Eddie J. Thomas was convicted of three counts of forcible rape and two counts of forcible sodomy in 1982. His victims were children. Thomas was sentenced to twenty-three years imprisonment, of which he served seventeen. He was scheduled to be released from prison and placed on parole on July 14, 1999. On July 13, 1999, the State filed a petition to commit Thomas to the Missouri Department of Mental Health pursuant to Missouri’s sexual predator law, sections 632.480 et seq., RSMo Supp. 1999.

Desi Edwards was convicted of rape in 1989. His victim was a child. Edwards was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He was released on parole in 1997. In January 1998, Edwards was returned to prison after violating his parole by using alcohol and failing to pay fees. On November 24, 1999, the State filed a petition to commit Edwards to the Missouri Department of Mental Health pursuant to Missouri’s sexual predator law, sections 632.480 et seq., RSMo Supp.1999.

At trial, juries found against Thomas and Edwards using verdict directors that read, in relevant part, as follows:

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

[[Image here]]

Third, that the respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, and Fourth, that as a result of this abnormality the respondent is more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if he is not confined in a secure facility, then you will find respondent is a sexually violent predator.

[[Image here]]

As used in this instruction, “mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.

As used in this instruction, “predatory” means acts directed towards strangers or individuals with whom relationships have been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.

Thomas and Edwards both challenge the constitutionality of sections 632.480 et seq. and the validity of the instructions under which they were each committed. Their claims are controlled by two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), that addressed Kansas’ sexual predator law.

For all relevant purposes, the Kansas and the Missouri sexual predator statutes are the same. Both provide for the continued civil commitment of sexually violent predators. A “sexually violent predator” is defined in both statutory schemes as a “person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in ... acts of sexual violence.... ” And both statutes define “mental abnormality” as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.” Section 632.480, RSMo; section 59-29a01 K.S.A. et seq. (2001 Supp.).

[*791] In Hendricks, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the Kansas statute violated Hendricks’ right to substantive due process. Reversing, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute against Hendricks’ due process challenge as well as against challenges made on the grounds of double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking. The United States Supreme Court did not address any instructional issue, but stated:

The mental health professionals who evaluated Hendricks diagnosed him as suffering from pedophilia, a condition the psychiatric profession itself classifies as a serious mental disorder. Hendricks even conceded that when he becomes “stressed out,” he cannot “control the urge” to molest children. This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings. Hendricks’ diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a “mental abnormality” under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process purposes.

521 U.S. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citations omitted).

In Crane, the Kansas Supreme Court again reversed a trial court commitment pursuant to the Kansas sexual predator act on the basis that Hendricks required a finding that a dangerous individual be completely unable to control his behavior. Holding that such a reading of Hendricks was overly restrictive, the United States Supreme Court explained that:

... [In Hendricks] we did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case, (emphasis supplied) 534 U.S. at 870, 122 S.C. 867, 870, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (emphasis supplied).

Both Hendricks and Crane make clear that sexual predator statutes as enacted in Kansas and Missouri are constitutional so long as the mental abnormality causes the individual “serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.” Accordingly, to be constitutional under Crane, the instruction must require that the “degree”^[1] to which the person cannot control his behavior is “serious difficulty”.^[2] Although the instructions used below required findings that “the respondent is more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if he is not confined”, this is not enough because they did not require the juries to “distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality[*792] or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist”.^[3]

While there was sufficient evidence in both these cases to justify a finding of “serious difficulty” in controlling the appellants’ behavior, the instructions given in these two cases did not define mental abnormality in this essential way. The record in neither ease establishes that this issue was beyond contest. To comply with Crane, the instruction defining mental abnormality must read as follows:

As used in this instruction, “mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.

Accordingly, the judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded for new trials as required by Crane.