see Parker v. Clary Lakes Recreation Assn., 272 Ga. 44, 45 , 526 S.E.2d 838 (2000). [2] OCGA § 9-5-8; see Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 204 , 415 S.E.2d 906 (1992). [3] Id.; Wilson, supra. [4] (Citations omitted.) Ledbetter Bros., Inc. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22, 23 (2), 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976). [5] Reardigan v. Shaw Indus., 238 Ga.App. 142, 143 (1), 518 S.E.2d 144 (1999). [6] They do not argue that the covenant is overbroad in either its duration or its territorial coverage. [7] 234 Ga.App. 833, 834-835 …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CHAFFIN Et Al.
v.
CALHOUN Et Al.
S92A0012.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 6, 1992.
415 S.E.2d 906
1992 Ga. LEXIS 417
Herbert Shafer, Crumbley & Crumbley, Wade M. Crumbley, for appellants., Blount & Renehan, Ernest D. Blount, Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Jack G. Slover, Jr., Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Charles W. Byrd, for appellees.
Clarke, Bell, Hunt, Benham, Fletcher, Sears-Collins, Weltner.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 71%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (1)
Clarke, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory injunction requiring the Sheriff of Henry County to cooperate in the implementation of a plan to transfer personnel and equipment to the newly created county police department. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

In January of 1991, the Henry County Commissioners voted to create a county police department. [1] At that time the Sheriff employed about 125 employees, but was seeking funds to increase his force to 149. The County Commissioners wanted to shift the responsibility for patrolling and drug enforcement to the new county police department. The Commissioners drafted a budget that reduced rather than increased the Sheriff’s budget. The Commissioners then set out a plan to transfer certain personnel and equipment to the new police department. The Sheriff refused to cooperate with the plan. The Commissioners filed an action seeking injunctive relief. After a hearing the trial court found that the Sheriff could reasonably discharge his duties with the budget and staff provided. The trial court then granted an interlocutory injunction requiring the Sheriff to cooperate in the[*203] implementation of the County Commissioners’ plan. This appeal followed.

In this appeal the Sheriff contends that the County Commissioners have attempted to take all law enforcement responsibility away from the sheriff’s office. He concedes that the County Commissioners have the power to create a police department, but points out that they have no power to divest the Sheriff’s office of all law enforcement responsibilities. The Commissioners respond that, given the evidence presented, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the Sheriff retains law enforcement responsibility and capability under the new budget and that the transfers of personnel and equipment were necessary to avoid duplication of effort and expense. The Commissioners argue that the trial court below properly determined that the Commissioners did not abuse their discretion in setting the budget and reallocating equipment.

Sheriff Chaffin is an elected, constitutional officer. Article IX, Sec. I, Par. III (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. His statutory duties are defined in OCGA § 15-16-10, and include not only the enumerated duties such as maintaining the jail and serving warrants, but also those duties that “necessarily appertain to his office,” such as the power to make arrests, to maintain the peace and to enforce the law. OCGA § 15-16-10 (a) (8); Wolfe v. Huff, 232 Ga. 44 (205 SE2d 254) (1974) (Wolfe I). The sheriff is not an employee of the county commission. Board of Commrs. of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482 (396 SE2d 903) (1990). And although the county commission has the power and the duty to issue a budget, the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties.

In Wolfe I, supra, this court upheld the power of the county commission to create a county police force. The case held, however, that the “commissioners could not divest the sheriff of his power and duty to enforce the laws and preserve the peace.” Id. at 45. After remand, the county commissioners removed from the sheriff’s proposed budget all funds for law enforcement purposes. Justice Nichols wrote that the commissioners could not “do indirectly, by the exercise of their fiscal authority and their control of the county property, that which they could not do directly.” Wolfe v. Huff, 233 Ga 162, 164 (210 SE2d 699) (1974) (Wolfe II). The court held that “the commissioners were under a duty to adopt a budget making reasonable and adequate provision for the personnel and equipment necessary to enable the sheriff to perform his duties of enforcing the law and preserving the peace.” This does not mean, however, that county commissioners must approve the budget that a sheriff proposes. In Randolph, supra, we affirmed the power of the county commissioners to cut the sheriffs budget, even though the budget cut would probably require the sher[*204] iff to lay-off one of his five deputies. In other words, the commissioners may remove some funds from a sheriff’s budget that are required for law enforcement purposes, but not all funds, and may not divest the sheriff of his law enforcement power and duty. The budget must be reasonable under all of the circumstances and must provide reasonably sufficient funds to allow the sheriff to discharge his legal duties.

Decided May 6, 1992. Herbert Shafer, Crumbley & Crumbley, Wade M. Crumbley, for appellants. Blount & Renehan, Ernest D. Blount, Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Jack G. Slover, Jr., Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Charles W. Byrd, for appellees.

Here, the commissioners have removed about 47 percent of the sheriff’s budget. Although this is a substantial portion of the Sheriff’s budget and will reduce the Sheriff’s law enforcement capability, the trial court found that the budget is sufficient to allow the Sheriff to perform his duties. On the record before the court, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous. The trial court considered all of the evidence and applied the correct standard. Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction. OCGA § 9-5-8. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s entry of injunctive relief, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed.

Clarke, C. J., Bell, Hunt, Benham, Fletcher, Sears-Collins, JJ., and Judge Phillip R. West concur. Weltner, P. J., disqualified.
1

Under a statute passed in the 1992 legislative session, future actions to create a county police department will require ratification by popular vote. See OCGA § 36-8-1.