At page 840 Determining when a traffic stop becomes unreasonable18 citing casesholding that a constitutional violation occurred when the officer issued the motorist a citation, was denied permission to search the trunk of the motorist’s vehicle, sent for a drug sniffing dog, and used the dog to detect drugs in the trunk
- State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Ryan Flood, No. M2019-00525-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2020).publishedTenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-201 (a)(1); State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Ziberia Carero, No. E2018000684-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2020).publishedA traffic stop may be “unreasonable” if the “‘time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters.’” State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001)…
- State of Tennessee v. Antoinette Feaster, No. M2009-01284-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2010).publishedThe Defendant relies heavily on State v. Morelock, in which we suggested that an officer should have “obtained [the defendant’s] signature on the citation and sent him on his way” in lieu of extending the defendant’s detention for the purp…
- State of Tennessee v. Melvin Jerome Reed, Jr., No. M2008-01850-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2009).publishedA traffic stop may be deemed “unreasonable” if the “‘time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters.’” State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir…
- State of Tennessee v. Kenneth L. Davis, No. W2008-00226-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2009).publishedThe Defendant cites to State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn.1992), seemingly for the proposition that, following the issuance of the citation by Officer Barnes, the Defendant’s continued custody immediately became unreasonable.
- State of Tennessee v. Triston Lee Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).published (holding that a constitutional violation occurred when the officer issued the motorist a citation, was denied permission to search the trunk of the motorist’s vehicle, sent for a drug sniffing dog, and used the dog to de…)
- State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174 (Tenn. 2005).publishedA traffic stop may be deemed “unreasonable,” if the “ ‘time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters.’” Troxell, 78 S.W.3d at 871 (quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir.2001) and citing Stat…
- State of Tennessee v. Calvin T. Barham, No. W2002-00246-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2002).published(a prolonged and extended traffic stop can result in the invalidation of consent)
- State v. Elpidio Valdez, No. M1999-00791-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2000).publishedHere, the Defendant argues that this “routine traffic stop” was “prolonged and extended to the point that the detention, reasonable in the beginning, became unreasonable toward the end.” State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Mechelle L. Montgomery, No. M2013-01149-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2014).publishedAn otherwise reasonable stop may become unreasonable “‘if the time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters.’” State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564…
Show 8 more citing cases
- State of Tennessee v. Mario Jones, No. E2011-00123-CCA-MR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2012).publishedState v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2002)(quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Eugene Taylor, No. E2010-01817-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2011).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Lloyd Andra Webb, No. E2009-02135-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2011).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Harry Richard, No. W2008-02458-CCA- R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2010).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Landon McConaughy, No. W2008-01645-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2010).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Hammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2006).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State of Tennessee v. Orson Wendell Hudson, No. M2004-00077-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2005).publishedUnited States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim.
- State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2002).published Otherwise a reasonable traffic stop can become unreasonable and constitutionally invalid “if the time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters.” United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir.2001); see also…
v.
David S. MORELOCK, Appellee
OPINION
BIRCH, Judge.Pursuant to Rule 3(c), Tenn.R.App.P., the State of Tennessee appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Robertson County finding unconstitutional the warrantless search of a car driven by David S. Morelock, the defendant, and ordering that the large quantity of marijuana seized as a result thereof be suppressed as evidence. The judgment must be affirmed.
I
The record of the suppression hearing establishes that Mark Norrod, a state trooper, observed a car speeding north on Interstate 65 at about 3 a.m. At the time, Norrod was travelling in the opposite direction; he turned around, pursued, and stopped the ear.
[*839] Morelock was the sole occupant. Norrod requested his driver’s license, but Morelock was unable to show one. Norrod learned, nevertheless, that Morelock’s Georgia license was valid, and that he was not a fugitive. Norrod then prepared two citations, one for exceeding the speed limit and the other for failing to exhibit a valid driver’s license.
Although their business had ended, Nor-rod continued to detain Morelock and press his investigation. He asked Morelock for permission to search the passenger compartment of the car; Morelock concedes, on appeal, that he consented. Even so, Nor-rod failed to find any evidence that would incriminate Morelock.
Norrod persisted, and the following conversation occurred:
NORROD: You are not carrying any drugs or weapons in the car are you?
MORELOCK: No, sir.
NORROD: You mind if I look in the car?
MORELOCK: Well, no it don’t make any difference.
NORROD: You do not mind if I look in?
MORELOCK: I got Christmas presents and stuff like that ...
NORROD: OK, have you got your keys and everything?
MORELOCK: Yeh, they’re in there.
NORROD: Your keys are in the car?
MORELOCK: Yeh, uh huh (indicating yes by sound).
NORROD: OK.
PERIOD OF SILENCE AND TAPE IS CUT OFF
TAPE CUTS BACK ON
NORROD: You mind opening the trunk up?
MORELOCK: You’ve got the keys because they’re not in the car.
NORROD: They’re right here in your back pocket, there.
MORELOCK: No, yeah, I mind. You probably need a search warrant to.
NORROD: Not if you give me permission.
MORELOCK: Well ... there’s no reason to search ... you know, because you have already searched the car.
NORROD: Pardon me?
MORELOCK: There is no reason to search the car is it?
NORROD: Well, you gave me consent to look up front, you don’t want to open the trunk?
MORELOCK: Well, I mean anything that is not ... you know ... locked or anything like that, I’d rather ...
NORROD: You don’t want me to look in the trunk?
MORELOCK: Well, I don’t have anything in there that I don’t want you to see, but I mean its just no [sic] right.
NORROD: Well, I understand that, I understand that, but if you don’t want to let us look in the trunk, that’s alright, but we are going to go ahead and look up front here. But, I want you to understand something. I’m not trying to put any fear and coercion into you, but right now as soon as I get through searching this car, you’re going to be free to go, okay. You’re free to go, but I’m going to hold the car until I get a drug dog up here? Okay?
MORELOCK: Oh, that’s fine, yeh.
NORROD: If that’s the way you want to do it. You know, that’s up to you, okay?
MORELOCK: Yeah, that’s fine.
NORROD: You want me to get a drug dog?
MORELOCK: Well, whatever, yeh, that’s fine.
NORROD: We’re going to take a look up front, you stand around in here for these officers.
MORELOCK: Could I get some cigarettes?
NORROD: You stand around in here.
The dog soon arrived; with Norrod and the dog’s handler assisting, the dog was permitted to “search” the car. The search resulted in the discovery of over 250 pounds of green plant material in the trunk and rear seat of the car.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that the search of the trunk was conducted without probable cause and held[*840] that the seizure of the items from it was therefore unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Tennessee Constitution.
II
We review to determine whether the evidence contained in the record preponderates against the judgment of the trial court, and we must reverse the judgment should the evidence so preponderate.
III
As a preliminary matter, the State of Tennessee questioned the defendant’s “standing.” The uncontradicted proof showed that the defendant had permission to drive the car, which had been leased by his brother. The trial court found that the defendant had standing; this ruling was eminently correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991).
Our laws provide that when a law enforcement officer stops a person for a speeding offense, the officer shall issue a traffic citation to such a person in lieu of arrest, continued custody and the taking of the arrested person before a magistrate. T.C.A. § 55-10-207(a)(l). Admittedly, Nor-rod was justified in stopping Morelock for the traffic violation. However, Norrod could have obtained Morelock’s signature on the citation and sent him on his way.
Furthermore, even if Norrod chose not to allow Morelock to resume his journey without a driver’s license in his immediate possession, which would itself have been a violation, [1] he could have directed Morelock to lock the car and leave it parked until another person could legally drive it away. Alternatively, should Nor-rod have concluded that the car constituted a traffic hazard, he could have ordered the car towed. So what we have here is a routine traffic stop prolonged and extended to the point that the detention, reasonable in the beginning, became unreasonable toward the end.
On appeal, the State of Tennessee insists that the search accomplished with the dog’s assistance was merely an extension of the initial consent search and valid for that reason. What the state misapprehends, however, is that even were we to assume that the defendant consented to the initial search, the character of his detention had changed in the meantime from reasonable to unreasonable.
On this point we think the case of State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn.Crim. App.1989) is controlling. In Coleman, our court invalidated a search which was based on consent obtained during the time the defendant was being unreasonably detained.
Therefore, under Coleman, the suppression of the property seized by virtue of this invalid consent was proper. See also Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Thus, because the State of Tennessee has not demonstrated the evidentiary preponderance it asserts, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed.
On a final note, the trial court did not dismiss the indictment, nor has the state suggested that the trial judge’s ruling has the substantive effect of dismissal of the indictment as is required by Rule 3(c), Tenn.R.App.P. Such effect is, nevertheless, inferable on the record. Consequently, we have addressed the merits of the issue in the interest of judicial economy. See Tenn.R.App.P. 2.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the indictment.
BYERS, P.J., and JONES, J., concur.. T.C.A. § 55-50-351(a).